

JAMES W. SPAIN

**THE PATHAN
BORDERLAND**

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by

JAMES W. SPAIN

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FOR
MY MOTHER AND FATHER

PREFACE

This study is intended to be of interest primarily to students, be they casual or devoted, of the North-West Frontier and of the Pathans who live there. It is impossible, however, for anyone interested in the Pathans and their land not to be concerned, as they are themselves, with the role the borderland plays on the broader scene of world affairs. "The Great Game" of Kipling's day is by no means ended. It still provides for any number of players and an infinite variety of gambits.

In attempting to touch on all that concerns the Frontier, I have not tried to set local developments continuously in the context of world affairs but merely to introduce vignettes of those aspects of international affairs which have had and are having a major effect on the Frontier and its people.

Even so, it has been necessary to deal with much of the material in summary form and to venture into such fields as anthropology, sociology, and psychology, for which I have little taste and perhaps less competency. Finally, this book was written in bits and pieces over a period of more than five years and almost four more will have passed between the time of its completion and its actual appearance in print.

Perhaps the most significant thing to be said about the book is that it is by an American. So far as I am aware it is the only work to deal comprehensively with the Frontier which has yet come from such a hand. Let me temper what may appear to be simple chauvinism by explaining that I mean no more than that it was written by a third party, one who has never had a vested interest in any of the various struggles, Russian versus British, British versus Pathan, Pakistani versus Afghan, which comprise so large a part of the history of the Frontier.

Detachment — whether or not it has been achieved here — is rare in the literature of the Frontier. The always fluent British have contributed enormously to that literature. Many of them have written as the de-

fenders of progress and civilization in India and the world against the charming but barbarous Pathans and the ever-sinister Russians. Some Englishmen have succumbed to the barbarous charm and written to defend "their" Pathans against a dense and indifferent government in Calcutta, New Delhi, or London, but even these have been deeply involved personally in the struggles of the Frontier. The few Pathans who have spoken to the world on behalf of their people have usually been concerned with scoring in old feuds or provoking new ones. None of them have had a good word for the British.

What I have tried to project in these pages is a deep interest in the Frontier which began a decade ago during an assignment at the American Embassy in Karachi and has continued since that time through several subsequent visits. A generous grant from the Ford Foundation in 1953-55 made possible research in the India Office Library in London, as well as at the Public Record Office, the British Museum, and Oxford and Cambridge Universities. The Ford Grant also provided the opportunity for several additional months of study in the Frontier area (some of them as resident in a Pathan village), for search of official records in Lahore and Peshawar, and for extensive discussion with tribesmen and Pakistani government officials. A visit of several weeks to Kabul was also possible. The material collected in the field was supplemented by work in the Library of Congress, the New York Public Library, and the Columbia University Library.

While much of the work that has gone into this book was made possible by the Ford Foundation grant, the Foundation is not, of course, responsible for the accuracy of the material, the way I have presented it, or the judgements that I have made.

I am grateful also to a number of scholars and experts on the Frontier who have been unfailingly helpful and courteous to me. This is true particularly of the many political leaders, government officials, and tribesmen in both Pakistan and Afghanistan who gave freely of their time and unique knowledge. Notable among them are Saadullah Khan, the late Ataullahjan Khan of the Civil Service of Pakistan, and Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Advocate General in Peshawar, all of whom have long served on the Frontier, and Muhammad Aslam Khan Khattak of Pakistan's Foreign Service. For the warm hospitality which made their house a second home for me during several visits, I owe much to Abdul Satar Khan and Jamshed Khan of Takht-i-Bhai. These men have over the years encouraged my interest in the Frontier, corrected my mistakes, and suggested new fields for investigation. In doing so they have con-

tributed greatly to the production of this work, though they must be held as innocent as the Ford Foundation of any responsibility for the final results.

In the broader field of scholarship, I am deeply indebted to Professors Schuyler C. Wallace and J. C. Hurewitz of the School of International Affairs of Columbia University, whose encouragement and guidance were a major factor in the production of this book, and to Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, whose scholarship and deep knowledge of Muslim India, freely made available, were of great value to me in attempting to keep the story of the Pathans in perspective.

Finally, there is my wife, who not only scanned dusty bookshelves and edited smudgy manuscripts, but eagerly and valiantly followed me through the narrowest streets of Peshawar and up the steepest slopes of the Khyber hills, pointing out with discriminating and unerring feminine eye the important "little things" past which I sometimes charged precipitously. She alone has been rash and devoted enough to waive any disclaimer for the form and substance of this book.

Washington, D.C.
September, 1961

J. W. SPAIN

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INTRODUCTION

Before beginning to look closely at the Pathans, or Pukhtuns, or Afghans, as they more usually call themselves, it is well to emphasize that they are no obscure aborigines recently discovered in the depths of Africa or a remote corner of Australasia. Theirs is probably the largest and most vital tribal society remaining in the world. There are about eleven million Pathans, roughly half of whom live in Pakistan and half in Afghanistan. (As a point of comparison, there are about half as many Kurds.) Considerably more than half of the Pathans, probably as many as seven or eight million, still live in a rigidly tribal social structure. While the other three or four million have been to a greater or lesser degree subject to outside forms of social and political organization, they too participate in a common culture and language, and for the most part retain a knowledge of their tribal connection which makes for consciousness of a common identity. The whole group is highly homogeneous, and the attitudes and reactions of the most highly-educated Pathan are likely to be virtually identical to those of the least sophisticated.

The Pathans have their own history, almost a thousand years old, their own literature, poets, and scholars, their own heroes who were major figures in Asian history. Even today, men of their blood hold high places beyond the confines of the Frontier: the Afghan royal family are Muhammadzai Durrani; the President of Pakistan and most of the top officers of the Pakistani army are Pathans.

There are men sitting quietly in their villages on the Frontier at this moment who have fought the Germans and the Turks in World War I, the Bolsheviks in Russia after World War I, and the Italians and Japanese in World War II. There are men who have been decorated by Queen Victoria and honored by Lenin. There are men who have killed senior British officers and who have helped crown a king in Kabul.

For one who comes first to the Frontier, as the author did, nurtured

on the exotic imagery and romance of Kipling's stories and ballads, a wonderful surprise awaits. It is all true! Tall, bearded tribesmen stride through the narrow streets of Peshawar with an arrogant lilt, rifles on their shoulders, daggers in their neckbands. Along the crumbling walls of the city stand the ancient *serais* where the great caravans from Bokhara, Samarkand, and Kashgar once unloaded.

The bazaars are still piled high with exotic merchandise: red and gold slippers, brass and copper vessels, enameled daggers, golden turbans, and all the multi-colored spices of the East. The dazzling white of the minarets of the mosque of Mahabat Khan is reflected in earrings and bangles in the dusty street of the silversmiths. One feels that Tamerlane might ride by and not notice the passage of five centuries.

On a trip through the Khyber, the visitor is carefully inspected at Fort Jamrud, where the great Sikh General Hari Singh met his death at Pathan hands, and then, if he has obtained proper authorization, he is allowed to proceed up the narrow defile still bristling with forts and gun emplacements. At the Afghan border, while enjoying a cup of fragrant green tea, he is joined by a group of smiling Russians, wearing the high fur caps of Central Asia, who are passing from Afghanistan to Pakistan on unknown business.

In Waziristan, when the traveler joins the political agent for a trip out of the heavily fortified cantonments, an escort guard of quietly deadly scouts, rifles at the ready, falls in ahead, behind, and on the flanks of the party. The movements of the group are carefully timed to bring it back within the walls of a fort before darkness falls and the gates of the villages and cantonments are barred for the night.

Throughout there is danger and excitement in the air, and yet, today, enough security that all but the most craven visitor can relish his experiences without undue preoccupation with his skin. What better way to enjoy romance and adventure!

There is a second stage that sets in after a while with most visitors from today's socially and economically conscious world. The admiring outsider becomes acutely aware that there is another side to the picture: the poverty and ignorance of the bulk of the people, manifested in widespread tuberculosis, glaucoma, and infant mortality; the severe and senseless restrictions placed on women by the rigid *purdah* system; the avarice and vice of many of the men, their braggadocio and exaggerated threats and promises; the brutal and futile blood feuds.

In this stage, the student of the Pathans congratulates himself on having taken off his rose-colored glasses. He concludes that the Pathan is

something of a fraud. He places his finger almost inevitably on the economic problem as the really important factor in the area. He feels compelled to do something "to help these people" who, beneath their tarnished veneer of romance, are among the most wretched in the world. The next step is plans for the introduction of improved pastoral methods, the development of cottage industries, the disarmament of the tribes and their resettlement on newly irrigated land on the plains.

The Pathans do have their seamy side, and such an approach is, within limits, praiseworthy and overdue. The idea of helping the Pathans was almost completely ignored in the heyday of British rule. Many British officers and administrators never looked beneath the surface and were content throughout their service on the Frontier merely to match swords and wits with the Pathans, going to their own death or defeat almost as cheerfully as they brought the same to the Pathans. The later British, such as Barton and Fraser-Tytler, were more aware of the Pathans' wretched economic condition and frequently tried to stir the Government of India to do something about it. Many Pakistani officials have embraced the idea that economic development holds the solution to the tribal problem, and, supported in recent years by a variety of foreign-aid programs, they have made considerable progress towards improving the lot of the Pathans — especially in the fields of health and education.

Most students of the Pathans stop after these two stages, satisfied that they have the balanced picture: a thin surface layer of archaic glamor, distracting only to the inexperienced observer, beneath which lies a large and squalid substructure of poverty and ignorance which must be attacked with modern methods.

Having gone through stages one and two, the writer found himself in a third stage, which has persisted to the present. The last is very like the first: The Pathan is real after all, and the traditional image of him is not far wrong. Even under close and prolonged inspection, the Pathan possesses to an extraordinary degree a high sense of personal dignity and a great love of freedom. These virtues, excellent even by modern standards, are manifested in such concepts as revenge and hospitality. However archaic and romantic these seem to the outside world, they are on the Frontier the natural expressions of an intact and living tribal society which, in its present state at least, is probably better served by them than by forms more familiar in other parts of the world. It would be too much to suggest that the Pathan is ennobled by his poverty, but it is to his credit that he refuses to trade his ideals of human dignity and freedom for an alleviation of it.

Perhaps the most convincing argument for the validity of the Pathan way of life even today is the remarkable adaptability of most of its followers. The Asian who has had intimate contact with the West and is unable to readjust to his own culture but remains an orphan in both worlds is an all too familiar figure. Few Pathans fit such a description. They appear to have a talent for making the best of both worlds. The young Pathan who has won a degree and social recognition at Oxford or Cambridge returns to his native village where his first act may be to take up the family blood feud. If he suffers psychological scars in the process, they are seldom apparent. It was probably no accident that it was for the Pathans that Kipling in the "Ballad of East and West" made the exception to his rule that ". . . never the twain shall meet".

But there is neither East nor West,
Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face,
Tho' they come from the ends of the earth.

I

THE LAND

GEOGRAPHY

The spectacular land in which the Pathans live has had a major effect on their history and their way of life. Their territory begins at the western end of the Himalayas where the mighty massif breaks up into a jumble of great peaks and ranges: the Karakoram, the Pamirs, the Hindu Kush. The main range of the Hindu Kush continues south and west, scarcely diminished in height and splendor, to divide Afghanistan into two portions. Another spur drops more directly south to become the Safed Koh Mountains which connect with the Sulaiman Range. Still further south, the Chagai Hills stretch off in a westerly direction until they fade away into the sand dunes of the Helmand desert. The mountain barrier extends for more than a thousand miles from the heart of Central Asia to the sands which border the Arabian Sea.

In 1893, Sir Mortimer Durand, on behalf of the British Government, drew a line along this rocky chain to divide India from Afghanistan. The Durand Line still separates Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakistan's North-West Frontier area lies mainly between the Durand Line on the west and the Indus River on the east. It runs roughly from 31 degrees 4 minutes to 36 degrees 57 minutes north latitude, and from 69 degrees 16 minutes to 74 degrees 7 minutes east longitude. Maximum length is slightly over 400 miles; greatest breadth is about 280 miles, although in the focal central section the mountain crest and the Indus are hardly ever 100 miles apart. The total area is approximately 39,259 square miles.

The northern boundary is the Himalayan massif where the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan separates by less than half a dozen miles the Hindu Kush from the Pamirs and Pakistan from the USSR. On the south, the area open-ends onto the Baluchistan Desert over which broods

the great final peak of the Takht-i-Sulaiman. To the east is Kashmir and the Pakistani Punjab. To the west is Afghanistan.

Politically, the area breaks down into two sections: (1) the Tribal Territory, which includes the Malakand, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan Agencies, and (2) the six Settled Districts, Hazara, Mardan, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. The Tribal Territory, which lies along the Durand Line, covers 25,140 square miles; the Districts, which are adjacent to the Indus, 14,119 square miles.¹

Geographically, the area falls into three slightly different divisions: (1) Hazara District, the only portion east of the Indus; (2) the relatively narrow strip between the Indus and the hills, which includes Mardan, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan Districts; and (3) the mountainous areas on the north and west along the Durand Line which constitute the Tribal Agencies.

HAZARA

Hazara District, bounded on the west by the Indus and on the east by the Attock District of the Punjab, runs north from a fairly wide base to form a wedge extending deep into the Himalayas. The wedge comes to a point at the head of the Kaghan Valley where the 13,000-foot Babusar Pass opens onto Gilgit. In the northern portion of the district, the Kaghan Valley is little more than a gorge through the rocky mountain walls. Further south, the mountains separate to throw off lower, well-wooded spurs which break the country up into small isolated pockets. At the very base of the wedge the hills open wide and the plains of the Punjab begin.

Hazara's proximity to the settled fertility of the Punjab, as well as the fact that it is "cis-Indus", i.e. situated on the eastern or "near" side of the Indus, has given this district a separate identity from the rest of the Frontier. This separate identity is, however, more distinctive politically and racially than geographically.

TRANS-INDUS DISTRICTS

The five districts on the west side of the Indus all abut the border hills to the west. However, their geographical characteristics vary widely.

¹ The states of Dir, Swat, and Chitral are parts of the Malakand Agency. The Tribal Territory also includes six strips attached for administrative purposes to the settled districts.

Peshawar and Mardan in the north lie in a broad valley. The Peshawar Valley is surrounded by hills through which run the Khyber Pass and the Kabul River on the west, and the Malakand Pass and the Swat River on the north.

A light, porous surface soil with some sand admixture underlaid with moisture-retentive clay combines with ten to twenty-five inches of annual rainfall and relatively plentiful irrigation water to make the Peshawar Valley the most important source of food production for the whole area. A long, hot growing season and only slight and infrequent frost also help produce good crops of fruit, wheat, barley, maize, pulses, sugar cane, and tobacco.

Kohat District to the south is separated from Peshawar by the Jowaki Range, through which runs the short but spectacular Kohat Pass. The district is a rugged tableland broken by low ranges of hills, between some of which are relatively fertile valleys with deposits of rich loam. Most of the hill soil is poor, however, and agriculture is almost entirely dependent on an annual rainfall of about fifteen inches. The Salt Range intrudes into the southern and eastern portions of the district, making internal communications difficult. Beyond it is a sandy plain.

Further south, around Bannu, a relatively fertile plain opens up along the lower reaches of the Kurram River. Irrigation and crop rotation make good agricultural yields possible, despite the arid character of much of the surrounding country. Even some of this (the Maswat Plain) produces abundant wheat when rainfall is sufficient.

Dera Ismail Khan, the southernmost district of the Frontier, consists mainly of an arid and stony plain penned in between the Indus and the western Sulaiman Hills. Its annual rainfall is from five to eight inches. There is a fertile strip of alluvial loam along the Indus and a clayey deposit called *daman*, "the skirt of the hills", along the lower slopes. The whole plain, which extends down into the Punjab, is known as the Derajat.

THE BORDER HILLS

The character of the northern and western hill tracts wherein lie the Tribal Agencies is even more varied than that of the districts. The Malakand Agency, which includes the small princely states of Dir, Swat, and Chitral, penetrates even further into the Himalayas than does Hazara District on the other side of the Indus. Close to the apex of Malakand lies the 12,000-foot Baroghil Pass which leads into the Wakhan Corridor

and on to China and the USSR. Chitral, the northernmost of the states, is a land of deep valleys and lofty peaks. It is cut off from the rest of the agency by the Lawari Pass, more than 10,000 feet high. A jeep track runs through the pass, but it is snowed in during most of the year.

In the southern portion of Chitral begin the thickly wooded hills which extend down into Dir, Swat, and Bajaur, where the Swat and Panjkora Rivers have cut relatively wide and fertile valleys. Dir is still isolated and backward, but Swat enjoys a progressive regime which has resulted in, among other benefits, 360 miles of motorable road.

Below Dir is the Mohmand country, which consists almost entirely of broken and barren foothills which extend into Afghanistan and present little opportunity for cultivation or communication. The low mountains, generally known as the Khyber Hills at this point, continue southward, broken only by the famous pass which twists through them a few miles south of the narrow gorge of the Kabul River. The Tartarra Peak, highest in the range, reaches about 6,800 feet.

South and west of the Khyber Pass, the fertile little valleys of Tirah lie among an almost impenetrable maze of hills and ravines along the slopes of the Safed Koh Mountains which run directly west to the Afghan border. At the end of the Safed Koh, "the White Mountain", 15,600 feet high, looks down on the Peiwar Kotal Pass, entry point to the fertile Kurram Valley from the Afghan highlands. The Kurram Agency runs southeast along the river, divided by a spur of the hills into an upper and lower valley, until the river debouches onto the Bannu plain. Kurram is the most fertile of all the tribal country, producing bumper crops of fruit and the medicinal plant, artemesia.

Below Kurram are the hills of Waziristan. Although only a few peaks are above 8,000 feet, the Wazir Hills are so rough and broken as to make many parts of the country inaccessible except by foot. The Tochi River cuts a fairly direct channel from the Afghan border to Bannu City in the North Waziristan Agency. Along the river live the Daur, from whom the narrow valley takes its name. As in Kurram, the valley is divided into an upper and lower portion by a spur of the hills which comes down to the river bed.

Further south, a series of steep gorges leads down from Kaniguram in the core of the knot of hills, to the Wana Plain, around which the South Waziristan Agency centers. The intermittent Gomal River also intersects the hills in the southern area, providing a rough but much traveled route from Afghanistan to Dera Ismail Khan, Baluchistan, and the lower Punjab.

Some of the higher hills are wooded and the semi-plateau area around Kaniguram provides some space for cultivation, but the Wazir Hills are for the most part barren from their beginning on the south flank of the Kurram Valley down to their merger with the Sulaiman Range near the famous Takht-i-Sulaiman ("Throne of Solomon") which is a spectacular landmark in the Derajat. The Wazir Hills receive little rainfall, and temperatures vary from — 13 to 122 degrees.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION

A good paved highway runs from Malakand south through all of the districts to Dera Ismail Khan on the Indus. However, this north-south artery was designed not to implement the natural communications and transportation channels of the land, which run east-west, but to cut across and control them. Thus the road served the needs of the imperial defence of British India, which was constantly on guard lest some dangerous or unwelcome element filter across the border along one of the natural routes which follow the slope of the land down to the Indus and India proper.

Since these passes and river valleys have played such a great part in history and are so essential to the maintenance of any kind of life in the wild mountain barrier through which they run, they are still worthy of note.

THE KHYBER

Most historic of them — and perhaps of all the passes of the world — is the Khyber, which cuts through the hills for thirty-two miles on an almost direct line between Peshawar and Kabul. A modern, double-lane road now passes through its entire length, but nonetheless the Khyber is tortuous enough and fortified enough to satisfy the most ardent romanticist. However, its statistics are unimpressive: 3,373 feet high at its summit, 1,670 feet at its eastern entrance, and 1,404 feet at the western entrance. Because of its eminent accessibility, the Khyber has always been the high road to India from Central Asia. It remains vitally important today in all commerce and communication between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

A little used alternate route through the hills in this area is the Mulla-

gori Road, which clings to the slopes of the hills about ten miles north of the Khyber.

The Kabul River, which breaks through the hills onto the Peshawar Plain a few miles north of the Khyber, is almost useless as an artery of communication because of the rapidity of its current and the narrowness of its gorge. However, it is possible to leave the Kabul River just east of Jelalabad in Afghanistan, and follow the Kunar River north and east to a point opposite Dir and the Mohmand country, where passage across the border hills is possible via several rough tracks. This was the path taken by Alexander on his march to India. It is still followed by some of the *powindahs*, Afghan nomads who swarm across the border into Pakistan every year.

KURRAM

Further south, the Peiwar Kotal at the top of the Kurram Valley provides another route. It was down the Kurram that Nadir Khan of Afghanistan came with his troops in 1919 to seize briefly the strategic town of Thal in the Third Afghan War. The Kurram is relatively accessible, but it is off the main road from Central Asia to the subcontinent and is used chiefly for local traffic.

THE TOCHI

The Tochi River, also known as the Gambila, runs through the Daur Valley in North Waziristan. A motor road runs between Miranshah and Bannu in the lower portion of the valley, and the route is a favorite of the *powindahs*. Another paved road runs south from Miranshah to Razmak in the heart of Waziristan and on to Jandola in the South Waziristan Agency. This road was constructed in the 1930's at great trouble and expense by the British to open up Waziristan for military action. It has been abandoned since 1947 when Pakistan withdrew the garrison at Razmak.

THE GOMAL

The Gomal, or Luni River seldom has water in it, although its bed runs from beyond the Afghan border to the Indus near Dera Ismail Khan.

This is the wildest and most isolated of the routes through the Frontier hills. Nonetheless, it provides access to Sind and the lower Punjab for thousands of *powindahs*.

THE FRONTIER AS A BARRIER

Perhaps the most important point to be made about the Frontier hills is that, although they are a barrier, they are a barrier with many and major qualifications. First, they are occupied. Two and a half million people live in the tribal area alone. Second, there are many natural routes through the barrier, of which the Khyber is only one. Thirdly, no power — including that of British India at its height — has ever been able to establish full control over the people and the passes of the hills. Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India at the beginning of the twentieth century, accepted these facts and formally divided the tribal area off from the rest of India as a marchland. This has been its role throughout history.

HISTORICAL SUMMARY ²

Gandhara, “the garden land”, first appears in history as part of the Arochosian satrapy of the Persian empire of Darius Hystaspes in the sixth century before Christ. It included the modern districts of Peshawar and Mardan, part of Kohat, the Mohmand country, Swat, Bajaur, and Buner. Its capital was at different times at Purushapura (Peshawar) and Pushkalavati (a few miles north of Peshawar). Troops from Gandhara participated in Xerxes’ invasion of Greece, and its people were known to Herodotus, Ptolemy, and Strabo as Gandaraoi or Gandarae.

THE GREEKS

Alexander the Great crossed the main range of the Hindu Kush in the spring of 327 B.C. and, dividing his forces, entered the Frontier hills. He himself apparently took a contingent up the Kunar River and crossed into Swat through one of the many little passes that run through the

² The historical summary which follows is based on various sources. However, main reliance for it was on the *Cambridge History of India*, 6 vols. (Cambridge: University Press, 1937), and the narrative generally agrees with that of the *Cambridge History*.

Mohmand country and Dir. Other units of his army went through the Khyber, while still others picked their way down the gorge of the Kabul River. Once on the other side, Alexander fought half a dozen sharp battles. Having subdued the countryside, he left Micator as satrap, crossed the Indus near Attock, and continued his march into India.

Within ten years, Alexander's lieutenants lost control of Gandhara, although the Seleucid Greek dynasty continued to rule in the upper part of the Kabul River valley. Chandragupta Maurya, the first great native ruler of India, added Gandhara to his empire, and his grandson, Ashoka, made Buddhism the religion of a majority of the people.

After Ashoka's death, the Greeks again moved down from their stronghold in Bactria (the present Afghan city of Balkh), and first Demetros and then Eucratides ruled Gandhara. About the middle of the second century before Christ, the rule of the Bactrians degenerated into a series of petty kings whose Grecian features and names may still be found on the host of ill-made coins which litter the Peshawar Valley.

These Bactrians were soon attacked by the Parthians and the Sakas who poured down from Central Asia. The Bactrians finally succumbed about the beginning of the Christian era to the Kushans, the most powerful section of the Yueh-Chi, a race of tough Central Asian nomads, whose most famous king, Kanishka, established an empire in north-western India centered on the Peshawar Valley. Various clans of the Yueh-Chi held the valley until they were overwhelmed — probably in the sixth century A.D. — by the Epthalites or White Huns who swept across the area in their war with the Sassanids of Persia.

The White Huns extinguished the Greco-Buddhist culture which had grown up out of the melting pot of Alexander, the Mauryas, the Bactrian Greeks, and the Kushans. This culture is usually identified with the name Gandhara, and for several hundreds of years the cities and monasteries it produced prospered throughout the area. The Chinese Buddhist pilgrim, Fa-Hien, visited Gandhara in 400 A.D. and was amazed at the wealth and high state of development of the monasteries, but when another Chinese visitor, Hiuen-Tsang, passed through Gandhara in the middle of the eighth century, he found little but ruins and desolation.

For the next three hundred years, during which Islam was founded and began its spread eastward, the Frontier was a warring ground for petty Hindu rajas and Central Asian nomad chieftains.

By the end of the eighth century Islam had extended its influence into Sind from the coast of the Arabian Sea, but it was not until the tenth century that a Turkic family of Muslims which had served the Samanid

kings established itself at Ghazni in Afghanistan — within sight of the Frontier hills.

MAHMUD OF GHAZNI

In 998 A.D., Mahmud, a son of this family, became ruler of Ghazni, whose territories his father had already begun to expand. Mahmud secured recognition of his sovereignty from the Caliph at Baghdad. Almost immediately, he began a long series of raids into India which earned him the title of "The Idolbreaker". Mahmud's first great battle took place near Peshawar in the fall of 1001, when he defeated Raja Jaipal. Five years later he defeated Anandpal, Jaipal's successor, at the same place and made the Frontier part of his empire.

It is in Mahmud's time that the name of the Afghans as a people living in the hills between Ghazni and the Sulaiman Mountains first appears. Islam had already penetrated into the hills to some extent, and, although at first hostile to Mahmud, the tribes soon rallied to the standard of "The Idolbreaker", and in the name of Islam joyfully followed him on his raids into Hindu India.

MUHAMMAD GHURI

When Muhammad, warrior chief of Ghur, a place a few hundred miles from Ghazni north of the Kabul River, appropriated the remnants of the Ghaznavid empire in 1173, the hill tribes gave their allegiance to him. In fact, according to some historians, Muhammad Ghuri was himself an "Afghan", but he is more generally assumed to have been an eastern Turk. Muhammad took Peshawar in 1179, and the hillmen undoubtedly shared in the loot of the city, as well as in that of Muhammad's other invasions of India.

After Muhammad Ghuri's death, his successor, Taj-ud-Din Yildiz, ruled the Ghurid empire from the Kurram Valley. In 1215 Taj-ud-Din was driven down into India by the Turkic Prince of Khiva, who in his turn had to abandon the frontier to Jenghis Khan, who led his Mongols into India for the first time in 1221. During the next two centuries, the emerging Afghan tribes made the best use they could of their rugged country to harass the Mongol hordes who came and went through the area and to block the weak attempts of the Turkic sultans of Delhi, who had inherited the eastern portion of Muhammad Ghuri's empire, to establish their control over the Frontier.

TIMUR

Timur the Lame left Samarkand in 1398 to invade India. He laid waste Chitral, pushed on through the Punjab, and sacked Delhi. He returned through Bannu in 1399. The Afghans, who had now struck out from their base in the hills to establish citadels in the area around Kohat and Bannu, did what they could to make Timur's passage difficult.

Timur left northern India in chaos. In the years that followed, several chieftains established their rule over different parts of the area. One of the most noted of them was an Afghan, Buhlul Lodi. In 1451, Buhlul seized the throne at Delhi and founded an Afghan dynasty which lasted for seventy-five years. The whole Afghan race shared his royal prestige, and more and more Afghans were soon pushing down from the highlands of Afghanistan into Frontier hills and through them into India. The movement was accelerated by renewed pressure from the west where Ulugh Beg, a descendant of Timur, ruled in Kabul.

BABUR

Another descendant of Timur now descended out of Farghana in Central Asia. This was Babur, the founder of the Mogul Empire of India, who lies buried in Kabul. In 1504, Babur took Kabul, and in January of 1505 he launched his first invasion of India. He came down through the Khyber Pass, Kohat, and Bannu, into the Derajat. Outside of Kohat, he destroyed a tribal ambush, and both here and at Hangu erected pillars of the heads of his fallen foes, according to the custom of his people. Another bloody pillar rose at Bannu, although here Babur spared some of his opponents when they came to him with grass between their teeth proclaiming themselves his "cows". Decimating the Afghans by day and being harassed by them at night, Babur celebrated the feast of *Id-i-Fitr* on the banks of the Gomal. In the *Babur-Nama*, he describes with respect the single-handed attacks of the "death-devoted" Afghans on his army.³

By May of 1505 Babur was back in Kabul where he set about recapturing the disintegrated Central Asian empire of his forebears. In October of 1511, he was able to proclaim himself king in Samarkand, and his rule extended over Bokhara, Tashkent, Farghana, and Kabul.

In January of 1519, Babur was across the Frontier hills in Bajaur.

³ Zahiruddin Mohammad Babur, Padshah, *Babur-Nama*, trans. by Annette Susanah Beveridge, 4 vols, bound as one (London: Luzac, 1922), pp. 229-240.

Making good use of his matchlocks, the like of which the Afghans had never before seen, he stormed the main citadel of the area, and, by his own estimate, put to death 3,000 of the male inhabitants and made their women and children captive. A great pillar of heads was left on the high ground near the fort. Babur took Bibi Mubarak, daughter of a Yusufzai chief, as his wife, hunted rhinoceros in Swabi, killed a tiger near Attock, made a brief raid across the Indus, and was back in Kabul in April.⁴

After several subsequent incursions, during which he established his rule over the Punjab, Babur shattered the forces of the Lodi sultan at Panipat, near Delhi, on April 20, 1526, and established the great Mogul Empire of India.

Until his death in 1530, Babur retained a tenuous control over the Frontier. Then the Afghans revolted almost immediately, and the area was dominated by one or another Aghan chief, except for a brief period between 1552 and 1556 when Babur's son, Humayun, held Peshawar.

SHER SHAH SURI

The greatest of these Afghan chiefs was Sher Shah, of the tribe of Sur, who rose from *jagirdar* (possessor of a land grant) of an obscure district in Bihar (Eastern India) to emperor of almost all of northern India. In 1540 Sher Shah, whose grandfather had migrated from near Peshawar to seek service with the Lodi sultans of Delhi, won a great battle over Humayun on the bank of the Ganges. Thereafter, for five brief years, he reigned until killed in a gunpowder explosion. During these five years he established a highly efficient bureaucracy under his own direct supervision, the like of which was not seen again until the high-tide of British rule. Tariffs were set up on lines designed to encourage commerce; the land tenure system was reformed; the police and judicial systems were reorganized. Taxes were collected strictly but justly. A marvelous road network was constructed, and it is to Sher Shah that India owes its famous Grand Trunk Road from Peshawar to Bengal.

THE MOGULS

Sher Shah's empire crumbled rapidly after his death as his relatives and lieutenants quarreled over the spoils. In 1556, Akbar, the greatest of all

⁴ Babur, *op. cit.*, pp. 367-395.

the Moguls, succeeded his father, Humayun. It was not until 1585, however, that Akbar was able to re-establish imperial rule over Peshawar, making his Rajput general, Kunwar Man Singh, governor there.

The following year the tribes, inflamed by the teachings of Pir Roshan, who had founded a heretical Muslim sect on the Frontier some forty years earlier, revolted again. The Mohmands moved south, closed the Khyber, and drove Man Singh and his Rajputs out of Peshawar. In 1587, Akbar himself came to the Frontier with a strong Mogul army to suppress the rebels. He sent a force into Swat and Bajaur under his able and trustful counselor, Bir Bal. This force was destroyed by the Yusufzai, 8,000 Moguls losing their lives. A minimum of order was eventually restored by Todar Mal, Akbar's great Hindu general, who struck back at the tribes with the potent weapon of blockade. However, it was never possible to establish effective administration over the tribes.

From then on, the tribesmen's war with the Moguls hardly ever ceased. In 1620 another large Mogul army was destroyed while trying to force its way into the Tirah which had become a stronghold of the followers of Pir Roshan. A general uprising took place on the death of the Emperor Jehangir in 1627. In 1630, the imperial garrison in Peshawar was under seige for several months. In 1632, and again in 1660, Mogul armies unsuccessfully attempted to subdue the Tirah. In 1667 the Yusufzai invaded Hazara District east of the Indus and threatened the Moguls' communications center at Attock.

The population in the hills was growing rapidly in the seventeenth century, and scarcely a year passed that the Moguls were not distracted from their efforts to consolidate their empire in India by an uprising in the border hills. They resorted to all the weapons which the British were to employ 250 years later: subsidies, blockade, mobile columns, large fortified garrisons.⁵ None succeeded, and if, as some claim, the Mogul Empire in India began to die when it was cut off from its vigorous taproots in Central Asia, the Frontier tribesmen can claim a major share in its demise.

By way of digression, it is worthwhile mentioning here that the Pathans did not limit their activities to their own area. A notable migration of Pathan individuals and families down into India had been going on almost since the time of Mahmud of Ghazni. This increased under the Afghan sultans of Delhi and during the rule of Sher Shah Suri. It continued throughout Mogul days and was carried even farther in the eight-

⁵ During the reign of Aurangzeb (1658-1707), Mogul subsidies to the tribes ran about 600,000 rupees annually.

eenth century during the turmoil that accompanied the brief but widespread conquests of Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah. Notable examples of the success achieved by the Pathans beyond their own borders were the states of Tonk and Ruhelkhand whose ruling families jealously preserved the traditions of their Pathan origins. Even today a number of the petty nobility of latter-day India proudly trace their ancestry back to Pathan ancestors. The activities of these Pathans-in-exile, however, are beyond the scope of this work.

THE GREAT REVOLT

In the spring of 1672 the Mogul governor of Kabul set out to ensure communications with the capital at Delhi by marching an army through the Khyber, where the imperial right of transit was being violated with increasing frequency by the Afridis. These tribesmen caught the army at Ali Masjid on May 1, cut off its water supply, and then swooped down from the hills. They killed 10,000 Mogul soldiers, captured 20,000 men and women, including the governor's mother, wife, and daughter, and took 20,000,000 rupees' worth of loot. Aimal Khan, their leading chief, proclaimed himself king and declared *jihad*⁶ against the Moguls, and the whole country "from Attock to Kandahar" rose in revolt.

Khushal Khan Khattak, a warrior-poet who was chief of the great Khattak tribe whose lands lay along the west bank of the Indus from Mardan down to Bannu, joined forces with Aimal and set out to try to unify the tribes to resist the Moguls.

In 1673, the tribesmen defeated another Mogul army at Gandab. In March of 1674, they cut to pieces a third force in the Karapa Pass, and forced the Mogul remnants to flee into Bajaur.

At this point, the Emperor Aurangzeb came himself to the Frontier as his great-grandfather Akbar had done a hundred years earlier. Aurangzeb established his base camp at Hassan Abdal, twenty-nine miles east of the Indus, and stayed there a year and a half, disregarding the threat to his empire in Central India posed by the Marathas under the leadership of Shivaji, in order personally to direct operations against the tribesmen.

Aurangzeb's Turki general, Uighur Khan, raided the Ghilzai, Shirani, Yusufzai, and Mohmands, ravishing their country and burning their

⁶ The theological problem arising from the fact that the Moguls were by this time rather better Muslims than the tribesmen appears to have had no effect on Aimal.

villages, until the name of Uighur Khan was as much a symbol of terror as that of Hari Singh was to be 150 years later. For a while, the tribes held their own. Uighur failed to open the Khyber and was beaten back in a battle near Ali Masjid. In June of 1675 another Mogul army was defeated in Bajaur. The Moguls were also driven from the Jagdalik Pass in the south which Aurangzeb had used for communication with Kabul after the closing of the Khyber.

AURANGZEB'S TRIBAL POLICY

Nonetheless, by the end of 1675, Aurangzeb had established sufficient control to enable him to return to Delhi. He accomplished this less by force of arms than by skill of diplomacy. Many clans were bought over by subsidies. Rival claimants to the headship of tribes were encouraged. The perpetual jealousy and distrust of one group for another were fanned. Imperial spies penetrated the tribal councils. Brother was bribed to oppose brother, and son encouraged to depose father. By the time Aurangzeb departed, the Afridis and the Khattaks alone remained in alliance.

Aurangzeb's policy was continued by Amin Khan, an exceptionally able governor of Kabul, who ruled the province for the Emperor from 1677 to 1698. Amin Khan entered into the domestic affairs of the tribesmen, carefully directed their energies into intertribal feuds, and distributed subsidies with a liberal hand. He broke up Aimal Khan's last attempt to organize a confederacy by instigating the chiefs of the other tribes to demand a division of the loot which the revolt hoped to gain before the war began. He worked untiringly to promote dissension between the Afridis and the Khattaks, and when Aimal Khan died, the Afridis abandoned the fight against the Moguls. Khushal Khan fought on alone for many years, betrayed by his sons, abandoned by his allies, constantly harassed by the Moguls, until he died proud and defiant in 1691.

Aurangzeb's policy of divide and rule was neither original nor unique, but the cold-blooded Mogul applied it more persistently and scientifically than any of his predecessors or successors, possibly even the British. The policy produced anarchy on the Frontier, but it also resulted in security for the empire. The communication lines to Kabul were kept open, and the tribesmen were never able to combine in an uprising of sufficient size to threaten the rich provinces of India. The policy, thus, is of considerable importance to later history. By deliberately stimulating

the natural internal suspicions and dissensions of a tribal people emerging from a primitive background onto the main stage of events, it did much to destroy whatever chance there might have been of national spirit among the tribesmen. By perpetuating the isolation of the Frontier from the relatively advanced areas around it, Aurangzeb ensured the existence of a kind of no-man's land, which has persisted until this day, a land whose people are united only by their common hostility to any and all outsiders.

The Mogul power crumbled rapidly all over India after Aurangzeb's death in 1707. By the first quarter of the eighteenth century, tribal forays east of the Indus were common once again.

NADIR SHAH

The time was ripe for another conqueror to come out of the west. This proved to be Nadir Shah, an Afshar Turk from Khorasan. In the 1730's, Nadir Shah drove Mahmud Khan Ghilzai from the throne of Persia. Mahmud had seized it in the early part of the eighteenth century from the last king of the Safavid dynasty. Nadir proclaimed himself Emperor of Persia in 1736, and marched eastward the following year to punish Mahmud, an Afghan tribesman whose home was in Kandahar. After a long seige, Nadir took the city and, in June of 1738, he seized Kabul.

Once in Kabul, he forgot the original purpose of his mission and took the traditional royal road of conquest. He arrived in the Khyber in late November of 1738, and on the 26th overwhelmed the refugee Mogul governor of Kabul who tried to block Nadir's exit at Fort Jamrud with a force of 20,000 Afghan mercenaries. Nadir occupied Peshawar and pushed on to cross the Indus at Attock. The disorganized Moguls scattered before him as he marched across northern India, and he camped in Delhi from March until May of 1739. He looted the Mogul capital of incredible booty — including the famous peacock throne — and announced he was annexing the Mogul province west of the Indus. After giving the discredited Mogul emperor some patronizing advice on how to rule, he contemptuously spurned possession of the imperial city, and rode back to Persia. On his way home, the Afridis closed the Khyber to him, and the conqueror of Delhi had to be led through the backpaths of the Tirah by a renegade Orakzai.

AHMAD SHAH

Nadir's empire broke up immediately after his death in 1747. One of his lieutenants, named Ahmad, an Afghan of the Sadozai clan of the Abdali tribe, marshaled a small force and returned to his own country. Ahmad took Kandahar and established his capital there. In 1748, he declared himself King of Afghanistan, assuming the title *Durr-i-Durran* ("Pearl of Pearls"), as a result of which the Abdali tribe came to be known as the Durranis. Ahmad Shah continued the time-honored custom of raiding India, and in January of 1761, at the third battle of Panipat, he destroyed the Maratha Confederacy, which had succeeded the Moguls as the dominant power in India.

Ahmad Shah's main interest, however, was in his own country west of the Indus. He gave the Peshawar Valley something like a settled government for the first time in several hundred years. He also firmly established the Durranis as the ruling tribe of Afghanistan. Under his son, Timur Shah, internecine wars among the various Durrani clans and chiefs brought a return to near-anarchy. An attempt was made on Timur's life in Peshawar in 1791, and in the subsequent reprisals, many of the border chiefs, especially the Mohmands, were permanently alienated. Timur died two years later, and his twenty-three sons completed the destruction of the Durrani empire by their quarrels over the succession.

RISE OF THE MUHAMMADZAI

The Sadozai family quarrel was ended in 1818 by a revolt of the Muhammadzai family of the Barakzai clan of the Durranis. The rising was led by three brothers, Fateh Khan, Muhammad Azim, and Dost Muhammad, sons of Painsa Khan, patriarch of the family, who had been executed a few years earlier by one of the Sadozai rulers. The Muhammadzais extended their control over Kashmir and Peshawar during several years of fighting. Although the Sadozais managed to hold on to Dera Ismail Khan, Dost Muhammad mounted the throne in Kabul in 1826. Four other sons of Painsa Khan, Sultan Muhammad Khan, Yar Muhammad Khan, Sayyid Muhammad Khan, and Pir Muhammad Khan, became joint viceroys in Peshawar, and the frontier capital became an integral part of the Durrani kingdom.

THE SIKHS

Meanwhile, the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh had taken over the Punjab, and were rapidly pushing out to the north and west to pick up other parts of the original Durrani empire. In 1813, the Sikhs seized Attock and began raiding the trans-Indus districts. In 1818 Ranjit marched an army into Peshawar but left without attempting to hold the city. Dera Ismail Khan was also briefly occupied during the same year. In 1823 the Sikhs began what was to become an annual harassment of the Bannu Plain.

Ranjit himself returned to the Frontier in 1823. After shattering a combined Afghan-tribal force in a great battle near Nowshera, he formally took possession of Peshawar. However, he allowed the Durrani *sirdars* (chiefs) to remain as his viceroys. After seven years of misrule, the local tribes, inflamed by the preaching of Sayyid Ahmad, a puritanical Muslim from British India, rose again against the Sikhs. In 1830, Sayyid Ahmad and his devotees, supported by the tribes, captured Peshawar and managed to hold it for a few months.

In May of 1834 a large Sikh army entered Peshawar; the *sirdars* were expelled, and a permanent garrison under Hari Singh was established. This brought Dost Muhammad down from Kabul with an army in May of 1835. The Sikhs sent 40,000 men out to meet him at the eastern end of the Khyber. The local tribes remained aloof from both sides. The battle was never fought. As a result of a clever piece of bribery and intrigue carried on by Josiah Harlan, a gentleman adventurer from Pennsylvania in the service of Ranjit Singh, Dost Muhammad found himself betrayed, outwitted, and surrounded.⁷ He retreated quickly back to Kabul.

In 1836, the Sikhs formally annexed Dera Ismail Khan, giving the Sadozai *nawabs* there the same treatment that had been accorded the Muhammadzai in Peshawar. Kohat was also garrisoned but was quickly abandoned after Dost Muhammad's army, led by his eldest son, Akbar Khan, appeared again in the Khyber in April of 1837. This time the tribes came to the support of the Kabul army, and Hari Singh was killed in a bitter battle near Jamrud, although the fort itself was not taken.

Ranjit Singh died in June of 1839, and the Sikh empire lost its vitality

⁷ Harlan's exploits are recounted in his own book, Josiah Harlan, *A Memoir of India and Avghanistaun* (Philadelphia: J. Dobson, 1842), pp. 162-164; and in Charles Masson, *Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, and the Panjab*, 4 vols. (London: R. Bentley, 1844), III, pp. 335-345.

and discipline. A garrison remained at Peshawar, however, and the Italian General Avitabile ruled as governor for the Sikhs from 1838 to 1842. Known locally as "Abu Tabela", Avitabile ruled with a brutality unprecedented even on the Frontier. He was hated and feared more than Hari Singh himself. Despite his repressive measures, Avitabile found it impossible to subdue the hill tribes, and the countryside was either deeded over in *jagirs* (grants) to favored local chiefs or left to its own anarchical devices, with Sikh armies making "tax-collecting" forays whenever they had the strength.

In 1839-40, the Sikhs allied themselves with the British power spreading out from Bombay and Calcutta to depose Dost Muhammad briefly from the throne of Kabul in the First Afghan War. The future of the Frontier was an important issue in the war, but the fighting had little effect on the area itself. The Sikhs continued their haphazard rule over the Frontier until 1847, when the Sikh empire passed under British suzerainty. For the next two years, the Sikhs ruled as British vassals (with the assistance of British administrators). Finally, in the Lahore Durbar of March 30, 1849, the British took direct authority over the Frontier.

II

THE PEOPLE

INTRODUCTION

An effort has been made in the previous chapter to reconstruct a summary of historical events up to 1849 as they affected the Frontier and its people. Just who and what these people are has not yet been made completely clear. In a purely scientific sense, it is doubtful if it ever will be.¹ It is sufficient for our present purpose, however, to emphasize that the inhabitants of the Frontier are clearly of varying origin. They probably include among their ancestors some of the original Aryan occupiers of the region. Over the course of the centuries, the Greek, Persian, Turkic, and Mongol invaders who passed through the Frontier also added their blood.²

The inhabitants of the Frontier appear first in history as "Afghans", a troublesome people living in the Sulaiman Mountains east of Ghazni, in the time of Mahmud. As they expanded in number and rose to power, important divisions among them became apparent. It is obvious, for example, even in the historical summary of the preceding chapter, that the Lodi and Durrani nobles who established themselves on the thrones of Delhi and Kabul were to some extent different from the hillmen of the Safed Koh and Sulaiman Mountains.

¹ A good summary discussion of the ethnic problem of the Frontier may be found in C. Collin Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1932), pp. 37-46. Some anthropometric data are contained in Appendix C of the same work.

² The idea that the Frontier tribes were "the lost tribes of Israel", and that Pushtu is a Semitic language persisted among some British writers into the twentieth century, although scholars had much earlier ascertained the language as Indo-Iranian and the people as of non-Semitic origin. E.g., Bernard Dorn, *A Chrestomathy of the Pushtu or Afghan Language* (St. Petersburg: The Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1847), p. ii. Olaf Caroe, in *The Pathans, 550 B.C.-A.D. 1957* (London, St. Martin's Press, 1958), argues that the Ephthalites or "White Huns" constitute a particularly important element in the Pathan amalgam, pp. 81-90.

Variations in names for the whole group also complicate the picture. The Frontier tribesmen are still quite properly known as Afghans, although the same name is also applied to all nationals of Afghanistan, many of whom have no ethnic connection with the men of the Frontier. The most familiar name in the west is Pathan, a Hindi term adopted by the British, which is usually applied only to the people living east of the Durand Line. Most of the people on both sides of the border usually call themselves Pukhtun, Pakhtun, Pushtun, or Pashtun. The first two words are used in the guttural language of the north; the latter two in the softer Kandahari dialect of the south. Some, however, like the Yusufzai, prefer Afghan. For convenience, Pathan is used throughout this work, except where the context requires one of the other names.

As the name favored by the people themselves suggests, the most practical touchstone of identity is language. Almost all the people speak Pushtu. (The southern word is more commonly used in English than the northern Pukhtu.) This is an eastern Iranian language, definitely distinct from the Persian and Urdu used in the areas to the west and east of it.

The Pathans themselves have a very precise explanation of who they are. This existed in its present form when the first Englishman to come into contact with them, the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, visited the Frontier in 1809.³ It consists of an almost certainly fictional but remarkably consistent genealogy going back to Saul, the first King of Israel. Every true Pathan can fit himself and his ancestors into this great family tree. There are indications that the genealogy was composed almost entirely out of whole cloth about 400 years ago. Nonetheless, it is valuable since it provides a framework which reflects the real divisions of the group at that time and has preserved the actual lines of descent since.⁴ For these reasons and because the Pathan takes his genealogy very seriously, the traditional story of the tribes is presented here in summary form.

THE ORIGIN OF THE PATHANS

The race was founded by Kais, thirty-seventh lineal descendant of Saul of Israel. Kais was a saintly warrior who lived near Ghur in Afghanistan

¹ See Mountstuart Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubal and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, Brown, and J. Murray, 1815), pp. 158-160.

⁴ See Hugh R. James, "Report on the Settlement of the Peshawar District", *Selections from the Records of the Government of India, 1865*, No. 46 (Calcutta: Government of India, n.d.), pp. 47-48.

in the seventh century. He was converted to Islam by an early missionary and subsequently visited Arabia and received a blessing from the Holy Prophet. Kais' descendants moved to Kandahar shortly after his death. In Kandahar, the people from Ghur met and intermarried with the Gandhari, some of the original inhabitants of the Peshawar Valley, who had fled from the White Huns in the fifth and sixth centuries.

The new clan took its language — Pushtu — from the Gandhari and its religion — Islam — from the Ghuris. Over the next few hundred years its growing population spread north and east and back down into the Peshawar Valley. Here, other indigenous groups which, unlike the Gandhari, had not fled the White Huns, were absorbed. These, according to some versions of the story, became the Afridis and the Khattaks.

Throughout the evolution of the tribes, various invaders moved into one or another of the clan structures, resulting in a strong Turkic cast in one group, a predominant Iranian influence in another.

Each of the three great branches of the race traces its origin to a son of Kais. The Sarbani Pathans, which include the Durrani, Ghori Khel, Khakhai Khel, Shinwari, Yusufzai, Muhammadzai, and Mohmands, claim descent from Sarban. The Ghilzai Pathans, among which are the great nomad clans of the Sulaiman Khel and the Aka Khel, are descendants of Baitan, through his daughter and a Persian prince. The Ghurghusht Pathans, such as the Afridis, Khattaks, Wazirs, Mahsuds, Dauris, Turis, Jajis, and Bangash, are the descendants of Ghurghusht.

TRIBAL STRUCTURE

Before attempting a brief description of the major tribes, a few general remarks are necessary. Every Pathan group is connected in one way or another with every other group, and the Pushtu-speaking people constitute a very real cultural and social entity. However, it is almost impossible to devise a framework into which each group can be neatly fitted. Each major tribe has two or more *khels*, which may roughly be equated with the English term, "clan". The *khels* break up into extended family systems of varying degrees of magnitude. Some of these subdivisions are also known as *khels*; some are called *kors* or *kahols*.

However, an individual *khel* may have lost all connection with its parent tribe, and may exceed in numbers other tribes which include several *khels*. Names are also misleading. Two groups which have no practical connection with each other and which may be vastly dissimilar

in size and importance may have the same name. There is a Sipah clan among both Afridis and Shinwaris, an Usman Khel among both Mohmands and Mahsuds. Thus, except when obviously referring to one of the major tribes, a given group name may be meaningless without context.

The basis of each group, from the smallest to the largest, is blood relationship — real or fancied. This is most compelling among the tribes still living in the hills, where, for example, a man will think of himself first as “the second son of Malik Shahbaz Khan of the Shahbaz Khel subsection of the Galai division of the Adam Khel Afridis” rather than as “Jamshed Khan of Jamrud Village in the Khyber Agency”. Geographic considerations take on more importance among the long settled plains tribes, and personal identification here would be more apt to be “Jehangir, son of Isa Khan, of Takhal Village, a Khalil living in Peshawar *tahsil* of Peshawar District”. These distinctions frequently tend to be lost, as many tribes have members both in the hills and in the settled districts. Some tribes also extend across the border into Afghanistan.

The one exception to the blood groupings is the Samil and Gar factions which exist to a greater or lesser extent among most of the tribes. These factions, which have no relation to other tribal groupings and no unified policy or objectives, are known in some areas as Spin (White) and Tor (Black). Vaguely akin to political parties, they seem designed primarily to enable a man to belong to a group hostile to that of his neighbor to whom he may be joined by blood ties. The origin of the factions is lost in antiquity, and few Westerners have ever been able to grasp their real meaning. Perhaps the only parallel in the West is the notorious “blue” and “green” factions which so disturbed the eastern Roman Empire in its final days.

Most tribes in which the factions have been important were about equally divided between them. Thus, among the Afridis, the Kambar Khel, Kuki Khel, Adam Khel, and Aka Khel were Gar, while the Malikdin Khel, Zakka Khel, Kamar Khel, and Sipah were Samil. Allegiance to either faction was usually inherited, but an individual could change sides, although he was seldom able to carry his clan with him. The factions have lost much of their importance in recent years and are virtually forgotten by the younger generation of tribesmen.

In the face of this complex and confusing situation, it is probably best simply to start along the Durand Line at the northernmost limit of the Pathan area and work south and east, touching on the characteristics of the most important tribes, and ignoring those which by virtue of their

small size or isolated location have had little influence on the Frontier.⁵

THE YUSUFZAI

The Yusufzai are one of the largest, oldest, and most sophisticated of the tribes. They also have perhaps the greatest number of divisions and offshoots and the greatest variety of development. They inhabit both the wild mountains of Dir and Swat and the fertile plains of Mardan. All together they probably number close to a million.

The tribe as a whole may be roughly divided into the hillmen and the plains dwellers. The former live in Dir, Swat, Buner, and parts of Bajaur. They also extend across the Indus River into the Black Mountain area. The group living in the hills is more properly the true Yusufzai, but they are known more usually by their various clan names: the Akozai and the Malizai in Dir and Swat, the Iliaszai (also called simply Bunerwals) in Buner, and the Isazai on the Black Mountain. All of them are the descendants of the Khakhai Khel of the Sarbani Pathans who apparently migrated eastward from the upper reaches of the Kabul River Valley in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They pushed the Swatis across the Indus and have long held the balance of political power in the two states of Dir and Swat, the Khan (or Nawab) of Dir being a member of the Akhund Khel subsection of the Painsa Khel Malizai.⁶

The section of the Yusufzai which lives in the plains is sometimes called the Mardans, though the people themselves prefer the prouder name, Yusufzai. These clans are divided into three main groups: the Kamalzai, the Ama zai, and the Baizai. They live on the so-called Yusufzai Plain in Mardan District; intermixed with them are pockets of Khat-taks, Utman Khel, Daudzai, and Gigianis.

The Yusufzai, especially those dwelling on the plain, are attractive, hard-working agriculturalists, striking in appearance, relatively clean and neat, and inordinately proud of their clan as the blue-blooded

⁵ No real count of the tribes has ever been taken. Official Pakistani census reports contain only estimates for the tribal agencies. Consequently, the figures given for each tribe in the succeeding pages are only approximate and have been pieced together from several sources.

⁶ The present *Wali* of Swat is a great-grandson of the Akhund of Swat, originally of the relatively unimportant Safi tribe, who established his authority in the area as a saint in the last century. The *Wali's* vigorous and progressive administration is in marked contrast to the backward feudal rule of the Nawab of Dir who was finally deposed by the Pakistan Government in 1960.

aristocracy of the Pathans. The traditional system of land tenure in which each man holds a *daftar*, or piece of land of his own, as well as a share in the tribal common land, remains relatively intact. This makes for a large number of small freeholders, although the growth of the khan system following the British land settlement in the nineteenth century has also resulted in some individual holdings of as much as 20,000 acres.

In many ways, the Yusufzai tribe is the most representative of the Pathan community. Part of it is familiar with the settled life of the plains and the government administration. Part of it dwells in the unadministered hills where life is lived almost completely according to traditional tribal usage. (There seems to be relatively little contact between the two groups.)

BAJAURIS

Bajaur is a wild hill tract lying south of Dir along the Afghan border adjacent to the Mohmand country. Its inhabitants are as diversified and intractable as the terrain. The main tribes are the Salarzai, the Utman Khel, and the Mamunds.

The Utman Khel are Sarbani Pathans who followed the Yusufzai eastward in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Some of them have been amalgamated into the plains Yusufzai. In Bajaur, however, they remain in a relatively untouched state, preserving some of the oldest and more obscure customs of the Pathans. The Utman Khel is the largest group in Bajaur (about 115,000). The dominant element in Bajaur, however, is the Salarzai. The five Salarzai clans divide their allegiances among the rival Khans of Khar, Nawagai, Pashat, and Kotkai. Attempts to upset these allegiances have been responsible for much of the trouble for which Bajaur has traditionally been noted.

MOHMANDS

The Mohmands are closely connected geographically and politically to the clans of Bajaur, but are much more numerous and homogenous. The Mohmands total about 400,000 persons, roughly half of whom live on either side of the Durand Line.

The tribe descends from the Ghoria Khel of the Sarbani Pathans. The Ghoria Khel migrated from Afghanistan at about the same time as the

Khakhai Khel, from whom the Yusufzai are descended. The Mohmands living east of the Durand Line split into two groups at an early date. One section, the Kuz (Lower) Mohmands, lives north of the Kabul river, contiguous to the settled districts. Some have left their hills and have earned a reputation as hard-working, land-hungry farmers. The Kuz Mohmands are divided into five main branches: the Tarakzai, Halimzai, Utmanzai, Dawezai and Mandi Khel. They are called the "assured clans" because in 1895, when they accepted the British government's administration, the British assured them they would lose none of the subsidies and protection they had been wont to receive from the Amir of Afghanistan.

The Bar (Hill) Mohmands occupy a patch of barren, inaccessible hills of about 1,200 square miles which abuts on the Durand Line on the west and is bounded on the south by the Kabul River and on the north by Bajaur. They have proven to be one of the most resistant of all the tribes to change. Below the Mohmand area are the Mullagoris, who extend into the Tartarra Range north of the Khyber, and are known locally as the descendants of Mullah Gor, son of Bayazid, Pir Roshan, founder of the Roshani sect. Consequently, they do not appear in the regular genealogies.⁷

The main center of the Mohmand country is Lalpura, just across the Afghan border where the hills break down into the Kabul River valley. The Mohmands in Pakistan have always been in fairly close touch with their relatives across the border, to whom they can readily flee when proscribed in their own country. Consequently, they have never been backward in expressing their annoyance with the British government. To a lesser extent, a similar situation still exists, and the Afghan proposal for an independent "Pukhtunistan" has excited more interest among the Mohmands than among most other tribes.

In general, the customs of the Mohmands are similar to those of the Yusufzai. However, they do differ in two important respects. The Mohmand khans and *maliks* have more influence than is the case among the traditionally democratic Yusufzai. This leads to more intense intratribal feuding, and has occasionally resulted in bitter contests between the *maliks* and the *mullahs*. The latter also play a more important role among the Mohmands than among most other tribes.

The second difference, although it has little political significance, marks the Mohmands as something close to barbarians in the eyes of

⁷ Sir Richard Warburton, *Eighteen Years in the Khyber* (London: J. Murray, 1900), pp. 7-8.

most of their fellow Pathans. This is simply the absence of *hujras*, or guest houses, in the villages of the Bar Mohmands, a lack that is interpreted by the other tribes to mean that the Mohmands do not place any great value on *melmastia*, or hospitality, which is the traditional duty of every Pathan.

THE AFRIDIS

The Afridi, whose claim to unblemished Pathan lineage has been questioned by several writers,⁸ has, ironically, come to represent the archetype of the Pathan. To him can be applied a whole catalogue of contradictory adjectives: brave, cautious, honorable, treacherous, cruel, gallant, superstitious, courteous, suspicious, and proud.

The tribe numbers about 250,000. It is divided into eight clearly distinct clans: Adam Khel, Aka Khel, Kamar Khel, Kambar Khel, Kuki Khel, Malikdin Khel, Zakka Khel, and Sipah. These occupy about 1,000 square miles of hilly country south and west of Peshawar. Through this area runs the Khyber Pass. To the south of the Pass is the Tirah, the Afridi homeland. Entrance to the Tirah is through the Khajuri Plain, and the Chora Valley. On the southwest, several small passes lead down into the Kurram Valley. To the north, the Khyber is accessible from the Tirah through many narrow gorges in the mountains.

All of the Afridi clans have their own areas in the Tirah, and most of them extend down into the Khyber over which they have always exercised the right of toll.⁹ The Malikdin Khel live in the center of the Tirah and hold Bagh, the traditional meeting place of Afridi *jirgas* or assemblies. The Aka Khel are scattered in the hills south of Jamrud. All of this area is included in the Khyber Agency. The Adam Khel live in the hills between Peshawar and Kohat. Their preserve is the Kohat Pass, in which several of the most important Afridi gun factories are located. This area is set

⁸ E.g., Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 62; Major R. T. I. Ridgway, *Pathans* (Calcutta: Government Press, 1918), p. 50; James, *op. cit.*, p. 64; Sir Mark Aurel Stein, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, July, 1925, pp. 402-403.

⁹ In the sixteenth century, the Afridis collected Rs. 125,000 a year from the Mogul Empire, in addition to individual levies on each traveler. By 1865, their receipts had dropped to Rs. 22,900 from the Amir of Afghanistan, plus an individual levy of Rs. 5 per laden camel (Rs. 3 if the load was food), Rs. 3 per horseman, and Rs. 1½ per unladen camel or pedestrian. Reliable figures on more recent subsidies paid by British India and Pakistan are not available, but there is little doubt they far exceed the Mogul figure.

aside in a separate strip of unadministered territory attached to Kohat District. Except for the Adam Khel, the Afridi clans are migratory, moving down out of the lofty Tirah to the lower hills and the Khajuri Plain in the winter.

Although the entire tribe proved itself capable of concerted action against both the Moguls and the British, the Afridis are given to bitter interclan feuds, leaving them little time for major quarrels with neighboring tribes. Most noted of the feuds are those between the Adam Khel and the Aka Khel and between the Kuki Khel and the Zakka Khel. The last-named clan, incidentally, is considered something of an archetype of the Afridis. It is reputed to be so untrustworthy that the other clans traditionally refuse to accept a Zakka Khel oath in a *jirga* unless it is accompanied by the giving of hostages. The bickering is enhanced by the considerable influence exercised among the Afridis by the *mullahs* and the adherence of the various clans to the Samil and Gar factions.

The Afridis are light-skinned, pleasant-looking men, somewhat slighter in stature than the Yusufzai. A Hebraic cast of features and a partiality for full beards, added to the grace with which most of the older men wear their flowing garments, convey an impression of an assembly of Old Testament prophets.

The Afridis, especially the Adam Khel, Kambar Khel, and Malikdin Khel, joined the British Indian army in greater numbers than most other tribes. The famous Khyber Rifles, whose headquarters are at Landi Kotal in the Khyber, have — except for periods when the British banned the Afridis from service because of revolt or intrigue — been very much an Afridi organization. In recent years, the Afridis have built up a profitable trucking business between various points within the Frontier and from Peshawar to Afghanistan. Much as the Sikhs in India, they also serve as the motor mechanics of northwestern Pakistan, and are capable of prolonging the life of the most decrepit vehicle almost indefinitely.

Despite the Afridis' willingness to participate in a *jihad* at the wave of a green flag, their religious laxity has been the subject of much concern to their fellow Pathans. In the seventeenth century, Khushal Khan Khat-tak, the great Pushtu poet and lifelong ally of the Afridis, lamented:

The call of the muezzin is not to be heard in Tirah, Unless it is the crowing of the cock at the dawn of day.

The Roshani heretics of the sixteenth century found a refuge in the Tirah after having been driven out by other more orthodox tribes, and

reportedly Pir Roshan, the founder of the sect, is still venerated there today.

Perhaps the Afridis' best answer to charges of irreligion, however, is a story they tell of themselves. One day long ago, a saintly *pir*, or holy man, came among the tribe. They paid homage to him and asked for his prayers. He denounced their lack of virtue and reviled them with the fact that in all their country they did not have a single shrine or tomb of a saint of their own whose intercession they might solicit. Impressed by the argument, the Afridis killed the *pir* on the spot and erected an impressive shrine over him at which they conducted their devotions thereafter.¹⁰

THE SHINWARIS

The Shinwaris, another small group of Sarbani Pathans, live at the extreme western end of the Khyber and in the hills skirting the lower part of the Jelalabad Valley of Afghanistan. The tribe numbers about 50,000. It is divided into the Mandehzai, Sangu Khel, Sipah, and Ali Sher Khel branches. Only the last has any members living on the Frontier (about 12,000). Although the tribe has been the source of much trouble to the rulers of Afghanistan, it has never been very important east of the Durand Line.

ORAKZAI

The Orakzais occupy an area of about 1,200 square miles centering on the Samana Crest, a southern ridge of the Safed Koh. They also extend into the southern valleys of the Tirah and the lower hills north of the Kurram Valley. All of them appear in the Pathan genealogy as descendants of Ghurghusht, but the various sections of the Orakzai seem really to be almost separate tribes. These are the Ismailzai, Massuzai, Daulatzai, Muhammad Khel, Sturi Khel, and Lashkarzai. The last are the largest and most powerful. One of their clans, the Mamuzai, were for years a noted thorn in the flesh of British administrators in Kurram and Kohat. Four vassal clans, the Ali Khel, Malla Khel, Mishti, and Sheikhan, live

¹⁰ The origin of this widely quoted story is frequently ascribed to some English author with a well-developed sense of humor. It is worth noting, however, that James, in his settlement report written in 1865, mentions it as being current among the Yusufzai, and it is still repeated by the Afridis today.

among the Orakzai, adding to the heterogeneity of the community. Their total number is about 95,000.

Feuds abound in the Orakzai country. The Gar and Samil factions divide subgroups within the clans as well as the clans themselves. Sectarian differences add to the hostility, the Mohammad Khel and half of the Sturi Khel, as well as various sections of the vassal clans, being Shia Muslims, while the rest of the Orakzai are Sunnis. These internal disagreements spill over into additional feuds with the Zaimusht, Afridis, Bangash, and Turis.

ZAIMUSHT

The Zaimusht, who dwell on the slopes of the hills around the mouth of the Kurram Valley and own a few villages on the plain, are also a clan of the Orakzai, according to some authorities.¹¹ However, they themselves claim to be Sarbani Pathans, and appear to be distinct from the Orakzai. They number about 70,000, and are noted chiefly for having produced the notorious Chikhai, Sarwar Khan of Chinarik, a successful freebooter who at one time virtually ruled the lower Kurram Valley.¹²

TURIS

The Turis are the main tribe in the Kurram Valley. They appear in the genealogy as Ghurghusht Pathans, but are Shia in religion. They have a definite Mongol cast of features and are fairly likely descendants of early Turkic conquerors. They claim to have originated with a Turkic family headed by Toghani which migrated eastward from Persia sometime before the establishment of the Mogul Empire in India. Early in the eighteenth century, they drove the Bangash out of the Kurram Valley.

A well-developed Turi social, religious, and legal framework, somewhat different from that of the other tribes, apparently persisted into the nineteenth century. Their body of customary law, known as *Turizuna*, was similar in structure to *Pukhtunwali*, the general code of the Pathans.

¹¹ E.g., Sir William Barton, *India's North-West Frontier* (London: J. Murray, 1939), p. 48.

¹² "Chikhai" died in 1903 at the hands of the Wazirs as a result of a feud. For an account of his exploits, see Barton, *op. cit.*, p. 103, and Theodore Leighton Pennell, *Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier* (London: Seeley, Service, 1927), pp. 277-286.

However, it provided for the tribe's Shia religion and the devotion of its members to one or another of the four great families of *pirs* or *sayyids* who lived in the area. As among the Yusufzai, landholdings were highly organized, and every true Turi still has at least a theoretical share in the tribal lands at the home villages of Peiwar and Malana.

Being Shias, the Turis suffered almost constantly from the persecution of their Sunni neighbors. Possessing the most fertile land of all the tribal territory, they also had something worth protecting. Consequently, they welcomed the British and made common cause with them at an early date. They have long been in close contact with the administered districts of Kohat and Bannu. As a result, they have tended to lose their independent tribal customs and outlook more completely than the other tribes along the border.

The Turis are divided into the Hamza Khel, Mastu Khel, Gandi Khel, Alizai, and Duparzai. Together with a few small vassal tribes, they number about 20,000. The Samil and Gar factions exist among the Turis, but under the names of Spin and Tor. Allegiance is also divided among the four *sayyid* families, the followers of three of which traditionally form the Sust Gundi as opposed to the disciples of the fourth family who comprise the Ting Gundi.

THE BANGASH

The Bangash were the previous inhabitants of the Kurram Valley and many of them still dwell in the lower reaches of the valley. The rest occupy a narrow strip running from the mouth of the Kurram Valley to the Indus. The main center of the Bangash is Hangu. The tribe numbers about 10,000, and is divided into the Miranzai, Baizai, and Samilzai. Like the Orakzai, some are Shia and some Sunni. Almost all belong to the Gar faction. The tribesmen are quiet, reserved, and hard-working. Many have served in the British Indian and Pakistani armies.

WAZIRS

The Wazirs are the most important tribe in the tangle of mountains which runs south for more than a hundred miles below Kurram. This area is divided into the tribal agencies of North Waziristan, the headquarters of which is at Miranshah, and South Waziristan, which has headquarters

at Tank in the winter and Wana in the summer. The Wazirs are descendants of Ghurghusht. They appeared in their present territory as early as the fourteenth century, and today number about 200,000, a few of whom live in Afghanistan.

The tribe is frequently known as the Darwesh Khel to distinguish it from the Mahsuds who are also Wazirs by origin. It is divided into two great branches; the Utmanzai and the Ahmadzai, who occupy an arc astride the Durand Line from the mouth of the Gomal to the mouth of the Kurram Valley. On the Pakistan side of the border, the Utmanzai are concentrated in North Waziristan and the Ahmadzai live generally in South Waziristan, though some are scattered throughout the entire Waziristan area.

The two branches break up into at least four distinct levels of subgroups, making for almost three hundred separate clans. The most important groups — each of which includes several subgroups — are the Madda Khel, Kabul Khel, Isparka, Nasruddin, Hathi Khel, and Tori Khel. The Fakir of Ipi, the most renowned “hostile” of recent years, was a Tori Khel.

To some extent the Wazirs are migratory. They move their small herds of sheep and goats up and down the hills according to the seasons. The Wazirs speak Pushtu with a distinctive accent, and dress largely in black and dark colors in contrast to their northern neighbors who prefer lighter-colored clothes. The British found them peaceful and cordial when contact was first established,¹³ but in later years they gave the Government of India more trouble than any other single tribe. As late as 1937-38, several British Indian divisions were involved in Waziristan in what amounted to almost full-scale war.

Consequently, they enjoy a reputation for treachery and ruthlessness. Nonetheless, they are a brave and virile people, passionately fond of their barren hills; they have won the respect of many of the Pakistani political officers who have dealt with them. It must be admitted, however, that they do not seem to inspire the personal admiration and fondness which is frequently accorded by outsiders to the Afridis, or even to the Mahsuds, wilder brothers of the Wazirs.

The process of migration, which has pretty well run its course in other areas of the Frontier, has not yet been completed in the case of the Wazirs. More fierce and numerous than their Daur, Bannuchi, and Bangash neighbors, the Wazirs might have been expected to have seized

¹³ Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, p. 385. Elphinstone's opinion was confirmed by Edwardes in 1847, Taylor in 1852, Temple in 1854, and MacGregor in 1863.

the relatively fertile land held by these tribes rather than to have remained in their inhospitable hills. This was to some extent at least prevented by the bitterness of their clashes with the British who extended their protection over the more tractable tribes. Unable to destroy the British power, the Wazirs stayed in their hills, making an occasional foray onto the plains, and frustrating a long series of British attempts to establish the imperial power in the hills.

Since the creation of Pakistan, the Wazirs have begun a gradual descent from their hills. Some have enlisted in the army and the scouts. However, until large new tracts of land can be developed and made available to them in the Derajat or the presently uncultivable parts of the Bannu Plain, the majority of the Wazirs will probably remain in their hills and depend for support primarily on government subsidies.

The Wazirs played a large role in raising Nadir Khan to the throne of Afghanistan in 1929 after the overthrow of King Amanullah, and they still retain a fairly close contact — in part friendly and in part hostile — with Kabul.

MAHSUDS

The Mahsuds live surrounded on three sides by the Wazirs with the fourth, or eastern side being occupied by the Bhattanis. The Mahsuds have long-standing feuds with both of their neighbors. This accounts — in addition to their long history of rebellion against the British and Sikhs — for their reputation as the wildest of all the Pathans. As already indicated, the Mahsuds are really nothing more than one division of the Wazirs. Any attempt to explain this to a Mahsud, however, is to invite a sudden and violent end to scholarship.

The Mahsuds number about 100,000, and are divided into three branches: Bahlolzai, Alizai, and Shaman Khel. Like the Wazirs, these are further subdivided to the second and third power. The most important subgroups are the Shabi Khel, Manzai Khel, Nana Khel, and Aimal Khel.

The Mahsud country centers on Kaniguram and Makin. It extends down into parts of the Gomal, the Tank Zam, and onto the edge of the Wana Plain. The Mahsuds are even more dynamic and aggressive than the Wazirs. They are also under pressure of an even more rapidly increasing population. In recent years, large numbers have left their territory to work in semi-military labor battalions, building roads in other parts of the Frontier. Others will occasionally appear in such unlikely

occupations as house servants in Karachi, deckhands on a coastal steamer, or truck drivers practically anywhere. Mahsuds took over most of the shops in the Tank bazaar after the Hindus fled in 1947. Those who remain at home continue their step-by-step encroachment on the land of the Wazirs, and there are pieces of disputed land on the edge of the Wana Plain on which as much blood as water is shed annually.

In the middle of the Mahsud country, chiefly in and around Kaniguram, live the Urmurs. This small tribe has its own language called Bargista and its own traditions and customs, although these have been pretty well merged into the Pathan culture which surrounds the Urmurs. The Urmurs appear in the genealogy as Sarbani Pathans, but their Pathan origin is questionable. They are obviously dependent completely on the Mahsuds, but a remarkable good-fellowship and equality appear to exist between the two tribes, and the Urmurs support their more powerful neighbors enthusiastically in the fight with the Wazirs. The whole tribe numbers only a few thousand.

BHITTANIS

The Bhattanis are spread over a fairly large area east of Waziristan from the Marwat Plain south to the Gomal. Some are located within Tribal Territory, while others dwell in Dera Ismail Khan District. They number about 43,000, and are divided into three branches: the Tatta, the Dhana, and the Uraspan.

The tribe claims descent from Baitan, the third son of Kais, but they have little in common with the Ghilzai. The Bhattanis have occasionally allied themselves with or against their neighbors, but in general appear to be a low spirited group, lacking the dynamic qualities of both Wazir and Mahsud. They are referred to locally as "the jackals of the Wazirs".

DAURS

The fourth tribe which inhabits Waziristan is the Daur. They are regarded by their neighbors as being the worst possible examples of Pathans — if indeed their Pathan origin is not denied altogether. Tradition has it that they are descended from a concubine of one of the lesser lights of the early Ghurghusht patriarchs, and the idea that the Daur are some kind of illegitimate or half-caste Pathans remains fixed among the other tribes.

The Daur number about 50,000, and are divided into the Tappizad, Idak, and Mallizad. These in turn break down into several dozen sub-groups. The Daur or Tochi Valley is one of the few fertile areas in Waziristan, and the wonder is that they were able to hold it until the British became strong enough to protect it for them.

Every imaginable vice — cowardice, filthiness, opium addiction, and unnatural licentiousness — has been ascribed to the Daur both by their compatriots and by foreigners.¹⁴ However, from the author's personal observation, it must be said that when left alone to do so, they cultivate their little valley assiduously and are willing to trade their meager products of shoes and leather goods to all comers in the Miranshah bazaar.

SETTLED TRIBES

All or most of the tribes discussed above live in Tribal Territory or have a close connection with it. Numerous other tribes and subtribes, who are true Pathans but have to varying degrees lost their contact with the hills, live in the six settled districts. This group maintains the Pathan heritage and customs but its tribal structure has been greatly weakened by a settled agricultural life and the necessity of submitting to governmental administration.

The Daudzai, Muhammadzai, and Khalils constitute the backbone of the hard-working yeomanry of the Peshawar Valley. Each group has its own particular area, but mixed villages also exist. Although the influence of the clan is still powerful, it is frequently unable to exert itself as an entity in the face of the outside economic and political influences which come to bear on its individual members. Consequently, though honor is as dear to the settled Pathan as to his hillman brother, the former must find an individual basis for upholding it, since he cannot rely on tribal activity. This may account in part for the abnormally high homicide rate in the otherwise peaceful agricultural villages which dot the fertile valley.

Two of the plains tribes further south are fairly large in numbers. They also serve to exemplify the divergent directions which the Pathan character can take, and consequently deserve mention.

¹⁴ See E. E. Oliver, *Across the Border of Pathan and Biloch* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1890), p. 121; Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 66; Barton, *op. cit.*, p. 53; Ridgway, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

BANNUCHIS

The Bannuchis, who occupy Bannu City and the plain around it, are to the settled Pathans what the Daurs are to the hillmen. They claim to be descendants of Ghurghusht but are a mixture of Mogul, Durrani, Punjabi, and Hindustani blood, with probable strains of Turkic, Iranian, and aboriginal as well. They are divided into seven separate clans. The Bannu bazaar is a clearing house for goods from all over the Frontier, and the fields and orchards which surround the city provide much of the food for the nearby hills.

KHATTAKS

The Khattaks have been described by an authoritative foreign writer as "the most favorable specimens of Pathans on the whole Frontier",¹⁵ and this opinion seems to be shared by many of their neighbors. The tribe appears to be possessed of all the courage and aggressiveness of the hillmen, and at the same time its members are given to a remarkable degree of straightforwardness and restraint in their dealings among themselves and with others. In appearance, they are a sturdy, light-skinned group, noted for their cleanliness. They appear to be both able and content to follow the twin careers they have adopted of warrior and farmer.

The tribe claims descent from Ghurghusht, and is divided, mainly on a geographic basis, into three sections: the Seni Khattaks, the Akora Khattaks, and the Saghri Khattaks, the latter living east of the Indus. The Khattak lands run along the Indus River from above Attock down to about fifteen miles north of Kalabagh. The southern portion extends westward to the mouth of the Kurram Valley. The Seni Khattaks are located in Kohat District; the Akora Khattaks in the northern part of Mardan. None dwell in Tribal Territory.

Historically, the Khattaks come closer to being a nation than any of the other tribes. From the time they came into their present territory in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the whole tribe has been led more or less consistently by one chief, and the equality which each man claimed did not lead to the semi-anarchy which prevailed among many of the other tribes.¹⁶ The Khattaks had early and relatively close relations

¹⁵ Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

¹⁶ According to Khattak tradition, the tribe got its name in the following manner. Four Pathan brothers, Lukman, Usman, Utman, and Jadran, were hunting to-

with the sophisticated Moguls. Akor, a Khattak chief, received grants of land from Akbar in return for protecting the Attock ferry and the road onward to Peshawar. Khushal Khan, before his break with the Moguls, captured a fort in Ajmere which had defied the efforts of several Mogul generals.¹⁷

The Khattaks attained a relatively high degree of social organization and culture at an early date. The subdivisions of the tribe are more complex than those of the other Pathan groups, and a kind of aristocracy of blood exists. The most noted clans are the Khan Khel, from which have come all the chiefs of both the Seni and the Akora Khattaks, and the Fakir Khel, descendants of a brother of Khushal Khan Khattak.

POWINDAHS

A certain amount of seasonal migration among some of the hill tribes permanently resident on the Frontier has already been noted. However, the largest and most important migration takes place among the *powindahs*, or, as they are called in Afghanistan, *kuchis*. These people come down in the fall from the Afghan highlands. They cross the border through the Khyber, Kurram, Tochi, Gomal, and by a hundred lesser-known routes, and spread out all over the Frontier and beyond into Sind and the Punjab. In the spring they return to Afghanistan, frequently penetrating into the Hazarajat and clashing with the Hazaras who live on the high plateau of central Afghanistan. The movement takes place every year and may include anything from 100,000 to 300,000 people.

Powindah, as the word is used on the Frontier, means simply nomad. Most of the nomads, however, are Pathans and almost all of them speak

gether. They met four veiled girls. Usman, Utman, and Jadran wanted to cast lots for the girls, but Lukman insisted that he be given first choice because he was the eldest. He chose the girl in the finest clothes. When the veils were removed she proved to be the ugliest. The others jeered, "Lukman has got into the *khata* (mud)!" As a result his descendants were known as Khattaks. — Usman was thin and ugly. Some visitors to his house once asked his servants, "Who or what is that?" The servants replied, "That too is *afridah* (a creature of God)". Hence Usman's descendants were known as Afridis. Utman's descendants, incidentally, are known simply as the Utman Khel. See "Tarikh-i-Murassa" written by Afzal Khan about 1690 in *Khalid-i-Afghani*, trans. Trevor Chichele Plowden (Lahore: Munshi Gulab Singh, 1893), pp. 187-188.

¹⁷ F. H. Pollock, "Rough Notes on the Khattuks of the Teree Country and the Khurah on the Right Bank of the Indus below Attok", *Selections from the Public Correspondence of the Administration for the Affairs of the Punjab* (Lahore, 1857), I, 41.

Pushtu. They belong to the Ghilzai branch of the Pathans whose historic home is around Kandahar and the Ghazni Plain. Among the more important individual tribes are the Sulaiman Khel, Ali Khel, Aka Khel, Taraki, Nasirs, Tokhis, Hotaks, and Khoroti.

There is no uniformity and little apparent organization to the migration. In some cases whole villages move as a unit, driving their flocks before them, to set up summer homes on the eastern skirts of the border hills. Other groups consist of men who have deposited their families somewhere en route and whose purpose is to bring down goods to trade in Pakistan. At one time, the *powindahs* were important carriers in the caravan trade between Central Asia and India, but at present most of their imports consist of crudely-tanned hides and skins and the rough-hewn timber produced in the Afghan highlands.

Some groups are evidently prosperous and travel with all the luxuries of Central Asian caravans: hordes of livestock and camels, furniture, servants, and liberal food stocks. Others are in dire poverty and come down simply to offer themselves for the hardest kind of agricultural labor in return for food and fodder for their few animals. Some have no animals at all and trudge along living as best they can off the barren countryside. A few are moneylenders, traditionally but incorrectly known as "Kabulis" among the villages of Sind and the Punjab where their transactions involve only a few rupees in capital but bring a profit of several hundred percent.

The Durand Line, which has left such a long and bloody mark in history, formerly presented no problem to the *powindahs*. Traditionally, they have passed over it unknowingly on some remote hillside or been waved across it without formality by the guards at the regular border crossings. In Pakistan, sugar and wheat ration cards and other privileges similar to those enjoyed by the permanent inhabitants have been accorded them.¹⁸ For many years, the Pakistani Government made no effort to stop the migration, since the *powindahs* provided needed seasonal agricultural labor at a minimum cost and also took back with them into Afghanistan stories of the relative prosperity of the people on the Pakistani side of the border.¹⁹ In recent years, as a result of an increase in

¹⁸ This continued a practice begun by the British almost as soon as they took over the Frontier. See "Memorandum, Dera Ismail Khan", *Selections from the Records of the Government of India, 1852* (Calcutta: Government of India, n.d.).

¹⁹ Under a new policy, adopted after this chapter was prepared for the press, the Government of Pakistan closed the border to the *powindahs* in the winter of 1961-62. It now appears that this last great migration of the world's peoples has ended.

their armament — which presumably also reflects some increase in their prosperity — the nomads have become better able to protect themselves against the attacks of predatory tribesmen (mainly the Wazirs and Mahsuds).

SAYYIDS AND MIANS

Scattered throughout both the settled and hill tribes are *sayyid* and *mian* families. These exercise considerable influence on village life, an influence usually based on the sanctity of the founder of the family. The *sayyids* claim to be direct descendants of the Holy Prophet and usually have certain hereditary religious functions. These are chiefly legalistic or ritualistic, and while the *sayyids* have been the source of much trouble among the tribes, a *sayyid* is not usually as influential as a *mullah* or *pir* who, in addition to his assumed religious role, often has an integral place in the warrior hierarchy of the clan. The *sayyids* marry almost exclusively among themselves, but otherwise have little to distinguish them from their neighbors. Few know any Arabic, and they are thoroughly Pathan in culture.

Both Sunni and Shia *sayyid* families exist, but the latter appear to command more influence among their people than the former. In the nineteenth century, the amirs of Afghanistan frequently used the *sayyids* to stir up sectarian troubles between the tribes and to counter British influence.

The *mians* are also hereditary families. They correspond in a sense to the Brahmins of Hindu India, although they do not have as direct a religious function as either Brahmin or *sayyid*. The family usually gets its title as a result of the scholarship or wisdom of its founder. Although illiterate *mians* abound, most of the families are educated above the average and follow various "learned" professions; school-teaching, compounding medicine, and the like. The *mians* also tend to intermarry among themselves, but they are more closely integrated in the clan system than the *sayyids*.

PESHAWARIS

The inhabitants of the Frontier capital are called simply Peshawaris. They are the cosmopolites of the Pathan area. They have no place in the genealogy although they are completely Pathan in culture. There is no

doubt that they are a separate breed, but it is difficult to say with any precision what has gone into that breed. The most distinctive element is probably Kashmiri.

The first Englishman to visit the city of Peshawar set the number of its inhabitants at about 100,000 in 1809. He described them as:

... men of all nations and languages in every variety of dress and appearance ... mixed people of the town in white turbans, some in large white or blue frocks and others in sheepskin coats. . . Persians and Afghans in brown woolen tunics or flowing mantles and cape of black sheepskin or coloured silk . . . Khyberees with the straw sandals and the wild dress and air of their mountains . . . Hazarehs, not more remarkable for their conical caps of skin, with the wool appearing like a fringe round the edge, and for their broad faces and little eyes, than for their want of the beard, which is the ornament of every other face in the city. . . a few women with long white veils that reach their feet . . .²⁰

Twenty years later, when the great traveler Charles Masson rode into the city on the elephant on which he had crossed the Kohat Pass, he found "a strange medley of mixed races, of Tajiks, Hindkis, Panjabis, Kashmiris, etc., proverbially roguish and litigious".²¹

After another twenty-five years, Herbert Edwardes, one of the first British administrators to reside on the Frontier, wrote of the city: "It has a large and busy and thriving population of wild and warlike people, all armed with knives and daggers, and naturally inclined to think little of pointing their arguments with the sword".²²

The continuing cosmopolitan character of the city was reflected in the first census taken in 1868. This recorded no less than thirty-one separate major castes, tribes, and races present in the city — including, strangely, seventeen Americans. A breakdown by profession revealed, among others, 2,767 government employees, 1,452 police, 2,151 priests (*mullahs*), 4 printers, 1 jeweller, 5 drug sellers, 2,411 blacksmiths, 1,701 goldsmiths, 4,806 beggars, 1,201 female musicians, 147 dancing girls, and 307 prostitutes.²³

²⁰ Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57.

²¹ Masson, *op. cit.*, I, 131.

²² Herbert B. Edwardes, *Memorials of the Life and Letters of Major General Sir Herbert B. Edwardes*, 2 vols. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co., 1886), I, 227.

²³ Government of India, *Central Asia*, Part I: "A Contribution Towards the Better Knowledge of the Topography, Ethnography, Statistics, and History of the North-West Frontier of British India", compiled by C. M. MacGregor, 3 vols. (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1873), II, 585.

Later descriptions retain the same exotic flavor, and Peshawar today still captures the imagination of the visitor and excites him to whatever efforts at vivid description he can produce. The city has never had great importance as a market or industrial center. It takes its importance from its strategic position as a crossroads of commerce and nerve center of the whole Frontier. It is also the administrative and military headquarters. Its influence reaches — however tenuously — into the farthest corner of the tribal agencies, and the mosques and bazaars of the city act as a lodestone which draws almost every Pathan at least once in his life to see its sights and hear its sounds.²⁴ The city is the rich ornament of the valley, and, in addition to the delights it offers the peaceful visitor, has always, in theory at least, also been the potential prize of the hillman's *lashkar* (war party).

To the west of the old city, a neat cantonment with broad, tree-lined streets and spacious gardens has grown up. Here are the offices and homes of Westerners and the Pakistani officials who are responsible for administration of the Frontier. The gates of both city and cantonment still close at sundown. Although "obviously law-abiding" folk can pass in and out after dark with little formality, few of them do so without a little thrill of adventure and the memory that the last time the Afridis overran the city was 1930.

OTHER PEOPLES

The Pathans have dominated the Frontier since they first moved into the area. However, some non-Pathan elements have managed to maintain a separate identity. Most of the small non-Muslim tribes and castes who dotted the Frontier — including the wildest tribal areas — before 1947 have migrated to India, although a few Hindus, and even, it is said, Sikhs, remain as individuals protected by various Pathan clans.

The Baluch tribes who live along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border further south extend into parts of the Derajat. A few smaller groups retain their distinctive language and customs but most have adopted Pushtu and intermingled with the Pathan tribes.

²⁴ Peshawar's new and rapidly growing university is also once again making it an educational center. Elphinstone (Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, p. 189) noted in the beginning of the nineteenth century that many more students came to Peshawar from Bokhara than went from Peshawar to Bokhara. The saintly wisdom of the *mullahs* of Hushtnuggar drew students from all over the Muslim world until close to the end of the century.

Scattered throughout the central part of the Frontier are various Muslim groups of Indian origin. All of these people are referred to as Hindkis. Most important among them are the Gujars, who are concentrated among the Yusufzai and serve them as artisans and tenant farmers. The Gujars and the Awans, a similar group, resemble the Pathans in almost every respect and, away from the Frontier, frequently pass as Yusufzai. They have no place in the clan structure, however, and at home are regarded as socially inferior, though loyal and industrious satellites.

The inhabitants of the Hazara District, east of the Indus, are of mixed origins. For the most part their culture and descent are more Punjabi and Kashmiri than Pathan. However, about twenty percent of the people of Hazara speak Pushtu, and there are several distinct tribal groupings. Of these, the most important are the Jaduns, Tarins, Dilazaks, Tarkhelis, and Mishwanis.

The Jaduns occupy an area stretching up from just above Haripur to just below Mansehra, including Abbottabad, the district capital. They claim descent from Ghurghusht and migrated from west of the Indus to their present home in the seventeenth century. The tribe is divided into three main sections, the Hassanzai, the Salars, and the Mansurs. The Tarins occupy the Haripur plain to the west and south of Haripur. They are Sarbani Pathans, and have a long history of resistance to both the Sikhs and the British, a history of which they are very proud. Their most distinguished son today is Muhammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan.

The Dilazaks, according to their own account, were driven out of Afghanistan by the Mogul Emperor Babur. They are few in number but have maintained a distinct identity. They live mostly at the eastern end of the Haripur plain. The Tarkhelis live in the extreme southwestern corner of Hazara District along the Indus not far above Attock. They seem to number only a few thousand today. The Mishwanis are the Tarkhelis' northern neighbors. Many of them claim to be *sayyids* as well as Pathans. They too have a history of resistance to the Sikhs.

In the northern part of Hazara District, in Gilgit, and in a large arc stretching northeastward through the Himalayas to Indus Kohistan, Upper Swat, and Chitral, live a people whom the Pathans call Kohistanis ("People of the Mountains"). There are many different languages and racial groups within this complex, but all bear a certain resemblance to each other. They seem to be the result of a mingling over the centuries of Mongol, Chinese, Iranian, and Pathan blood with that of the original Aryan invaders of the subcontinent. Some of them, such as the ruling family in Hunza, claim to be direct descendants of Alexander's Greeks.

The Shia sect is predominant in this area, which has close cultural connections with the territory around Kashgar in Sinkiang beyond the Himalayas. One group, the Kafirs, who dwell in three small valleys in southern Chitral, has never been converted to Islam, and still follows a form of nature worship.

One large group, which claims Pathan origin, is the Swatis, who dwell along both sides of the Indus in the river's upper reaches. These people were apparently the original inhabitants of the Swat Valley, hence their name. They were driven out by the Yusufzai in the seventeenth century. In modern times they have been largely cut off from the Pathan community, if indeed they were even a part of it, and should not be confused with the present inhabitants of Swat, many of whom, as noted earlier, are Yusufzai Pathans.

The most important of the Himalayan groups is the Chitralis. These people hold the extreme northwestern corner of the Frontier. Their language is Khowar, and in it their country is called Kho. They number about 100,000, and are separated from Dir and Swat by the 11,000-foot Lawari Pass which constitutes the only practicable entrance to the state from the south.

The Chitralis are divided into three major divisions: (1) the Adamzada, who constitute the nobility, headed by the family of the ruler, who is known as the *Mehtar*, (2) the Arbabzada, petty officials and tradespeople, and (3) the *Fakir-i-miskin*, "the people of poverty".²⁵

²⁵ The mass of the people are hard-working and inoffensive. However, the Adamzada have as bloody a dynastic history as any ruling group in the world. In 1892, when the Great Mehtar, Aman-ul-Mulk, died, 16 of his 17 sons were disposed of violently in the struggle for succession. The problem was finally solved when the British moved in and installed on the throne the remaining son — "Shuja-ul-Mulk, an intelligent, trustworthy, little boy, nine or ten years old". See Frank E., and George John Younghusband, *The Relief of Chitral* (London: Macmillan, 1895), p. 17.

III

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

INTRODUCTION

Because of their ferocity and inaccessibility, the Pathans have been less subjected than many of their fellow "primitives" in other parts of the world to ink-blot tests, anthropometrics, and statistical anthropology. Fortunately, therefore, any attempt to characterize them must rely primarily on their own writings and actions and the experiences of those relatively few outsiders who have had close contact with them.

The principal impression which emerges from such a study is that the Pathan is above all an individualist, despite the rigid behavior standards prescribed by clan membership. Nonetheless, there are important traditional and social factors which guide community life and in many cases influence or even determine the actions of individuals. These mores vary considerably in different parts of the Pathan area, and codification of them is virtually impossible. However, certain of them are almost universal, and some knowledge of these is essential to an understanding of what the Pathan is and how he got that way.

PUKHTUNWALI

Khushal Khan boasts in one of his poems:

I despise the man who does not guide his life by honor,
The very word 'honor' drives me mad.
What madman cares whether he gains or loses a fortune!

The demands of honor are set forth in *Pukhtunwali*, sometimes called *Nang-i-Pukhtun*, which may be translated as "The Pukhtun Code" or "The Way of the Pathan". Throughout the Pushtu-speaking area, it is

virtually impossible to find even a child — male or female — who is not keenly aware of the main elements of *Pukhtunwali*. It goes back as far as Pathan history goes, and, according to tradition, a good deal beyond. Lengthy volumes of commentary have been written on it in the vernacular, and some of the finer points are subject to endless arguments among the authorities. For the most part, however, the broad philosophic concepts on which most systems of law are based are beyond the Pathan's horizon, and the ordinary regulatory laws with their myriad "do's and don't's" are beneath his contempt. Therefore he guides his life on the basis of a few simple principles.

BADAL

The first and greatest of these is *badal*, revenge regardless of cost or consequence. There are indications that originally *badal* was to be taken only by the victim — or in the case of a murder, by the victim's family — against the individual who had committed the hurt or insult.¹ However, the obligation of *badal* has for a long time rested on the insulted or injured clan as a whole and can be wiped out by action against the clan of the aggressor as well as against the individual concerned. This has given rise to the blood-feuds which dominate many intertribal relationships and has resulted in the wiping out of whole families and small tribes.² *Badal* permits no limitation in time or space, and the obligation remains as long as a single member of the clan survives. Occasional killings in such non-Pathan environments as Calcutta and Singapore are found to be the result of a feud which had its beginnings in some distant year in the Khyber or the Gomal.

MELMASTIA

The second greatest demand of *Pukhtunwali* is *melmastia*, hospitality and protection to every guest. It is exercised by the tribesmen to a degree frequently embarrassing to the guest — whether he be foreigner who knows he will never be in a position to return it, or fellow-tribesman who may fear that he will not be in a position to return it adequately when the occasion demands.

¹ See Government of India, *Central Asia*, Part I, III, p. 266.

² See Pennell, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

Melmastia enjoins the obligation of protection as it does that of nourishment — although both obligations cease the moment the guest has passed beyond the doorstep of the host or the limits of his territorial responsibility. On occasion, protection may be extended into a wider sphere by proclaiming the visitor the guest of a particular chieftain or clan as long as he remains within the Pathan community. This is traditionally symbolized by the giving of a possession of the sponsoring chieftain, perhaps a dagger or a garment, which the guest wears as a symbol of the protection he is under. A formal escort or guarantee of safe conduct to a stranger, emissary, or even enemy, is called *badragga*.³ Violence or hurt of any kind is almost never offered to a bonafide guest, regardless of how poor or distasteful he may be — both because of the high regard in which the obligation of *melmastia* is held and because of the obligation to take *badal* which would automatically be placed upon the host. Anyone who can gain access to the presence, most especially the house, of a Pathan can claim asylum from the host regardless of the previous relationship between them. Incidents have occurred where innocent men died defending strangers or even their own personal enemies who demanded refuge while being pursued by hostile forces.

While the British administrators generally respected *Pukhtunwali* and allowed the independent tribes to conduct their lives in accord with it, the obligations of *melmastia* frequently led to difficulties. Under the British principle of joint tribal responsibility, the government insisted that the tribes refuse protection to and deliver up individuals who were charged with serious crimes committed in the settled districts and who had taken refuge in the hills. Individual hosts and often whole clans refused. Neither side was prepared to abandon principle. Subsidies were cut off, expeditions mounted, bridges blown up, and pickets ambushed, and another flare-up took place on the Frontier.

One of the first British administrators on the Frontier, who had little else good to say about his charges, confessed in his official report: "For gold, they will do almost anything except betray a guest". He adds: "Any person who can make his way into their dwellings will not only be safe,

³ Alexander Burnes, British emissary to the Court of Kabul, begged for and was given an Afridi *badragga* when he passed through the Khyber Pass in 1837, Sir Alexander Burnes, *Cabool: A Personal Narrative of a Journey and Residence in that City in the years 1836, 7, and 8* (London: J. Murray, 1843). The extremes to which *Pukhtunwali* can be carried are portrayed fictionally but realistically in the story, "The Lovers of Kandahar", which appears in Count Gobineau, *Tales of Asia* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1947).

but will be kindly received".⁴ The only violation of *melmastia* which is generally accepted — although it does involve the doer in *badal* — is the practice, especially common in Waziristan, of covertly sniping at a foreign visitor when he is the territory of an enemy tribe. This is intended to bring down the wrath of the authorities on the tribe in whose territory the offense is committed.

Revenge and hospitality are the two great commandments of *Pukhtunwali*. There are a number of other more specific customs and traditions which have been institutionalized among the tribes to varying degrees and which merit mention in a discussion of "The Way of the Pathan".

NANAWATI

About one of these, *nanawati*, there is considerable confusion. Most of the British writers, including the authoritative ones like Davies and Caroe, define *nanawati* simply as asylum or sanctuary, the obligation of giving protection to anyone, even an enemy, who demands it. Caroe calls *nanawati* an extension of *melmastia*. He defines it as a "verbal noun carrying the meaning of 'coming in'".⁵

This definition does not appear to be recognized among the Pathans themselves. The concepts of asylum and sanctuary are known and accepted as part of *melmastia*. *Nanawati*, today at least, is a very different thing. It is a "going in" or a "giving in" to an enemy, carrying with it a connotation of great shame for the one who undertakes it and no obligation to accept it on the part of the one to whom it is offered. For example, a tribesman has acted against another in a way to bring revenge against himself. He or his family are either too weak or too cowardly to face the consequences. Before the revenge is taken, he goes to his enemy, admits his guilt, and throws himself upon his enemy's mercy. Further abasing himself, he may perhaps bring with him his women, unveiled and bearing the Holy Koran, to aid the effort to appease his enemy. If the enemy is willing, he may accept a sheep from the penitent; a *jirga* may

⁴ Richard Temple, "Report Showing the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes, Independent and Dependant, on the North-West Frontier of the Punjab", in *Selections from the Records of the Government of India, 1856* (Calcutta: Government of India, n.d.), p. 55.

⁵ Caroe, *op. cit.*, p. 351; Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 49. An earlier British authority provides a double definition for *nanawati*: "protection given to anyone who may in extremity seek an asylum under a roof, or mediation resorted to by a person, generally the weaker party, who seeks to make peace with someone he has injured". Ridgway, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

be held, and the obligation and right of *badal* renounced. *Nanawati*, thus, is surrender rather than sanctuary. The Pathans being what they are, precious little of it is practiced on the Frontier.

The terms "*habeas corpus*" and "Fifth Amendment" have no meaning for the Pathans. The tribesmen do, however, have their own glossary of legal phrases which cover equally important concepts. A *jirga* may declare one man *dushman*, the officially recognized enemy of another. The latter then has a right, recognized and approved by the community, to kill the offender. On the other hand, a *jirga* may declare that a man who has been killed is *toi*, literally, "spilled", that is, his death occurred in pursuit of a feud, the score is now even, tit-for-tat has been taken, and no revenge killing is justified.

Another kind of killing, which is not justified by *Pukhtunwali* but is nonetheless unfortunately common, is *meerata*. This is a murder accomplished for the specific purpose of removing the victim from the line of inheritance so that property will pass to the murderer or to someone more favored by the murderer.

The concepts of *jhagh* and *tor* are frequently involved in relations between the sexes. A man who wishes a particular girl for his bride and is fearful that he may lose her to someone else, either because he lacks the qualifications required by her family or because negotiations for betrothal to another are underway, may declare unilaterally that he has *jhagh*, a claim, on her, thereby announcing that anyone else who attempts to claim her will have to deal with him first. (This at least gets him involved in the negotiations for the lady's hand in one way or another, even if it doesn't always get him the lady.)

Tor (literally "black") is a state of open guilt or infamy. For instance, if it becomes known that a woman has been involved in an illicit love affair with a man, she is pronounced to be *tor* with the man (and he *tor* with her), and they both may be killed.

A *sharmala* is a particular *jirga* convoked, usually by the offender or his representatives, to seek a negotiated settlement of a quarrel or feud. Compensation is agreed upon; sheep may be given; a daughter may be offered in marriage to a son.

A truce in a feud (which may eventually become a settlement) arranged by a *jirga* or the government is symbolized by the setting out of a stone, *tiga*, and the word is virtually synonymous with the making of an at least temporary peace.

Amr-i-maruf is a generally recognized settlement of a petty quarrel in the community. Usually the *mullahs* of a particular area, led by one

of their number and with the at least tacit approval of the *maliks*, go about as a self-constituted arbitration and mediation committee, seeking to remove source of dissension, *e.g.*, popular resentment at the usurious rates charged by a particular moneylender. Their decisions are generally accepted.

THE VALUE OF PUKHTUNWALI

Despite the fact that it has perpetuated the blood feud, *Pukhtunwali* provides for what is probably the maximum possible amount of law and order in a society of warrior tribes. While it is true that for the most part it is the individual who acts on the code, the community at large judges with remarkable unanimity the righteousness of his action and supports it or opposes it. *Pukhtunwali* is still by all odds the strongest force in the tribal area, and the hill Pathans, unlike their brothers in Afghanistan and the settled districts of Pakistan, accept no law but their own. By virtue of their remoteness and power, the hillmen have kept their tribal society intact, and consequently are to a large extent free of the cultural and psychological tensions which plague the more "civilized" Pathans, who find that the requirements of *Pukhtunwali* are frequently frustrated by Pakistan's British-type civil law. Economic, social, and political pressures will undoubtedly change this situation in time, although they have had remarkably little effect on it in the last hundred years, but for the present at least the hill tribes live by the code of their ancestors with remarkably few concessions to the rest of the world.

The integrity of *Pukhtunwali* as a determining standard of behavior has occasionally been challenged by critics of British and Pakistani tribal administration. This argument holds that *Pukhtunwali* is primarily a cultural tradition, that it was never meant to take the place of more formal law, and that it achieved its present eminence only by virtue of the British and Pakistani refusal, for strategic and security reasons, to allow the Pathans the benefit of nineteenth- and twentieth-century legal developments. The added point is made that the only legal recognition afforded the tribal code was in the Frontier Crimes Regulations which were aimed more at suppression than development of the tribes.

The argument has an element of validity. It is certainly true that *Pukhtunwali* owes its position in the tribal area at least in part to the absence of any competing system of law. However, it is also true that the Pathan tribes on the Afghan side of the border, who are at least

nominally subject to the same national and *shariat* laws as the rest of Afghanistan, also still guide their affairs by *Pukhtunwali*. The lack of a competing system of law among the Pakistani hill tribes appears to be due less to the refusal of the British and Pakistanis to offer it to them than to the tribes' refusal to accept it. This they still do, although they are eager to enjoy the benefits of schools and medical care. Unlike their brothers on the plains, they are still in a position to pick and choose as far as the benefits of civilization are concerned.

THE JIRGA

A *jirga* in its simplest form is merely an assembly. Practically all community business, both public and private, is subject to its jurisdiction. In its operation, it is probably the closest thing to Athenian democracy that has existed since the original. It exercises executive, judicial, and legislative functions, and yet frequently acts as an instrument for arbitration or conciliation. Mogul ambassadors, Sikh generals, British administrators unrepentant tribesmen, Pakistani politicians, and American celebrities have stood before *jirgas* during the years.

Elphinstone found the *jirga* in a remarkably high state of organization when he passed through the Frontier on his way to Kabul in 1809. He describes something like a system of soviets, in which the *kundi* (ward or hamlet) *jirga* sent representatives to a village *jirga*, which sent selected members to a *khel* (clan) *jirga*. This in turn was represented in the main tribal *jirga*. Ultimately, the best representatives of each tribe sat in the *Loe* (Great) *Jirga*, which advised and on occasion selected or overturned the Amir or King of Kabul.⁶

The *jirga* system of today is not very different, though the division of the Pathans into nationals of two separate states has eliminated the *Loe Jirga* as a practical representation of the entire Pathan community.⁷ In an important *jirga*, each *kundi*, *khel*, and tribe must be represented. There are no elections and no credential committees. Representatives are usually chosen on the spur of the moment, almost always on the basis of age, shrewdness, and reliability.

⁶ Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-187; also James, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁷ The Government of Afghanistan has incorporated the *Loe Jirga* into its political structure. However, it meets seldom, and then usually only to confirm the policies of the Government. Its membership has been revised to represent the various groups within Afghanistan rather than the Pathan clans.

The *jirga* is essentially a round-table conference. There is no chairman or presiding officer. Everyone whose interests may be affected has a right to speak. Decisions must be unanimous and solemnized by a prayer. If this cannot be achieved, the *jirga* breaks up. A *jirga* may meet under the shade of a solitary tree by the side of a dusty road in Waziristan or on the spacious green lawns of Government House in Peshawar.

A large *jirga* is an impressive sight. The observer, if he watches closely, and preferably if he knows a little Pushtu, will recognize some familiar types. Among the speakers there is usually a sober, long-winded elder, humorlessly appealing for a return to tradition and righteousness. This may elicit a reply from a fiery young hothead who would rather fight than talk and once started on either pursuit finds it impossible to stop. If tension becomes apparent, a soft-spoken, gently whimsical *malik* in his middle years can usually be counted on to beguile his listeners into at least a semblance of agreement. A jovially obscene back-slapper may rise next to steamroll the mellowed group into a decision before the mood can shift again.

Almost always, somewhere on the fringe of the crowd, is the sullen dissenter with turban-cloth half concealing his face, who is determined to make it apparent by his demeanor that he is present in body but not in spirit. Inevitably, there is the religious devotee, young and lean or old and solid, whose eyes glint with an other-worldly fury as he rolls the name of Allah on his tongue. Any outstanding problems are apt to be settled by the portly "leading *malik*" sitting well forward, who applauds all views but speaks only to compromise them. It could, save for dress and language, be the floor of an American political convention.

The *jirga* as it operates today, has three main functions. In its broadest and purest form, it regulates life at all levels within tribal society requiring community attention, *e.g.*, the choice of a site for a new mosque, punishment of domestic infidelity, settlement of a blood feud, or a decision to take up arms against a neighboring tribe. Secondly, the *jirga* provides a mechanism by which the decisions or opinions of the tribe are communicated to the government and the decisions of the government passed to the tribe. In this sense, the *jirga* handles the foreign relations of the tribe and has the authority to commit it to a course of action. A third form, the so-called "official" *jirga*, composed of men appointed by an officer of the Government of Pakistan, has little to do with *Pukhtunwali* in the traditional sense. It acts as an advisory jury to the officer in trying crimes under the Frontier Crimes Regulations. (See Chapter VII below.)

There is seldom any voting in a *jirga*. The "sense of the meeting" is usually abundantly apparent, although its import would frequently curdle the souls of the peaceful Friends who coined the term. The armed membership of the *jirga* is its enforcing agency if enforcement is needed. The sanctity accorded the *jirga* is indicated by the fact that very rarely does it break up in a fight. In view of the volatile nature and heavy armament of the Pathan, this is truly a triumph of tradition over instinct.

The traditional penalty for defiance of a *jirga* is the burning of the culprit's house. This is particularly effective, as a Pathan's home is very literally his castle, being fortified with watch towers, thick walls, and iron-studded gates. The owner's prestige and honor are intimately associated with his ability to protect it, and in British times, large punitive expeditions or bombing aircraft were sometimes sent out with the sole object of destroying a rebellious *malik*'s house and thus discrediting him.

The *jirga* has several interesting aspects from the standpoint of political theory. The right of a man to sit in a *jirga* rests on the consent of the community as well as his own prowess or renown. He is a representative in a very real sense — either of one family or viewpoint within the tribe or, in a mixed *jirga*, of the tribe itself. Unlike Burke's ideal Member of Parliament, he possesses no independent powers of action and must put forward the views of the group he represents. Usually, he is also expected to have ascertained the views of the group before he speaks, and if he has not, he stands in danger of being disowned.⁸ Once the *jirga* has arrived at a decision, all of the members are obliged to use their power and influence to enforce that decision.

A subtle point, which is frequently obscured by the semi-judicial role of the *jirga*, is that the body's function is to settle peacefully an existing situation more than to judge right and wrong, determine guilt, or pass sentence. The parties, who in a Western court would be plaintiff and defendant, appear as equals. One has usually acted against the other and the nature of the act is generally known and agreed upon by all concerned. The function of the *jirga* is to determine whether what was done was rightly done, and if not, what the party acted against is entitled to do to square accounts.⁹ In working out the proper settlement, the *jirga* members take into account the requirements of *Pukhtunwali*, the circumstances in

⁸ See James, *op. cit.*, p. 53. The judicial *jirga* convened by the political agent or deputy commissioner to try a criminal case under the Frontier Crimes Regulations is, of course, an exception to this principle. Here the members of the *jirga*, in theory at least, act as impartial jurymen.

⁹ Elphinstone, the first Englishman to observe the system, grasped this point immediately. See Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

the particular situation, and the character of the individuals concerned. They are also guided by a generally accepted scale of monetary compensation which the injured party can honorably accept, if he so chooses, instead of retaliation in kind.¹⁰

Decisions are usually very simple: Mahmud had a right to kill Afzal because Afzal had killed Mahmud's uncle, and no more is to be made of the affair; Alamgir had acted correctly in killing his wife because she had committed adultery, and his father-in-law had no complaint against him;¹¹ Hukmat acted unjustly in killing Bashir without cause, and Bashir's relatives are entitled to kill Hukmat, unless they are prepared to accept Rs. 4,000 *nagah* (blood-money) from him, in which case the matter is finished and no *badal* may be taken. When complex disputes over property or intertribal feuds are involved, settlement is more complicated, and recourse is usually had to the Shariat.

RAWAJ AND SHARIAT

The Pathans' way of life is also governed by the *rawaj*, or *rawaj-i-am*, customary law, and by the *shariat*, Muslim law. *Rawaj* is more in use than the *shariat* and is generally preferred. It varies from tribe to tribe, and several British attempts at codification failed to produce a representative picture. This was due in part to the fact that the Muslim Pathans early became conscious of their religious affinity with other Muslims of the subcontinent, and insisted to their British interrogators that there was no *rawaj*, only the *shariat*, the universal Islamic code. In addition, the *maliks* and elders have always recognized the practical wisdom of keeping personal law as flexible as possible. Marriage and inheritance provisions are still much influenced by *rawaj*. For example, a presumption of marriage exists only if there is a presumption of the required contract

¹⁰ This varies from area to area. A hundred years ago, a death was worth Rs. 360; permanent injury, Rs. 180; and a wound, Rs. 50-90. Inflation and devaluation have resulted in a higher price scale in recent years. Today, for example, in Kurram, a death is worth Rs. 2,000; among the Mahsuds it is worth Rs. 7,700.

¹¹ The adulterer is also subject to death, and, among certain clans, if the adultery is particularly flagrant or well-proven, the death of one of his relatives as well is required to satisfy fully the honor of the injured husband. In the case of a woman, cutting off the nose may sometimes be substituted for the death penalty. The latter practice was so common in the Frontier area that a special surgical operation was developed centuries ago; it involved partial repair of the damage by a graft of skin from the brow. See Pennell, *op. cit.*, p. 193. The custom now seems to persist only in Hazara.

— *i.e.*, no common law marriage is recognized. The Islamic doctrine of equality of inheritance of all sons is modified by recognition of the special right of the eldest who, along with at least tentatively inheriting his father's community responsibilities, also inherits a slightly greater share of his property. According to *rawaj*, a daughter does not inherit anything, although any interest she may have in immovable property by virtue of gift or dower cannot be alienated. A widow is entitled only to support (*guzara*) from her husband's estate until her death or remarriage. An unmarried daughter is also entitled to *guzara* until her marriage.

One of the most extreme divergencies from the *shariat*, noted by an early British writer who describes it as common among the Yusufzai, was a division of the inheritance into equal parts for the descendants of each wife rather than merely equal parts for each son. Thus, if a man had four wives, and the first three had one son each, each of the three sons would get a quarter of the total; if the fourth wife had four sons, each of these would get one-fourth of the remaining quarter.¹² This appears to have been done only when the wives were of inferior social position.

Certain conventions are also accepted among the Pathans as recognized guides to behavior. One of the most generally recognized is *bota burhumpta*, which can best be translated as "tit-for-tat". This permits a man who has lost a piece of property, usually an animal, to gain possession in any way he can of a similar piece of property belonging to the thief or his clan. Thereafter an exchange is effected, and, according to the niceties of the convention, the specific animals or objects involved are henceforth exempt from activities of a similar nature.

If the first injured party is unable to recover his loss, either by force or through the *burhumpta* system, he can then — if his adversary is an honorable man — have recourse to *boongali*, ransom of the object by paying one-fifth of its value in cash to the possessor.

According to the Pathans' own proverbs, the most frequent offenses against law and order stem from *zar*, *zan* and *zamin*: gold, women, and land. Most blood feuds have their origin in one or more of these. In the year 1919-20, for instance, the North-West Frontier Province (excluding the tribal area), where British civil law was in full effect, had 474

¹² H. B. Lumsden, "Report on the Yusufzai District", in *Selections from the Public Correspondence of the Administration for the Affairs of the Punjab, 1853*, p. 360. Fragments of *rawaj* appear in J. G. Lorimer, *Customary Law of the Main Tribes of the Peshawar District* (Peshawar: N-WFP Government Press, 1934); and in H. N. Bolton, *Summary of the Tribal Custom of the Dera Ismail Khan District* (Peshawar: N-WFP Government Press, 1907).

recorded murders (probably far less than half of those which actually occurred). Of these, 149 were officially ascribed to relations between the sexes, 96 to plunder, 36 to land disputes, and 58 to blood feuds. The last undoubtedly involved all three of the former.¹³

INDIVIDUALS IN THE COMMUNITY

Tribal society begins and ends with the individual, who in most tribes holds his status by virtue of being a *daftari*, one who in fact or theory is entitled to a share in tribal lands and a voice in tribal councils. The importance of each group, from *kahol* to full tribe, depends directly on the number of individual tribesmen whose allegiance it commands. This allegiance is usually, though not invariably, based on blood, and consequently it is concerned primarily with the community rather than with a particular leader.

THE MALIK

Certain men are accepted as leaders and spokesmen for the group, however, and these, on the basis of ability and experience, are able within narrowly limited bounds to direct the activities of their fellows. In the tribal area, the chief of the group is called *malik*. The original Arabic meaning of the word, "king", is misleading, and the *malik*, among the Pathans, is at best a "usually first among equals".

In the settled districts, the chief is more usually called *khan*. In both cases, wealth, family influence, and the approval of the government are not without value in attaining and holding the title, but the leader's personal character and ability is the determining factor of the extent of his influence. In recent years, some tribal *maliks* have become wealthy through industry and ingenuity, but they still have no right to a greater

¹³ North-West Frontier Province (India), *N-WFP Administration Report, 1910-20*, p. 7. Major R. T. I. Ridgway, an experienced recruiting officer, in a work written earlier and republished in 1918, lists the main causes of blood feuds as: (a) intrigues with women, (b) disputes about debt or inheritance, (c) quarrels about water or land, (d) murder of a member of a family or their *hamsayas* (dependents) and (e) violation of *badragga* (safe conduct). See R. T. I. Ridgway, *Pathans* (Calcutta: Government Press, 1918), p. 19. The results of *zar*, *zan*, and *zamin* constitute the main subject of Pathan anecdote. See *Da Kissa Khani Gup* ("Tales of the Storytellers' Bazaar"), compiled by Qazi Ahmed Jan (Peshawar: Behari Lal, 1931).

share in the tribal holdings and councils than any other man — nor can they commit the group in any way without the consent of the whole male community.

Primogeniture is, for most purposes, unknown among the Pathans, but the *maliki* or “malikship” almost always stays within the same family. The role of the *malik* in the tribal area seems to have changed little over the years.¹⁴ On the other hand, the khans, the traditional leaders in the settled areas, have lost much of their original leadership as the social structure has changed. However, many of them amassed large land holdings during the British land settlement in the middle of the nineteenth century and are very wealthy.

THE MULLAH

A liberal supply of *mullahs* (priests) exists in the Frontier area. Since Islam has no formal priesthood, the *mullahs* and other varieties of holy men are self-appointed. The *mullah's* usual responsibility is the village mosque and the primary religious education of the children. He may also on occasion act as a counselor to the *malik* and the more important members of the community. In the settled districts, he is more usually a retainer of the khan or of a leading family. As a result of the average tribesman's fanatical devotion to and considerable ignorance of his religion, a clever *mullah* is able to exert considerable influence over the community's thinking — even in matters far removed from religion. An exceptionally able man may combine the functions of *mullah* and *malik* and be acknowledged as the group's leader in both religious and civil affairs.

A *mullah* who is the chief person at a mosque and usually leads the congregation in prayer is called *imam*. A holy man who ordinarily does not participate as a leader of the ritual but is devoted to some particular saint or mystic school may have the title, *sheikh*. The *talib-ul-ilm* are a kind of third order which more or less formally devotes itself to studying religion while practicing regular lay occupations.

There is also a group called *astanadars* (“those who have place”). Among these are *pirs* (pious men) or the descendants of such; *mians*, believed to be the descendants of a class of scholarly saints in the ancient days (the title is commonly accorded to teachers and descendants of the

¹⁴ See Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, p. 163; and James, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

Quresh, the tribe of the Holy Prophet); *pirzadas*, *akhundzadas*, and *sahibzadas*, who are sons of men who in one way or another won a claim to holiness; and in some places a few *fakirs* or *darweshes*, theoretically members of one of the Sufi orders but frequently merely individual mystics. These are seldom of Pathan origin. Somewhat apart and rather above all these are the *sayyids*, who are frequently addressed as *shah* and whose claim to religious position is based exclusively on their descent from the Holy Prophet.

Despite the prevalence of religious superstition, all of these, like the *malik*, depend for their position to a great extent on the opinion of their fellow tribesmen, and unless they give evidence of real religious devotion by austere and righteous living, do not hold a very high position in society. The *mullah*, if he is a member of the tribe, possesses his own land in addition to administering that set aside for the mosque. He is not, however, entitled to levy any kind of religious contribution on his fellows, since to grant him the right to do so would be to grant him a fixed authority which most tribesmen would find intolerable, no matter how high and spiritual its purpose.

The *mullah* has played a conspicuous part (almost inevitably destructive) in British relations with the tribes, and exceptional individuals like the Powindah Mullah, the Haji of Turangzai, and the Fakir of Ipi welded religion and war into the *jihad*¹⁵ which sent the tribes streaming against the *dar-ul-harb* (place of war) of British India. With the advent of the Muslim state of Pakistan, the impetus afforded to the *jihad* by the "infidel challenge" of the British has disappeared, and though the Fakir of Ipi remained defiant in his cliffside stronghold on the Waziristan border until his death in 1960, his influence rested on his not inconsiderable ability as an outlaw rather than on his religious sanctity.

THE LASHKAR

The best English equivalent of the Pushtu *lashkar* is probably the American Indian "war party". A *lashkar* is simply a number of men who have joined together for the purpose of fighting against a common enemy or toward a common objective. The Pathan outlook on life being what it is, the word is one of the most common in the language. As in the case

¹⁵ Among the Pathans, the word *jihad* frequently does not have the same meaning as in formal Islamic law. It is commonly used to cover almost any act of violence against a non-Muslim or unorthodox Muslim sectarian.

of a *jirga*, size is irrelevant. The term is applicable to a dozen men going to a nearby village to steal a sheep and to the tens of thousands who poured into Kashmir in 1947-48.¹⁶

Despite its informal character, the *lashkar* is eminently practical and functional, and can involve planning in great detail. According to one venerable *malik*, the ideal *lashkar* should be divided into three groups. The first and best-armed group attacks the objective and then falls back on the second group which has been stationed some distance back toward the home village. Here the first group turns the loot over to the second and disperses into the hills. A third group, which has been left only a few miles outside the village, takes over from the second group as the withdrawal continues. These bring the loot and prisoners into the village which the first two have already reached and where they have replenished their ammunition. The plunder is assured at this point, and everyone's blood is hot. Any intrepid pursuers are then fallen upon by the reassembled *lashkar* with pleasingly disastrous effect.

THE HUJRA

The *hujra*, or community center, represents a gentler and more sociable side of the Pathan character. It exists in practically every village in both the settled area and in tribal territory, and is considered a mark of civilization and prestige. Many of the other tribes look askance at certain sections of the Bar Mohmands in whose villages *hujras* are rarely found. Traditionally used as a male social center where the unmarried young men of the tribe sleep,¹⁷ the *hujra* also houses visitors and serves as a focus for community action and opinion. Meals and tea are served to all. A village may have several *hujras* which compete with each other in hospitality. Civil affairs of all kinds are conducted in the *hujra* and gossip and information exchanged. Since, as Elphinstone noted 150 years ago, "Their [the Pathans'] ordinary employment, when seated, is conversation", the *hujra* is usually well-filled. Many *hujras*, even in remote villages, now possess a battery-operated radio; consequently, such alien subject as the United Nations and the "cold war" have entered the conversation of the tribesmen. Tashkent Radio competes with Radio Kabul and Radio Pakistan in Pushtu-language broadcasts, and BBC and the

¹⁶ See Chapter X below for a detailed treatment of the Kashmir *jihad*.

¹⁷ A bachelor is looked upon as a "wanderer" in the Pathan community, and usually does not sleep even in his brother's house.

Voice of America offer still other views of the world in English, Urdu, and Persian.

DEPENDENT CLASSES

Even a cursory study of a Pathan village reveals that the ordinary Pathan *daftari*, whom one might expect would compose the village mass, is something of an aristocrat in his own right. His needs are served by various tenant farmers and artisans known as *hamsayas* (dependents, "one who shares the same shade") and *ghulams* (servants). (The latter word is passing out of usage today.) Most of these belong to the Gujar and Awan tribes, which are non-Pathan in origin. Most are Muslims, but Hindu *hamsayas* also exist — even today. In some areas, separate villages of these people carry on their own life on lands leased from Pathans. Individually, they serve in various menial and clerical roles in a Pathan village or household. In both cases, they may be better off economically than the proud Pathans whom they serve.

The exact relationship of a *hamsaya* to his Pathan patron is difficult to describe. Before the advent of the British, a mild form of slavery was widespread among the tribes. The slave (in this case more usually called *ghulam*) could not own his own land or cattle; he could not leave the country, and was required to contribute a major share of his time or produce to his master. Slavery was common among the Yusufzai as late as the 1870's, at which time Hindu *hamsayas* had also to pay the *jazia*, the traditional head tax imposed by Islam on the infidel.¹⁸

Also common in the nineteenth century was a peculiar form of slavery — more accurately, peonage — under which a landless Pathan could give himself into the power of a *daftari*. This was called *chorekar*, and in return the master usually had to offer a piece of land for cultivation, advance some money, and, frequently, a slave girl (*windza*) to enable his new dependent to set up a household. The *chorekar* bound himself to remain until he had paid off the advances. Since three-quarters of the produce went to the *daftari* by virtue of his ownership of the land, the remaining one-quarter had to cover cash advances and the price of the *windza*, as well as support the dependent household. The *chorekar's* life was not unduly hard, however, as once he had proven himself an able husbandman, he could usually easily find another *daftari* who would be willing to pay off his debt to the original master in order to enter into the same arrangement with the *chorekar* himself.

¹⁸ Government of India, *Central Asia, Part I*, III, 312.

Even today, the role of the *hamsaya* in the tribal area is a highly feudal one, and, according to some reports, individual cases can hardly be distinguished from slavery. However, the average *hamsaya* is more likely to be a rootless Pathan from another village who, for one reason or another (frequently trouble with the law at home), has attached himself as a kind of courtier or man-at-arms to a powerful *malik*, or a Hindu accountant who shares his patron's profits and benefits from his patron's protection in any contacts he may have with non-members of the clan to which he is attached. Technically, the Hindu accountant is as free to come and go as the Pathan man-at-arms, but he is apt to find it less conducive to his welfare to defy his patron or attempt to abandon him.

THE ROLE OF WOMEN

Pathan women ordinarily take no part in social or public affairs. In the tribal area, all of the women of the *malik*'s family and other families who make claim to social distinction observe *pardah*, the veil. In some cases, this may take the extreme form of "four-wall" *pardah*, under which the woman never leaves her own house — even for visits to female friends or relatives. This does not mean that the upper-class Pathan women lack influence. Intelligent and aggressive within the limits prescribed by custom, these women direct the substantial domestic affairs of their men and play a large part in arranging marriages and family alliances — sometimes directly through negotiations with female members of the other family and sometimes through the intermediary of go-betweens. The women also provide the practical means of implementing the demands of *melmastia* (hospitality), so important a part of *Pukhtunwali*, and many a *malik* has grown in honor as a result of his wife's abilities and industry in running her kitchen. The women are as fanatically devoted to *Pukhtunwali* as their men, and are frequently an important factor in urging the obligations of *badal* (revenge) on their lazy or reluctant males. Few among them are unable to handle a rifle, pistol, or dagger, and women of all classes may be found helping behind the lines in battle.

The wives of the ordinary tribesmen do most of the work, cooking, fetching water, grass, and fuel, milking, harvesting the crops, looking after cattle, sewing and washing. They do not observe *pardah* as such but tend to withdraw at the sight of a strange male.

Except in a few of the larger towns of the settled districts, there is to date no sign of an incipient female revolt against the *pardah* system, and

in an area where there is a surplus of every kind of labor, there is little economic incentive for it. So formidable is *purdah* on the Frontier that even the fashionable ladies of Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi, who the night before may have been the center of male attention at a gay party, don a *burqa* and retire into the *zenana* (women's quarters) when they arrive in Peshawar. In addition to visiting among themselves, the local ladies find their entertainment in Friday visits to the mosques and graveyards and in marriage festivities.¹⁹

Most Pathans have only one wife, although all insist on the validity of the Islamic privilege of having four if they want to, and a few of the wealthier men enjoy it in fact. In the "good old days" some attached even more than four to their households. The additions were usually *surutis*, handsome slave girls brought down from Kashgar by the Kaka Khel Khattaks and retailed at Rs. 40 to Rs. 300 each. The traditional tribal custom of buying brides has been tempered somewhat among the townsmen of what might be called the middle class by the Islamic and Pakistani custom of a marriage settlement which includes both dowry and pledge of funds by the husband. The latter is designed to give the wife title to a certain amount of money in the event of her husband's death or if she is subsequently divorced by her husband.

Most tribal brides, however, are still "bought" by cash or commodity payments to their fathers. Among some of the wealthier khans of the settled districts and the more powerful hill *maliks*, pride of family has resulted in a peculiar twist on both customs. Rather than pledging to the bride an extravagant sum of money which in fact is to be paid only in the event of divorce or after the death of the husband, only a token sum, easily paid by anyone, is pledged. This is to indicate that divorce (or legitimate grounds for it) is unthinkable and no monetary safeguard is required between families of honor. Underlying the gesture is the fact, as all parties are well aware, that divorce is apt to result in the death of the offending husband at the hands of his ex-wife's relatives rather than in mere pecuniary penalization.

LAND TENURE

With the exception of the Ghilzai *powindahs*, none of the great Pathan clans are real nomads. They love their land as much as their swords, and


¹⁹ The *purdah* system has begun to break down in Peshawar in the two years since this material was prepared for the press.

frequently a tribesman will develop an affection for a particular barren hillside far exceeding anything felt by a dairy farmer in the American Middle West for his green and fertile pastures. The Pathan's very "citizenship" in the tribe rests on his right to a *daftar* or share in the land, and the important role the land system plays in the whole structure of tribal society makes it desirable to consider it in moderate detail.

When the tribes moved onto their present holdings, the new land was shared out according to what appears to have been a fairly standard procedure. About half of the whole was set aside for the common grazing of the entire tribe. This is called the *shamilat*. The remainder was allotted in roughly equal shares to each of the major groups of the tribe. Each of these shares was then divided equally among the constituent subgroups with a smaller portion being held in common (again called *shamilat*). Of the latter, a portion called *seri* was set aside for the support of the mosque and *imam* and *mullahs*. Then each major family got an equal portion of the remainder of the share received by the subgroup. The family distributed individual plots among its adult males.²⁰ These descended to the owners' sons in equal shares, as did the owners' rights in the *shamilat* both at the subgroup level and at that of the whole tribe. Residential plots in the village were shared out in the same manner.

The individual's assigned plot was called *bukhra*. His share in the

²⁰ For example, the division among the Kamalzai section of the Yusufzai was as follows: The Malizai set aside about 60 percent of their land for common grazing. The remainder was divided into 400 plots for cultivation. Those were then assigned:



shamilat was known as *inam*. *Bukhra* and *inam* together constituted his *daftar*, and all real Pathans were *daftaris*. When, after several generations, fragmentation of holdings became extreme, a *jirga* divided some of the common land into shares and apportioned them out to supplement the original *bukhras*. A man who did not want to cultivate his portion of agricultural land or use his residential site could lease it to a tenant, but ownership remained his or his descendants' indefinitely. Only under the most exceptional circumstances would he officially alienate it, as to do so would be to give up the basis of his status in the tribe. Abandoned land might be used by anyone who chose, but the owner or his descendants could reclaim it and all improvements on it at any time.

In later years, as the common land gave out from over-grazing and frequent redistribution for cultivation, it was no longer possible to check the process of fragmentation, and the rigid *daftari* system squeezed many men out of the community to seek employment in the Indian plains or to take to brigandage in the Frontier hills. This was felt chiefly among the tribes such as the Yusufzai, who inhabited the fertile valleys and whose society had come to depend almost exclusively on cultivation. In the barren hills, where dependence on agriculture alone had never been possible, tribal structure was less affected by migration, and a particularly hard-up family could more easily be aided by a general subscription of the required food and shelter.

The land structure, despite the wear and tear of at least 300 years, was still fairly intact when the British came. One of the first British administrators, writing about the Yusufzai in 1851, reported that at the time of annexation: "Each man cultivated his *bukhra*, or any portion of it, at pleasure, paying no tribute or share of the produce to anyone, his duty to the tribe requiring only that he should join in all offensive or defensive operations undertaken in accordance with the resolutions arrived at in their *jeergahs* or councils".²¹

Both the Sikhs (whose attempts at land regulation were erratic and purely pecuniary in motive) and the British (whose aim was to devise and collect at all costs a just land revenue) recognized the tribal common land as tax free. In a misguided attempt to avoid taxation, many Pathans turned part of their *bukhras* into *inams*. They further insisted that any land which they might have made cultivable by artificial irrigation was not to be considered part of their taxable *bukhras*.

These tactics had worked well enough with the Sikhs, but they were

²¹ James, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

in many cases to have disastrous effects on the *daftaris* of the Peshawar Valley when land settlements were made by the British administration during the twenty years after annexation. The *maliks* and khans bore the brunt of the dealings with the British land settlement officers, most of whose previous experience had been gained in Bengal where the land tenure system was considerably different. The settlement officers were faced with the problem of determining just who was responsible for the common and exempted lands. The *maliks* and khans soon found that a large common holding increased their prestige, and frequently, by officially accepting in their own name the obligation to pay taxes on it, they emerged from the settlement with full personal title to common land under British law.

Apparently abandoned *bukhras* presented the settlement officers with a problem similar to that which was critical in the American West. From the beginning, the British recognized "squatters' rights", although at first accommodations were made whereby the *daftari* remained owner and was entitled to a share of the produce but lost the right to evict the cultivator except under specified circumstances. Later, however, ownership and consequent liability for taxes were decided and recorded as final. As a result, some former *daftaris* found themselves without either *bukhra* or *inam*. In other cases, Gujar or Awan *ghulams* or *hamsayas* were confirmed in permanent rights of cultivation, and the Pathan *daftari*, if he had a clear enough title, retained ownership, unless the land was seized for non-payment of taxes. In a few cases the British, ignoring the very basis of Pathan society, vested outright ownership of the land in the Gujar or Awans who were cultivating it.

Originally, the *malik's* *daftar* was no greater than that of any other tribesman. It was recognized, however, that his duties as a representative of the community handicapped his ability to cultivate it personally, and many *maliks* turned all or part of their land over to non-Pathan *hamsayas* for cultivation. Since these people were by and large better and more industrious agriculturists than the Pathans and at the same time, because of their inferior social status, were content with a lower standard of living, they frequently made the land produce better for the *malik* than if he had worked it himself. Some *mullahs* applied the same technique to the *seri*, thus making it possible for them to devote more time to their religious studies and duties. If labor was available, many ordinary Pathan *daftaris* also settled tenants on their land, thus leaving themselves free for the many demands of the *jirga*, the *lashkar*, *badal*, and *melmastia*, as well as the attractions of the *hujra*.

This situation has been perpetuated by the outside subsidies which have always come to the Pathans as tribute to their political and military power and by the ready availability of loot in the rich lowlands. Thus, even those tribes whose land is barren have seldom been forced by the pangs of hunger to abandon tribal mores in favor of a subsistence agricultural economy.

Frederick Barth, an anthropologist who worked in Swat State in 1954, has evolved an interesting ecologic theory based on this facet of Pathan society. Barth discovered that the expansion of the Pathans up the Swat Valley at the expense of the native Kohistanis, which continued for several centuries, was checked by the Pathans' reaching the end of the area on which the double-cropping necessary to support their way of life was possible. The Kohistanis, with a more purely agricultural society, were able to exist in the higher areas where only a single crop and some herding were possible.²²

WESH

A peculiar aspect of traditional Pathan land tenure was the provision for periodic exchanges of land among individual members of a tribe and between entire clans and tribes. Called *wesh*, the idea was to allow every member of the group and each of the various groups as a unit to enjoy the best land for some time and thus to prevent the development of leadership based on economic power. These exchanges persisted among certain sections of the Yusufzai into the middle of the last century and, surprisingly, were usually effected without bloodshed. The exchanges took place at varying periods: three, five, ten and thirty years. In some cases, land only was exchanged; in others, residences also were included. The custom has died out now, although in some of the wilder areas of Dir, Buner, and Bajaur, it was noted to be still in existence in the 1930's.²³

²² Frederick Barth, "Ecologic Relations in Swat, North Pakistan", *American Anthropologist*, LVIII (December, 1956), 1081.

²³ The abortive Sikh land settlements recognized *wesh*. However, the British settlements did not, as obviously the custom made impossible the formulation of any rational land-revenue system and tended to discourage development of the land. A detailed account of an exchange early in the nineteenth century can be found in Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, pp. 335-336. The custom is also mentioned by Warburton, *op. cit.*, p. 23; James, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102; Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 55; and Lumsden, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

IV

CULTURE AND OUTLOOK

Religion and language have had great influence on Pathan culture. These factors are intimately involved in the complicated problem of Pathan nationalism. Some comment on all three of these factors is essential to a discussion of the Pathan community and to an understanding of the Pathan outlook on life.

RELIGION

Islam came to the Frontier earlier than to any other part of the sub-continent except Sind, where it was introduced by the Arabs in the eighth century A.D. It is not surprising, therefore, that all Pathans are Muslims. Since they received their religion from Sunni Turkic dynasties, it is also natural that the great majority of the Pathans are Sunnis of the Hanafi school.

Neither is it surprising that the Pathans, who are given to "taking serious things seriously", are devout and frequently fanatical followers of their religion. However, a deeply cherished secular tradition in public matters, a low rate of literacy, and centuries of isolation from the main currents of Islam have made most tribesmen's understanding of their religion narrow and personal and have contributed to the growth of superstition.

Doctrinally, the Pathan lives by the Islamic creed in its simplest form: "There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His Prophet". The prescribed prayers and dietary laws and the Ramadan fast are observed strictly.

Interestingly, the two most important religious expressions of the Pathans have been deviations from Sunni orthodoxy, and the effect they have had on Pathan history has been considerable.

THE ROSHANIS

Toward the middle of the sixteenth century A.D., a man named Bayazid, who was probably of Pathan origin although he claimed to be a member of the Arab Ansari tribe of Madina who welcomed the Holy Prophet Muhammad when he fled from Mecca, appeared in the Frontier hills. Bayazid was for his time a well-educated man. He had studied under the well-known Punjabi mystic, Mullah Sulaiman Julundari, and had apparently been influenced by the doctrines of the Persian *sufis* and the Hindu *yogis*.

Bayazid gave himself the name Pir Roshan, "the illuminated saint", and in 1542-43 founded a new sect among the Pathans. He preached the Hindu doctrine of the transmigration of souls, and added to it the teaching that nothing really exists but the Deity, who requires no set form of worship. The greatest manifestation of the Deity on earth, Pir Roshan claimed, was in the person of a *pir*. The greatest of *pirs* was Pir Roshan.

Repugnant as these doctrines were to the basic tenets of Islam, the Roshani sect spread throughout the Frontier in a very few years, almost all the Yusufzai embracing it. Pir Roshan's greatest opponent in the religious sphere was the Akhund Darweza of Peshawar, one of the first great figures of Pushtu literature and probably the most respected orthodox religious leader in Pathan history. The Akhund dubbed Pir Roshan "Pir Tarik", "Saint of Darkness", and reclaimed many adherents of the sect to orthodox Islam.

The Roshanis constituted a dynamic force in all Pathan affairs throughout the last half of the sixteenth century and inspired several major attacks on the Mogul power as well as numerous intertribal conflicts. The sect was almost completely wiped out in 1611 in the course of a major campaign against it by the Mogul Emperor Jehangir. However, strongholds remained in the Tirah and among the remoter valleys of the Sulaiman Mountains for many years, and a few descendants of Pir Roshan in Kohat and the Tirah remained steadfast in his doctrines in the middle of the nineteenth century. Even today, some orthodox Sunni tribesmen insist that the Shias among the Bangash and Orakzai are really followers of the Roshani doctrine.¹

¹ Ridgway also mentions this belief: *op. cit.*, p. 31.

SAYYID AHMAD BRELVI

Whereas the Roshanis were almost exclusively a Pathan sect, the tribesmen's second religious enthusiasm was part of a larger movement in nineteenth-century Islam. This centered on the sect of Sayyid Ahmad Brelvi, founder of a movement frequently referred to in British documents as "the Hindustani Fanatics", "the Patna Conspiracy", or "the Indian Wahhabis".

Sayyid Ahmad was born in the United Provinces of India in 1782. He began his manhood as a trooper in the entourage of the Pathan freebooter who founded the Tonk state in central India, and eventually drifted to Delhi, center of the decaying Muslim heritage in India. In Delhi, he studied under the respected divine, Shah Abdul Aziz, son of Shah Waliullah. Sayyid Ahmad's religious thinking took a militant turn shortly afterwards, and he gathered about him a small number of disciples, including the nephew and son-in-law of Shah Abdul Aziz. He published a book attacking in violent terms the rule of Sikhs over Muslims in the Punjab and the Frontier.

In 1820, Sayyid Ahmad performed the *hajj*, and while in Arabia came under the influence of the puritanical Wahhabi sect founded by the Saud family. Upon his return to India, he began preaching a *jihād* against the Sikhs, and his following having grown during several tours of India, he moved to the Frontier.²

The Pathans, especially the Yusufzai, smarting under Sikh rule, rallied to Sayyid Ahmad's standard, and he made arrangements with the Durrani *sirdars*, who ruled Peshawar under Sikh mandate for a large-scale uprising. When a Sikh army appeared on the Frontier, the *sirdars* deserted the Sayyid, and his tribal forces were shattered in a battle in 1828. Sayyid Ahmad then took refuge in the Yusufzai country, and, with the aid of the Khans of Hund and Zaida and Malik Mir Baba of Chargullai, successfully attacked the *sirdars*, killing Yar Mohammad in a battle at Zaida in 1829. In 1830, he managed to drive both the *sirdars* and the Sikh governor from Peshawar and briefly held the city as the capital of a new Islamic empire.

Sayyid Ahmad had established centers in India before coming to the Frontier. These groups came into conflict with the British authorities, and he received continual reinforcements from them for his campaign against the Sikhs. Most important of the centers was the one at Patna.

² Sir William Hunter, *Our Indian Mussalmans* (London: Trübner, 1872), is a comprehensive, though biased study of Sayyid Ahmad's movement.

The Sayyid continued to preach his puritanical doctrines on the Frontier, and on the grounds that every true Muslim must be married, he attempted to force the Pathans to supply wives for his followers who had come up from India unprovided with women. Eventually, the tribes revolted at his teachings, and on a chosen Friday bonfires were lit throughout the Yusufzai country, at which signal the Sayyid's *mullahs* were strangled and his spiritual authority renounced.

This forced the group to withdraw to the Pakhli Valley in Hazara District. Here they came under pressure from the Sikhs, and on May 4, 1831, the Sayyid was killed at Balakat by a Sikh force under Sher Singh and General Aitable.³ The remnants of the group continued to receive support and volunteers from Bengal and Patna, however, and their activities took on an increasingly anti-British flavor. By 1858, the movement had recovered enough strength to provoke a revolt by the Khuda Khel against the British Raj. A British column was sent to destroy the colony, only to have it move once again, this time to the inaccessible Barandu Valley.

In 1868, a *jihad* was proclaimed against the British, and all the tribes from Dir to Kohistan joined with the sect in a fight against the infidel. The result was the Ambela Campaign, which cost the British ten percent casualties out of a force of 9,000 men, the largest campaign the British had yet mounted in northwestern India. Sayyid Ahmad's followers and the tribesmen soon parted company again, and the colony wandered for thirty years in the upper Yusufzai country, before settling in Buner and across the Indus on the Black Mountain. A few devotees still live in Chamarkand.

The Roshanis and the group founded by Sayyid Ahmad were at opposite ends of the religious spectrum. The former was a purely local sect with extensive mystic leanings; the latter was a product of Arabian and Indian Islam with a puritanical bent. They were 300 years apart in time. The Pathans renounced their allegiance to both sects soon after they had given it. Yet each at its height excited great enthusiasm and inspired important events.

Just why they did so is difficult to understand. The admitted religious credulity of the Pathan seems an insufficient answer. Probably the appeal

³ The writer has found it difficult to determine the exact sequence of events in the three-cornered conflict among the Durrani *sirdars*, the Sikhs, and Sayyid Ahmad. The sequence given here is based on the detailed account given in James, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-14. This account was pieced together from local sources some 25 years after the events described.

of both movements lay in the opportunities they presented under the cloak of Islam for an expression of the Pathans' individuality and their resentment of the people who claimed to rule over them — the Moguls in one case, the Sikhs and British in the other. At any rate, it is doubtful if these movements would have had the appeal they did have if they had been pacifist and non-political, concerned only with salvation in the next world rather than revenge and glory in this one.

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Some Pushtu enthusiasts in Kabul claim that the language is the direct descendant of the ancient Aryan tongue, and that Sanskrit and Avestan are both offshoots of Pushtu. The same school of thought, citing the works of Amir Kror of Ghur, holds that Pushtu poetry was written as early as the eighth century A.D. These claims appear doubtful, and it is fairly clear that development of the language as a literary instrument postdates the coming of Islam.

Relatively little Pushtu literature has been translated into European languages, and few manuscripts or vernacular publications are available.⁴ The earliest major writer was probably the Akhund Darweza whose *Makhzan* dates from about 1535. This book is a polished refutation of the doctrines of Pir Roshan, and is a remarkable combination of dogmatic theology, forensic wit, and logical argument, reminiscent of the *Summa Theologica* of Thomas Aquinas.

KHUSHAL KHAN KHATTAK

Khushal Khan Khattak, probably the best and most celebrated of the Pushtu poets, was born in 1613 A.D., the son of Shahbaz Khan, chieftain of the powerful Khattak tribe. The warrior-poet succeeded to the chief-

⁴ Works in English include H. G. Raverty, *Selections from the Poetry of the Afghans* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1867); and C. E. Biddulph, *Afghan Poetry of the Seventeenth Century* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1890). James Darmesteter, *Chants Populaires des Afghans* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, E. Leroux, 1888-1890) contains a large selection of folk songs, many of which celebrate noted events of the time and earlier. The first part of Darmesteter's work is probably the best cultural and linguistic history of the Pathans available. The Pushtu Academy at Peshawar also has a good collection of manuscripts and some publications to its credit.

tancy of his tribe at the age of twenty-seven when his father fell in battle with the Yusufzai. Khushal Khan held a *jagir* (land grant) from the Mogul emperors and served the Emperor Shah Jehan in several of his wars — including an expedition to Badakhshan in 1644.

Khushal Khan incurred the wrath of the Emperor Aurangzeb who succeeded Shah Jehan on the throne of Delhi in 1659. Aurangzeb imprisoned the poet for seven years in the fortress at Gwalior in central India, during which time many of Khushal's best works were written.

Upon his release, Khushal Khan returned home and organized a tribal confederacy against the emperor. In this his chief allies were the Afridis, and his main opponents the Yusufzai. Eventually Aurangzeb broke up the confederacy through bribery and promises of office, and Khushal's own son, Bahrem, defected to the Moguls and several times sought to take his father's life. The disunity of the tribes and the perfidy of his son left Khushal with a bitter and cynical outlook which is reflected in most of his later poems.

Under constant pressure from the Moguls, Khushal resigned the chieftaincy of the Khattaks to a loyal son, Ashraf — himself a poet of no mean ability — and with a small band of followers wandered from place to place in the hills, pursued by the relentless Bahrem. The aging poet settled at last in the Afridi country and died at the age of seventy-eight.

His body was taken to Akora in the Khattak mountains along the west bank of the Indus and secretly buried there, so that in his own words "the dust from the hooves of the Mogul horsemen may not defile my grave". The tomb remains today and is still a sacred place to the Pathans. True to his Pathan honor Khushal, according to tradition, left instructions that if any of his loyal sons should ever succeeded in getting their traitorous brother Bahrem into their power, they should cut him in two and burn one part of him at the foot and the other at the head of the old chief's grave.

Khushal Khan's writings cover a wide field. According to Raverty, Khushal wrote both in Pushtu and Persian on medicine, ethics, religious jurisprudence, philosophy, falconry, and also wrote an autobiography.⁵ It is for his poetry, however, that he is most noted. Several hundred poems are extant in one form or another. Many of these have never been translated. The poems themselves cover a wide variety of subjects: love, war, the chase, nature, religious devotion, political affairs. In all of them, Khushal Khan's treatment of his themes is realistic, and for this he is

⁵ Raverty, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

almost unique among the Pushtu poets, most of whom, in the *sufi* manner, use physical images only to represent divine love and eternal truth.

Khushal Khan was the father of fifty-seven sons as well as an unrecorded number of daughters, and there can be no doubt that when he speaks of the "honeyed lips, slender waist, and soft hips" of his "beloved", his thoughts are occupied with a flesh-and-blood woman rather than a mystic symbol. There is little doubt, either, that he many times made good the boast of his old age that:

My flights like the old falcon's are among the hills,
But still I have taken many pretty young partridges.
The falcon, whether he is young and untrained, or old
and experienced, seeks his prey,
But the old bird's swoop is more scientific and unerring.
Love's affairs, O Khushal, are fiery and full,
And even if the flame goes out, the smoke is still there!⁶

Khushal Khan's love of his own land and people and his despair over their lack of unity, as well as his unremitting hatred of the Moguls, are graphically illustrated in his poems.

In the old days Pukhtuns were kings in Hind,
And they can still outdo the Moguls in deeds.
But they have no concord and have broken their God-given unity,
And so come to be nothing!
O God! Khushal would become a youth again,
If only you could give them sweet concord.

How can the proud Pukhtun make peace with the Mogul?
Wild beasts are more easily reconciled!
One whose rough mountain garments are his pride
Bears himself ill in gaudy Mogul shawls.

Verily, the Pukhtuns are deficient in sense and understanding —
They are the tail-cut curs of the butchers' slaughter-house.
They have played away dominion for Mogul gold
And they lust after Mogul offices.
If the camel with its lading enters their houses,
They are first taken up with stealing the bell from its neck.
They begin in Kandahar and stretch all the way to Damghar,
And all are worthless and good for nothing who dwell in between.

If the Pukhtun people are of the human race,
In disposition and ways they are very Hindu,

⁶ The translations of Pushtu poetry in this work are based on varied sources, some of them oral. Content of the poems, however, in general coincides with that in Raverty's and Biddulph's translations.

They have neither skill nor intelligence
 But are happy in ignorance and strife,
 They do not obey the words of their fathers.
 Nor do they listen to the instructions of their teachers.
 They ever lie in wait to injure one another
 And hence by calamity are always remembered.
 But still, O Khushal! thank God for this:
 They are not slaves, but free-born men!

Khushal Khan brought to his poetry all the dash and fire that a Pathan brings to battle. Likewise, he brought the Pathan's self-satisfaction and lack of modesty, proclaiming calmly, "When in Pushtu poetry I raised my battle-flag, the world of words I rode down on my warhorse."

He also had, however, a strain of fatalism and hedonism, which reminds one inevitably of Omar Khayyam, as in the verse "In Praise of Wine":

A professed carouser I; from me sobriety do not seek,
 I grasp the filled cups from morn to eve.
 Who is he who can compare the sun's beauty with thy face, O Wine!
 The sun is a weak lamp, while you vie with the dawn.
 Veil not your eyes, Ascetic, from viewing a maid's fair face.
 Such a deed is allowed by the code of love.
 In the days of grief, O Cupbearer, pour wine into my glass
 So that it may rise sparkling in the crystal.
 Up, Censor! Khushal has come!
 Prepare for the battle! Bathe yourself in wine!
 Since ablutions are the true Muslim's weapons.

THE LATER KHATTAKS

Khushal Khan's poetic ability was reflected in his descendants. His daughter, Halima, was a poet of note, and his son, Ashraf, who spent the last ten years of his life as a Mogul prisoner in the Hyderabad Deccan and Maharashtra, ranks among the half-dozen best Pushtu poets. Most of Ashraf's works are a lament for his lost homeland and are pathetic in the graphic imagery of the exile's longing. He lacked the fire and universal interest of his father, however, and many of his works are abstruse and his meanings obscure.

Abdul Qadir Khan Khattak, another son of Khushal Khan, is considered by most Pathans to be a better poet than his brother Ashraf. Qadir translated Jami's and Sadi's poems from Persian into Pushtu, and his own original writings are deeply tinged with the mysticism of the Persian *sufis* whom he admired. On Ashraf's death, Qadir aspired to succeed

his older brother in the chieftaincy of the Khattaks, but was defeated by Ashraf's son, Afzal, who in a single day put to death Qadir, ten other uncles, and many cousins.

Afzal, a grandson of Khushal Khan, was noted for his literary as well as his blood-thirsty qualities. Few of his poems are extant, but his *Tarikh-i-Murassa*, a history of the Pathans, remains one of the best sources of information on the tribes in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries.⁷

Afzal's son, Qasim Khan Khattak (the great grandson of Khushal Khan), was born about 1725 A.D. Qasim left the land of his ancestors at a fairly early age and wandered in Kashmir and India. He lived for a while at Sirhind and finally settled in the Rohilla state of Rampur. He remained a bachelor, and when he died in Rampur, his body was taken back to be buried with that of his forefathers in the Khattak hills. Qasim wrote under the poetic name "Shaida", and was throughout the later period of his life a devotee of the *sufi* colony at Sirhind. His poems reflect the tastes of the *sufis* and are full of metaphysical symbols and classical Persian allusions. While his work is highly esteemed among the Pathans, it fails to excite the emotional response of Khushal Khan's writings, and it is doubtful if many of the tribesmen fully understand Qasim's mystic meanings.

RAHMAN BABA

Mullah Abdur Rahman, more popularly known as Rahman Baba, was probably the greatest poet outside the Khattak line, and is quoted by the Pathans almost as much as the great Khushal Khan. Rahman was a Ghoria Khel Mohmand who lived a secluded life in his native village where he devoted most of his time to religious contemplation. Most of his poems appear to have been written between 1660 and 1710 A.D., a generation or so later than those of Khushal Khan.

Rahman Baba's poems are also touched with *sufi* mysticism. However, unlike those of the Persian *sufis* and their imitators, his writings are in a direct and simple style. One of his poems is a paean of praise to God, listing the divine attributes in a manner very similar to that of the Nicene Creed and emphasizing by repetition the uniqueness of Islam's militantly monotheistic Allah. Rahman Baba also preached the brother-

⁷ A partial translation of the *Tarikh-i-Murassa* may be found in the *Khalid-i-Afghani* collection, trans. Trevor Chichelle Plowden (Lahore: Munshi Gulab Singh, 1893).

hood of man and the conquest of self in language reminiscent of the great Christian mystics. His couplets are full of such expressions as "A blind man who sees nothing is a better man than one who sets his eyes on another's wife", and "I, Rahman, am but the servant of every God-fearing man, whether he be of high, middle or low degree."

At the same time, Rahman Baba was Pathan enough to be unable to resist the challenge thrown down by Khushal Khan a half century before when the great Khattak boasted of "riding down the world of words". Rahman ends one of his poems: "Khushal Khan was but a slave of mine, /For in the Pushtu language, I am the only Alamgir".⁸

ABD-UL-HAMID

Abd-ul-Hamid, a younger contemporary of Rahman Baba, was another Mohmand. Abd-ul-Hamid too was a disciple of the *sufis*; he took a delight in hair-splitting, and had a cynical and humorous outlook on life. One of his most appealing works begins:

O Necessity, what a terrible calamity you are!
 You change man's nature into that of a dog.
 You make the Muslim follow the Hindu's rites,
 And the Hindu observe the usages of the Faithful.
 You make kings and princes stand at your door,
 And deprive them of their thrones and crowns.

Another of Abd-ul-Hamid's poems, this one on the subject of love, begins with the wry comment:

If kings have a liking for thrones and scepters,
 Lovers are partial to ruin and desolation.

MIRZA KHAN ANSARI

Mirza Khan Ansari is generally thought to be a grandson of Pir Roshan, founder of the Roshani sect. Some admiring Pathans, however, claim he was of full Yusufzai blood. Like Qasim Khan Khattak, Ansari wandered far from his native hills. He was well known in Herat. He lived for a while as court poet in one of the Rajput states. He received the patronage of the Mogul Emperor Aurangzeb who, despite his reputation for ortho-

⁸ Alamgir, "the world-conquering", the name assumed by the Mogul Emperor Aurangzeb, who defeated Khushal Khan.

doxy, refused to act against Ansari whose works show signs of his grandfather's heresy as well as his own *sufi* tendencies. In his later days, Ansari is supposed to have retired and settled down in the Tirah where he repented of his heretical beliefs and became a noted orthodox divine in the then flourishing theological schools of Peshawar.

KHWAJA MUHAMMAD BANGASH

Only a few poems and practically no information are available on the life of Khwaja Muhammad Bangash. Khwaja Muhammad is something of a connoisseur's poet in Pushtu literature, and is still respected (though little understood) among some sections of the Bangash as their ancestral poet. He reportedly won great fame during the time of the Emperor Aurangzeb as a defender of orthodoxy and one who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca and Madina. Nevertheless, his few extant poems show the same *sufi* tendencies as many of the other Pathan poets, and his disregard for conventional moral theology is summed up in the line, "What are the little sins of Khwaja Muhammad in the benevolent waves of the ocean of God's great mercy!"

There are other names of less importance in the annals of Pushtu poetry. In the grand tradition practically all of them — including many of the religious leaders — appear with sword or rifle as well as pen in hand. Even today in Peshawar or Kabul a collection of poets is probably easier to assemble than a like number of members of any other profession — except, perhaps, the warrior. One of the most important of the rebellious *maliks* who lead the "Pukhtunistan" agitation today is Mira Jan, a Mohmand, who is more widely and less controversially known under his poetic appellation of Sial. In similar manner, the Haji of Turangzai, a Mohmand *mullah* who was a thorn in the side of the British administration in the first quarter of this century, was known and respected in many tribal villages less as a fighter against the British than as a patron and scholar of the Pushtu language.

AHMAD SHAH ABDALI

Only one of these other writers, however, bears specific mention, and that primarily because his literary ability was coupled with great historical importance. This is Ahmad Shah Abdali, in effect the founder of Afghan-

istan. Ahmad Shah, as has been noted above, founded the Durrani dynasty in 1748, and later extending his rule over much of Persia, Kashmir, and northern India, broke the power of the Marathas at the third battle of Pannipat in 1761. Ahmad Shah wrote a number of poems in Persian and a collection of odes in his native Pushtu. In sharp contrast to his bloody life, Ahmad Shah's poems are full of pleas for God's mercy for his sins and prayers for strength to overcome the temptations of his body. One of them begins:

I cry unto You, my God, for I am ashamed of my sins and wickedness,
But I do not despair for no one has ever left Your threshold without hope of
mercy.

The opening words of another are:

May God annihilate thee, fly that is human nature!
For no one's mouth has been left unpolluted by thy impure kiss.

This abhorrence for his own pursuit of the pleasures of the flesh makes Ahmad Shah, the hard-fighting Asian chieftain, similar in one respect at least to the princelings of Christian Europe in the Middle Ages and early Renaissance.

PUSHTU FOLK LITERATURE

Many of the songs and stories which are repeated in Pathan villages are reminiscent of the versatility of the folk literature of medieval Europe. One of the best known is the Kabuli love song, *Zakhmi Dil*, "Bleeding Heart", which in altered cadence and with revised (and very obscene) words was a favorite marching tune among Pathan soldiers of the British *Raj*. Another, simpler love song is in the form of a duet. Since women, of course, do not participate, the beloved's response is sung by another male member of the company — frequently a female impersonator. Part of this song follows:

The flowers grow dim in your hair,
And your eyes, my beloved, are the flowers of love.
O my rare treasure!
O my life! O my soul!
O my little mountain poppy!
You are my morning star.
You are the flower on the hillside.
You are the white snow on the crest.
Your laughter is the waterfall.

Your whisper is the evening breeze.
 O my sprig of apple-blossom!
 Who spilt moonlight in your eyes?
 O my little butterfly!
 Come and live with me.

O my lover! Build me a hut on the top of the Sulaiman Koh,
 And I will come dancing to it like a golden partridge.

One of the Pathan story-tellers' favorite tales is such a splendid expression of the Pathans' swiftly changing but always practical outlook on life that a rough version of it in complete but summary form follows:

Once a great prince had a very beautiful wife whose greatest charm was her eyes which mirrored all the wonderful things she saw or thought about. One day the prince, who was very much in love with her, noticed a dullness in her eyes. Despite all the doctors could do, the dullness increased day by day. The prince called all his counselors together and asked them what to do. Omar the Poet recommended that the prince be grateful for all the beauty that he had already enjoyed in the eyes of his princess and that he accept the affliction, making it easier by taking all the color from his own dreams and the light from his own heart and pouring it into the eyes of his wife. Then, said Omar, he would remember and hear again the melodies that once came forth from the eyes of the princess.

"Slop and nonsense! Fiddle sticks and make-believe!" said Khalil the Wise. "Be wise and practical, my prince. The world is full of beautiful girls with shining eyes. I will bring you a bevy from the Valley of Shameem who will turn your house into a firefly garden on a summer night."

The grieving prince was furious. He pulled out Khalil's beard and sent him away.

Rahman the Seer spoke. "In the mountains beyond the river lives a man whom the world calls a beggar. But he has in his heart a pool of something that will cure any ailment, for it has conquered time and death. Go find him, my prince. Ask for the magic liquid and put a drop of it in each eye of your princess. They will shine lovelier, brighter, and dreamier than before."

The prince was glad and set out with all his followers to find the beggar. Eventually he did, and he asked him: "What have you in your heart?"

"Love and laughter", laughed the beggar.

"Will you give me two drops of it for my wife?"

"Yes, if you will pay the price for it."

"Name it", said the prince.

"Your kingdom for the drop of laughter and your pride for the drop of love", replied the beggar.

"Too high! My kingdom and the power that goes with it have been given me by Allah. Since you have been so unloving to your prince, I deem you unfit to hold your treasure and confiscate it in the name of the law and the people."

The prince had the beggar put in chains and took him home and cast him into prison.

The next morning, when the door of the prison was opened, behold, by the grace of Allah, nothing was there but a heap of rags, skin, and bone. The beggar had gone and taken his love and laughter with him.

On the wall of the prison he had left a message: "My prince, that which is under your law, I leave for your law to deal with."

When the prince saw this, he was very angry because he had never been defeated before.

He was very angry with all the wise men and pulled out all their beards.

He was very angry with the princess because it was for her sake that he was defeated, and he said: "Damn her eyes!"

Then he sent for Khalil the Wise and went with him to the Valley of Shameem with fine horses, musicians, hawks, and greyhounds, and forgot his one defeat in the many blissful conquests of the Valley of Shameem.

But the poor little princess

She is nearly blind.⁹

The picture that emerges from even such a superficial survey as has just been completed is of a virile Pushtu literature which, despite its age, has not decayed — possibly because, unlike Persian and even Urdu literature, its development has been sporadic and never completed. As such, it is in many ways representative of the character of the Pathans and indicative of the problems which agitate their society.

The Pathans' only significant cultural contribution has been in the field of literature. In accordance with the Islamic tradition, graphic art among the tribesmen is rare indeed, and most of the skill of Pathan hands is expended on the construction and ornamentation of weapons. In fact, many of the remains of the great Buddhist Gandhara culture which abound in Swat and parts of the Khyber Agency have been ruthlessly destroyed by the iconoclastic tribesmen. The art of music is not highly developed, the most common instruments being the drum, the fife, and simple bagpipes. The tunes, however, are all virile and stirring.

The Khattak dance, which despite its name is common to several of the tribes, is also popular. There are several forms of the dance, all martial in the extreme, all involving large numbers of participants, exclusively male. Though the Khattak dance is most frequently seen as a display or recreational performance of Pathan troops, it is occasionally performed in tribal villages.¹⁰ The Yusufzai and Afridis generally abhor dancing and look upon it as frivolous and degrading.

⁹ A more detailed version of this story appeared in the Afghan Government news bulletin, *Bakhtar*, December 29-30, 1956. See Darmesteter, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-145 for several similar tales.

¹⁰ Ian Stephens, *Horned Moon* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1953), includes a stirring description of a Khattak dance on pp. 235-236.

NATIONALISM

Probably the most vexing of the problems of the Pathans is that of Pathan nationalism. The development in the past ten years of the Kabul-sponsored "Pukhtunistan" movement has made the question of whether or not such a thing exists a far more than academic one. The Kabul movement has also added to the complexity of a problem already far from simple.¹¹

Such nationalist sentiment as exists among the Pathans is not a product of the trend which has swept Asia in the twentieth century. It is a different and much older thing and dates back at least to Khushal Khan Khattak. Attempts have been made in recent years, mainly by the Afghan sponsors of the "Pukhtunistan" movement, to portray such historical figures as Muhammad Ghuri and Mir Wais as Pathan nationalists. Pir Roshan is also claimed to have been an early nationalist, but he does not appear to have been one any more than Shivaji, the Maratha freebooter who fought the Moguls because they represented law and order in his time, was the father of the Indian freedom movement which culminated in the Congress Party's assumption of power in an independent India in 1947.

There can be little argument that Khushal Khan Khattak had real nationalist sentiments, though it must be admitted that these sentiments appear to have developed only after his personal quarrels with the Moguls resulted in his loss of the pecuniary benefits he had been accustomed to receive from them. Nevertheless, Khushal Khan was the first to express a coherent Pathan nationalism, and his hatred of all things Mogul for the later part of his long life seems to have been something more than a mere tribal chief's hostility to an immediate enemy. Khushal Khan's attempts to unite the Pathans against the Moguls and his insistence on their ability to determine their own destiny were also more than mere attempts to win allies in a personal power struggle.

Khushal Khan's efforts foundered, however, on the tribes' distrust of one another, which was cleverly exploited by Aurangzeb. Since Khushal Khan's time, hatred of the "infidel" British Christian and Sikh, and resistance to outside interference with tribal custom rather than nationalist aspirations have been the motivating factors in Pathan rebellion against authority. This feeling has handicapped absorption of the Pathan into either British India or, to date, Pakistan, but it has not contributed to the welding of a separate nation, even though racially and culturally

¹¹ The "Pukhtunistan" movement is discussed in Chapter XII below.

the ten million homogeneous Pathans have a more solid national foundation than do many of the existing African and Asian states.

Just why nationalism has not developed more definitely among the Pathans is difficult to explain. Certainly, the political and economic impracticability of making a modern state out of the area they inhabit would not have deterred them if they had actually desired to do so. Neither would historic or religious ties with either Afghanistan or Pakistan.

One can only guess at the reasons for this tendency which is out of tune with the broader political currents of the twentieth century. Probably the most important reason for the lack of nationalism among the Pathans is their long history of intertribal hostilities and jealousies which have crystalized into a pattern of life which makes unity extremely difficult to realize. In addition, the potentially fruitful nationalist movement which might have developed around Khushal Khan in the seventeenth century was deliberately and effectively scotched by Aurangzeb, acting from reasons of high policy.

Finally, of course, the Pathan homeland is sufficiently isolated that its inhabitants have been relatively untouched by the broader nationalist trends which swept the world both in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and are doing so again in the twentieth century. On the positive side, there is the fact that the Pathan tribal structure has remained sufficiently vigorous that the individual Pathan can and does find it possible to realize his objectives within it and thus lacks the incentive to replace it.

The Pathans' position thus is similar in several ways to that of the other great living tribal society of western Asia, that of the Kurds. Both Kurds and Pathans, whose lands, by the way, at no place adjoin, are in many respects "more of a nation" than some of the divisions of the Arabs which have succeeded in becoming independent states.

Since the Pathans lack the nationalist compulsion, their chances for eventual absorption into the national life of Pakistan seem good, although a long period of time and full recognition of their ability to contribute to the national leadership will be necessary. Many of them are still susceptible to a nationalist ideology based on racial concepts — especially when this is presented cleverly and continuously by outside sources. Thus, however artificial the current Afghan concept of "Pukhtunistan" may be, it is unlikely to disappear completely until and unless Afghanistan chooses to remove permanently the stimuli it has offered in the last ten years. Afghanistan's reasons for being reluctant to do so are discussed in Chapter XII below.

THE COMING OF THE BRITISH

INTRODUCTION

Englishmen were active on the Frontier long before Britain formally took over sovereignty from the Sikhs in 1849. Some, like Elphinstone and Burnes, were merely passers-through whose main concern was with larger matters of empire. Others, like William Moorcroft, who penetrated the Wazir country in 1824, and Charles Masson, who wandered all over the area in the 1820's and 1830's, lived for prolonged periods among the Pathans and studied their history and ways.

None of the early comers were impressed with Sikh administration. Masson complains of the excesses committed by Ranjit Singh's troops, and points out the absurdity of the Sikh leader's twice sending armies to Peshawar to extort from Yar Muhammad Khan, one of the Durrani *sirdars* who ruled the city, the gift of a prize horse.¹

Burnes noted when he passed through Peshawar in 1837 that under the governorship of General Avitabile "the Sikhs have changed everything . . . the whole neighborhood is one vast camp, there being between 30,000

¹ Masson, *op. cit.*, I, 124-146. Masson, whose real name was James Lewis, was a deserter from the British East India Company's Army. He began his travels at Agra in 1827, and fell in with the American adventurer, Josiah Harlan, who was making his way to Lahore and Kabul to seek service under Ranjit Singh or Dost Muhammad. To avoid arrest as a deserter, Lewis changed his name to Masson and gave himself a fictitious American background. This false identity persisted and his travels are described in Sir Thomas Holdich, *The Gates of India* (London, Macmillan, 1910), under the title "American Exploration", Harlan eventually informed the British authorities of Masson's true identity, and the deserter escaped imprisonment only by agreeing to supply the East India Company with secret intelligence on Afghanistan in return for immunity. This he did for many years. A large collection of Masson's manuscripts is in the India Office Library in London. So also are the secret minutes of the East India Company meetings at which his immunity was arranged. The Masson papers are an invaluable source of information on the Frontier during the first half of the 19th century.

and 40,000 man stationed on the plain . . . Mohammdan usages have disappeared . . . the sounds of dancing and music are heard at all hours and the fair *grisis* of the Panjab enchant the soldiers with varied strains of Hindee, Cashmeree, Persian, and Afghanee".²

Sikh administration, if such it could be called, was chaotic. Arbitrary sums were entered in the revenue books at Lahore or in Peshawar, and whenever a few troops of soldiers were available, they were sent out to collect the "taxes" due. Wherever the troopers appeared, villages emptied and all moveable property, including wooden window and door frames, were carted off to the protection of the hills, into which the Sikhs did not dare penetrate. The Sikh soldiers in turn pillaged and destroyed the villages and laid waste the fields.

Occasionally the Pathans showed their defiance. One tragi-comic episode is still told around Swabi in Mardan as if it had happened only a few years ago. A Sikh army under the great Ranjit Singh himself was encamped on the eastern bank of a stream, hesitant to attempt a crossing because of the swollen waters. The Pathans on the west bank rounded up a score of cows, an animal sacred to the Sikhs, and slaughtered and ate them in full view of the fuming army. As anticipated, the insult goaded Ranjit Singh into action. The first companies of infantry he sent into the water were swept away and drowned while the Pathans gleefully munched their *kabobs* and shouted insults. Suddenly a squadron of picked cavalry under the French General Allard appeared from behind a patch of woods and dashed straight into the stream. Almost before the startled Pathans could arise from their feast, the troopers had struggled across and were upon them. They and all the Pathans whom the Sikhs could catch for a day's ride around the spot were put to the sword.

The sole interest of the Sikhs in the Frontier was revenue. In those areas over which the Sikhs were able to hold control, the khans were assessed 10,000 rupees each year and the cultivators required to deliver up as much as three-quarters of their produce. Tracts of land were allotted indiscriminately to Hindu money-lenders from the Punjab, some of whom were allowed to pay part of their tribute in Pathan heads rather than money.³ In the face of this constant persecution, the stronger spirits abandoned their land and withdrew to the hills permanently.

This was the situation which the first British administrators found

² Burnes, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

³ James, *op. cit.*, p. 45; H. C. Lumsden, "Report on the Yusuzfai District", (1853), *Selections from the Public Correspondence of the Administration for the Affairs of the Punjab*, I, 368.

when they came to the Frontier in 1847 and 1848. These men did not represent the British Government or the East India Company directly. A number of them had been "seconded" to the Lahore Durbar in an attempt to bolster up the Sikh Empire which had begun to collapse after the death of Ranjit Singh. Few of them approved of their temporary masters' way of ruling, but they were at first prepared to follow orders.

One, Herbert Edwardes, writes graphically of his experiences while on a Sikh tax-gathering raid to Bannu in 1847. Deena Nath, the Sikh Chancellor, explained to the young British officer that as a result of "the particularly barbarous ideas of freedom" of the Pathans around Bannu, it had been impossible for several years to confer on them the "blessing" of a resident Sikh governor. Consequently, the annual revenue of 65,000 rupees was considerably in arrears. Edwardes was to accompany the Sikh soldiery, help them collect as much money and kill as many Pathans as possible, and see to it that the revenue was deposited in the Sikh treasury.

Edwardes set out to do as directed, but the spark of empire was already burning in him. He refused to allow the troopers to harass the villagers as they advanced, and kept his men under strict discipline as they marched into Bannu. Here he summoned a *jirga* of elders and stated his proposition:

Your revenue is 65,000 rupees a year; and, as you refuse to pay it, the Sikhs come and inflict on you a loss fifty times greater. They destroy your harvest, burn your houses, plunder your flocks and herds, and sell your wives and children as slaves. This beautiful valley which nature has bestowed on you is withered into a curse. What for? You say it is for your liberty! I offer you that liberty . . . Only pay of your own free will into any treasury you like an annual tribute of 40,000 rupees, and no army shall enter your valley, no Sikh show his face within your boundaries. You shall be left in the undisturbed enjoyment of your own country and your own laws.

The *jirga* discussed the revolutionary offer and then rejected it, saying they preferred to remain free and persecuted.

Edwardes replied with a stern warning:

I have explored your valley and know its riches. I have discovered your hidden road. I have counted your 400 forts. I have estimated your tribes . . . I will lead in another army by a new way, and level your forts, and disarm your tribes, and occupy your country . . . You shall have the best laws that an enlightened people can frame for you, but they will be administered by a Sikh governor. He cannot oppress you, for the English will be over him. You shall be justly ruled, but you shall be free no more!⁴

⁴ Herbert B. Edwardes, *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, 2 vols. (London: R. Bentley, 1851), I, 27-28.

Edwardes made good his promise in 1848. In 1849, the Sikh governor disappeared when on March 30 the British took over sovereignty in the great Lahore Durbar which ended the short-lived Sikh Empire of the Punjab.

While Edwardes was making straight the path of empire in Bannu, others, James in Peshawar, Lumsden among the Yusufzai, Abbott in Hazara, and Taylor in the Derajat, were also serving as precursors of the new imperial law. After the transfer of sovereignty, the same men continued their work under the direction of the newly-established Punjab Commission. The problems they faced were enormous.

The very boundaries of the trans-Indus tracts were vague. On the east, the Indus divided them from the Punjab. On the north, they tapered off vaguely into the Himalayas. On the west, no one could say just where the Sikh province had ended and Afghanistan begun. The boundary which the British decided upon⁵ corresponds closely to that which exists between the settled districts and tribal territory today. Beyond this line, the British made it clear, they claimed or wanted no authority or responsibility, the hill tribes being left free to maintain their independence or give allegiance to Kabul as they chose.⁶

RELATIONS WITH THE TRANS-BORDER TRIBES

The first and most immediate problem which confronted the British was the security of their new domains. The hill tribes were in their usual state of ferment in 1849. Their unrest was increased by the large number of Pathans from the plains who had taken refuge in the hills from Sikh excesses. The British had for some years been allied with the Sikhs and less than ten years before had joined them in a war against the Amir of Kabul toward whom most Pathans felt some degree of affinity. As a

⁵ Temple described it at the time thus: "The Frontier line commences from the top of the Kaghan glen (a dependency of Huzara) near Chelas on the North-West corner of Maharaja Golab Singh's Territory [Kashmir], and then passes round the North-West boundary of Huzara, on East side the Indus to Tarbeila; then, crossing that river, it winds round the North and North-West boundary of the Peshawar Valley to the Khyber Pass; then round the Afreedee Hills to Kohat; then round the Western boundary of the Kohat District, along the Meeranzye Valley and touching the confines of the Cabul Dominions; then round the Wuzeeree Hills to Bunnoo line and to the head of the Suleemane Range; and then, lastly, right down the base of Suleemane Range to its terminate on the upper confines of Sindh and of the Khelat Kingdom." See Temple, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

result, the new masters of the Frontier were viewed with only a little less hatred than the Sikhs themselves. In addition, a change of regime in the plains was always looked upon by the hungry hillmen as an opportunity for loot. Their eagerness was encouraged to some degree by Kabul, which hoped to recover its lost territories now that the Sikh Empire which had conquered them was no more.⁷

The Hassanzai of the Black Mountain area came into conflict with the new administration almost at once when the British attempted first to tax and then to halt their traditional salt trade with the Punjab. Sayyid Ahmad's followers intensified their incitement of the tribes to revolt against "the new infidels" and began periodic raids against the ferries established at various points on the upper Indus by the British. In 1854 the colony's mischief-making capabilities were enhanced by the arrival of a group of *thugs* (practitioners of *thugee*, ritual murder) who had escaped from British confinement while working on road gangs near Peshawar.

The contemporary Padshah of Swat was inviting the allegiance of tribes from British territory and sending raiding parties down onto the Peshawar Plain. The Mohmands, many of whom lived within British Territory, owed at least nominal allegiance to the Amir of Kabul through their khan at Lalpura. They continued to raid less predatory tribes and when pursued fell back on their Afghan connection. The Afridis in the Khyber Pass, described by Temple as "among faithless tribes, the most faithless",⁸ continued to insist on their sovereignty over the Khyber and closed it at their whim.

The Turis at the upper end of the Kurram Valley, which was still part of the *jagir* (land grant) of one of the sons of the Amir of Kabul, made seasonal raids onto the Bannu Plain. The Kabul Khel Wazirs and the Mahsuds maintained their ancient feud to the detriment of peace and prosperity in the surrounding country. The Dauris in the Tochi Valley refused to deal with British administrators, insisting that they were subjects of the Amir of Kabul.⁹ At the extreme southern end of the new territory, the Baluchi tribes, many of which lived part of the year in British territory, refused to accept the authority of the new government.

⁷ The Afghans actually came down and briefly occupied Bannu and Peshawar while both British and Sikhs were distracted by their conflict in the Punjab early in 1849. They retreated promptly, however, after word of the decisive British victory over the Sikhs at Gujerat reached the Frontier.

⁸ Temple, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁹ In the negotiations over the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1855, the British agreed that the Amir could have the Dauris, if he wanted them.

The Gomal, which at this time was almost as important a trade artery as the Khyber, was closed as frequently.

The British tackled the problem of administration with energy and imagination. Most of the Sikh garrisons had withdrawn to Lahore to join the fighting against the British which had broken out early in 1849 and led to British annexation of the Punjab. Those who remained were evacuated promptly after the British took over. For a short while after annexation, the districts of Peshawar, Kohat, and Hazara were placed under the direct control of the Board of Administration for the Punjab headed by Henry Lawrence in Lahore. Within a year, however, the three districts were set up as a regular division under a commissioner. Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu were placed under a Deputy Commissioner until 1861 when they were formed into the Derajat Division under a separate commissioner. In 1853, the Punjab Board was abolished, and John Lawrence became Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. The pioneer Englishmen quickly became parts of the new machine. Taylor was appointed Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan. Edwardes served in Peshawar and replaced Mackleson, the first commissioner, when the latter was assassinated by a tribesman in 1853. Abbott was appointed the first Deputy Commissioner in Hazara. The best and most experienced administrators who could be spared from other parts of India, and many military officers, "seconded" from their regiments for civil duty, were despatched to the Frontier. Authority to continue existing tribal subsidies and, where desirable, to institute new ones was given by Lahore.

A special military body of what in those days was formidable proportions was speedily set up. It included the forces which the British had organized to bolster the Sikh Empire and was first called the Punjab Irregular Force but the name was soon changed to the Punjab Frontier Force. (The members of both are referred to in the military annals of British India as "Piffers".) The Frontier Force consisted of five regiments of infantry, three batteries of light field artillery, two garrison artillery batteries, two companies of sappers, the Sind Camel Corps, five regiments of cavalry, and the famous Corps of Guides (picked cavalry). Almost all of the troops were native and, even in the early days, many of them were Pathans.

The force was promptly used in an effort to control the offending tribes. Less than a year after annexation, an expedition of more than 3,000 men was sent against the Kohat Pass Afridis to punish them for interfering with travel and commerce between Peshawar and Kohat. Sixteen more expeditions followed within the next six years. The targets included the

Afridis, the Yusufzai, the Miranzai, the Mohmands, the Utman Khels, the Wazirs, the Shiranis, the Orakzai, the Turis, and the followers of Sayyid Ahmad.¹⁰ None of these military movements could be called successful.

The new guardians of the Frontier realized as quickly as the Mogul Aurangzeb had three centuries earlier that military force alone was not an effective instrument for control. Troops could protect the settled districts well enough, but when they moved into the hills, casualties from snipers and skirmishers were high, the expenses of supply enormous, and the offending tribesmen elusive. Frequently the most that a column of several thousand men could accomplish was the destruction of an empty fort or an abandoned village.

The British lost little time in developing a more complex control mechanism. The Kohat Pass Afridis provide a case in point. Less than a month after annexation, the Adam Khel who dwelt in and around the main part of the Pass were promised a subsidy of 5,700 rupees annually for "protecting" (*i.e.*, not attacking) travelers through the Pass. Long before the first year's payment had been earned, the Adam Khel closed the Pass and rose in open rebellion. Sir Charles Napier, Commander-in-Chief of all British forces in India, came personally to the Frontier to lead the expedition against the Adam Khel. The soldiers, 3,200 of them, opened the Pass temporarily. When they withdrew, the Afridis fell upon the caravans again.

This time an Orakzai *malik*, whose clan lived nearby, was given a subsidy of 8,000 rupees to "protect" the Pass. The resulting Adam Khel-Orakzai feud kept the Afridis too busy to interfere with traffic in what had formerly been their exclusive preserve. However, the feud flared up to the point where almost all movement in the whole area had to be suspended. At this point, a third subsidy for "protection" of the Pass was given to the Bangash. The resulting expansion of the intertribal feuding drew the fighting well away from the Pass itself.¹¹

Finally, on December 1, 1853, the Adam Khel came to terms. In a fifteen article "treaty", they promised to return or pay for all property "already robbed or in future robbed", to expel all fugitives from justice in British territory, to turn over any tribesmen guilty of murder in British territory, to undertake that no member of the tribe would commit a crime in British territory, to maintain posts in the Pass for the safety of trav-

¹⁰ *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, 24 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908), XIX, 208-210.

¹¹ Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

elers, and to give hostages to live in British territory. In return they received a subsidy of 5,000 rupees a year.¹²

It is worth noting that the British at this point were following in the footsteps of the Moguls by trying to control the tribes through: (1) subsidies, (2) playing one clan against another, and (3) taking hostages for future good behavior. Shortly afterwards, the officer in charge of the Kohat Pass Afridis, one Colonel Coke, advanced the theory of control a step further. He prescribed that in the event of trouble, the procedure to be followed was: "to close the Pass at once, seize all the Afridis to be found in the Peshawar and Kohat Districts, put the men in jail, sell their cattle, stop all Pass allowances held by the Afridis, and, when the matter is settled, cause all losses to be made good, not from their confiscated allowances, but from the allowances made from the time they may commence".¹³

The notion of collective responsibility of the tribes which Colonel Coke enunciated was to be the keystone of British tribal policy until 1947. It was simple and admirably practical. The various Pathan clans without exception thought and felt as a unit, although their members might on occasion act individually. If the whole group was made responsible for the action of any of its members, it would be more likely to control such actions and more vulnerable to reprisal if it did not do so. Since all of the hill tribes depended for most of their necessities on the settled area, and many of their members could be expected to be there at any given time, the weapons of seizure and blockade were potent indeed.

Edwardes perfected the blockade technique shortly after becoming Commissioner of the Peshawar Division in October, 1853. He dismissed the *arbabs*¹⁴ and "civilized" Pathan informers whom his predecessor had employed and dealt directly with the hill *maliks*. When a tribe offended

¹² The text of the "treaty", the first of many of a similar nature, appears in Government of India, *Central Asia, Part I*, I, 5-6. The inter-tribal feud which the British precipitated in 1850 was finally settled only in 1865 by a large representative *jirga* which decided on compensation for all the killed and injured and provided that each of the parties might construct pickets along the Pass road provided each picket was "beyond matchlock distance of the road and the other pickets". The text of this agreement may be found in P. L. N. Cavagnari, "Report on the Kohat Pass Afridis", *Selections from the Records of the Government of the Punjab and its Dependencies* (New Series, 1883), p. 25. The report itself was written in 1867.

¹³ Government of India, *Central Asia, Part I*, I, 6.

¹⁴ The *arbab* families of the Peshawar Valley date back to the Moguls who used them as middlemen to deal with the tribes. Most of them are wealthy, well-educated landowners in the Valley. The principle *arbabs* are those of Landi and Takalbala, villages near Peshawar.

the new government's conception of right and justice, Edwardes barred the entire group from the Peshawar market, "thereby making the community suffer for its complicity in crime, or unwillingness to exert itself for its punishment and prevention".¹⁵ Denying a clan the use of the Peshawar market meant that it had to import its necessities from a great distance or obtain them through its neighbors, who, of course, took a heavy commission for the service.

At the end of 1853 some Kuki Khel Afridis waylaid a messenger in the Khyber who was carrying a bottle of quinine to the native representative maintained by the British in Kabul.¹⁶ Edwardes immediately announced that every Kuki Khel found within British territory was to be imprisoned. To speed the process, he offered twenty rupees for each tribesman and fifty rupees for each *malik* apprehended. So well did the men of the other tribes respond that before dark of the day on which the announcement was made, 300 rupees' worth of Kuki Khel reposed in the Peshawar jail. The next afternoon, the Kuki Khel elders appeared and returned the quinine. Edwardes, conscious of the East India Company's limited budget, made them reimburse the 300 rupees before releasing the imprisoned men.¹⁷

The blockade technique was later to become more complicated and impersonal, as well as less effective, as the British bureaucracy grew larger. Edwardes was a master of it in his own day, however. He respected the tribesmen, and they respected him. Perhaps part of their respect was due to his ability to make an occasional exception to his own notions of justice in order to conform to local mores. One such exception appears in a "treaty" signed, August 24, 1857 with the notoriously unruly Zakka Khel Afridis. Article five of this document reads: "Reparation is *not* to be made in the event of any person of the tribe abducting the wife or daughter of a resident of British territory, but if he should have brought off any property also, that shall be returned; if the parties deny that any property has been extracted, an oath on the Koran shall be administered to them".¹⁸

¹⁵ Herbert B. Edwardes, *Memorials of the Life and Letters of Major General Sir Herbert B. Edwardes*, arranged by Emma Sidney Edwardes (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 1886), 2 vols.; I, 230.

¹⁶ Malaria was endemic among the tribes, and quinine, which the British introduced, was soon as popular an item of loot as rifles and cartridges.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 222-223.

¹⁸ The original is in the India Office Library. The italics have been added.

THE SEPOY MUTINY

A clue to Edwardes' willingness to accommodate the Zakka Khel may lie in the date of the document. It was signed during the great sepoy (native soldier) rebellion of 1857 while Delhi was still in the hands of the mutineers.

In the spring of 1857, the 55th and 64th Bengal Native Infantry of the East India Company's Army were on the Frontier in addition to the under-strength Punjab Frontier Force. After the first word of the rising at Meerut in May came to Peshawar, British officers began to censor the sepoys' mail. They discovered that many of the sepoys were in correspondence with Sayyid Ahmad's followers in Swat and Sittana and that these in turn were in touch with the rebels in the Bengal Presidency.

The Corps of Guides was sent south immediately to join the remnants of the British forces. The Bengal Native Infantry was marched out to the edge of the tribal area as if an attack were expected from that quarter. Edwardes and Nicholson (who was later to die in the retaking of Delhi) attempted to raise new levies among the Pathans to replace the troops being sent south. The tribes showed themselves reluctant to enlist, however, and the Government in Calcutta expressed alarm at the raising of more native forces, and so the effort was abandoned.

After a few weeks of tension, the garrisons at Nowshera and Mardan mutinied. Their behavior was tame compared to what was happening in other parts of India. They simply refused to obey orders. The Nowshera troops were induced to march into Peshawar where they were disarmed without violence. The Mardan garrison (the 55th B.N.I.) was disarmed against the wishes of their British colonel. They thereupon deserted, and the colonel blew out his brains in despair over the affair.

Two of the deserting sepoys were captured in Hazara District a few weeks later. On June 13, they were blown from the mouths of guns before a large assembly which had been convoked for the purpose of being impressed by the executions. The main body of the 55th Native Infantry, about 600 men in all, fled together into Swat. The British succeeded in getting the local tribes to expel them, and, unable to return to the plains, the desperate sepoys set out to march across the mountains to Kashmir where they hoped to be given refuge by the Maharaja.

They managed to cross the Indus and pushed on eastward under constant harassment by the tribes. In early July they had gotten as far as the Kagan Valley, their number having been reduced to less than 200 by the rough terrain and the hostile tribesmen. They then surren-

dered to the British. In the following weeks almost all of them were executed, many being blown from guns in carefully staged ceremonies throughout Hazara. The graves of some may be seen in Abbottabad today. This appears to have been the sum total of blood shed on the Frontier during the 1857 Mutiny.

Nonetheless the summer of 1857 was a critical time for British rule on the Frontier. Even if the danger from the sepoys was relatively slight after the first days, the British were surrounded by powerful foes, any one of whom could have struck successfully if he had chosen to do so. There is little doubt that in combination, the border tribes, Sayyid Ahmad's followers, and the Afghans could easily have driven the British back across the Indus. This in turn would in all likelihood have inspired the Punjab to revolt. Conscious of this, Sir John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Punjab and anything but a timid man, proposed early in June that the British evacuate the Frontier, including the Derajat, invite Dost Muhammad, the Amir of Kabul, to reoccupy his former territories, and, as a reward for his loyalty, allow him to keep them after the Mutiny had been suppressed.

This proposal was vigorously opposed by Hugh James, one of the pioneers on the Frontier, who was now John Lawrence's secretary. Edwardes and Nicholson also strongly objected from Peshawar. Lawrence agreed to refer the matter to Calcutta for decision. On August 7, a telegram arrived from Lord Canning, the Governor General: "Hold on to Peshawar to the last!"¹⁹

And so it was. Delhi was recaptured on September 20, and the Mogul princes, erroneously deemed responsible for the Mutiny, were slaughtered in cold blood by Major Hodson, an old Frontier hand and former commander of the Guides.²⁰ The Afridis and their kindred clans remained in the hills, holding almost continuous *jirgas* but taking no action. Sayyid Ahmad's followers lost heart when word came of the defeat of some of their companions in India and limited their operations to sporadic raiding from their mountain stronghold. Dost Muhammad, whatever his reasons,

¹⁹ The sequence of events described in the preceding paragraphs has been developed from several sources, the most important of which is Edwardes, *Memorials*, I, 360-475; and II, 1-25.

²⁰ W. S. R. Hodson, *A Soldier's Life in India* (London: J. Parker, 1859). Hodson's book presents a graphic picture of the mixture of righteousness and barbarity with which the British as well as the Indians thought and acted during the Mutiny. Hodson's book also tells of his service on the Frontier in 1846-54. He was not one of the most enlightened officers to serve there, and his letters do not make edifying reading.

lived up to the promises of friendship exchanged with the British a few years earlier in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of Peshawar in 1855. By doing so he lost what was probably Afghanistan's last chance to recover its lost provinces.

British officials of the time and later historians unanimously ascribe the British success in holding the Frontier during the Mutiny to the calmness and daring displayed at the time, which intimidated the local people and impressed them with the indestructibility of the British *Raj*. Indeed, Edwardes and his colleagues did act with great courage and skill, and they deserve no little credit for maintaining peace at a critical time. Probably the determining factor, however, was the fact that the Punjab remained loyal. Had the warrior Sikhs and Muslims there risen against the British, the Mutiny would almost certainly have spread to the Frontier also.

In addition, of course, few of the Pathans had any personal interest in the sepoy rebellion in the Bengal Presidency (province), and those who thought about it at all looked upon it as a war between two sets of foreigners: British and Indians. The Pathans at the time had had little experience with the cumbersome bureaucracy and the sometimes repressive policies of the British East India Company, and they certainly did not consider themselves part of India. Such resentment as there was developed later when some British officials of the new Government of India, which succeeded the Company, unjustly laid the bulk of the blame and punishment for the Mutiny on Muslim elements in India.

The end of the Mutiny and the assumption of responsibility for the government of India by the British Crown brought few visible changes to the Frontier. Its importance had always been strategic rather than economic, and the East India Company had taken little notice of the lands beyond the Indus. The changeover, however, helped give an air of permanence to the British regime in the eyes both of the Pathans and of the British officers working there. With the major threat to the security of the area settled for some time at least, both British and Pathans were free to turn their attention to other problems.

LAND SETTLEMENT

The most important of these was the need for establishment of a land tenure system. The Pathans needed such a system to restore some order to their traditional pattern²¹ which had been weakened by excessive

²¹ See Chapter III above.

fragmentation even before it was shattered by the chaotic administration of the Sikhs. The British needed a system to provide revenue and to help reduce the turbulence of their Pathan subjects. The British administrators also hoped, by improving agricultural conditions in the area which they were administering, to lessen the ties between the settled Pathans of the Peshawar and Derajat divisions and their irrepressible brothers in the hills.

The land settlement process was one of Britain's better contributions to the sub-continent. The first land settlement in Bengal was carried out in 1786 under Lord Cornwallis. By the time the British took over the Frontier from the Sikhs, they had considerable experience in reordering India's real estate. However, conditions on the Frontier were different from those which had prevailed in Bengal. The original egalitarian distribution of tribal lands remained as a framework, but many masters had subsequently made different allotments, which were enforced or not depending on the political situation at any given time. In many cases, at least three different claims existed against the same plot of land: the Pathan *daftar*, a Mogul *jagir*, and a Sikh grant.

The British officers who had served the Sikh Durbar had made some efforts toward setting up a rational land tenure system even before annexation. Edwardes in 1848 had won the friendship of some of the Wazir clans dwelling on the edge of the Bannu Plain by recognizing their claims to certain lands on the edge of the Plain. Land settlement continued apace after annexation, with the Punjab Commission, always short of funds, giving it a high priority.

A conscientious effort was made to deal directly with the lower levels of leadership rather than with the khans or *jagirdars*. Each village head was made responsible to the government for the revenue of his village, and the titles of the owners of the various plots of land in it were recorded after being agreed upon by the village head and the rest of the community. This was the beginning of the *tahsildar* system which remains in effect today. Long-standing disputes were settled, frequently in an arbitrary manner, by the young British settlement officers whose ignorance of local custom sometimes resulted in injustice.²²

²² See Lumsden, *op. cit.*, pp. 369-381, for a description of an early settlement; also Hugh R. James, "Lieut. James' Summary Settlement of Hushnugar in the District of Peshawar" (1851), *Selections from the Public Correspondence of the Administration for the Affairs of the Punjab, 1857*, Vol. I. James refused to recognize individual rights to *inam* (the share in the tribal common land), insisting that a man's *daftar* (land rights) were limited to his *bukhra* (allotted portion) in the fields or the village. (See Chapter III above.) Thus the common land eventually

The land settlement process continued over several years. When it was completed the Frontier had a practical and reasonably equitable land tenure and revenue system. The number of middlemen in the tax structure was reduced to a minimum, and a fairly large number of small freeholders obtained clear and protected title to their land. Assessments were fixed for specified periods, avoiding the mistakes made a half a century earlier in Bengal when a "permanent" rate had been set with resulting dislocations as crop and currency values fluctuated over the years. The resulting agricultural prosperity made the Peshawar and Derajat Divisions food-exporting areas for some years, and in 1864-65, 200 to 250 boats were recorded as having carried mixed cargoes of wheat, gram, *bajra*, pulses, oilseed, cotton, and wool from the Indus ports of Bannu District (mainly Kalabagh) to Sind and the lower Punjab.²³

THE DEVELOPING ADMINISTRATION

The pattern of administration set on the Frontier in the 1850's did not alter greatly in the following thirty years. However, the bureaucracy grew larger, and the caliber of the administrators declined as the web of government, manifested in police, public works, irrigation, and a score of other ways, gradually spread over the settled districts.

The law courts of British India, with their hordes of half-trained Hindu lawyers who lived by encouraging petty litigation, were introduced into the province and soon became a vehicle for the continuation of the Pathans' personal feuds. After some years of this the Frontier Crimes Regulations, the first set of which was promulgated in 1872, probably came as something of a relief to the Pathans. The Frontier Crimes Regulations, or FCR, as they are still familiarly known, were anything but democratic, but they did establish a separate code of law for the Frontier based in part at least on local custom. The FCR provided for trial by official *jirgas* selected by the Deputy Commissioner. The usual rules of

was recorded in the name of a tribal leader, frequently the khan, who by virtue of his willingness to pay taxes on it obtained ownership.

²³ H. B. Urmston, "Notes on the Bunnoo District", *Selections from the Records of the Government of the Punjab and its Dependencies* (New Series), 1866, p. 3. Just when and why the Frontier districts passed from a food surplus to a food deficit area is not clear, although population increase undoubtedly had something to do with it. However, the change had clearly taken place by the end of the nineteenth century.

evidence were suspended, and the need for outside legal counsel greatly reduced.

The hill tribes remained intensely suspicious of the new developments in the districts and would have nothing to do with them. Despite subsidies, blockades, and subversion, they remained as intractable as ever, and scarcely a year passed without an expedition in force into the hills.²⁴ These expeditions followed what Sir William Barton, perhaps the most capable and enlightened British administrator the Frontier has ever seen, calls the "burn and scuttle" policy. Since the troops were seldom able to come to grips with the tribesmen in open battle, fields were burned, houses destroyed, fruit trees cut down, and in a few classic cases the ground was ploughed with salt. These tactics were supposed to have the effect of impressing on the offending tribe the cost of disregarding British regulations and thereby deterring it from doing so again. In tribal eyes, the expeditions in most cases simply increased the weight of *badal* to be taken against the British.

The increasingly difficult problem of tribal control was a subject of much learned discussion in England and India in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. The controversy became especially lively about the time of the Second Afghan War (1878-80) as Imperial Russia advanced steadily southward and eastward until the outposts of the Tsarist empire were within marching distance of the British Indian frontier. By this time, two main schools of thought, each of which dated back at least forty years, emerged into sharp focus.

THE CLOSE BORDER SYSTEM

The more conservative of these was the Close Border system. Essentially, it held that the British Indian Government should not assume responsibility for any area it was unable or unwilling to administer as an integral part of its domains. Opinions as to just where British India's northwest frontier should be drawn varied at different times. Viceroy Lord Lawrence (1863-68) was prepared to revert to the Indus as a natural geographic and cultural boundary. Most officials, however, accepted the boundary inherited from the Sikhs, *i.e.*, the western border of the Peshawar and Kohat Divisions, as the proper international boundary. This area, they pointed out, had been administered constantly, if not always successfully, since 1849.

²⁴ There were 40 expeditions between 1849 and 1878.

As everyone realized, however, the problem was far less where to draw the line than what to do about the area beyond it, since it was manifestly impossible to ignore the fierce and powerful tribes in the hills. This problem, as the advocates of the Close Border saw it, was primarily a diplomatic, or as it came to be called, a political, one. As such, it was largely separate from the problem of administration within the settled districts. Political control of the trans-border tribes, they held, could be imposed from a base within the settled districts through a policy of subsidies, blockade, occasional interference in tribal affairs, and, when necessary, punitive expeditions. The objective was twofold: to protect the security of the settled districts and to deny the area beyond the border to any non-indigenous power — most immediately the Amir of Kabul, and most importantly the Tsar of Russia. This, as has been seen, was the policy begun in 1849 by Edwardes.

THE FORWARD POLICY

The Forward Policy favored pushing the international boundary as far westward and northward as physically possible, and by dint of changing existing conditions in the extended area through both education and force of arms, exercising full sovereignty over the whole. Obviously this procedure would sooner or later bring India and Russia face to face in Central Asia. There were different opinions as to just where this should come about. Some said India's frontier lay on the Oxus; others were satisfied with Herat and the Hindu Kush.²⁵ During and immediately after the Second Afghan War, the proposal for a "scientific frontier" on a line from Kabul through Ghazni to Kandahar was popular. (The British were in actual occupation of the three cities in 1879-80.)

That it was possible under certain conditions to push administration out into the tribal areas was proven by Colonel Robert Sandeman in Baluchistan. The Sandeman system, a kind of humane corollary of the Forward Policy, was unique in that it had as a basic goal the welfare of the tribes. Sandeman held that the Government had a moral obligation to attempt the gradual civilization and settlement of the tribes. The way to do this was through "peaceful penetration" of their homelands, based on knowledge and sympathy. Behind this was the assumption that given the chance to improve their economic lot, the impoverished hillmen

²⁵ It is interesting that more than 50 years later, the gentle Mahatma Gandhi also thought of India's true frontier as the Hindu Kush.

would abandon their predatory habits in favor of peaceful sedentary ones. The immediate instrument for such improvement was employment of the tribesmen in levies, road-making, and other services.

The Sandeman system worked well in Baluchistan, and almost from the beginning, administration was extended up to the limits of the area of British interest. However, the Baluch border tribes were considerably less intractable than the Pathans. Their tribal culture was less highly developed; and they had but recently suffered under the corrupt and despotic rule of the Khan of Kalat and the Amirs of Sind, compared to which the British rule was light and benign. In addition, they were many fewer in numbers than the Pathans.

THE FORWARD POLICY IN THE NINETIES

Finally, in 1890, the British pushed their base out beyond the Close Border. Appropriately, it was Sandeman who led the way. From Zhob in Baluchistan, he moved up the Gomal, picketing it and establishing levy posts in key positions. The Khidarzai Shiranis, who opposed the expansion, were overcome by an expedition and forced to agree to the establishment of levy posts in their area.

In 1891, a regular punitive expedition against the Orakzai was followed by the declaration that the Samana Crest, a high ridge in the Sulaiman Koh which dominated the Miranzai Valley and the southern Tirah, was the *de facto* British boundary; pickets were then constructed along it. The following year, pickets were extended up the Kurram Valley, and with the consent of the Shia Turis, who were facing the prospect of extinction in a *jihad* against them by their Sunni neighbors, the Valley was brought under the rule of a British political agent.

In 1893, Amir Abd-ur-Rahman of Kabul reluctantly agreed to delimitation of his eastern boundary. The line which was settled upon by the Amir and Sir Mortimer Durand was demarcated in 1894-95 and remains the international boundary today.²⁶ During the course of the demarcation

²⁶ The Durand Line, as the boundary came to be called, has been a source of dissension between Afghanistan and British India (later Pakistan) ever since. Amir Abd-ur-Rahman pleaded with the British repeatedly not to include the hill tribes within their boundaries. He wrote Viceroy Lord Landsdowne, in a much quoted paragraph: "If you should cut them out of my dominions, they will never be of any use to you nor to me. You will always be engaged in fighting or other trouble with them, and they will always go on plundering. As long as your Government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a strong hand, but

the Mahsuds attacked and burned the British Boundary Commission camp at Wana, subsequent to which a strong garrison was stationed there. A short time later, the Tochi Valley was occupied without objection by the Dauris who, like the Turis, found the British presence a useful protection against their neighbors.

In the far north, a British political agent had been temporarily resident in Gilgit as early as 1876. The vast area below the Pamirs centering on Gilgit and Chitral was technically under the sovereignty of the Maharaja of Kashmir. The Maharaja in turn had accepted British suzerainty in 1846 when Kashmir was separated from the Sikh Empire of the Punjab. Through the 1880's the British generally exercised minimal influence in the northern area through the Maharaja. A separate Gilgit Agency was established in 1889, however, and the British took advantage of the chaos which followed the death of Aman-ul-Mulk, the ruler of Chitral, to establish garrisons at Chalt and in Hunza in 1892. In 1895, a road was built through the Malakand Pass, and posts were set up in the Pass, at the crossing of the Swat River, and in Chitral itself.

On September 10, 1895, the Pamir Boundary Agreement with Russia established the Russian-Afghan border in the Pamir area, thus completing the international boundaries of Afghanistan. The Pamir boundary ended in the east at the northernmost point of the Durand Line. The area in between, in places only a half-dozen miles wide, comprised the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan, which would neatly and, it was hoped, eternally separate the domains of Britain and Russia.

Demarcation of the Durand Line brought the controversy between the Close Border and the Forward Policy into more acute focus. British India now had two clearly defined borders with which it must be concerned: One, the Close Border, dating from 1849, ran along the western edges of the Peshawar and Derajat Divisions. The other, Afghanistan's western boundary, ran along the crest of the hills, roughly parallel to the first at a distance of from fifteen to sixty miles further west. (In the far north the administrative border turned eastward and as much as 200 miles of tribal territory separated the two lines.) The two lines

if at any time a foreign enemy appears on the borders of India, these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies: . . . In your cutting away from me these frontier tribes, who are people of my nationality and my religion, you will injure my prestige in the eyes of my subjects, and will make me weak, and my weakness is injurious to your Government." Abdur Rahman, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, ed. Mir Munshi Sultan Mohammad Khan, 2 vols. (London: J. Murray, 1900), II, 158.

marched together for about 350 miles from south to north. In between were roughly 25,000 square miles of no man's land occupied by the hill tribes, not under British law, but containing fingers of British penetration in the Gomal, the Tochi, the Kurram, the Khyber, and up the Malakand into Chitral.

Centered on these fingers were the newly-established political agencies of South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Kurram, and Malakand, as well as the Khyber which dated from 1881. Laid out on a map from south to north, the five British fingers could easily be envisioned as a hand, palm up, with the Malakand as the thumb. Many contemporary strategists, in fact, saw the arrangement as "the strong right hand" of British power on the Frontier, which could be curled into a fist to smash a Russian advance on India.

The problem was that the fingers could not relax a moment, or even wiggle in vigilance, without getting severely scarred by the hostile tribes who held the ridges between them. The advocates of the Forward Policy, who were riding high as a result of the outward movements in the early 1890's, urged pacification and administration of the entire area up to the Durand Line — either by "peaceful penetration" or by further employment of the brute force which had established the beachheads in the first place.

The Close Border supporters, now somewhat on the defensive, argued that the 1895 agreement with Russia, by definitely delimiting Afghanistan, had settled the position of Afghanistan as a buffer state once and for all and had thus greatly reduced the chances of a clash with Russia. They also pointed out that taking over the tribal area would result in a greatly increased drain on revenue and emphasized the cost of maintaining the fingers which were already established in it.

The latter consideration was highlighted by the great tribal rising of 1897-98, when, as Sir William Barton puts it, "the border burst into flame from the Tochi to the Malakand".²⁷ The 1897 rebellion will be discussed in more detail later.²⁸ It is sufficient here to recall that in 1897-98, more than 60,000 regular troops had to go into battle merely to preserve the "strong right hand", which under such circumstances would surely have been incapable of striking a deterrent blow at a Russian advance.

²⁷ Barton, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

²⁸ See Chapter IX.

THE NEW ORDER

The shape of a new order of things began to emerge hot on the heels of the bloody stalemate of 1897-98. British frontier policy in the future, it was announced, would be based on three points: (1) concentration of forces, (2) avoidance of unnecessary interference with the tribes, (3) control of the arms traffic.²⁹ These points represented something of a compromise between the two schools of thought. The fingers already in the tribal area were to be maintained, but no effort was to be made to administer the tribes which dwelt around them. However, tribal capability for aggression was to be limited by denying — insofar as it was possible — additional armament. The absolute necessity of the last provision became apparent in the fighting of 1897-98 when the tribes demonstrated their possession of and proficiency in modern weapons.

The effort to limit tribal armament, incidentally, was to continue for almost exactly fifty years. It was never successful. The Pathans obtained their weapons by bribery and theft in India and Afghanistan. They demonstrated incredible ingenuity in taking them from British troops by stealth and open assault. They were frequently supplied from the arsenal at Kabul. They set up their own gun factories at an early date. From 1890 onward, a large-scale smuggling trade was maintained from the Persian Gulf and the Mekran Coast. The British managed to curtail this by 1910, but they were never able to cut off the flow of weapons into the tribal area entirely.³⁰

A new administrative organization was obviously necessary if the new policy was to be implemented. The Punjab Government, since its establishment in 1849, had grown into a mighty bureaucracy with its heart and soul in the rich plains surrounding Lahore and Amritsar. The Frontier was frequently run, so to speak, with the left hand. Calcutta often intervened as a result of the strategic nature of many of the problems which arose. London was also involved, since Whitehall technically handled (through the Government of India) such foreign relations as Afghanistan had and was constantly negotiating with St. Petersburg for an accommodation in Central Asia. The numerous expeditions against the tribes gave the military a more than usually important role. In addition to dealing with the turbulent and culturally separate trans-Indus

²⁹ Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1898, LXIII, N-WF*, Cmd. 8714, pp. 11-17.

³⁰ See Davies, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-178; and Arnold Keppel, *Gun-Running and the Indian North-West Frontier* (London: J. Murray, 1911).

districts, Lahore now had also penetration into the tribal area to concern it.

Several times since 1849 separation of the trans-Indus area from the Punjab had been proposed. Lord Lytton and Lord Roberts had strongly urged separation shortly after the Second Afghan War, but neither they nor the other powerful exponents of the idea in India had ever been able to get it accepted in London. Finally, in 1898, when the fighting on the border had tapered off, the India Office took another look at the problem of governing the Frontier, and concluded that "the present arrangements are not satisfactory".³¹

In January of 1899, Lord Curzon of Kedleston became Viceroy of India. He had been for many years keenly interested in Indian affairs and had also traveled extensively in Central Asia. He thoroughly agreed with the India Office's assessment and brought with him to India authority to do something to improve the situation. After more than a year of study, Curzon, in a long and well-argued minute, proposed making the Frontier districts into a separate unit and bringing the tribal territory directly under the Government of India. This, he stated, would "entrust tribal management exclusively to those who know the tribes".³²

Curzon got his wish on November 9, 1901, when the North-West Frontier Province was formally created and direct control over the tribal area assumed by the Government of India.

The problems which the new administration faced and its success in dealing with them will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.³³ Before leaving the men of the nineteenth century, however, it is worthwhile to consider briefly the changes that had taken place during the fifty years of British rule. Some of the most important of these are not explicit in the documents and can only be deduced from the attitudes of the succeeding administrators and the reactions of the Pathans.

The British administrators in the early days were remarkable men. Many were bachelors who devoted their entire lives to learning the ways of the people they ruled — or tried to rule. They traveled constantly and were on intimate, if not always friendly, terms with all of the leaders and most tribesmen. They carried on a voluminous correspondence — almost exclusively on the subject of their work — with their families at home, their male relatives in other parts of India, and their colleagues in Lahore and Calcutta. They seldom went on leave and took little re-

³¹ *Parliamentary Papers, 1898, LXIII, N-WF, Cmd. 8714, p. 3.*

³² *Parliamentary Papers, 1901, XLIX, N-WF, Cmd. 496, p. 150.*

³³ See Chapter VII below.

creation while on the job. They held fast to their beachhead of empire in Central Asia in the face of the 1857 Mutiny, the Second Afghan War, and almost constant tribal uprisings. What little leisure they were able to snatch from trying to make the Pathans behave was devoted to trying to convince Lahore, Calcutta, and Whitehall to allow the Pathans to live their own life and to realize that the Frontier presented peculiar problems.

Later in the century, when the foothold was secured and expanded into an occupation, large families came "out East" to establish a "piece of England" on the Frontier. Men whose main interest and hope of advancement were far away in Lahore or Simla served their time fretfully on the Frontier. Military officers whose only interest in the Pathans lay in their value for "blooding" new troops played an increasingly important role in the conduct of affairs. The distinction between the "Political", who was expected to be interested in native ways and to defend the Pathans (and who was superciliously excused for it), and the military and civil administration became sharper.

Decisions on administration had to be referred to Lahore or to Calcutta. High policy was made in London, frequently only after lengthy maneuvering with St. Petersburg. Often, the interests or welfare of the Pathans were the least considerations in a decision. While both Englishmen and Pathans remained intelligent and courageous in their respective ways, a barrier grew between them — all too frequently reinforced by the fear and distrust of the English women in the cantonments who feared the silent and mysterious hills as their menfolk never did. In retrospect, it is ironic to realize that in 1901, when the North-West Frontier Province was born, British rule on the Frontier had already passed its half-way mark. It is safe to assume that such an idea never entered the wildest dreams of the ladies and gentlemen in the cantonments who toasted the new viceroy and the old queen. They thought and acted as if they were to be there forever.

VI

“THE GREAT GAME”

INTRODUCTION

In 1922, a special North-West Frontier Inquiry Committee summed up more than a century of British policy: “The ultimate aim of our whole frontier policy is the security of India. The immediate object of our North-West Frontier policy is to control the trans-frontier tribes as to secure life and property in our frontier districts”.¹

British efforts during the nineteenth century to secure the immediate object were discussed in the preceding chapter. They were always made, however, in the context of the ultimate aim, which was to protect India and the general British position in Asia against Russia. To this end, “The Great Game”, of which Kipling writes so romantically, went on for well over a hundred years. To understand British policy on the Frontier — and why it differed so greatly from British policy in other parts of India — it is necessary to understand something of “The Great Game”, even though some of its moves were made far from the Frontier hills and years before the British came to control them.

THE STRUGGLE FOR HERAT

Even before the Congress of Vienna (September, 1814 to June, 1815) had finished reshaping the map of Europe, England was preparing to cope with the Russian threat in Asia. The Treaty of Teheran was signed by Persia and England on November 15, 1814. Under its provisions: (1) Persia undertook to prevent passage through its territory of any

¹ Government of India, *Report of the North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee and Minutes of Dissent by Mr. T. Rangachariar and Mr. N. M. Samarth* (Delhi: Government Central Press, 1934), p. 6.

European army marching on India and to exert influence to persuade the Khans of Khiva, Bokhara, and Kokand to do likewise; (2) the limits of the two states of Russia and Persia were to be "determined according to the admission of Great Britain, Persia, and Russia", (3) Persia and Great Britain would come to each other's assistance in case of war, except that (4) in the event of an Anglo-Afghan war, Persia was to place an army at the disposal of Great Britain, but (5) in the event of an Afghan-Persian war, Great Britain would not interfere and would use its good offices only at the request of both belligerents.²

Some twenty years later, during Lord Auckland's regime as Governor General of India (1836-42), rumors of the developments in Central Asia which Britain feared reached London and Calcutta. A many-sided competition for control of Herat, strategically located at the western end of the Hindu Kush, about midway between the territories held by Britain and those in Russian possession, began between the Amir of Kabul, the Shah of Persia, the Afghan chiefs of Kandahar, and the Khan of Khiva. None of the competitors could be assumed to be friendly to British interests, and at least two (Persia and Khiva) were suspected to be acting under Russian inspiration.³

The chess game on the Central Asia steppe got underway at once. In September of 1836, Lord Auckland decided to establish relations with the Amir of Kabul, Dost Muhammad, who had regained the throne after a period of chaos following the deposition of Shah Shuja with whom Elphinstone had signed a treaty in 1809. Lord Auckland chose as his emissary Captain Alexander Burnes. Burnes arrived in Kabul in September, 1837. Two months later Captain Vacovich of the Imperial Russian Army also showed up in Kabul. Vacovich's appearance confirmed British suspicions, and the struggle between the two great empires began in earnest.⁴

The Russians moved simultaneously in Teheran. Count Simonich, the Russian Minister to the Shah, strongly urged that the Persians seize Herat before Khiva or Kabul (whom the Russians were also encouraging

² Text in Great Britain, *British and Foreign State Papers, 1812-14*, Part 1, Vol. I (London: Ridgway, 1939), 261-264.

³ Sir Henry Rawlinson, *England and Russia in the East* (London: J. Murray, 1875), Chapter III.

⁴ Burnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 141 ff.; Kaye, John William, *History of the War in Afghanistan*, 3 vols. (London: Richard Bentley, 1857), III. A third-party account of the sparring between Vacovich and Burnes can be found in Masson, *op. cit.*, II. For an account of the events surrounding the First Afghan War based on Russian sources, see Philip E. Mosely, "Russian Policy in Asia (1838-39)", *The Slavonic Review*, XIV (London, April, 1936), pp. 1-11.

in the same matter) did so. When word of this reached London, Prime Minister Lord Palmerston ordered the British Minister in Teheran, Sir Henry Ellis, to make his government's objections to a change in the control of Herat clear to the Russian. Ellis did so, using terms as bold as those of the Monroe Doctrine. "Afghanistan", he told Simonich, "must be considered as a frontier to our Indian Empire; no European nation has relations, either commercial or political, with that country".⁵

This was a clear warning to Russia against overtures to Kabul and against support of any third party's expansion into Afghanistan. Thus, the British chose unilaterally to establish Afghanistan as a marchland a dozen years before their border moved across the Indus River and seventy-five years before Lord Curzon spelled out the marchland theory in classic style in his famous Romanes Lecture at Oxford.⁶ It should be noted also that the words, "European nation", excluded India and the independent princely states of that area from the prohibition. Inherent in this was another basic British policy which was to be maintained in the face of vigorous and continuous Afghan objection until 1921 — Anglo-Afghan relations must be conducted through the Government of India rather than directly between London and Kabul.

The Shah of Persia, the strongest of the pawns in the game, precipitated the first crisis in the imperial struggle. In the fall of 1837, before Burnes in Kabul had had time to influence Afghan intentions, and in spite of warnings from Ellis in Teheran, Muhammad Shah marched on Herat. Simonich ignored Ellis' pronouncement and openly gave the Shah assurances of support. The Russian count actually accompanied the besieging army and played an important role in the direction of military operations.

Herat at this time might or might not have been in "Afghanistan", depending on the nationality of the cartographer. Ellis' statement makes it clear that the British assumed it was. London protested to St. Petersburg about Simonich's encouraging the Shah.⁷ Said Palmerston: "He is acting avowedly as a tool of Russia, and the proceedings of Russia in Afghanistan are as direct an approach to British India as it is at present in her power to make".⁸ St. Petersburg disowned Simonich's actions,

⁵ *Parliamentary Papers, 1839, XL, Afghanistan, 10.*

⁶ Lord Curzon, *Frontiers*, the Romanes Lecture for 1907 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907).

⁷ *Parliamentary Papers, 1839, XL, Afghanistan, 17.*

⁸ Sir A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, eds., *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, 3 vols. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1923), I, 205.

quoting his orders "to dissuade the Shah from prosecuting the war at any time and in any circumstances".⁹ Nonetheless the siege went on, and the Russian diplomat remained in the Shah's camp before Herat.

The British now decided to try a new approach. A naval expedition was despatched from Bombay to the Persian Gulf in June, 1838. Karrack was occupied, and rumors of a huge British army advancing upon Shiraz and laying waste all the country it passed through reached Herat and put the Shah's camp into a near panic. Not unnaturally, the British took advantage of this state of affairs to inform the Shah once again that Persian occupation of Herat or any part of Afghanistan would be considered "a hostile demonstration against England", and that "already had a naval armament arrived in the Persian Gulf and that if the Shah desired the British Government to suspend the measures in progress for the vindication of its honour, he must retire at once from Herat".¹⁰

Two months later, despite Simonich's efforts to prolong the siege, the Persian army gave up and marched back to Teheran. Simonich was recalled by the Imperial Russian Government, and his successor was instructed to inform the Shah that "Russia will not take part in the civil wars of the Afghan chiefs, nor in their family feuds, which have no claim to our intervention".¹¹

THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR

While the British were matching their wits against Simonich in Teheran, another diplomatic game was going on in Kabul. When Alexander Burnes arrived at Kabul on a "commercial" mission on September 20, 1837, he was greeted with great friendliness by the Amir Dost Muhammad who hoped for British aid against the eastward incursions of the Persians. Four days after his arrival Burnes, in a private conference with the Amir, urged him to expel the Persians from Herat and exert his authority over the western regions of Afghanistan. Dost Muhammad wanted Herat all right, but the price he demanded for making common cause with the British was not only assistance against the Persians on his western border but security on his eastern border as well — *i.e.*, assurances that Peshawar and the Frontier districts which had been taken from him by the Sikhs would be restored.

⁹ *Parliamentary Papers, 1839, XL, Afghanistan, 17.*

¹⁰ *Kaye, op. cit., I, 282-84.*

¹¹ *Parliamentary Papers, 1839, XL, Afghanistan, 201.*

Burnes made vague promises that “arrangements” would be made with Ranjit Singh for restoration of Peshawar. In return Dost Muhammad began active opposition to the Persian campaign. He urged the chief of Kandahar, who had planned to join the Shah of Persia in the attack on Herat, to desist. He began to collect forces to send westward. It was in this atmosphere of good feeling that word reached the court that a Russian envoy was on the way to Kabul.

Captain Vacovich entered Kabul on December 19 and presented letters from Count Simonich and from the Tsar. Burnes began to grow worried almost at once and sent an urgent request for instructions to Lord Auckland. He received them in January. They included a strong rebuke for exceeding his authority in discussing Peshawar with Dost Muhammad. The Sikhs, the Viceroy pointed out, were Britain’s strongest ally in India. Peshawar was theirs and would remain so.¹²

Meanwhile Vacovich told Dost Muhammad that the Russians had 50,000 men ready to march to the assistance of an Afghan attack on Herat and, after completing the reduction of that city, to march on the Sikhs and restore Peshawar and part of the Punjab to Dost Muhammad.¹³ Despite this tempting, if not very practical proposal, Dost Muhammad continued to press Burnes for an agreement which would involve the return of Peshawar. In the face of his orders, Burnes could do nothing. On March 21, 1838, Dost Muhammad himself wrote to Lord Auckland begging him to “remedy the grievances of the Afghans and to give them a little encouragement and power”.¹⁴ It appears that the Viceroy never

¹² Kaye, *op. cit.*, I, 202. In a private letter Burnes described the situation in which he found himself as follows: “We are in a mess here! Herat is besieged and may fall, and the Emperor of Russia has sent an envoy to Kabul to offer Dost Muhammad Khan money to fight Runjeet Singh!!!! I would not believe my eyes or ears; but Captain Vacovich — for that is the agent’s name — arrived here with a blazing letter three feet long . . . I sent an address at once to my Lord A. bidding him look what his predecessors had brought upon him, and telling him that after this I knew not what might happen, and it was now a neck and neck race between Russia and us.”

¹³ Mohan Lal, *Life of the Amir Dost Muhammad Khan of Kabul*, 2 vols. (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1846), I, 304.

¹⁴ Kaye, *op. cit.*, I, 208. It is difficult to find a clear and unabridged record of the actual official correspondence concerning the Burnes mission to Kabul and the preliminaries to the First Afghan War. The sequence of events described in this chapter has been reconstructed from Burnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 140 ff.; Masson, *op. cit.*, III; Kaye, *op. cit.*, I, 166-210; *Parliamentary Papers, 1839, XL, Afghanistan*, 179-204; and *Parliamentary Papers, 1859, XXV, Afghanistan*. Kaye charges that the official record was “garbled . . . mutilated . . . and emasculated” to justify the war launched by Lord Auckland. He quotes heavily in his work from “the unpublished correspondence of Sir Alexander Burnes”. The *Parliamentary Papers of*

deigned to reply. On April 26, 1838, Burnes left Kabul in despair and disgrace, and Dost Muhammad turned to Vacovich.

Vacovich had clearly accomplished a good deal at Kabul. The English envoy had been driven out in disgrace. Russian influence had been established and the groundwork for a future Russian-Afghan alliance against British India laid. This, after all, was what the whole British maneuver in Persia had been designed to avoid.

Faced with this situation, British policy turned again to the use of force. The exact point at which the decision to make war against Dost Muhammad was taken is not clear, but it probably came immediately after Burnes was informed that Peshawar must remain in Sikh hands. On October 1, 1838, Lord Auckland, as Governor General of India, issued the controversial Simla Manifesto. This high-flown document announced an alliance between British India, the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh, and Shah Shuja, a deposed amir of Kabul who was living in India with a few thousand emigré followers, for the purpose of "restoring the unity, independence, and prosperity of the Afghan people and providing for the security of the possessions of the British Crown".¹⁵ This was to be accomplished by the restoration of Shah Shuja to the throne from which he had been driven some twenty years earlier.

All this warlike preparation was predicated on the need to prevent Russian-sponsored Persian occupation of Herat. Not long after promulgation of the Manifesto, word reached Auckland that the siege of Herat had been lifted. The combined British-Afghan-Sikh forces were already gathering at Ferozepur. What was to be done now?

Auckland decided to go ahead with the war. On November 8, he announced that while the retreat of the Persian Shah from Herat was "a just cause of congratulations to the Government of British India and its allies, he [the viceregal third person] will continue to prosecute with vigor the measures which have been announced with a view toward the substitution of a friendly for a hostile power in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan".¹⁶

The Army of the Indus gathered at Ferozepur during November, 1838. It consisted of 9,500 men of all arms of the Bengal Army, including

1859 appear to contain more but still not all of the correspondence, a portion of which appeared in 1839.

¹⁵ Text in Kaye, *op. cit.*, I, 373-374. See also the text of the "Treaty of Alliance and Friendship Executed Between Maharaja Runjeet Singh and Shah Soojah-ul-Mulk, with the approbation of, and in Concert with, the British Government, June 26, 1838". (*Ibid.*, pp. 332-335.)

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 383-84.

elements of a European regiment, and 35,000 camp followers. Shah Shuja joined it with 6,000 Afghan levies. A large contingent of Sikhs came down from Lahore led by Ranjit Singh, who joined Governor General Auckland on the reviewing stand for a grand parade of all the forces on November 29 and 30. A few days later Ranjit Singh and his Sikhs returned to the Punjab, having promised to send a force of undisclosed number through the Khyber to attack Kabul.

It took 30,000 camels to move the Army of the Indus, but it got underway shortly, marching toward Quetta en route to Kandahar. On the march, the ranks were swelled by a brigade (about 3,000 men) of the Bombay Army which had come up through Karachi. The force moved through the Bolan Pass, and after four and a half months on the march captured Kandahar on April 25, 1839. It then turned north, slaughtered the garrison at Ghazni in the last week of July, and entered Kabul almost without a fight on August 7. Dost Muhammad had already fled, accompanying the departing Russian mission on its way home. Shah Shuja was set back on the throne. The Sikhs, who had been happy to have the British do the work, never arrived in force, although a token contingent joined the British garrison at Kabul after the city had been occupied. A more or less permanent army of occupation was left in Kabul to support Shah Shuja against his hostile subjects and to see to it that he fulfilled his promises. An official mission was also established at his court.

For a year all was well. It appeared that the Russians had been excluded from Afghanistan by the most effective possible means — *i.e.*, prior British possession in force. Then in August, 1840, the standard of rebellion was raised all over Afghanistan. Within a month, Kabul was in a state of siege, and the British garrison had to try to fight its way out. Few of the Kabul forces ever reached India again; Alexander Burnes, who was about to take charge of the mission, was killed in the rout. By January, 1841, the British and Shah Shuja had been driven completely from the country.

Anarchy reigned throughout 1841 and 1842. Lord Auckland took advantage of the disorder to send a flying column back to Kabul to vindicate his honor. It burned the Great Bazaar of Kabul, but quickly withdrew in the face of constant attack and harassment.

In January, 1843, Dost Muhammad rode down from his exile in the north and took control of his country again. "The Great Amir" returned to his throne full of hatred for the British, a hatred shared by his people and kept alive by the sight of the rubble of Kabul.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WAR

As a military exercise, the British adventure in Afghanistan in 1839-40 was a fiasco. Many critics deny that it was desirable in the first place. Almost all connected with it admit it was unnecessary after the lifting of the siege of Herat. No one could claim that it was successful. British casualties were high; not a yard of territory was added to the British Empire; the foundation was laid for the deep and bitter Afghan hatred of the British which persists until today. Yet, whether Lord Auckland intended it so or not, the war was probably not without aspects favorable to "The Great Game". To see why this is so, it is necessary to turn for a moment to a contemporary event in Russia.

In 1840, while the British were still secure in Kabul, a Russian expedition of 5,000 men, with twenty-two field guns and 10,000 camels, started from Orenburg to rescue Russians held as slaves by the Usbeks of Khiva. Orenburg was at that time the Imperial Russian Government's easternmost outpost. The distance which separated it from Khiva was roughly the same as that which separated Karachi from Kabul (about 1,000 miles).

The kind of treatment accorded prisoners by the Usbek khans was well known, and even the British were prepared to admit that there was cause for the expedition. The idea that it might also be a comparative flexing of muscles was inescapable, however, and the British in Kabul were highly alarmed. Plans were laid to cross the Oxus and occupy part of Bokhara, to which the deposed Dost Muhammad had at one time a formal title and to which he had fled.

Before action could be taken, however, word was received that the Russian force under General Perofski had been completely crippled by the climate and terrain of the steppe and had fallen back on Orenburg with heavy losses. Pulses in Kabul slowed down, and the trans-Oxus plan was dropped.¹⁷

The motivation for the Russian advance on Khiva has never been officially set down, but it appears reasonable to interpret it as an attempted counterdemonstration of Russia's capability to move an army as deeply and as quickly into Central Asia as could Britain. Perofski's effort failed miserably, and the effect was the opposite of that intended, although paradoxically the military failure ended in political success, for

¹⁷ Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-152.

the Russian prisoners held by the Usbeks were subsequently released.¹⁸

From the standpoint of "The Great Game", the significance of the military maneuvers of 1839-41 lay in the fact that the British had twice proved their ability to march from their base in India and win battles in remote parts of Central Asia while the Russians had demonstrated that they were not yet able to do so. The fact that the British were unable to administer the captured area was not significant in this early stage of the game. It was clear that the "porch of Empire" could be defended if necessary. On the other hand, the Russians had managed, through their diplomatic success in Kabul, to demonstrate that they could embarrass the British in Central Asia and involve them in hostile contact with the indigenous population without ever moving a Cossack south of the Oxus.

The results of this first test of strength in Afghanistan can be seen in the twenty years of *status quo ante bellum* which followed. During this period, Russia made no overt moves against the khanates and scrupulously avoided contact with Kabul. Since this was so, the British could afford to tolerate Dost Muhammad's continued refusal to accept a British envoy at Kabul and his chronic unwillingness to cooperate with the Government of India in relieving the pressure of the hill tribes on the Frontier. Under Lord Lawrence, British policy came to be characterized by the phrase, "masterly inactivity", words never used except with a sneer by the Conservative Party at home.

THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR

The lull in the struggle for Central Asia showed signs of coming to an end in 1868. In that year, the Imperial Russian Government, without a fight, established nominal sovereignty over Samarkand, once claimed by the Amir of Bokhara. Dost Mohammad had died in 1863, and the usual period of anarchy followed until 1870 when his son, Sher Ali, managed to establish his succession to the throne of Kabul.

By this time, Britain had annexed most of the remaining independent parts of India, and the subcontinent was in substantially the same con-

¹⁸ After Perofski's army had been destroyed by ice storms in the Ust Urt desert north of Khiva, the Russians fell back on political penetration. This was at least partially successful, as a treaty of peace and alliance was signed between the new Khan of Khiva and the Imperial Russian Government in 1841. (W. K. Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central Asia*, London: Oxford University Press, 1953, p. 121.)

dition geographically and administratively as it was at the time of independence and partition in 1947.

Even Lord Lawrence, that mildest of men and most cautious of viceroys, in the last year of his office was forced to recommend to the Home Government that a definite policy be decided upon and that attention be given to the arrangement with Russia of mutually satisfactory frontiers in Central Asia.¹⁹ English politics at home were also entering a new phase. In February, 1868, Lord Derby was succeeded as prime minister by Disraeli, and the more aggressive Lord Mayo was appointed viceroy to replace Lord Lawrence, whose name was linked with the policy of "masterly inactivity".

Before the Conservative Government could turn its full attention to implementation of a Forward Policy in Central Asia, however, it gave way in December, 1868, to Gladstone's Ministry. Almost immediately upon coming into power, the Liberal Government acted on Lawrence's suggestion and approached St. Petersburg with a proposal that a neutral territory in Central Asia, into which neither power would penetrate, be agreed upon.

Russian reaction was favorable, and Foreign Minister Gortchakoff suggested that Afghanistan would be ideal as "*une zone indépendante*". He added graciously that the Imperial Government "*considère l'Afghanistan comme entièrement en dehors de la sphère où la Russie peut être appelée à exercer son influence*".²⁰ The Russian suggestion might have been acceptable to the London Government, since it contained the open and unqualified admission of non-concern which was the fundamental principle of British policy for Afghanistan. However, it was apparently vetoed by Lord Mayo in Calcutta. At any rate, British Foreign Minister Lord Clarendon counterproposed the Oxus as a line neither power should cross with military force.²¹

In the course of a three-year exchange of notes, the British relinquished

¹⁹ Ward and Gooch, *op. cit.*, III, 73.

²⁰ *British and Foreign State Papers, LXIII (1872-73)* (London: Ridgway, 1879), 659.

²¹ No record of Mayo's objections appears to exist in official sources. However, Mayo is described as objecting to the Russian proposal in William Habberton, "Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan, 1834-1907", *Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences*, XXI, No. 4, p. 24 (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1937). Habberton attributes the opinion to Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 309, but Rawlinson is also unclear on the point. It seems likely that this was the case, however, as Clarendon's counterproposal was in line with Mayo's desire to establish the Oxus as a dividing line. Clarendon's proposal appears in *British and Foreign State Papers, LXIII (1872-73)*, 670-71.

the idea of a neutral zone beyond the far boundary of the Afghan buffer, and accepted a dividing line which was at least on the far edge of the buffer. At length the Agreement of 1873 emerged, and the Oxus was accepted as the basis of the yet undemarcated northern boundary of Afghanistan.²² The main results were: (1) establishment of the Oxus as the dividing line between Afghan and Russian territory, (2) Russia's formal exclusion of Afghanistan from its sphere of influence, and (3) acceptance by the British of eventual absorption by Russia of all of the khanates north of the Oxus, including areas once under the suzerainty of the Amir of Kabul. Neither the British nor the Russians consulted the Amir in making the arrangement.

This was the situation when Gladstone's Liberal Government was overturned in 1874. Disraeli became prime minister again. Lord Derby was appointed foreign minister; Lord Salisbury, Secretary of State for India; and Lord Lytton, Viceroy of India. The new team was definitely dissatisfied with the modest achievements of Gladstone's patient diplomacy. It made no secret of its dedication to the Forward Policy or of its determination to use force, if necessary, to achieve the objective described by one of its supporters as “the elimination for ever of Russian insolence and Russian threat to the realization of our destiny in Central Asia”.²³

Tension grew rapidly after Lytton's arrival in India. The Russians began communication with Amir Sher Ali. Lytton persuaded the Afghan Amir to a conference in Peshawar in 1876 but failed to get his consent to the sending of a British mission to Kabul. Sher Ali openly admitted he was in correspondence with the Russians and refused to discontinue it.²⁴

When Sher Ali held out for more than a year against British demands, Lytton decided to send a mission to Kabul regardless of the Afghan Amir's repeated declarations that he would refuse to welcome it. The mission, under Neville Chamberlain, was turned back by Afghan soldiers in the Khyber Pass on August 25, 1878.²⁵

Underlying the increased activity in Central Asia, of course, was Russian anger at British intervention in the Russo-Turkish War. The

²² The “Agreement of 1873” is really only the final exchange of notes. Most of the communications passed between Lord Clarendon and Lord Granville on the British side and Prince Gortchakoff on the Russian. It may be found in *British and Foreign State Papers*, LXIII (1872-73).

²³ R. S. Hayes, *Unmasterly Inactivity in Central Asia* (London: R. Bentley, 1873), p. iv.

²⁴ *Parliamentary Papers, 1881, XCVIII, Central Asia*, no. 1.

²⁵ Ward and Gooch, *op. cit.*, III, 85.

British Government split on what to do about the rebuff in the Khyber. Disraeli and Salisbury (who had become foreign minister) had just completed their negotiations in Berlin. They feared that smouldering Russian resentment over the forced evacuation of their troops from Turkey would burst into flame if the British went on the offensive in Central Asia at this time. Consequently, Disraeli and Salisbury preferred to temporize with Sher Ali.

Ironically, Lord Lytton, who had been specially chosen by Disraeli and Salisbury to carry out their Forward Policy, and Lord Cranbrook, who had replaced Salisbury as Secretary of State for India, insisted on the necessity of teaching Sher Ali a lesson at once. The India Office men won the day. An ultimatum was sent to Kabul demanding an apology for the incident in the Khyber and agreement to accept a British mission at once. Failing this, Sher Ali was informed, he would be declared an enemy. The ultimatum which was sent on November 2, 1878, expired on November 20.²⁶ Sher Ali tried to make amends, but the British ignored his efforts, and the Second Afghan War began.

Just as in the First Afghan War, the British force was in overwhelming strength. It numbered about 35,000 fighting men with a host of camp followers, and moved into Afghanistan in three columns, one through the Khyber, one through the Kurram, and one through the Bolan Pass. Unlike its predecessors of forty years before, the Army was composed exclusively of British forces, and set out from an area under its direct control. Jalalabad, Kandahar, and the Peiwar Kotal were occupied within a few days. Sher Ali, in the footsteps of his father, fled north to Turkestan. He received the same treatment. No assistance was given, and he was told to go home and "make friends" with the British.

The harried Amir turned southward again and got as far as Mazar-i-Sharif, whether to "make friends" or continue resistance will never be known, for he died there on February 21, 1879. His son, Yakub Khan, met the British at the gates of Kabul and made peace, accepting all the British demands.²⁷ Chief among these was the acceptance of a permanent British mission at Kabul, conduct of all Afghan foreign affairs through the British Government, agreement not to enter into any pacts with foreign states, and not to go to war with anyone except with British concurrence. Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi, which controlled ingress and

²⁶ Ward and Gooch, *op. cit.*, III, 85-86.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, III, 87. A detailed story of the war may be found in Sidney H. Shadbolt, *The Afghan Campaigns of 1878-80*, 2 vols. (London: S. Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1882).

gress in the south, were ceded to British India, and the all-important Khyber in its entire length passed into British hands.²⁸

A British mission under Sir Louis Cavagnari quickly arrived in Kabul. Sher Ali was dead, and this time there was no deposed amir sulking in the north to stir up trouble. Kandahar and Jelalabad were evacuated entirely and only a token force left at Kabul. What appeared to have been a quick, successful, and economical war had been concluded.

On September 3, 1879, Cavagnari and his party were massacred by mutinous Afghan troops and a mob which Yakub Khan either couldn't or didn't oppose. The British armies, still largely intact, turned and marched westward again. With amazing speed, all of Afghanistan was reoccupied. Lord Roberts, at the head of a flying column, arrived in Kabul October 12 and accepted the resignation of Yakub from the amirship. The unfortunate Yakub was exiled to India proclaiming that he “would rather be a grasscutter in the English camp than ruler of Afghanistan”. For all practical purposes, Roberts replaced him as “Lord of Afghanistan”.²⁹

A Conservative government dedicated to a strong Forward Policy was in power in England. Afghanistan had come completely under British military domination. In many quarters it was assumed that Britain would round off its Indian Empire by including half of Afghanistan within “the scientific frontier” for which the Conservatives had long been calling. Actually, the first policy attempted was one of fragmentation. Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and the other provinces were to be set up as independent native states on the Indian pattern. They would be given to any chieftain deemed strong enough to hold his own principality but not strong enough to unite the others with it.

By December, 1879, Roberts' throne was beginning to become uncomfortable. The pattern of 1840 showed signs of reappearing. Tribal risings began around Kabul and quickly spread. Within a few weeks, a full-scale war against the British was being mounted by a dozen individual chiefs. By February, 1880, Viceroy Lytton was eager to wash his hands of the whole mess. He wrote Lepel Griffin, new head of the mission in Kabul, that the envoy's first duty on reaching Kabul should be “the preparation for us of a way out of that rat-trap”. To this end, Lytton enunciated four cardinal points: (1) non-restoration of the ex-

²⁸ The Treaty of Gandamak, signed May 26, 1879. Text in *Parliamentary Papers*, LVI, 1879-80, *Afghanistan*, 3-5.

²⁹ Lady Betty Balfour, *The History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, 1876 to 1880* (London: Longman, Greens, 1899), pp. 366-369. Roberts actually received the title, Lord Roberts of Kandahar.

Amir, (2) permanent severance of western from northwest Afghanistan (presumably separation of Herat and Kabul), (3) neither annexation nor permanent occupation of the latter, and (4) willingness to recognize any ruler whom the Afghans would empower to negotiate evacuation of British troops.³⁰

In the first week of March, a clue to the identity of the needed leader appeared. A report reached Kabul that Abd-ur-Rahman Khan, a nephew of Sher Ali, who had been living in Russian Turkestan for ten years, had appeared at Balkh in northern Afghanistan. It was widely rumored that Abd-ur-Rahman had been sent into the country by the Russians to take advantage of the precarious situation of the British. Nonetheless, Griffin began negotiations with him, and four months later Abd-ur-Rahman was proclaimed Amir at a durbar in Kabul on July 22, 1880. Abd-ur-Rahman would have nothing to do with Lytton's cardinal points, and even refused to begin the business of ruling the country which had just been given to him until the British mission had left Kabul. He did, however, concede that "by mutual agreement a Muhammadan agent of the British Government might be stationed at Kabul for convenience of intercourse".³¹

Within a year, Abd-ur-Rahman had extended his rule over all Afghanistan, driving the Sadozai chief of Kandahar from his seat almost before the evacuating British army had passed out of sight of the city's walls. The Treaty of Gandamak was dead. So was Lytton's theory of controlling Afghanistan by breaking it into fragments.³²

The Second Afghan War, like the First, was considered a fiasco by many Englishmen. There was still no satisfactory British mission in Kabul. Little territory had been added to the Empire (although that which had been added was subsequently to prove valuable). A strong and independent monarch sat upon the throne of Afghanistan. British arms had once again proven their ability to conquer Afghanistan but left in considerable doubt their capacity to hold it.

As was the case during the First Afghan War, the British maneuvers in 1878-80 did not go unnoticed in St. Petersburg. In what was probably another attempt at a counterdemonstration, Major General L. N. Sobelev, Commander-in-Chief in Turkestan, led an expedition against the Tekke Turkomans in the winter of 1880-81. Sobelev, who was known

³⁰ Balfour, *op. cit.*, p. 408.

³¹ Ward and Gooch, *op. cit.*, III, 90.

³² For a fascinating biography of this man who "civilized his people while remaining himself a barbarian", see Abdur Rahman, Mir Munshi Sultan Muhammad Khan (ed.), *The Life of Amir Abdur Rahman*, 2 vols. (London: J. Murray, 1900).

as "Bloody Eyes" among the Turkomans, killed 20,000 men, women, and children, and reduced the Turkoman citadels, but the Russian army suffered heavily from the climate and the terrain.³³

Probably far more important than General Sobelev's expedition was his three-volume work devoted to an analysis of the British campaign in Afghanistan. These volumes, which were published individually in 1880, 1881, and 1882 in St. Petersburg, were contemptuous of British policy and accomplishments in India and Central Asia. Sobelev did, however, note and recount that in the course of ten days, the British had been able to move 146,000 men (four-fifths of whom, it must be admitted, were camp followers), 15,197 horses, 6,227 bullocks, 138 guns, and 37,742,400 pounds of military supplies to concentration points in northern India.³⁴

From the standpoint of the Frontier, of course, the most important result of the Second Afghan War was that the British were now in possession of the Khyber, the Kurram, and the Bolan Passes. This much they salvaged from the Treaty of Gandamak.

PENJDEH

Although the future relationship of Afghanistan and British India was far from satisfactorily defined at the end of the Second Afghan War, one vital fact in "The Great Game" had been clearly established. As far as Russia was concerned, Britain was to be the main influence in the buffer area which divided the two empires.

The problem now became one of defining Afghanistan. In 1884 Imperial Russian troops occupied Merv oasis, just north of Afghanistan's strategic but ill-defined northwestern corner.³⁵ The geography of Central Asia was so vaguely understood at the time that Merv was there for the taking by the first comer. Britain had no solid basis for complaint against the Russian action, since no English statesmen had ever taken the time or the trouble to declare Merv a part of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, a

³³ For an account of Sobelev's expedition, see Charles Marvin, *The Eye-Witnesses' Account of the Disastrous Russian Campaign Against the Akhal Tekke Turkomans* (London: W. H. Allen, 1880).

³⁴ L. N. Sobelev, *The Anglo-Afghan Struggle*, trans. W. E. Gowan (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1885), p. 48.

³⁵ This occasioned widespread alarm in England, described by the Duke of Argyll as "an acute case of Mervousness". See George Douglas Campbell, Duke of Argyll, *The Afghan Frontier*, 2 vols. London: Strahan, 1879), II, 310.

request for information on Russian intentions for the use of Merv was promptly sent to St. Petersburg.³⁶ Before a reply was received, new information came out of Central Asia.

The Russians were reported expanding their foothold from Merv into the Penjdeh district of western Afghanistan. The Penjdeh area, according to the Agreement of 1873, was definitely within the territory of the Amir of Afghanistan. The tenor of Lord Granville's notes to St. Petersburg grew sharper. At British insistence, a boundary commission was appointed to demarcate the northern and western limits of Afghanistan.³⁷

Late in 1884, Sir Peter Lumsden, the famed Frontier administrator who had been appointed British delegate to the commission, arrived at Sarakhs, where it had been agreed the commission members should meet and begin their work. Lumsden found no Russian opposite number awaiting him, but he did encounter Cossack pickets fifty miles south, well within Afghan territory. Lumsden cooled his heels at Sarakhs during the winter of 1884-85 while a barrage of notes passed between London and St. Petersburg. The situation showed no signs of improving, and Victoria herself cabled Alexander on March 1885, asking him to prevent an armed clash in Central Asia.³⁸

On March 30, 1885, Russian troops occupied Penjdeh itself and drove out the Afghan defenders with a loss of 500 Afghans. "War is inevitable", concluded British Ambassador Thornton when the news reached St. Petersburg.³⁹ In Parliament, Gladstone proposed a vote of credit of eleven million pounds, of which six and a half million were to be devoted directly to military preparations made necessary by the incident at Penjdeh.⁴⁰

At the time the Penjdeh incident occurred, Amir Abd-ur-Rahman was conferring with Viceroy Lord Dufferin in Rawalpindi. The Amir was fearful of further Russian encroachments on his domains and was just as eager as the British to stabilize the situation in the northwestern corner of his territory. At the same time, he had no desire to be caught in a war between the two great powers and to see a return of British troops to his country. He apparently suggested to Lord Dufferin that the Russians be allowed to retain Penjdeh, if the Zulfikar Pass, strategic

³⁶ *Parliamentary Papers, 1884-85, LXXXVII, Central Asia, No. 19, 17.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*; see also Habberton, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

³⁹ Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, *The Life of Granville, George Levinson Gower, Second Earl of Granville*, 2 vols. (London: J. Murray, 1905), II, 190.

⁴⁰ Ward and Gooch, *op. cit.*, III, 190.

key to the highlands of central Afghanistan, remained in Afghan hands. To this St. Petersburg agreed. War was averted.⁴¹

On September 10, 1885, a protocol defining the Russian-Afghan border in the Penjdeh area was signed. In July, 1886, a boundary commission was set to work under the September protocol. The commission's work was completed in June, 1888, and the final boundaries confirmed on June 12 of that year.⁴²

THE PAMIR BOUNDARY

The center of interest in "The Great Game" next shifted to the east and north. The Indian states of Kashmir, Chitral, and Gilgit, the Afghan provinces of Badakhshan and Wakhan, and the Russian protectorate of Bokhara all came together in the great Pamir Range. The lofty peaks had hitherto prevented any significant activity in this area, but it was obvious to all that before "The Game" was over, the British would have to contend with a Russian delaying action here.

In the fall of 1891, Captain Younghusband, a British explorer, met a Russian party in the Wakhan Valley. The Ab-i-Wakhan is a tributary of the upper Oxus and runs through a narrow valley just south of the Great Pamir and north of the eastern end of the Indian Himalayas. Younghusband was expelled by the Russians who made it clear they considered the area their territory.⁴³ Almost at once, reports of Russian parties moving about the high mountains of Chitral and Kashmir also came in. The Chief of Hunza, a sub-state in Gilgit, declared himself in favor of Russia and drew down upon his head a British expedition designed to change his mind.

⁴¹ Abdur Rahman, *op. cit.*, I, 285; *Parliamentary Papers, 1884-85, LXXXVII, Central Asia*, 239.

⁴² *Parliamentary Papers, 1888, LXXVII, Central Asia*, No. 1, 2-3.

⁴³ Sir Frank E. Younghusband, *The Heart of a Continent* (London, J. Murray, 1896), pp. 271-272. The affair was carried out in the best Victorian tradition. According to Younghusband: "On leaving camp I made the Gurkha escort salute the Russian officer by presenting arms, and Captain Grombtchevsky returned the compliment by ordering his Cossacks to "carry swords". We then parted, Captain G. saying to me that hoped we might meet again, either in peace at St. Petersburg or in war on the Indian frontier; in either case I might be sure of a warm welcome. I thoroughly enjoyed that meeting with a Russian officer. We and the Russians *are* rivals, but I am sure that individual Russian and English officers like each other a great deal better than they do the individuals of nations with which they are not in rivalry. We are both playing at a big game, and we should not be one jot better off for trying to conceal the fact."

Negotiations between London and St. Petersburg began anew. After considerable war talk in the press of both sides and much diplomatic give-and-take, agreement on the Pamir boundary between Russia and Afghanistan was reached in March, 1895. The last of Afghanistan's borders was defined, and the main struggle in Central Asia between the two great empires ended.

The British now had exclusive control over the foreign affairs of Afghanistan, a well-defined buffer state, which the Russians had admitted to be outside their sphere of influence. The Russians had everything else. The most dangerous part of "The Great Game" was over.

At the turn of the century, the Russians made one last bid. This was in effect a reversion to the question which had dominated the early stages of the struggle: exclusive British control of Afghanistan's foreign relations. On February 6, 1900, when the British were preoccupied in Africa, Russia announced that "the reestablishment of direct relations between Russia and Afghanistan in regards to matters concerning frontier administration is indispensable".⁴⁴

A long diplomatic battle followed. Russia made a rather feeble attempt to apply pressure through minor troop movements north of the Oxus. The Government of India under Viceroy Lord Curzon created the new North-West Frontier Province and established an elaborate new military organization on the Frontier.

Events in the outside world, however, determined the outcome of this last round. After the British had achieved victory in Africa, these events were all on their side. An Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance was signed in 1902. In 1905, the Treaty was amended to include specific reference to the North-West Frontier of India, and instead of the original proviso for mutual defense only in the event of an attack by two or more nations, provision was made for joint action against any power which attacked the signatories.

Russia was further isolated when France, hitherto the Tsar's only great power ally in Europe, entered the Entente Cordiale with Britain in 1904. The Imperial Russian Government's sorry showing in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 weakened Russia's prestige further.

Eventually, on August 31, 1907, "The Convention relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet" was signed in St. Petersburg. Again, from its position of strength, Great Britain gave a token but retained the sub-

⁴⁴ Great Britain, eds. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1894-1914*, 10 vols. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928-38), I, 307.

stance. The Convention conceded to Russia the right to settle local boundary questions directly with Afghan frontier officials. It also recognized "le principe de l'égalité de traitement pour ce que concerne le commerce" and agreed "que toutes les facilités qui ont été ou seront acquises à l'avenir au commerce et aux commerçants anglais et anglo-indiens, seront également appliquées au commerce et aux commerçants russes".

However, the main point was clearly stated:

Le Gouvernement Imperial de Russie déclare qu'il reconnaît l'Afghanistan comme se trouvant en dehors de la sphère de l'influence russe, et il s'engage à se servir pour toutes ses relations politiques avec l'Afghanistan de l'intermédiaire du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique; il s'engage aussi à n'envoyer aucuns Agents en Afghanistan.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ The text of the agreement is in Gooch-Temperley, *op. cit.*, IV, 618-620. Russia had complained continually about Britain's commercial monopoly in Afghanistan since before the First Afghan War. Whatever illusions either empire may have had about the markets of Central Asia in the first half of the nineteenth century, by 1907 both were well aware of the commercial barrenness of the area.

VII

BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

CURZON'S NEW ORDER

From 1849 to the close of the nineteenth century, British administrators on the Frontier were responsible to the Government of the Punjab, except in certain cases concerning trans-border affairs, when responsibility ran "through" the Government of the Punjab to the Government of India.

The new regime which Viceroy Lord Curzon imposed on the Frontier in 1901 simplified administration considerably. All authority was vested in one man who held the titles of Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province and Agent to the Governor General. According to an official report of the time, "as Agent to the Governor General, he controls the political relations with the tribes in direct communication with local political officers; and, as Chief Commissioner, he exercises in the settled districts taken from the Punjab the functions which the Punjab Government relinquish".¹

The reorganization severed from the Punjab the districts of Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Hazara, and Peshawar. (The last was eventually subdivided into Peshawar and Mardan Districts.) So interested was Curzon in establishing a homogenous unit that Hazara, the population of which was chiefly non-Pathan, was excluded in his original scheme. The single *tahsil* of Isa Khel, inhabited by non-Pushtu-speaking people of mixed descent, alone of all the trans-Indus territory above Dera Ismail Khan remained to the Punjab.

The reorganization also formalized the "five transborder charges of the Malakand [which included Dir, Swat, and Chitral], the Khaibar, Kur-

¹ Great Britain, India Office, *Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India, 1901-02* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1902), p. 56.

ram, Tochi, and Wana . . . the whole embracing as nearly as possible the Pathan parts of the Frontier and no more".²

Hitherto, the organization of tribal territory had been an almost complete hodgepodge. A special political agency for the Khyber had been set up in 1878 with the duty of keeping the Pass open. A similar agency for Kurram had been established in 1892, although the Kurram Valley, since its cession by the Afghans in 1879, had generally been treated as a part of British India. The Malakand, Wana, and Tochi Agencies had been set up in 1895-96 in connection with the demarcation of the Durand Line. Paradoxically, the Malakand Agency was directly under the Government of India, although the Wana and Tochi Agencies were responsible to the Government of the Punjab.

The first Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor General was Lt. Col. H. A. Deane. His staff consisted of: (1) Indian Civil Service officers, (2) military officers of the Political Department of the Government of India and the Punjab Government, (3) provincial civil servants, (4) officers of the subordinate civil service, (5) district superintendents of police, and (6) officers specially recruited for technical jobs. The posts reserved exclusively for the first two categories were: those of the chief commissioner, his secretary, assistant secretary, and his personal assistants, the revenue commissioner and revenue secretary, the deputy commissioners and political agents, the judicial commissioner, and division, sessions, and district judges.³

The more than usually heavy percentage of military men appointed to the staff was a continuation of the general trend by which the military had come during the 1890's to play an increasingly important role in administration. It was also encouraged by Curzon's conviction that the Frontier provided an excellent training ground, and by the martial character of the Pathans themselves. The physical setting up of the new administration at Peshawar cost the modest — even for the time — sum of Rs. 350,000.

From the standpoint of political development, the new order of things was in several ways a step backward. The five districts which had been taken from the Punjab were "scheduled districts" under an Act of Parliament of 1870 and had thus always been subject to rule by executive decree. However, the Punjab had since 1897 enjoyed a legislative coun-

² Great Britain, India Office, *Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India, 1901-02*, p. 55.

³ N-WFP (India) Government, *Administration Report of the N-WF Province, 1901* (Peshawar: Government Press, 1902), p. 13.

cil through which some slight degree of popular representation — even of the scheduled districts — had been possible. This and other minor benefits were wiped out in the change, and the Frontier districts found themselves back in a situation similar to that in which the whole Punjab had been just after the 1857 Mutiny.

Instead of a lieutenant-governor and council, they had a chief commissioner and five deputy commissioners. Instead of the chief court of the Punjab, they had a judicial commissioner and a revenue commissioner. Instead of Acts of Legislature passed by the Punjab Legislative Council, they were ruled by executive regulations issued by the authority of the Governor General or the Chief Commissioner.⁴

It is true that the political benefits which the inhabitants of the N-WFP lost were slight, and that dwellers in Tribal Territory were affected not at all. At any rate, representative government in India was in a very primitive stage at this time, and the Pathans, who had never considered themselves part of India anyway, were probably more proud than concerned about having for themselves a separate province which emphasized and legalized this feeling of apartness.

The Hindu population of the province, however, strongly opposed the new arrangement, and continued for decades to press for reamalgamation with the Punjab.⁵ Unlike Curzon's even more controversial partition of Bengal, however, the new order on the Frontier ended only in 1955 when the Government of Pakistan amalgamated the N-WFP, the Punjab, Sind, Bahawalpur, Khairpur, and Baluchistan into a single West Pakistan Province.

THE NEW PROVINCE

Even apart from its geographic location, the new province was in many ways unique in India. It was a deficit area economically, but was free of many of the complicated social and economic ills which plagued older parts of the British Indian administrative system. The British land settlements of the nineteenth century had upset the traditional pattern of landholdings to some extent, but there was still a fairly large number

⁴ Section 123 of the statute setting up the new province stated simply: "The legislative authorities for the N-WFP are two: I. The Legislative Council of the Governor General, II. The Governor General in Executive Council". See *N-WFP Administration Report, 1901*, p. 35.

⁵ Government of India, *Report of the N-WFP Enquiry Committee* (Delhi: Government Central Press, 1934), p. 2.

of small freeholders and a good many occupancy tenants whose rights were assured both by custom and law.

At the same time the overwhelming problem which faced the British on the Frontier was security — security against the Russian menace beyond the Pamirs and the Oxus, and security for the new province against its numerous lawless inhabitants and the wild tribesmen of the hills.

In most other parts of British India, the political history of a particular province can usually be sketched out through a study of the periodic reforms enacted by a government becoming increasingly, though always grudgingly, responsive to the popular desire for some measure of self-government. As far as the Frontier is concerned, however, the story throughout is one of a struggle for control — a control which was never completely established and a struggle which ended only when the British departed in 1947. In this context, the political history of the Frontier under British rule hangs more on milestones of suppression than on those of reform.

THE FRONTIER CRIMES REGULATIONS

The first set of Frontier Crimes Regulations was promulgated in 1872. This was revised in 1887. In 1901, after separation of the N-WFP from the Punjab, a third set was enacted. These, intended by Curzon to take into account the peculiar relations which existed between the Province and Tribal Territory, remained in force (except for a few brief periods of suspension) for the duration of British rule, and are still, in amended form, in use today in Pakistan.

Among other items, the Frontier Crimes Regulations (III) of 1901 provide for the referral of civil and criminal cases to *jirgas* appointed by deputy commissioners, blockade of tribes as penalties, community fines, prohibition in certain cases of the erection of new villages, the removal of established villages where necessary to maintain law and order, "imprisonment with a view to prevent crime", and the regulation of village *hujras* (guest houses).

Two concepts — neither of them new — embodied in the Frontier Crimes Regulations are particularly notable. The first, trial by *jirga*, was generally represented by the British as a concession to Pathan tradition. In some ways, however, it appears to be more of an admission of the inadequacy of nineteenth-century British justice in the face of the Pathans' disregard for it. While the *jirga* was beyond doubt a Pathan in-

stitution, the form it took under the Frontier Crimes Regulations was a far cry from its natural state.

In the first place, the members were appointed by the Deputy Commissioner of a district — usually when he was convinced he could not get a conviction in a case through the ordinary courts. The usual rules of evidence were suspended. If the Deputy Commissioner did not like the decision brought in by the four or more men appointed as a *jirga*, he could remand the case for further enquiry or refer it to another *jirga*. In any event, the decision of the *jirga* was primarily recommendatory, and the actual acquittal or conviction and sentence was formalized in a decree by the Deputy Commissioner.

There was no right of appeal from conviction and punishment under the Frontier Crimes Regulations, although the Chief Commissioner had the power of revision in civil and some criminal cases. The only safeguards which the defendant had were his right in a criminal case to object to any appointed member of the *jirga* and the assurance that the maximum penalty, regardless of the crime, was fourteen years rigorous imprisonment and a ban on re-entry into British India.

In general, the Frontier Crimes Regulations applied to both the Province and Tribal Territory. The main concern of the latter, however, lay in the formalization of the concept of collective responsibility initiated by Coke and Edwardes half a century earlier.⁶ The breadth and vigor with which the concept was applied may be seen in Section 21, which provides:

In the event of any frontier tribe, or any section or members of such tribe, acting in a hostile or unfriendly manner towards the British Government or towards persons residing in British India, the Deputy Commissioner may, with the previous sanction of the Commissioner, by order in writing direct:

- a. the seizure, wherever they may be found, of all or any of the members of such tribe, and of all or any property belonging to them or any of them,
- b. the detention in safe custody of any person or property so seized; and
- c. the confiscation of any such property; and may with the like sanction, by public proclamation:
- d. debar all or any members of the tribe from all access into British India; and
- e. prohibit all or any persons within the limits of British India from all intercourse or communication of any kind whatsoever or of any specified kind or kinds, with such tribe or any section or members thereof.

This provision, backed up by the mobile column or the established cantonment (depending on which school of frontier strategy was in the

⁶ See Chapter V above.

saddle at the time), was to be the backbone of British tribal policy for the remainder of their rule in India. "To repeal the trans-frontier sections [of the Frontier Crimes Regulations]", said the North-West Frontier Inquiry Committee in 1922, "would be to paralyze our whole system of trans-frontier control".⁷

The Frontier Crimes Regulations in a somewhat modified form continue in effect in Pakistan today. Their value has been the subject of endless argument. Officials, both British and Pakistani, generally swear by them as the only means by which the necessary minimum of order can be enforced within a legal framework among the turbulent Pathans. On the other hand, they are condemned as neither democratic, just, nor Pathan, both by many educated non-official Pathans and many an obscure tribesman who has suffered under them.⁸

POPULATION AND FINANCE

The population of the Frontier increased rapidly under British rule. The population of the settled districts more than doubled between 1855, when the first census was taken (1,144,047), and 1931 (2,425,076). No figures are available for the tribal area.

Of greater interest than the change in numbers was the shift in the pattern of population flow into the districts during the period in which British administration was consolidated. Accurate figures are not available for the early years, but it appears that throughout the nineteenth century, the main influx continued to come, as it always had, from the west. In 1891, for example, a total of 123,625 moved into the districts from Afghanistan and the tribal areas, while only one-third as many came up from India. By 1931, immigrants from the west had dropped to 55,707 while newcomers from the east had risen to 99,484.⁹

Despite the influx of what may be assumed to have been gentler people from the east, the striking sex ratio of the Frontier population apparently remained substantially unchanged. In 1931, in the N-WFP, there were still only 843 females for every 1,000 males. The proportion was undoubtedly still more extreme in the tribal area.¹⁰

⁷ Government of India, *Report of the N-WFP Enquiry Committee*, p. 27.

⁸ See, for example, Abdul Qaiyum, *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier* (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1945), p. 15.

⁹ Government of India, *Census of India, 1931*, XV (Calcutta: Central Publications Branch, 1931), 54 ff.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

The expanding population also had its effect on the cost of running the province. Even excluding the enormous cost of the regular troop units maintained on the Frontier, the budget never quite balanced.

In general, budget figures indicate that even in good years the provincial administrators were unable to make ends meet, and that a single bad year, such as 1930-31, resulted in an enormous deficit. Expenditures for security dominated the budget throughout British rule in the twentieth century. Education fared very poorly indeed. Despite an increasing population, land revenue and excise taxes remained fairly constant. By the end of the 1930's, the central government had to step in openly and provide more than half of the total receipts. At the same time, the item for "political" expenditures was removed from the budget. Even so it refused to balance.¹¹

¹¹ *N-WFP Revenue and Expenditures:*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Revenue</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Deficit</i>
* 1902-03	Rs. 3,313,807	Rs. 5,184,705	Rs. 1,870,898
1917-18	9,154,608	9,849,694	695,086
1930-31	6,974,679	36,906,817	29,932,138
1938-39	18,005,000	18,668,000	663,000

* Figures for 1902-03 do not include certain local funds included in 1917-18 and later.

Selected Items of Revenue and Expenditure

<i>Item</i>	<i>1902-03</i>	<i>1917-18</i>	<i>1930-31</i>	<i>1938-39</i>
REVENUE				
Land Tax	Rs. 1,726,302	Rs. 2,206,066	Rs. 1,762,538	Rs. 2,063,000
Irrigation Tax	—	—	—	1,219,000
Stamps and Excise	—	2,200,000	1,700,000	—
GOI Grants-in-Aid	—	—	—	10,000,000
EXPENDITURE				
"Political"	2,097,106	4,622,716	3,002,382	—
"Watch and Ward"	—	—	15,161,769	—
Police	1,067,104	2,571,881	—	3,328,000
Law and Justice	584,084	1,034,327	1,644,259	1,696,000
Education	29,987	593,682	2,063,349	222,500

(Figures for both tables compiled from *N-WFP Administration Report, 1902-39.*)

TRIBAL POLICY

When Curzon arrived in India in January, 1899, he found the Forward Policy very much in force. The five British fingers were armored and extended into the Malakand, the Khyber, the Kurram, Tochi, and Wana.¹² Scattered along them were more than 10,000 troops — the aftermath of the great rising of 1897. The small tribal levies and militia units which had been established there were shattered, and Britain depended for control of the Frontier obviously and solely on armed might.

The new Viceroy, possessed of a considerable knowledge of Central Asia and a keen interest in geopolitics, had his own theory of tribal policy. Basically, it involved a return to the old Close Border policy but with a careful formalization of the Tribal Territory as a “march-land”.¹³

New militias were organized in Waziristan, Kurram, and the Khyber. The levies were reorganized as loose supporting groups for the militia. By 1904, all regular troops, except for a small unit at Drosh in lower Chitral, had been withdrawn behind the administrative border, and the security of the tribal area given over to the hands of such noted militia units as the Khyber Rifles, the Samana Rifles, and the Tochi Scouts.

Subsidies were increased, and development of a communications and transportation system for the militia units provided work for the tribes. The political agents were given almost complete responsibility for their agencies and reported directly to the Agent to the Governor General. The militia was responsible to them, and regular army units limited their activities to the settled districts.

In 1901-02, a road was completed through the Kohat Pass, home of the boisterous Adam Khel Afridis, and it became possible to make the journey from Kohat to Peshawar in only a few hours. Within the next two years railroad spurs were pushed up to Dargai below the entrance to the Malakand, and to Fort Jamrud, outside the entrance to the Khyber. Thal, at the neck of the Kurram Valley, was also connected to the Indus by a narrow-gauge line.

Curzon's objective was to allow, and even encourage, the tribal area to go its own way as much as possible. Removal of the provocation of the army, he believed, would reduce the chances of local outbreaks and allow the regular military to concentrate on its proper job — the defense

¹² See Chapter IV above.

¹³ *Parliamentary Papers, 1901, XLIX, N-WF, Cmd. 496, 72.* See also Curzon's *Romanes Lecture of 1907.*

of India against an attack from beyond the Durand Line. At the same time, if a tribal rising too powerful for the militia to handle were to occur, the army, with its units concentrated in cantonments in the districts and with the new communication systems at its disposal, would be able to move rapidly to the center of the trouble and crush it.

Initially, the Curzon system brought a period of relative peace and security to the Frontier. It also greatly reduced the tremendous expenditures on military activity which had been made in the last half of the Nineties. Curzon was able to boast on his departure from India that he had spent only 248,000 pounds on military expeditions during his seven years of office as compared with 4,584,000 pounds for the five years preceding.¹⁴

The Curzon policy held through the relatively small Mahsud rising of 1901-02 and through the Zakka Khel Afridi and Mohmand troubles of 1908. It held also through World War I — probably chiefly as a result of doubling the Afridis' allowances and the relatively friendly attitude of Amir Habibullah of Afghanistan. Even the collapse of Russia and the advance of German armies into the Caucasus and Turkish forces into Persia did not touch off an uprising, although a number of Indian Muslims, outraged by Britain's war against the caliphate, attempted to stir up trouble in Tribal Territory with the assistance of the remnants of Sayyid Ahmad's followers. When the tribes failed to respond, the agitators went on to Kabul where they plotted unsuccessfully with the German and Turkish missions for a revolt in India.

THE THIRD AFGHAN WAR

In May, 1919, Amanullah, the new Amir of Afghanistan, for a series of complicated and not very convincing reasons, declared war on British India. At this point, as the British readily admitted, "The Curzon system, like so many older and more majestic institutions, broke under the mighty pressure".¹⁵

Widespread tribal risings began almost at once. When the Afghan commander, General Nadir Khan (later to become King Nadir Shah), unexpectedly appeared with an army before Thal at the neck of the Kurram Valley, the militia system broke down all over the Frontier.

¹⁴ R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, and K. Datta, *An Advanced History of India* (London: Macmillan, 1946), p. 902.

¹⁵ *Moral and Material Progress of India, 1928*, p. 269.

Major elements of the Khyber Rifles and the Tochi and Wana Scouts mutinied, and most of western Waziristan was abandoned to the Afghans, who occupied Wana briefly. Mohmand and Afridi *lashkars* closed the Khyber, and the tribes cheerfully abandoned their subsidies in anticipation of loot. The whole tenuous control of the tribal area built up over twenty years disappeared almost over night.

The war with the Afghans — the only one of the three in which the British had been involved in which they had not been the aggressors and had not been convinced that they were really fighting the Russians — was settled fairly easily. Nadir Khan was chased away from Thal, and the threat of a British invasion of Afghanistan caused the withdrawal of Afghan troops from Waziristan. A single bomb dropped by a Royal Air Force craft on Kabul helped convince Amanullah that it was best to end the war. The Treaty of Rawalpindi, signed on August 8, 1919, provided for an end to hostilities and indicated Britain's intention to withdraw its control over Afghan foreign affairs. After two years of negotiations, the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 made the new relationship final.¹⁶

The tribal rising which the Afghan War had inspired was not to be handled so simply nor so peacefully. In the fall of 1919, British influence and control had for all practical purposes disappeared from the tribal area. Delhi and London were keenly interested in re-establishing it before Amanullah changed his mind or the newly dangerous Bolshevik Russian menace was able to take advantage of the vacuum. The usual method was employed, and in the winter of 1919-20 a large force of British troops was sent against the recalcitrant tribes. (The fighting will be described in Chapter IX below.) This action was followed by construction of a road system linking Wana, Razmak, and Miranshah, the establishment of large permanent garrisons in Razmak and Wana, and the complete reorganization of the militia system.

THE NEW SECURITY FORCES

The Scouts, *khassadars*, and Frontier Constabulary, as they presently exist, date from this reorganization. A Scout unit, officered by British officers from regiments of the Indian army, was assigned to each agency. As a precaution against future wholesale desertions, no more than one-

¹⁶ Texts in *Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads Relating to India and Neighboring Countries*, compiled by C. U. Aitcheson (Calcutta: Central Publications Branch, 1929-33), XIII, 23-24, Hereafter referred to as Aitcheson.

third of the Scout enlistees could be from Tribal Territory. The main duties of the Scouts were to maintain British political control in the tribal area and to preserve a necessary minimum of order there while preventing raids into the districts. Total enlisted strength of the Scout units in the Frontier agencies in 1921 was 7,285.¹⁷

The Mohmand militia unit was disbanded entirely and replaced by the Frontier Constabulary, a kind of province-wide security police. The Constabulary was responsible for repelling raids from Tribal Territory into the districts, for the capture of proclaimed outlaws, and for the patrolling of roads and communications. It was officered by members of the Imperial Indian Police, "seconded" from their own service. The Constabulary maintained posts on the edge of the settled districts and was authorized to operate in Tribal Territory as needed. Its size increased gradually until in 1930 it numbered 4,112 infantry and 435 mounted infantry. Even in quiet years, the Constabulary was kept busy and casualties were high: 629 killed or wounded in 1927-28; 512 in 1928-29; and 435 in 1929-30.¹⁸

The old haphazard system of calling on a tribe that was in receipt of subsidies to provide men on demand was strengthened by the establishment of a formal *khassadar* system, under which men designated by local *maliks* were enrolled for the purpose of guarding roads, supplying escorts to travelers, and carrying out other such duties in Tribal Territory as the Political Agent required. The *khassadars* supplied their own arms and equipment and were normally more highly paid than the Scouts or Constabulary in order to attract the best men and to bind them to good behavior by fear of the loss of income. In 1928, there were 1,400 *khassadars* in the Kohat Pass and 3,500 in Waziristan.¹⁹

Chighas, or pursuit parties, were also organized in many villages of the settled districts. These were obliged by law to resist and pursue any tribal raiders attacking their village. The government provided each village with a certain number of rifles and ammunition. In other villages, voluntary police forces were organized under the command of the local khans. These groups got arms, ammunition, and pay for the time spent drilling or in action.

¹⁷ *N-WFP Administration Report, 1921*, p. 10.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

THE RAZMAK POLICY

The most important aspect of the new approach was the establishment of large cantonments at Wana and Razmak for the purpose of dominating Waziristan — especially the Mahsud country. The modified Forward Policy which thus replaced Curzon's modified Close Border policy was frequently referred to as the Razmak Policy. In theory it was limited to Waziristan, and the re-entry of regular troops into the tribal area was justified on the grounds that the volatile and anarchical tribes of the south could not maintain any kind of order in their own country. In fact, however, the flexing of British muscles beyond the administrative border extended throughout the tribal area, and in 1921 the railroad linking Peshawar and Fort Jamrud was pushed up through the Khyber to Landikotal.

In 1922, the Razmak Policy received the stamp of approval from the North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Denys Bray, Foreign Secretary of the Government of India. It became known as "peaceful penetration" or "control from within" and was to remain the basis of British tribal policy until the end.

In the beginning, the new policy was successful. The political agents, with subsidies and appointments in the Scouts and *khassadars* at their disposal, and backed by strong concentrations of regular troops close at hand, were able to deal with the tribes from a position of strength. Afghan intrigue among the tribes was reduced by the new King Amanullah's turning his attention to modernizing his country, and a certain amount of Anglo-Afghan cooperation began under the 1921 Treaty which provided that both Afghanistan and British India should notify the other in advance of any "military operations of major importance" undertaken against the border tribes on either side of the Durand Line.²⁰

The result was the "Quiet Twenties", during which no major uprising took place and the tribes gave some signs of having accepted the sight of British garrisons and roads in the midst of their homeland. Two developments did occur in the Twenties, however, which because of their place in the history and folklore of the Frontier deserve note.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF SWAT

In the years following the First World War, Miangul Gulshahzada, Abd-ul-Wadood, a grandson of the Akhund of Swat who had played so

²⁰ Aitcheson, *op. cit.*, XIII, 24.

important a role both in support of and against Sayyid Ahmad, began consolidating his power in the Swat Valley. Exploiting his position of inherited sanctity and employing remarkable administrative and strategic talents, the Miangul organized the tribes on the east bank of the Swat River, most of whom owed allegiance to the Nawab of Dir, into a strong confederation. He constructed a series of forts up and down the Swat Valley and connected them by telephone.

In April, 1923, the Miangul sent a *lashkar* into Buner, to which the Nawab of Amb, a small state along the Indus above Attock, had hitherto exercised a vague claim. The Nawab accepted the challenge and sent in a *lashkar* of his followers. On August 16, a sizeable battle was fought, during which the British authorities discreetly locked the other way, and Buner came under the Miangul's control. Inspired by his success, he began to consider trying to take over other parts of both Amb and Dir, but the British managed to divert his attention to development of the territory he already had, and in 1926 the Miangul was formally proclaimed *Wali* or ruler of Swat in a durbar in Saidu Sharif, his beautiful little capital.

The *Wali* refused to admit outlaws into his state, controlled the armament of his citizens, instituted a small army, and built a number of schools. He became a model of tribal responsibility and in the Thirties was encouraged by the British gradually to extend his control through Indus Kohistan up to the border of Kashmir. Shortly after the establishment of Pakistan, the old *Wali* voluntarily stepped down, and the state, still a marvel of efficiency and progress in the midst of a wild tribal country, is now ruled by the Miangul's son, Jehanzeb.

THE ELLIS CASE

By far the most noted incident of the 1920's was the kidnaping by Afridis of a young British girl, Mollie Ellis, from the cantonment at Kohat in the early hours of April 14, 1923. This profanation of British womanhood aroused violent emotions in the hearts of most Britons in India and at home. Coming at the same time as the newly aggressive Razmak policy, the kidnaping tended to harden once and for all the relationship of Pathans and British into one of hostility and distrust, which persisted until 1947. At the same time, the Ellis Case is interesting because of the manner in which complicated Pathan politics and aspirations are reflected in it.

In February, 1923, forty-six rifles were stolen from the British cantonment at Kohat. The theft was laid at the door of one Ajab Khan, a Bosti Khel Afridi, whose village lay in Tribal Territory along the flank of the Kohat Pass. At dawn on March 5 the Frontier Constabulary, commanded by Mr. Handyside, one of the Frontier's most famous policemen, with regular troops in support, surrounded Ajab's village.

A search resulted in the recovery of thirty-three of the missing rifles, some other stolen property, and the arrest of a few outlaws who had taken refuge in the village. Ajab himself was absent during the raid. According to the official record, the operation was conducted "with all possible regard for tribal susceptibilities",²¹ but the story got about — and still persists today — that some of the village women were subjected to search and insult.

Ajab brooded for some weeks on the insult to his honor. Then, goaded by his women and relatives, he raided Kohat again before dawn on April 14. In the course of the raid, Mrs. Ellis, the wife of a British officer, was killed, and her daughter Mollie, a girl of about fifteen years, carried off.

After an unsuccessful pursuit and a series of complicated negotiations, the Ellis girl was returned unharmed — chiefly through the efforts of two Pathan political officers, Resaldar Moghul Baz Khan and Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan, and a Mrs. Starr of a local English mission.

What began then was an excellent example of the problems involved in the administration of justice on the border. Ajab Khan and his associates in crime, Sultan Mir and Gul Akbar, father and son, fled through the hills, taking refuge with friendly tribesman as they went. Under stern threats of blockade and suspension of allowances, the Khyber Afridis and the Orakzai, in a *jirga* on May 12, 1923, agreed to exclude "the Kohat gang" from their territory. The fugitives moved on to a refuge with the Shinwaris just across the border in Afghanistan.

In early November, with every effort still being made to capture them, they apparently crossed back into the tribal area. Shortly afterwards, a Captain and Mrs. Watts were murdered at Parachinar, at the head of the Kurram Valley "under circumstances which clearly indicated that the outrage was the work of the Kohat gang".²² The pursuit was intensified, and in January, 1924, Ajab turned himself over to the Afghan Governor of Jelalabad. He and his band were taken with their families

²¹ N-WFP (India), *Report on the Administration of the Border of the N-WFP, 1922-23* (Peshawar: Government Press, 1928), p. 5.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

to Kabul, despite British demands for his surrender and some talk by officers in Peshawar of their going to get him in Jelalabad without recourse to international procedures. The Afghan Government, prevented by public opinion from returning the fugitive even if it had wanted to, let it be known that Ajab and his family were being "interned" beyond the Hindu Kush, and he was given land near Mazaar-i-Sharif.

Sultan Mir and Gul Akbar, reportedly under Afghan instructions, returned secretly across the border to live in the Tirah. Throughout 1925, 1926, and 1927, the hunt for them went on. Gul Akbar was finally taken and executed in Peshawar on May 29, 1928. Sultan Mir continued to elude pursuit and finally dropped from sight among the Sunni Orakzai.

The Bosti Khel Afridis, Ajab's clan, were fined Rs. 42,000 in cash and rifles as a result of the incident, and Ajab's own lands (valued at Rs. 8,000) were confiscated. His village was demolished, and, according to local legend, the site was ploughed with salt. The Daulatzai and other Orakzais were fined Rs. 19,500 for failing to live up to their responsibilities during the pursuit of the criminals.

As a footnote to the Ellis Case, it is interesting to note that Ajab himself lived on until 1961, aged and respectable, in northern Afghanistan, where he and his fellow Pathans were of considerable aid to the Kabul government in maintaining control over the local peasantry. He and his brother Shahzada were, after the establishment of Pakistan, involved in the "Pukhtunistan" movement (*see* Chapter XII below), and in late 1952 Shahzada returned for the first time to the site of his ancestral village to prepare the way for a raid into Pakistan by "Pukhtunistan" forces.

TRIBAL POLICY IN THE THIRTIES

The main events which made the 1930's the most turbulent period the Frontier experienced under British rule will be discussed in succeeding chapters as parts of a greater whole. Most prominent among them were the 1930 uprising in the country around Peshawar and the prolonged test of strength between the British and the tribesmen in Waziristan in 1936, 1937, and 1938.

British tribal policy continued basically unchanged throughout this upheaval. The assurances given in 1922 that the new Forward Policy aimed at bringing to the hill tribes the benefits of civilization and

economic improvement, were repeated periodically. In 1928, the government took the view that the new policy was “essentially positive and constructive. . . not a policy of military conquest but of civilization”. An official report concluded: “Thus the spirit of self-government among the tribes and their sense of responsibility will be kept alive, while British influence and economic forces will work steadily to destroy the causes which for centuries have kept these virile people as murderers and robbers”.²³

In the middle of the Waziristan disturbances, the India Office still insisted that “the standing object of the general policy of the Government of India in regard to the Frontier is to preserve the peace of the border and to foster good relations with the tribes with a view to their gradual pacification, civilization, and economic betterment”.²⁴

Nevertheless, little was done to change the prevailing climate of force and suppression. There were few services offered in health or education, and the primitive living conditions of the tribes remained untouched by the schools and hospitals which were being expanded rapidly elsewhere in India — including in the N-WFP. The military flavor of the administration which had become stronger after 1901 grew still more intense under the dictates of the Razmak Policy. Though never formally admitted by the government, the Frontier problem in the twentieth century was generally accepted to be a military rather than a political one, and the dominant influence was usually exerted by the Army.²⁵

While many individual political agents became so devoted to the welfare of “their people” as to be viewed with suspicion by their military colleagues, the British administration as a whole continued to ignore the affairs of the tribes as long as no threat to the security of the imperial *status quo* arose. While the political officers generally preferred to minimize intertribal conflict insofar as they could and frequently moralized about the horrors of the blood feud, in fact they appear to have done relatively little to establish a lasting cessation of fighting in the tribal area.

Sometimes British support, including RAF bombing raids, was openly committed to one group against another, as in the great internecine fight among the Mohmands in the 1930's, when the British supported

²³ *N-WFP Administration Report, 1928*, p. 270.

²⁴ *Parliamentary Papers, 1937*, Cmd. 5497: “Tribal Disturbances in Waziristan” (25 November 1936-14 June 1937), p. 7.

²⁵ W. K. Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 268.

the Lower Mohmands in their war with the Upper Mohmands led by the Haji of Turangzai and the Fakir of Alamgir. The pleas of the hill Mohmands, repeated from 1930 onward, for a separate political agent to look after their affairs, were ignored.²⁶

The official attitude toward intertribal fighting which did not concern the government directly was summed up in the *Border Report* for 1937-38: "Government have continued to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality in this Bajaur fighting, which they regard as a family quarrel in which they are not directly concerned".²⁷

THE SUBSIDY SYSTEM

Before considering the last days of British rule on the Frontier, it is worthwhile to look briefly at the system of tribal allowances. This system in one form or another dates back at least to Mogul times. The British employed it from the very beginning, but in the 1930's it reached a peak of development and set a pattern which is still maintained.

There are three distinct kinds of subsidy. The *lungi* is paid to individuals — usually *maliks* or other influential persons. It is generally paid on a regular basis, monthly, semi-annually, or annually. Payment varies from a few rupees to several hundred rupees per month. The importance of the *lungi* does not lie solely in its monetary value. Even a small *lungi* is a sign of recognition by the authorities of an individual as a leader in his area and adds to his prestige. In recent years, there has apparently been a tendency to supplement the *lungi* with occasional allocations of commodities or licenses to import cloth at controlled prices. The latter not only provide the tribe with an essential material in short supply in the hills but allow a sophisticated *malik* occasionally to pocket some extra money through resale or manipulation of a portion of the goods.

The *muajib*, the allowance paid to a tribe or a *khel* as a unit, is probably the most important of the subsidies. It is usually turned over to the *maliks* representing the tribe in the presence of a *jirga*. Distribution within the tribe is according to long-standing custom, and dissension over the division is rare.

²⁶ The Mohmands in tribal territory were the responsibility of the Khyber Political Agent whose hands were full most of the time with the equally turbulent and dangerous Afridis.

²⁷ *N-WFP Border Administration Report, 1937-38*, p. 2.

Kharcha is expense money paid for some specified task performed for the political authorities. It may be merely a rupee or two to cover the food of a messenger or a much more considerable sum to recompense a *malik* who has assembled a *lashkar* to chase back across the border a party of Afghan intruders.

In theory, the British recognized the subsidies as a right to which the tribes were entitled — partly in compensation for ancient tribal prerogatives, such as the taking of tolls from travelers in the passes, partly in return for concessions, such as road and railways built across tribal lands, and partly in payment for necessary services, such as the maintenance and policing of roads and railways. In fact, however, the authorities frequently employed the subsidies as a weapon which, used in conjunction with the blockade, could compel the tribesmen through economic pressure to do what was required of them.²⁸

Naturally, there was a great temptation on the part of the political officers to attempt to increase the influence of a cooperative *malik* by increasing his subsidy and channeling through him the *muajib* for groups larger than his own. This device was tried particularly in the long struggle among the various factions of Mohmands in the 1930's. It almost inevitably failed, as the tribesmen resented the attempt to interfere with the hierarchy of influence which they themselves recognized and had set up.

THE FINAL DAYS OF BRITISH RULE

Although the Waziristan uprising of 1936-38 was suppressed militarily, full control was never really established in the south. Though cantonments held firm at Razmak and Wana and a few more roads were pushed into Tribal Territory, the garrisons were never able to stand at ease and the roads were never safe. Travel was usually in heavily armed convoy and only on "Road Open Days", perhaps once a week. On these days, the full strength of a battalion or a brigade would be sent forth from the cantonment at dawn to picket a few dozen miles of road on which an incoming and outgoing convoy would pass each other, moving with carefully timed precision so that the troops would be back in the cantonment again before sunset.

The advent of the airplane provided a substitute for the traditional mobile column when the government felt that the punishment of some

²⁸ *N-WF Enquiry Committee Report*, p. 6.

remote village or tribe was necessary. Air raids were carried out by the RAF over a period of two years, despite the outcry of humanitarian groups in England against the bombing of defenseless tribal villages. And although informers employed by the political officers willingly reported the terrible devastation and the chastened hostiles which resulted from a bombing raid, these desultory bombings accomplished little other than the demolition of a few mud forts.

The aircraft were useful for reconnaissance purposes, particularly the spotting of *lashkars* crossing the border from Afghanistan or building up within the tribal area. However, at low altitude they were also vulnerable to sharpshooters, and the fate of the first few airmen forced to the ground was dire indeed. Subsequently, the always imaginative government announced a high ransom for the return of any airman lost in Tribal Territory regardless of cause, and the whole process took on something of a sporting air.

World War II, like its predecessor of twenty-five years earlier, passed relatively quietly on the Frontier. No hostile force attempted to break through the tank traps that had been hastily hauled into the Khyber and the Kurram. Afghanistan, despite its cordial relations with Germany, remained neutral throughout the war. While it was never deemed safe to remove the garrisons from Tribal Territory and along the border, considerable strength was diverted to the fighting front in Burma.

Some rather half-hearted efforts to raise the tribes against the British were made by the Italian and German missions in Kabul, and two German agents lost their lives in attempting to contact the Fakir of Ipi, who by 1939 had become the Frontier's most notorious hostile.²⁹ In 1941, Ipi apparently received a few hundred thousand Afghanis from the Axis powers in return for a pledge to use his forces against British India at the appropriate time, but nothing ever developed from the plan.³⁰

The years between the end of World War II and the departure of the British passed almost uneventfully on the Frontier. There were no major risings, although an occasional bombing of a tribal village was still deemed necessary, and travel in the tribal area was still a question of arranging one's schedule to coincide with the "Road Open Days". The

²⁹ For Ipi's earlier exploits, see Chapter IX below.

³⁰ The businesslike Fakir is supposed to have presented the Axis agents with a statement of his capabilities and expectations, to wit: (a) "Maintenance and intensification of sporadic small clashes: Rs. 300,000 annually until victory; (b) extension of same into further fields; Rs. 600,000 annually; (c) complete border rebellion: Rs. 1,000,000".

Russian menace reappeared on the horizon, but the attention of the rulers of India was preoccupied with the great agitation for independence sweeping those parts of India normally much more tractable than the Frontier. When the decision for independence and partition was made, the Frontier administrators took in hand the process of the plebiscite, and then departed after almost a century's rule.

As W. K. Fraser-Tytler, a distinguished official who served both on the Frontier and in Afghanistan, admits, they had not solved the problem of the Frontier, and in August, 1947, the British handed over to Pakistan "a fluid, difficult situation fraught with much danger to the future".³¹

³¹ Fraser-Tytler, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

VIII

THE FRONTIER AS A PART OF INDIA

INTRODUCTION

Many of the great conquerors of Asian history have held territory on both sides of the Indus. Until the coming of the British, however, none of them ever thought of the Frontier as a part of India. The Pathans themselves never thought so. The Afghan sultans of Delhi in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries ruled as a consciously alien race. Khushal Khan Khattak's poems written while he was in exile in India are full of his contempt for the country and its people, Hindu and Muslim alike. In the first verse of "The Ballad of the King's Mercy", written in 1889, Kipling states matter-of-factly: "There was a hound of Hindustan had struck a Yusufzai, Wherefore they spat upon his face and led him out to die". The words express the attitude of the Pathan in the late nineteenth century toward the dwellers on the Indo-Gangetic Plain.

It is almost impossible to find throughout the nineteenth century any indication of a feeling of community of interest between the Pathans and the other subjects of the British Indian Empire. The 1857 Mutiny brought together a miscellaneous collection of Hindu rajahs, Muslim nawabs, and sepoy of varied race, caste, and religion, but none of them were Pathans. Even the followers of Sayyid Ahmad were unable to achieve anything but the most transitory rapport with the tribesmen. The great Pathan rising of 1897 came at a time when relations between the British and the other subject races of India were at a peak of cordiality.

The British, while insisting on incorporating the trans-Indus area into their empire, recognized its individuality and in many ways contributed to its isolation. Perhaps the most notable of these was Curzon's severing of the trans-Indus districts from the Punjab and the establishment of Tribal Territory.

Throughout the period of British rule, the aim of government on the Frontier was security, not revenue or development. The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 and the Montagu-Chalmsford Reforms of 1919 passed almost unnoticed on the Frontier — which was, of course, excluded from their benefits. Not until 1932 was the chief commissioner replaced by a governor in order to bring the N-WFP theoretically at least on a par with the other provinces of India.

At the same time, inevitably, the ubiquitous lower echelons of British Indian administration made themselves felt more and more at the district and *tahsil* level, and Pathan custom was gradually subordinated within the Province to the dictates of a revenue, police, and judicial system based on experience in other parts of India. The result, in the years after World War I, was increasing disgruntlement and unrest — the feeling that the Pathans shared all of the burdens and none of the benefits which flowed from British rule. As Sir William Barton admitted in a later day: “The policy of forcing the Pathan tribal system into the administrative mould of British India accounts in great measure for the British failure to assimilate the Pathan into the Indian political system”.¹

THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF INDIA

Nonetheless, the winds of political unrest which were blowing with growing strength across India after World War I were felt in the Frontier area. The name of Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan, the Frontier's most famous fire-brand, first appeared in 1919, when the young landlord of Utmanzai led agitation against the Rowlatt Act which severely restricted political activity in India. The *Khilafat* agitation in support of Turkey had found few followers on the Frontier during the War, but a few years later interest was high when the celebrated Ali brothers allied the movement to the Congress Party in order to fight against the harsh peace terms being meted out by the British and French to defeated Turkey.

The *Hijrat* movement, which taught that all Muslims must leave India as a land ruled by infidels and go to a land under Muslim rule, excited the imaginations of many Pathans, and in August of 1920, 18,000 of them sold their land, homes, and shops, and moved to Kabul,² where the horde of immigrants became so embarrassing to the Afghan Amir that he cooperated with the British in encouraging them to return to India.

¹ Barton, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

² *Moral and Material Progress of India, 1920*, p. 53.

In 1922, the North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee looked into the growing unrest and in its report admitted that the inhabitants of the N-WFP were "assuredly not behind the rest of India either in intelligence or capacity to manage their own affairs". The report added: "Their aspirations for reforms have been awakened into full consciousness and will not be satisfied by anything short of reforms enjoyed elsewhere".³ The committee recommended establishment of a legislative council of the type proposed by the Montagu-Chalmsford Reforms with sixty percent elected members, and also the appointment of a native minister to take charge of all the subjects which were "transferred" to the native administration in the Punjab.

Nothing was to come of the recommendation for ten years. In the meanwhile, the Razmak Policy went into effect, and, while resentment still smouldered in the tribal areas, the Frontier appeared to be quieting down. The close interrelationship of the Province and the tribal area and the paramount demands of security were cited to postpone reform. Besides, some of the more versatile Pathans had found new and uncitizenly outlets for their energies. Thus, the *Border Report* for 1924-25 noted as an important problem for the year "the existence of a large scale and profitable trade in women. . . abducted or enticed from Swat or Peshawar District, carried off across the Afridi border, and finally exported for sale in Sind".⁴

By the end of the 1920's, there was increasing evidence that the Frontier was no longer indifferent to happenings in other parts of India. The celebrated Rangila Rasul case, in which the Hindu author of a book ridiculing the Holy Prophet was killed in a courtroom by a Muslim from Hazara District, aroused considerable emotion in Tribal Territory as well as in the settled districts. When the murderer was hanged in Karachi, a wave of communal⁵ emotion swept the Frontier, and many Hindu shopkeepers and dependents were expelled from Pathan villages.

In 1928 the Simon Commission recommended that the Montagu-Chalmsford Reforms be extended to the N-WFP in a limited form. Instead of quieting the unrest, this occasioned a new wave of resentment at the restricted nature of the proposed reforms.

³ *N-WF Enquiry Report*, p. 22.

⁴ *N-WF Border Administration, 1924-25*, p. 5.

⁵ Communal, as used in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, is generally synonymous with religious. It refers to anything having to do with the customs and activities of the Hindu and Muslim communities and to relations between them.

ABD-UL-GHAFFAR KHAN AND THE KHUDAI KHITMATGARS

By this time, Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan and his brother, Dr. Khan Sahib, an officer in the Indian Medical Service, had established contact with Gandhi and the Indian Congress Party. The Khan brothers, both of whom had been jailed after the Rowlatt Act agitation, had also established relations with tribal dissidents, especially the Mohmands, to whose most turbulent leader, the Haji of Turangzai, they were related by marriage.

In 1929 Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan founded the Khudai Khitmatgars, the "Servants of God", whose uniform was dyed with local brick dust to a distinctive shade of red. In British official records, the organization was quickly dubbed "the Red Shirts", and nervous administrators professed to see a sinister connection between it and the "Red Menace", which had been discovered beyond the Hindu Kush almost before the Tsarist threat was in its grave.

The Khudai Khitmatgars gained adherents rapidly in Peshawar and the surrounding countryside, and Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan became a leading figure in Indian political activities. Khudai Khitmatgar *jirgas* were set up in most villages in Peshawar District and links established between them through neighborhood, tribal, and district *jirgas*. At the top was a provincial *jirga*, which included the Khudai Khitmatgar high command. All of the *jirga* members were elected, and the system began to develop into a kind of parallel administration independent of the British government. Side by side with the Khudai Khitmatgar *jirgas* was an organization of volunteers bound by an oath of discipline to follow and enforce the organization's policy as determined by the high command. Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan personally appointed subordinate officers.⁶

THE 1930-31 AGITATION

On April 23, 1930, Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan and his associates were arrested for fomenting unrest. When the news of his arrest spread through Peshawar, the city erupted into rioting. Thousands of people put on red shirts and began dying red every piece of cloth they could get their hands on. Troops were called into the city, and tanks began patrolling the narrow streets. A tank was set afire by the demonstrators and a British soldier stabbed. Two platoons of the Royal Garhwal Rifles were

⁶ Qaiyum, *op. cit.*, pp. 40 ff.

ordered to open fire on the crowd in Kissa Khani Bazar, but refused to do so. They were disarmed and removed under an escort of British troops. The British soldiery then fired on the crowd, and large numbers were killed. Curfew was imposed and a kind of order restored under strict military rule.

At the first hint of trouble, hostile *lashkars* assembled in the hills. The Haji of Turangzai, with 2,000 men, hovered on the edge of Peshawar District. On May 11, 4,000 Madda Khel and Khidder Khel Wazirs appeared suddenly at Datta Khel Post in the Tochi Valley and attacked it. The same day, 1,200 Daurs attacked another fort. On May 25 rioting broke out in Mardan, and a British assistant superintendent of police was killed by a mob at Takkar, near Takht-i-Bhai. This was followed by firing on the mob which resulted in a large number of casualties.

An Utman Khel *lashkar* appeared near Shabqadar in the last week of May. The Afridis had been harassing the Khyber for several weeks, and in the first few days of June, a *lashkar* of 5,000 collected near Fort Jamrud. On the night of June 4-5, 2,000 of them poured down in a hit-and-run attack on Peshawar cantonment itself — the eighty-year-old symbol of British rule on the Frontier.

Afridi raids, sometimes with the attackers disguised as Frontier Constabulary, continued in Peshawar District throughout June and July. A hostile *lashkar* appeared in Hazara on June 9-10. On July 7, the Mahsuds attacked police posts at Sararogha and Ahmai Tangai. Dir and Buner were also in an uproar, with many tribesmen coming from there to join the Haji of Turangzai. The first week in August another Afridi *lashkar* of 5,000 got through to the outskirts of Peshawar where they were welcomed and supported by the local villagers.

Martial law was finally imposed all over the Frontier on August 15, and the army, reinforced by units hastily collected in the Punjab and other parts of India, began to reassert British control. Mohmand and Afridi *lashkars* were broken up by air bombardment, and a strong column sallied forth from Razmak to disperse the Wazirs and Mahsuds. From Peshawar, a column moved out and occupied the Khajuri Plain, the gateway to the Tirah and a favorite grazing ground of the Afridis. Tribal allowances were cut off and blockade imposed. Special *jirgas* were set up under the Frontier Crimes Regulations to try those who had participated in the disturbances, and a concerted effort was made to break up the Khudai Khitmatgar organization.

These measures brought a certain amount of security, but they did not end the unrest nor make possible a return to normal administration.

Early in 1931 the countryside was still so disturbed that revenue collection in Mardan District had ceased almost entirely, and government officials could move about only under heavy guard.

Finally, the British Government moved to deal with the general unrest and agitation all over India through a Round Table Conference in London between representatives of the Indian political parties and the Government of India and the India Office. In March, 1931, Viceroy Lord Irwin and Gandhi agreed that agitation would be suspended for the period of the London discussions.

Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan was released from jail as a result of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, as were other political detainees. Ghaffar Khan's exact connection with Gandhi at this point is not altogether clear, since the Khudai Khitmatgars had not yet formally become affiliated with the Indian Congress. At any rate, Ghaffar Khan chose to disregard Gandhi's promise, and the Khudai Khitmatgars recommenced agitation on the Frontier on an even bigger scale than previously. New training centers were established, and recruits from Tribal Territory, including large numbers of Mahsuds and Bhattanis, began to come in. Ghaffar Khan reportedly established contact with Mullah Fazl Din, son of the notorious Mahsud firebrand, the Powindah Mullah. The Khudai Khitmatgar leader was also an honored speaker at Mohmand *jirgas*, and Khudai Khitmatgar units were founded among that tribe. Police authority was disregarded throughout the districts, and attacks on British dispatch riders became common in what the British administration feared was a coordinated attack on their essential communications system. Imposition of a ban on public gatherings in Kohat and Bannu Districts failed to slow the agitation, and communal rioting broke out in normally placid Dera Ismail Khan.

By late summer of 1931, even the established khans in the settled districts, whose loyalty to the British had been assured for decades, began to withhold revenue payments, and a few of them lent their presence to Khudai Khitmatgar meetings. In an effort to counter this defection, Obedullah Khan, son of Dr. Khan Sahib, was arrested and sentenced as a defaulter under the Land Revenue Act. This brought a few of the more timid khans back into line, but the peasantry continued to flock to the Khudai Khitmatgar standard.

The Chief Commissioner scheduled an extraordinary durbar for December 22 at which, it was made known, the introduction of the reforms recommended by the Bray and Simon's Commissions would be announced. Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan and Khan Sahib ostentatiously re-

fused to attend the durbar, and the Khudai Khitmatgars proclaimed that no reform short of complete selfgovernment would be accepted. They scheduled a mass meeting at the Khan brothers' home village of Utmanzai for January 1, 1932.

Meanwhile the Round Table Conference had broken down, and the Gandhi-Irwin Pact was abrogated. On December 26, 1931, the government banned the Khudai Khitmatgars and arrested Ghaffar Khan, Khan Sahib, the latter's son, Sadullah, and Qazi Ataullah, a lawyer. Large bodies of troops, supported by the district police and the Frontier Constabulary, destroyed most of the Khudai Khitmatgar centers and took into custody nearly a thousand local leaders of the movement. In Kohat the troops fired on a large body of Khudai Khitmatgars who had gathered to protest the government's move, and fourteen were killed and thirty wounded.

Shortly afterward Gandhi was arrested and the Congress Party was placed under ban. Agitation was then picked up by the Muslim League. A "Buy Muslim" campaign caught on in the Frontier, and many of the Hindu shopkeepers and money-changers who were the economic lifeblood of the Frontier were maltreated and impoverished. Militant Muslim organizations, such as the Ansars and the Khaksars, spread into the Frontier, and the communal element common to Indian politics of the time intensified the already keen hostility between Pathan and Hindu.

The most significant aspect of the 1930-32 disturbances was that for the first time a Frontier rising had found its inspiration in India rather than in Afghanistan or on the Frontier itself. The British, painfully aware of the explosive nature of the powder magazine which constituted their most sensitive border, insisted that "in each and every case" the source of the trouble was the Congress Party.⁷ While this was probably an exaggeration, there could be little doubt that a new spirit was about in the land and that the Frontier's traditional lack of interest in what was going on in the rest of India had ended.

Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan, the "Badshah Khan", a six-foot-six-inch Pathan, who was soon to win the title of the "Frontier Gandhi", was admittedly and paradoxically an admirer of the Mahatma and a believer in the Congress Party doctrine of non-violent resistance. Professional Congress agitators were thick on the Frontier in 1930 and 1931, and the Congress apparently realized the high potential in their new area of operations for upsetting the British. The uniformity of the demands and

⁷ *N-WF Border Administration Report, 1930-31*, p. 2.

complaints put forward by tribes and villages in widely separated areas suggested some central direction not indigenous to the Frontier. The Afridis, when negotiating for a settlement, included among their demands the release from jail not only of Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan but of Gandhi.⁸

Nonetheless, there is little evidence that the Pathans — especially those in Tribal Territory — saw themselves as part of a mass movement struggling for a free and united India, as most Congressmen did. A large part of the Khudai Khitmatgars' success lay in the organization's conformity to traditional Pathan methods and outlook. It served as a vehicle for the expression of discontent growing out of the absolute and rigid British administration of the N-WFP and the stern implementation of the Razmak Policy. In a sense, it probably contributed to the peace of the Frontier by providing the means for political action where previously violent action had been the exclusive mode. Added to this were some rudimentary new ideas of economic and social improvement. It was above all, however, a Pathan party, and at this early stage fairly remote from Congress control.

By treating the Khudai Khitmatgars and the Congress as parts of the same vast seditious conspiracy, the British administrators contributed to the Frontier organization's growing closeness to the Congress in the early and mid 1930's. The Khudai Khitmatgars did not formally become affiliated with the Congress until August, 1931 — well after the agitation was under way. From the very beginning, however, the Congress, under Gandhi's shrewd leadership, adopted the Khudai Khitmatgars as its own, so successfully that, six years later, when Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan and his associates won control of the North-West Frontier Province in its first election, the Khudai Khitmatgars acted as part of the Congress machine.

Regardless of the motivation of the Khudai Khitmatgar movement, British administrators on the Frontier had ample reason to worry in the early 1930's. For the first time, British authority was being challenged throughout India by political agitation. While this agitation was "non-violent" in most parts of the country, it was violent and direct on the Frontier, and gave every promise of becoming more so as it went on.

⁸ Government of India, *India, 1931* (Calcutta: Central Publications Branch, 1931), p. 565. (From 1929 the *Moral and Material Progress* reports were succeeded by annual reports on *India*.)

REFORMS

In 1931 the official *Border Report* called for new powers for the government to set "definite limits both to the scope and direction of political propaganda" on the Frontier.⁹ The tide that was sweeping India could not be held back, however, and in 1932 the N-WFP was formally opened to a certain very modest kind of political reform. It was elevated to the status of a "Governor's Province", *i.e.*, the chief commissioner was replaced by a governor, and a degree of self-government was granted. Sir Abd-ul-Qaiyum, a retired civil servant with no political connections, became the first minister of the Province. In accordance with the Montagu-Chalmsford Reforms of 1919, real power remained with the governor and his executive council, but certain matters, such as health, sanitation, and public works were "transferred" to the ministry. Even on these the governor retained final authority.

It was hoped that this arrangement, together with the agreement for communal representation (*i.e.*, separate reserved seats and electorates for Muslims, Hindus, and Christians in representative bodies) which had been reached at the London Round Table Conferences, would appease Muslim sensibilities and lessen agitation on the Frontier.

This did not turn out to be the case. Despite his considerable ability and high personal integrity, Sir Abd-ul-Qaiyum was not popular. In the first place, he had little power, and in the second, his long service in the British administration and his lack of political connections made him susceptible to charges of being a British puppet.

Sir Abd-ul-Qaiyum's tenure of office was made more difficult by two events of a communal nature which stirred emotions both in the Province and the tribal area. Late in 1935, a Pathan schoolteacher of Bannu allegedly kidnapped a Hindu girl, and after converting her and renaming her Islam Bibi, married her. The girl's parents demanded her return and took the matter to court. The courts ordered that she be returned, and widespread communal disturbances followed up and down the Frontier. In April, 1936, a small historic mosque, the Shahidganj Mosque, on the grounds of a Sikh *gurdwara* in Lahore, was demolished with the approval of the government authorities, and another wave of disturbances followed on the Frontier.

In both cases, Ghaffar Khan and the Khudai Khitmatgars made the most of the incidents, despite their connection with the Hindu-dominated

⁹ *N-WF Border Administration Report, 1930-31*, p. 2.

Congress Party. They pointed out that this sort of thing could be expected at the hands of an alien and infidel government and emphasized Sir Abd-ul-Qaiyum's failure to protest the occurrences. Also, the Fakir of Ipi, a fanatical Wazir *mullah*, seized the opportunity to foment new disturbances in Waziristan.

Ghaffar Khan was "externed" from the N-WFP under the Public Tranquility Act, and the Khudai Khitmatgars remained banned. The movement continued to grow underground, however, and the "Badshah Khan's" popularity increased as he came to be looked upon as a martyr. Consequently, the Khudai Khitmatgars emerged in a stronger position than ever when a new constitution for India was promulgated in the Government of India Act of August 2, 1935.

The complexities of the Government of India Act of 1935, which was implemented only in 1937, are not pertinent here. It is sufficient to note that the Act provided for a fair degree of real representation, and that the N-WFP, for the first time, received the full benefits of a reform, although certain of the traditional restrictions peculiar to the Frontier area were retained — especially in matters concerning the relationship of the Tribal Territory to the Province.

In the election that followed implementation of the Act, the Frontier Congress Party, composed mainly of the Khudai Khitmatgar element, won nineteen out of the fifty seats in the legislature — a substantial plurality. In concert with Congress majorities in other provinces, however, the victors refused to form a government unless the Governor would promise not to use his special powers to limit the activities of the elected ministries. As in other parts of India, the Frontier Governor thereupon called on minority parties to form a government, and Sir Abd-ul-Qaiyum, with the reluctant support of Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh independents, became the chief minister once again. It was at this time that Mardan was separated from Peshawar and constituted as a separate district — partially in an attempt to break up the center of Khudai Khitmatgar power.

In August, 1937, after a conciliatory statement by the Viceroy on the powers of the governors under the 1935 Act, Congress decided to accept responsibility for government, and Sir Abd-ul-Qaiyum was dismissed by a no-confidence motion which was carried by nine votes. Dr. Khan Sahib took over as chief minister, and the opposition — Sir Abd-ul-Qaiyum's supporters and a few hitherto independent Muslims — gathered under the banner of Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim League.

The following year the Frontier was very much a part of political India.

Inayatullah Khan, leader of the militant Muslim Khaksars, Maulana Abu Kalam Azad, leading Muslim member of the Congress Party, and Maulana Shaukat Ali, all visited the Province. Gandhi himself did so twice, and his activities were laconically described in the annual administration report as follows: "Mr. Gandhi arrived in Peshawar on the 1st May and left on the 9th. The day before Mr. Gandhi's departure a political conference was held in the Shahi Bagh at Peshawar. Resolutions of a disloyal nature were passed".¹⁰

Shortly after the outbreak of World War II in 1939, the Congress decided not to cooperate with the British Government in its war effort. Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry resigned, as did all other Congress ministries in India. In 1942, when Gandhi's non-cooperation movement was at its height, large-scale disturbances took place on the Frontier under the Red Shirt aegis. In 1943, Muhammad Ali Jinnah agreed to form Muslim League ministries where possible, and Sardar Aurangzeb Khan became Muslim League Chief Minister of the N-WFP. The Congress majority in the Legislative Assembly boycotted the sessions, and the League, with the aid of some independents, carried on the government until the end of the war when the Congress reappeared and took over the government. In the election of January, 1946, the Khudai Khitmatgars again proved their power, and the Congress obtained a comfortable majority to continue Dr. Khan Sahib's government in power.

The eventual demise of this government will be discussed in a subsequent chapter, but the fact that the militantly Muslim Pathan Frontier was a stronghold of Congress power in the decade before independence remains one of the great paradoxes of Indian political history. The personal magnetism of Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan is immediately apparent to anyone who has ever talked to him even briefly. In addition, his status as a member of an old aristocratic family of Utmanzai and his relationship by marriage to the Mohmand leader, the Haji of Turangzai, gave him a strong claim to leadership among a considerable body of Pathans. Finally, his insistence on maintaining the Khudai Khitmatgars as a purely Pathan party with local objectives provided an attractive vehicle for the vague nationalistic feelings of the Pathans.

Ghaffar Khan was above all a mass leader. He worked long and hard for the poor, championing them not only against the British but against the domination of their own khans and landlords. He kept the Khudai Khitmatgars as a separate entity devoted to the cause of "the ordinary

¹⁰ *N-WFP Administration Report, 1938-39*, p. 111.

Pathan". He promised them ownership of the lands they tilled and possession of their landlords' houses. Gradually, the khans rallied to the Muslim League to protect their own position and in retaliation for the British desertion of them in favor of treating with the Congress in organizing the new order.

Ghaffar Khan's connection with Gandhi and the Congress and the sturdy Pathan's admiration for the little *bania* from Gujarat is less easy to understand. There is no doubt that Ghaffar Khan was genuinely devoted to some of Gandhi's economic and social principles. Yet his main purpose in the beginning in joining the Khudai Khitmatgars to the Congress seems to have been to save his own organization and to get it national backing. Gradually, the Khudai Khitmatgars became irrevocably attached to the Congress. Throughout the 1930's, Ghaffar Khan could not have been insensible to the ancient motto: "The enemy of my enemy is my friend". Ghaffar Khan's enemy was the British, and no one was hurting the British as effectively as the Mahatma.

The unnatural alliance lasted until the end of British rule, with the bulk of the Khudai Khitmatgars refusing even to vote in favor of Pakistan over India in the referendum of 1947. However, once the die was cast and the Frontier opted for Pakistan, the Khudai Khitmatgars disintegrated rapidly. Their acceptance of the Muslim state was no doubt encouraged by the communal killings of the fall of 1947 and by the Kashmir *jihad* which followed shortly after. Soon Ghaffar Khan was virtually alone in his stand for an independent Pathan state. These and other events of the stirring days of Partition are discussed in Chapter X below.

IX

TRIBAL REVOLT

INTRODUCTION

The military and political history of the Pathans is more than anything else a story of revolt. They revolted against the Moguls, against dynasties of their own race, and against the Sikhs. Most of all they revolted against British India. Revolt, the theory, practice, and fruits of it, was the Pathans' principal contribution to the history of British rule in the north-western corner of India.

No statistics of Pathan origin are available on this revolt, and even British statistics are incomplete. Detailed accounts of many of the smaller expeditions in the twentieth century are still unavailable. Those statistics which are on record are impressive, however. *The Imperial Gazetteer of India* lists fifty-four expeditions undertaken against the Frontier tribes between 1849 and 1902.¹ A proportionate number of expeditions took place between 1902 and 1947.

The number of troops employed in the nineteenth-century expeditions varied from 280 (against the Utman Khel in 1878) to 40,000 (against the Afridi and Orakzai in 1897). In accordance with the tradition of Pathan warfare, casualty rates were generally light — usually less than two percent — although the toll of British troops rose to ten percent in the 1863 expedition against Sayyid Ahmad's followers. In the twentieth century, as tribal armament improved and the struggle grew more bitter, the casualty rates rose. Throughout the entire period, uprisings were regular. Only once or twice did a five-year period pass without an expedition. In troubled times five expeditions a year were not uncommon.

¹ *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, XIX, 208-210.

REVOLT DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF BRITISH RULE

More important than the number and size of the expeditions were the pattern and motivation of the risings which occasioned them. In the beginning, most of the clashes between the British and the Pathans were simple and unpolitical. The new administrators were making their presence felt, and the tribesmen, who did not yet take the new regime very seriously, were asserting their independence. In 1857, of all the tribes within the administrative border, only a few Yusufzai villages rose, and the great Sepoy Mutiny, although it caused considerable alarm to the British administrators in Peshawar, passed almost unnoticed among the tribes.

In 1859-60, a tug-of-war for control of communication routes in Waziristan between the British on the one hand and the Kabul Khel Wazirs and the Mahsuds on the other led to sporadic fighting and a Mahsud attempt to destroy Tank. A British attempt at invasion of the Mahsud country was unsuccessful, and for almost a dozen years contact between the Mahsuds and the administration was cut off as the British enforced a desultory blockade. In 1878-80, a series of small expeditions against the Afridis, Mohmands, Zaimushts, Bhattanis, and Kabul Khel Wazirs was required to protect British prestige and communications during the Second Afghan War.

The major source of unrest on the Frontier between 1849 and 1890, however, was the continued presence of the followers of Sayyid Ahmad in remote and inaccessible parts of Tribal Territory. While the tribes were never able to get along with the Sayyid's followers for prolonged periods, his followers could nevertheless occasionally raise the tribes to religious frenzy. This would result in another attempt at a *jihad* against the unbelievers whose presence was becoming more ubiquitous and more repugnant all the time.

The main campaign against the Sayyid's followers and their tribal allies was fought in 1863. It is known as the Ambela Campaign after the strategic pass near which much of the fighting took place. The previous year the Sayyid's followers had proclaimed one of their periodic *jihads* against the British. Most of the northern Yusufzai area had been under blockade by the British in reprisal for border raiding, and the tribesmen seized the opportunity to join with the Sayyid's followers. The Bunerwals joined in, as well as sections of the Utman Khel and the Mohmands and mixed groups from Dir, Swat, and Bajaur. The British force of more than 9,000 men, gathered on the crest of the Ambela Pass, was sur-

rounded, besieged, and badly cut up. For more than a month it was unable to move. By this time, the tribesmen had, as usual, fallen out with the religious colony and with each other, and their attack was never driven home. The results of the struggle were indecisive, but the Sayyid's colony was driven further north into Buner.

In 1868, the largest British force yet mounted on the Frontier, 15,000 men, was sent on a spectacular route march along the Black Mountain on the east side of the Indus. This was intended more to demonstrate British strength and overawe the remnants of the Sayyid's colony which had fled there than to accomplish a specific military purpose.

There were other risings and other expeditions in the 1870's and 1880's, but no comprehensive policy or objective was behind them, and no decisive test of strength between the British *Raj* and the Pathan power in the hills took place. While few Britishers thought that peace and progress were just around the corner, it did appear likely that a gradual pace of pacification and accommodation would eventually lead to the establishment of a relationship acceptable to both Pathans and British.

REVOLT AGAINST THE FORWARD POLICY

Such was not to be the case, however. In the 1890's, under the impact of a revitalized Forward Policy, the climate of Frontier war and politics began to change. British power was being displayed more and more, and its tentacles were encroaching on the hills. Sandeman's push up the Gomal had cut off some of the southern tribes from unimpeded access to their usual routes to Afghanistan and had reawakened unrest among the Wazirs and Mahsuds. At the opposite end of Tribal Territory, the tribes of the Black Mountain were outraged by a British attempt to top the exploit of 1868 by sending an expedition over the crest of the mountain, and in October, 1890, the tribes drove the troops back down the mountain. Early in 1891, a British column attempting to construct pickets along the crest of the Samana Range, which separates Kurram from the Tirah, was attacked and driven back by the Orakzais.

In 1894, British attempts to demarcate the Durand Line between Waziristan and Afghanistan provoked a large-scale Mahsud uprising led by the Powindah Mullah. This was climaxed by the destruction of the British Boundary Commission camp at Wana. The British next moved to take direct control of the Tochi Valley inhabited by the weak and willing Dauris. The tax on rock salt from Kohat, one of the hillmen's

principal articles of import from the districts, was raised from eight annas to two rupees a *maund* (approximately eighty pounds). By the summer of 1897 the whole border was smouldering.

The buildup of British military strength, the tightening of administration in the districts, and the extension of both into the hills led many of the tribesmen to believe that their hills were about to be incorporated wholly within the framework of British India. This they correctly saw as a challenge to their very existence. Fuel was added to the flames by garbled accounts of the Greco-Turkish War, which suggested a widespread but unsuccessful Christian crusade against Islam. A final sensational note was added by the understandable refusal of the British to return to the Afridis some captive women who had fled from the tribesmen to take refuge in the settled districts.

The time was ripe for the first real test of strength between the Pathans and the British. Both probably realized, at least dimly, what was happening.

THE 1897 RISING

On June 10, 1897, Mr. Gee, a political officer in the Tochi, arrived in Maizar, a group of small villages in the upper part of the Tochi Valley, inhabited by Madda Khel Wazirs. Gee's immediate purpose was to select a site for a small fort to be built in the neighborhood. The Maizar villages were under official disapprobation for the killing of a Hindu the year before and had not yet paid the fine assessed against them. Gee's unexpected arrival with an unusually large escort frightened them. For one of the few times on record, the tribesmen grossly violated their own code of honor. After welcoming Gee and his party and feeding them, the tribesmen attacked the British without warning. Most of the British military officers were killed, but Gee and a portion of the escort managed to escape.

The news of the attack at Maizar ran quickly up and down the border. In Swat, a Bunerwal named Saidullah, known more familiarly as Mullah Mastun (called by the British "the Mad Mullah"), was inspired to declare *jihad*. In late July, he gathered a few boys and young men around him, one of whom he proclaimed King of Delhi, and started south toward the Malakand Pass. Within a few days he had rallied 20,000 tribesmen, who simultaneously attacked the British posts at Chakdarra and in the Pass itself. After a week of fighting and the loss of about 3,000 men to

the *mullah* and several hundred to the British, the *lashkars* drew off and dispersed as quickly and strangely as they had gathered.

The Mohmands' turn came the following month. On August 7, a *lashkar* of 5,000 led by Najm-ud-Din, the Adda Mullah, and including elements from almost all the Mohmand *khels*, appeared at Shabqadar on the edge of the Peshawar District. The tribesmen destroyed a nearby village in which numerous Hindus lived and retreated into the hills without engaging a contingent of troops which had been rushed out from Peshawar.

A week later the Orakzai began sniping at the few British posts which had been set up on the Samana Crest and succeeded in cutting off communication with them. A similar campaign got underway in the Khyber under the leadership of Mullah Sayyid Akbar, and by the last week of the month the entire Pass was in Afridi hands. Some units of the Khyber Militia which garrisoned the Pass deserted, but others held out until overwhelmed, despite withdrawal of their British officers at an early stage. (The latter action did little to increase tribal respect for British standards of behavior.) In early September, Afridi and Orakzai *lashkars* totaling more than 15,000 roamed at will along the fringes of the hills and threatened the town of Hangu. By the middle of the month, reinforced British columns began to push out from Peshawar and Kohat, and the *lashkars* pulled back into the valleys of the Tirah.

This ended the active phase of the rising, but the pacification and punishment which the British felt compelled to mete out took more than three years and employed a total of more than 75,000 troops. Expeditions were undertaken against the Mohmands, the Orakzai, the Afridis, the Wazirs, and into Swat. The invasion of the Tirah alone in 1898 employed more than 40,000 men. The Malakand Field Force of 10,000 men (now remembered chiefly for one of its least important members, a young subaltern named Winston Churchill) penetrated into Swat and Buner in the face of heavy resistance.

Huge fines were levied, large numbers of rifles confiscated, pickets built along the lines of march, and agreements to keep the peace extracted from such *jirgas* as could be coerced into assembling. The result of it all was a return to the *status quo*.

Strangely, the Mahsuds, usually ready to fight at the slightest provocation, played little part in the 1897 rising. However, under the leadership of the Powindah Mullah they remained hostile and aggressive during the next three years, and were finally assessed a fine of Rs. 100,000 for accumulated wrong-doing. When they refused to pay this, a blockade

was imposed in December, 1900. The Mahsud reply was a series of attacks on police and militia posts in Tribal Territory and a number of raids deep into Bannu District. The retaliatory British marches into the Mahsud country involved more than 12,000 men, but did little to subdue the turbulent tribesmen, although a measure of peace was re-established for a few years.

Curzon's withdrawal of forces behind the administrative border, which was completed by 1902, reduced tension considerably, and an unusually long period of relative quiet followed. Just why the Frontier exploded in the first place, however, is deserving of thought.

MOTIVATION OF THE 1897 RISING

Contemporary British opinion was divided on the causes of the 1897 rising. Some officials were convinced that the outbreaks all over the Frontier had been coordinated and planned as a major effort to drive the British from the area. Others believed that the incidents were spontaneous and unconnected. Some ascribed them to a spirit of religious fanaticism. The more far-sighted saw them as a reaction to the British forward movement into Tribal Territory in the 1890's.

While information is fragmentary, there is no evidence of any kind of joint planning among the tribes involved in the attacks. Indeed, none of the tribes had any organization, nor even any individual leaders, capable of conducting negotiations. Most of the British officials concerned eventually concluded that the risings were separate, spontaneous, and coincidental.² Certainly, the failure of the Mahsuds to rise until after all the other tribes had withdrawn or been driven back argues for the absence of a coordinated plan. The times and places of the attacks on the British appear to have been dictated largely by the disposition of British forces and establishments at the times when the various tribes chose to take the field. The call to battle was not given by one leader but by dozens of local figures each acting on his own, although some of these, mostly *mullahs*, were in communication with each other and with reverend colleagues in India, and possibly in Turkey.³

Religious fanaticism certainly played an important role in the risings. The Mullah Mastun in Swat was believed to have miraculous powers given to him by Allah. The proximity of the first outbreak of the Mahsuds

² *Parliamentary Papers, 1898, LXIII, N-WF, Cmd. 8713, 93 ff.*

³ *Ibid.*

to the celebration of Moharram, always an occasion for heightened religious emotion, was probably not entirely coincidental.

However, as Davies concludes after a careful and detailed examination of the 1897 rising, the Forward Policy was probably the main cause. He writes:

To the border Pathan there appeared the vision of a great mailed fist, the fingers of which, in the 'nineties, seemed to be closing around him. Isolated forts garrisoned by British troops commanded the trade routes running through his territory, or frowned down upon his native hamlet or terraced fields. Dazzling white roads wound their way like serpents towards his fortresses in the mountains. In the wake of demarcation commissions had sprung up long lines of white boundary pillars, enclosing his country and threatening that independence which was his proudest boast.⁴

From Swat to Waziristan, the Pathans' reaction to this was instinctive rather than deliberate violence.

THE ZAKKA KHEL

The British expedition against the Zakka Khel Afridis in 1908 is rather a footnote to the troubles of the end of the century. Like everything else on the Frontier in the first decade of the twentieth century, it was connected with the great upheaval of 1897. At the same time, however, it had a personal note peculiar to this most notorious Afridi clan.

The Zakka Khels were congenital robbers and proud of it. They stole from the Afghans, from the British, from passersby of any nationality, from other Afridi *khels* and from each other. Most of all, they liked to steal from the rich Hindus of the plains. They also sheltered and assisted bands of thieves from Afghanistan and from other parts of the Frontier. In the uneasy peace which followed the events of 1897, the Zakka Khel country in the upper reaches of the Khyber became a thriving den of thieves.

In September, 1904, a Zakka Khel gang robbed and murdered a wealthy Hindu merchant in his home in Kohat District, and killed five and wounded six of the party which attempted to pursue it. More raids reaching to the outskirts of Peshawar followed in rapid succession. The armament of the raiders improved as their wealth grew, and from 1905 to 1908 the Zakka Khel and its cohorts terrorized the border area and Kohat and Peshawar Districts. Rifles from the Persian Gulf were

⁴ Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

smuggled in large numbers through Afghanistan and Baluchistan, and competing groups of Zakka Khel outlaws vied with one another in attacking villages, ambushing police parties, and engaging regular troops. On one occasion, the Zakka Khel even attempted to kidnap an extra assistant commissioner of Peshawar. On January 28, 1908, a Zakka Khel band surrounded the house of Chela Ram, a wealthy Hindu banker, in the city of Peshawar itself, and got away with Rs. 100,000 worth of loot.⁵

Not unnaturally, the Zakka Khel had long been cut off from their allowances, and by 1908 they already owed in fines not only the entire amount of the forfeited allowances but what would have been due them for the next three years as well. As a result, an expedition was finally decided upon. After considerable argument among British officials as to whether the Zakka Khel country should or should not be brought under permanent administration rather than merely suffer an invasion, a column moved out, receiving for what was probably the first time a certain amount of cooperation from the other Afridi *khels*.

After some not very severe fighting, the most notorious of the robber bands fled over the border, the Zakka Khel *maliks* professed repentance, and the other Afridi clans undertook responsibility for the good behavior of the Zakka Khel. Thus ended the most spectacular phase of the Zakka Khel's personal revolt against the British *Raj*.

WAZIRISTAN 1919-20

The trouble which arose in Waziristan in 1919 was less spontaneous than that of 1897. Inspired chiefly by the Third Afghan War and a systematic agitation from Kabul, the 1919 rising came at a time when British pressure on the tribal area was relatively slight. However, it rapidly assumed many of the aspects of a simple fight to throw off British rule and continued long after the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of Rawalpindi of August 8, 1919 had ended the formal war between Afghanistan and British India.

The passage of more than two decades since 1897 had made important differences in the character of the fighting. By 1919 many tribesmen had obtained some military training and fighting experience in the levies, militia, or in the Indian Army.⁶ In 1920, for example, there were an

⁵ *Parliamentary Papers, 1908, LXXIV, N-WF, Cmd. 4201, p. 3.*

⁶ *Government of India, General Staff, Operation in Waziristan, 1919-20 (Calcutta: Central Publications Branche, 1921), p. 5.*

estimated 3,000 ex-servicemen among the Wazirs and Mahsuds alone. There were also an estimated 140,000 modern rifles, plus uncounted match-locks, flint-locks, and country-made weapons, in the Tribal Territory. The Wazirs possessed modern rifles for about 10,000 of their roughly 23,000 fighting men. The Mahsuds, despite their position as the poorest and most isolated of the tribes, were able to arm about 12,000 of their 16,000 warriors with effective weapons. The tribal armament was in some cases superior to that of the police and militia, some of whom were still equipped with old-style Enfield or Snyder rifles.⁷

As has already been noted, Afghan moves against Thal and Wana were followed by large-scale desertions and mutiny among the militia. As in 1897, the British speedily withdrew their own personnel and pulled back such units as remained loyal. These were badly cut up as they came back down the Tochi and Tank Zam and much of their stores and ammunition was lost. On May 26, 1919, 600 Wazir militiamen at Miran-shah revolted and drove back the Dogra units which had been sent in to cow them. The same day the Wazir and Afridi militia quartered at Wana mutinied and captured 600,000 rounds of ammunition.

By early June all of the Tochi and the Tank Zam down to Jandola had been swept clean of British control. After peace was made with the Afghans and the situation stabilized somewhat, the British sent out terms for submission to the tribes in Waziristan. (The rising in the north had collapsed in an early stage). The Tochi Wazirs accepted the terms, and control was re-established fairly quickly over their valley. The Wana Wazirs and the Mahsuds refused to make peace, and early in the winter of 1919 a large column moved out into South Waziristan. Its target was Kaniguram, the isolated capital of the Mahsuds.

In the course of several months of severe fighting, the expedition reached and sacked Kaniguram and the surrounding villages. The high cost of the punitive column is illustrated by the casualties which occurred in a clash on February 19-20, 1920, near Makin. The British lost sixty killed and ninety-one wounded. The Mahsuds loss was twenty-two killed and forty-eight wounded.⁸ After several weeks more of "burn and scuttle" operations, the column left the Mahsuds' country in May, 1920. The Mahsuds never formally came to terms, and the rifles and reparations which had been demanded from them were never received. Sporadic resistance continued into 1921, sparked by Haji Abd-ur-Razaq and

⁷ *Moral and Material Progress of India, 1928-29*, p. 267.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 135-36.

Mullah Bashir, who came down from Sayyid Ahmad's colony to urge on the Mahsuds.⁹

Fighting throughout the campaign was very severe, and the Mahsud *lashkars*, which at times numbered as many as 4,000 men, proved themselves a match for the British forces in the field. According to an official report, the Mahsuds "fought in a way they had never fought before, their attacks being well-organized, and their combination of fire and shock tactics being excellent".¹⁰

The total cost to British India of the 1919-20 campaign against the Mahsuds was estimated at more than £ 1,000,000 — several times greater than the cost of the actual war with Afghanistan. More than 80,000 troops (including almost 40,000 "non-combatants") were employed. More than 5,000 men were laid low by cholera and other diseases. Almost 500 were killed and nearly 2,000 wounded in the course of the "punitive" expedition.¹¹

That the 1919-20 campaign was a fiasco was as clear to the British as to the tribesmen. When the column had first been mounted, the permanent occupation of Kaniguram was proposed on the basis that the irresponsible and anarchical Mahsuds had no leaders or groups which could be counted upon to see that peace was preserved even if it was agreed to. With this end in mind the British had at first planned not to destroy the villages and crops, since these would be required to support the occupation forces. The old Curzon policy, which regarded as anathema any permanent establishment beyond the administrative border, still held, however, and the idea was abandoned in favor of "burn and scuttle" tactics. The ignominious results of these caused another reversal and led to the emergence of the Razmak Policy already discussed in Chapter VII.

The 1930-31 disturbances have already been described in some detail in Chapter VIII. They were, of course, an important part of the history of tribal revolt. Their connection with events in other parts of India, however, has given them greater meaning in the context of Frontier relations with India than in that of the Pathan-British struggle for control of the Frontier. In addition, there were some elements of banditry about the Afridi rising. Relatively little fighting took place, and the eventual settlement was more political than military.

⁹ *Moral and Material Progress of India, 1921*, p. 8.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1920, p. 7.

¹¹ C. E. Bruce, *Waziristan 1936-37* (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1938), p. 27; pp. 172-73.

WAZIRISTAN 1936-38

The next major test of strength between the Pathans and the British was in 1936. Again the scene was Waziristan. The main actor was Haji Mirza Ali Khan, the Fakir of Ipi, a Tori Khel *mullah* of the Utmanzai Wazirs who until his death in 1960 remained the Frontier's most notorious hostile.

The Waziristan tribesmen were restive in the mid-Thirties for a number of reasons. The limitations which the strong garrisons at Wana and Razmak placed on their activities had been demonstrated in 1931. There was considerable bickering within and among the various clans. The Tori Khel Wazirs, for example, were dissatisfied with the internal distribution of their tribal allowance. The influence of the older *maliks*, who had made their name in the 1919-20 fighting and many of whom now held lucrative supply contracts from the British garrisons, was diminishing. The young men were eager for another fight in which they could prove themselves and were willing listeners to fire-eating *mullahs* such as Ipi.

Politics in India was having more and more influence on the Frontier. The Islam Bibi and Shahidganj Mosque cases had inflamed religious fanaticism. In 1936, the Fakir of Ipi, of whom relatively little had hitherto been heard, raised a *lashkar* of Daurs among whom he lived in the Tochi Valley and threatened Bannu, demanding the return of Islam Bibi to her husband. The Tori Khel *maliks* professed inability to control Ipi unless the British demonstrated strong support for them against the hot-headed elements of the tribe.

The British did so by reviving an earlier plan to build a road up the narrow side valley of the Tochi into which Ipi and his followers had retreated. On November 25, 1936, two brigades moved into the valley from opposite directions to clear the country in preparation for the road work. Both columns came under heavy fire almost at once and in two days' fighting nineteen were killed and more than 100 wounded. A new expedition in greater strength was mounted and pushed its way up the valley with little resistance. While a kind of agreement was reached with the local *maliks*, Ipi fled to the Mahsud country where he settled down at Aarsal Kot in the Shaktu Valley.

The Fakir's fame had now spread throughout India. From his new headquarters, he organized a number of small bands of both Tori Khel and Mahsud young men, and set them to harassing British personnel and installations over a wide area. On February 6, 1937, a British captain of

the South Waziristan Scouts was murdered by the Mahsuds. The following day a British assistant political officer was killed in the Tochi while on his way to pay the *khassadars*.

These events were followed by a series of raids into the settled districts in which Hindus suffered heavily — thirty-one being kidnaped, ten killed and sixty having their houses sacked and burned. On April 9 a large convoy coming down from Wana was ambushed in the Shahur Tangi by a *lashkar* under Khonia Khan, a Jelal Khel Mahsud, and several British officers were killed.

In retaliation, a large British expedition set out on April 23 to punish the hostiles and those who harbored them and to bring Ipi back. During a two-month campaign, 32,000 regular troops, plus 5,000 scouts were employed. After severe fighting resulting in more than 600 army casualties, Aarsal Kot was taken. Ipi fled further south to a refuge among the Bhattanis where he gathered new forces. The total cost of the British expeditions was £ 1,200,000 to £ 1,500,000.¹²

By the end of the summer a kind of peace was patched up with elements of the Mahsuds, Tori Khel, and Bhattanis. It did not last very long. One of Ipi's principal lieutenants, the Mahsud Mullah Sher Ali, recruited a small *lashkar*, mostly professional outlaws and desperadoes, and attacked British communication lines throughout the fall and winter of 1937. At one point, about 10,000 troops were required merely to keep communications open.

The ubiquitous and talented Fakir managed to elude the British despite bombing raids directed against his various hide-outs and substantial rewards offered for his delivery, dead or alive. In the spring of 1938 a detachment of South Waziristan Scouts was almost wiped out and their English captain killed by Sher Ali's men at Splitoi. A short time later, Datta Khel Post in the Tochi was besieged. In the fighting Ipi's men employed a few artillery pieces of unknown origin. On July 23 a 400-man *lashkar* under one of Ipi's lieutenants, Khalifa Mehr Dil, a Khattak outlaw, attacked Bannu City, killed thirteen and wounded twenty Hindus, and made off with Rs. 100,000 worth of loot.

By this time Ipi had retired to a series of caves in a cliff at Gorwekht, west of Razmak, almost astride the Afghan border.¹³ Two brigades which

¹² Bruce, *op. cit.*, p. 27; Barton, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

¹³ He was visited there in the summer of 1954 by a Western journalist. See Christopher Rand, "Our Far-Flung Correspondents; From the Sweet to the Bitter", *The New Yorker*, February 19, 1955, pp. 100-115. Many of his former lieutenants have deserted him to make their peace with Pakistan, including Khalifa Mehr Dil, who surrendered in 1954.

attempted to reach the place were unsuccessful, less because of the resistance offered than because of the extremely rough terrain they encountered. Subsequent air attacks on Gorwekht accomplished little, and Ipi lived out his life at his border headquarters. The pattern of resistance which he set continued for the remainder of British rule in India.

THE PROBLEM OF LAW AND ORDER

Pathan revolt against British rule was not limited to periodic mass uprisings. Perhaps even more of a thorn in the British side was the day-to-day defiance of law and order in the settled districts as well as in the tribal area.

The task of keeping the peace was made especially difficult for the British by the formidable armament of the Pathans, which increased spectacularly in the twentieth century. In 1905 it was estimated that there were 29,000 breech-loading rifles in the tribal area.¹⁴ By 1920, the number had risen to 100,000. Ten years later the estimate was 220,000.¹⁵ Today it is several times that figure. In the districts efforts had long been made to control the number of arms by licensing, but the regulations were honored more in the breach than in the observance, and at least an additional 50,000 rifles were probably in private hands in the five districts in the late Thirties. None of these figures, incidentally, include the numerous pistols, revolvers, and not inconsiderable supply of automatic weapons which have strayed into tribal hands. Finally, of course, there is at least one dagger per Pathan.

The most important and difficult task of the N-WFP security authorities has always been one which is still described in Victorian English as "watch and ward". Raiding from the hills into the settled districts continued throughout the period of British rule. While the number of raids dropped off somewhat in the later years, their size and intensity increased proportionately.¹⁶

These raids usually had one or a combination of three motives. The most popular was simply loot. The usual target in this case was a prosperous Hindu merchant or village or a British supply depot or convoy from which rifles could be obtained. Probably next on the list of motivations was revenge of a general or specific nature against an enemy or

¹⁴ *N-WF Enquiry Report*, p. 15.

¹⁵ *Moral and Material Progress of India, 1929-29*, p. 26; *India, 1930-31*, p. 12.

¹⁶ *N-WF Enquiry Report*, p. 15.

*Raids by Trans-Frontier Elements on British India 1920-1938**

1920-21	391	1926-27	19	1932-33	17
1921-22	194	1927-28	18	1933-34	8
1922-23	131	1928-29	10	1934-35	21
1923-24	69	1929-30	4	1935-36	38
1924-25	39	1930-31	17	1936-37	37
1925-26	30	1931-32	21	1937-38	74
* Compiled from <i>Border Administration Reports</i> , 1920-38.					

the supporter of an enemy in settled territory. Finally, no small number of the raids appears to have been undertaken in pure defiance of British rule.

The raids took a heavy toll. For example, in Dera Ismail Khan District alone in 1919, the casualties were as follows: Muslims: 107 kidnaped, 54 killed, 51 wounded, Rs. 332,315 worth of property lost; Hindus: 18 kidnaped, 8 killed, 10 wounded, Rs. 738, 426 worth of property lost.¹⁷ In addition more than thirty attacks were made on army personnel or establishments for the purpose of rifle-stealing.

In the same year, the whole N-WFP (excluding Hazara) suffered a total of 611 raids, resulting in 298 killed, 463 kidnaped, 392 wounded, and Rs. 3,000,000 worth of property lost. The security forces were able to repel only 41 of the raids, and total tribal casualties amounted to 119 killed, 80 wounded, and 40 captured.¹⁸

The problem of meeting the threat to law and order from within the districts was also great. In 1910, for example, there were 474 murders in the Province. The motives of these, incidentally, are interesting. One hundred and forty-nine of them involved relations between the sexes; 96, robbery; 58, blood feuds; 36, disputes over land; and the remaining 135 stemmed from "miscellaneous" causes. By 1938, the number of murders annually had risen to 702, and crime had reached an all-time high with the provincial police handling 11,225 cases in all.¹⁹

The result of all this was a growing number of officially proclaimed hostiles or outlaws. In 1929-30, for example, the deputy commissioners of the districts had the following number of proclaimed offenders on their lists: Hazara, 62; Peshawar, 549; Kohat, 234; Bannu, 85; and Dera Ismail Khan, 18.²⁰ When a man was proclaimed an outlaw, everyone, villagers in the districts and tribesmen in independent territory alike, was

¹⁷ *N-WF Enquiry Report*, p. 15.

¹⁸ *Moral and Material Progress of India, 1920*, pp. 11-12.

¹⁹ *N-WFP Administration Reports, 1919-20*, p. 7; *1938-39*, p. 1.

²⁰ *N-WFP Administration Report, 1929-30*, p. 8.

obliged to kill or capture him, and, if he had had the opportunity and not taken advantage of it, could be punished for failing to do so. Most of the outlaws, of course, fled to Tribal Territory, where they became *hamsayas* of important *maliks*. The latter had a hold on their "guests" as wanted men; the outlaws had a knowledge of and contacts in the districts; increased banditry was the natural outcome.²¹ If pursuit became particularly hot, the outlaws fled across the border to Afghanistan. At the beginning of World War II, no less than 1,000 of these, individually listed and proscribed, were more or less permanent residents of Afghanistan's eastern provinces.

It is ironic that in the last ten years of British rule, security on the Frontier was weaker than at any other time in the century. There were no large-scale outbreaks after the Waziristan disturbances of 1937-38. However, traffic on the Peshawar-Dera Ismail Khan road was permitted for only a few hours in the morning when the road was heavily picketed. The Grand Trunk Road between Peshawar and Nowshera was closed after sunset. People were kidnaped regularly from the roads in the Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan Districts. The Public Works Department road crews had to work on the roads under escort and for only limited hours. All movements of officials in the agencies had to be under heavy escort, and care had to be taken that their routes were not known in advance. In Bannu Cantonment it became necessary for the army to lay out an inner cordon enclosing the houses of the top army officers and the Deputy Commissioner in order both to protect these key officials and to provide a redoubt in the event of attack.

THE BASIS OF REVOLT

It is difficult to speak in general terms about the Pathans' refusal ever to accept the presence and the law of British India on the Frontier. No simple pattern emerges from the risings of 1897, 1919, 1930, and 1936. It is noteworthy, however, that all of these major revolts took place during the second half of the century of British rule. The only really significant clash before 1897 was the Ambela campaign of 1863. This was directed against a specific and unique cause of unrest: the Sayyid

²¹ The story of one such hostile is well told in Anthony J. Bevan, *The Story of Zarak Khan* (London: Jarrolds, 1950), a novel which was later made into a very bad movie.

Ahmad colony. The reason for the absence of a large-scale revolt before the last decade of the nineteenth century appears to lie in the fact that the British had not yet established their position solidly on the Frontier. "The Great Game" with Russia was still on, and the Pathans, while very much aware of it, looked upon themselves as third parties, whose participation in the game could be pretty much on terms and at times of their own choosing.

In the 1890's, the British won the first phase of "The Great Game" and established themselves securely on the Frontier. The Pathans found themselves willy-nilly a part of the British Indian Empire. They didn't like it, and the price they extracted from their masters was high — so high that the British, for the rest of their period of rule, had to depend on force to maintain their authority in the area. Sometimes the strain was relaxed a little — as after the introduction of Curzon's Close Border policy. Sometimes it was intensified — as in the Razmak Policy and after the spread of Indian political agitation to the Frontier. It never ceased to exist, however, and to the end made impossible the amalgamation of the Frontier into India.

In harshly realistic terms, this state of affairs was not detrimental to Imperial Britain's interests. The frontiers of India remained secure. The enormous civil and military establishment of British India was able to absorb the levy which Pathan unrest laid upon it.

The sensitive subject of Pathan nationalism is touched on in more detail elsewhere (Chapters IV and XII). Certainly it has always had a substantial cultural basis, but until the 1930's it had no political overtones and was not a prime factor in resistance to British rule. Even in 1947, when the British departed and the "Pukhtunistan" question became a live issue, nationalism appears to have remained at a low ebb. At any rate, it appears never to have been the basis of the resistance to the British.

From the beginning, the more sensitive British administrators were acutely conscious of the peculiar problem of the Frontier. However sympathetic they were personally to the aspirations of the Pathans, security was the overwhelming objective, and any conflict between it and the desirability of political progress had to be resolved in favor of security. Fraser-Tytler believes that if the British had stayed, they would in the end have solved the problem through cooperation with Afghanistan, and eventually the "steady pressure of civilization operating from both sides of the border" would have "so altered the economic condition and mental outlook of the frontier tribes that they would have discarded their weap-

ons, their blood feuds and their tribal customs for a more settled and peaceful way of life".²²

Barton, writing almost ten years before the British departure, was less optimistic. He concludes: "Complete pacification of the tribal hinterland, though it may seem the only logical course for a great empire to follow, must be ruled out as beyond the sphere of practical politics".²³ Barton goes on to ascribe the apparently unbridgeable gap which had grown up between the bulk of the Pathans and the British due in large part to the insular, alien, and self-centered atmosphere which was conscientiously preserved in the cantonments and secretariats and the failure of the British to win either the friendship or respect of the tribesmen.

To the independent observer, Barton appears to have been closer to the mark on this point than Fraser-Tytler. Most tribal leaders are still acutely conscious of the difference between the treatment they received from the British (and, more recently, occasionally from the Pakistanis) and that which was accorded them by the Afghans, including members of the royal house in Kabul. They had little desire to accommodate their Central Asian habits and outlook to those of the Punjabis, Sindhis, Bengalis, and other races of India.

Religion, although they understand its finer points hardly at all, plays an important role in their lives, and while many of the *mullahs* to whom they gave their allegiance were ignorant, bigoted men whose habits differed little from those of the ordinary brigand, other *mullahs* dismissed by the British as common scoundrels were men of considerable learning and culture in their own society. The Haji of Turangzai, for example, was a Pushtu poet of note who established a number of schools in which Islamic learning and Pathan history and culture — as well as political "sedition" — were taught.

Harassed by the perennial misbehavior of the Pathans, the British authorities responsible for law and order cannot be blamed too much for the readiness with which they proclaimed offenders outlaws and directed against them all the power of government. At the same time, this procedure filled the hills with men who had little choice but to live as best they could outside of the law and who carried a life-long hatred of all things British in their hearts.

The policy of "peaceful penetration" which was revived in the 1920's brought little in the way of economic or social improvement to the tribesmen. Subsidies, which could readily be withheld, and blockade, which

²² Fraser-Tytler, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

²³ Barton, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

could easily be imposed, were no substitute for even the minimal measures to improve pastoral and agricultural methods which would have made it possible for the hillmen to support themselves a little better. No serious attempt was made to educate the tribesmen, and even in 1946-47, the last year of British rule in India, the budget for education in the tribal area was only Rs. 17,000.

The Frontier today, especially the tribal area, is probably as potentially dangerous a site of revolt as ever. Yet the active hostility which dominated it during the British days has almost entirely disappeared. The rate of crime within the districts is still extraordinarily high, but since the advent of Pakistan there have been at most only three or four incidents a year which could be classed as raids from Tribal Territory. The tribesmen in the hills are no more amenable to control, but the psychological barrier that existed between them and the government has been removed. In the Kashmir *jihad*, which occurred almost immediately after Partition, the tribesmen for the first time found themselves in close and friendly contact with officials of the government. The mutual confidence and good will developed in those days have persisted to a considerable degree. As a result, many "hostiles" of decades' standing have come in and made their peace.

This is not to say all problems have disappeared. The British were able regularly to go in and out from Razmak — even if only on "Road Open Days". Pakistani officials go there rarely and then only at the invitation of the Wazirs and Mahsuds who live in and around the abandoned cantonment. The Pakistanis have been no more successful than the British in getting at Ipi's stronghold. More than one disgruntled *malik* has joined the "Pukhtunistan" movement or departed for Kabul in retaliation for an insult — real or fancied — from a Pakistani official.

The tribesmen realize that the removal of all regular Pakistani troops from the tribal area in 1947 was carried out from a position of weakness and not from one of strength as had been the case in Curzon's day. (The soldiers were desperately needed on the Indian border and in Kashmir.) The hillmen have suffered economically from the loss of the road-making and food-supply contracts which they had in British days. Most importantly, however, the tribesmen have failed to act on what the British always assumed was the cardinal point of tribal action: *i.e.*, attack on weakness. Thus, paradoxically, the last ten years, during which the administering power on the Frontier has been the weakest in this century, have been the most peaceful in a hundred and fifty years.

Insofar as it is possible to generalize, it appears that the Pathans

during their long revolt were fighting primarily for the right to be free. This aspiration was undoubtedly less than noble in many of its manifestations. It involved the right to do things that cannot continue to be done if any society is to survive indefinitely in modern times. The Pathan objective is a highly individualistic and selfish one, having little connection with such sophisticated concepts as the self-determination of peoples or the equality of man.

Whatever its moral value and prospects for the future, however, the Pathans' kind of freedom simply could not be made to fit into the rigid bureaucratic mold of British India or into the strategic policies of imperial Britain. The result, in the words of Kipling's Afridi outlaw, was:

'Tis war, red war, I'll give you then,
War till my sinews fail,
For the wrong you have done to a chief of men
And a thief of the Zukka Kheyl.

X

PARTITION

INTRODUCTION

All of the problems which beset British India as independence and partition approached manifested themselves on the Frontier in the vital years of 1947 and 1948. The Frontier was touched by the bloody communal violence that rocked the Punjab and Bengal. It had in miniature the problem of the states, which technically became free agents with the lapse of British paramountcy, as well as the special problem of the Tribal Territory. The Congress-Muslim League battle, which was being fought out all over India, was waged more intensely in the N-WFP than in any other province. Vigorous Afghan protests over Pakistan's inheritance of the entire Pushtu-speaking area of British India added an international note.¹

Events of the partition period can be divided into three sections: (1) the political and communal strife which engulfed the people of the Frontier, (2) the process by which the N-WFP, the states, and Tribal Territory became part of Pakistan, and (3) that extraordinary manifestation of the Pathan character, the Kashmir *jihad*. The first two are twin themes in the accelerated tempo of life in the last days of British dominion and the first days of independence. They can be treated as complementary parts of a chronology of little more than a year. The last is unique and must be discussed separately.

THE MONTHS OF DECISION

In the general elections of January, 1946, the N-WFP returned the

¹ Afghanistan's traditional interest in the Frontier and Afghan moves during the partition period will be discussed in detail in Chapter XII.

Congress Party government of Dr. Khan Sahib to power with thirty out of fifty seats in the Legislative Assembly. The new ministry was dominated by Khan Sahib's brother, Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan, whose popular appeal the Muslim League had been unable to overcome despite its electoral victories in almost all the other Muslim majority areas of India.

Growing Hindu-Muslim antagonism was already the main fact of life all over India. In the political sphere, the lines were sharply drawn between the Hindu-dominated Congress Party and the Muslim League. No circumstances could have been less propitious for the success of so curious an anomaly as a Congress Party government made up almost entirely of militant Pathans attempting to maintain a common front with Gandhi and Nehru in a fanatically Muslim area.

The problems which the Congress ministry in the N-WFP were to face during the year ahead were amply demonstrated in October, 1946, when Jawaharlal Nehru made a trip to the Frontier, hoping to add strength to Khan Sahib's government and to convince the Pathans of the wisdom of loyalty to the Congress. Nehru was under physical attack almost from the moment of his arrival in Peshawar. Having been slightly injured when he attempted to make a speech in the city, he was flown in a Royal Indian Air Force plane to Razmak where the political agent had managed to collect a *jiirga* of respectable *maliks* to hear the Congress leader. The plane came under fire as soon as it landed, and, despite all the British officials could do, Nehru barely escaped another roughing up at the hands of the *jiirga*.

The political battle was joined in early 1947 when the Government of India felt compelled to take hostages and rifles and levy a Rs. 75,000 fine on the tribes of the Hazara District for provoking communal violence. The Muslim League quickly passed a resolution censoring the Government's action. The Congress group in the Frontier did nothing.

On February 20, the Muslim League leader in the Frontier Legislative Assembly, Abd-ul-Qaiyum Khan, was arrested in Mardan, where the League had just won a bye-election. In retaliation, the League turned to a favorite weapon of its opponents and launched a civil disobedience campaign against the Congress Government. The ostensible purpose was the release of Qaiyum and other jailed League leaders.

Congress' attempts to remonstrate with the League were answered with demands for invocation of Governor's Rule in the Province, and it soon became apparent that the real aim was overthrow of the Khan Sahib government. On March 10, serious communal rioting broke out in Peshawar where 40,000 Hindus trembled in the midst of 160,000

Muslims. Communications were cut, and the city was isolated from the rest of India. Troops fired on demonstrating crowds in the old city; hundreds of League workers were arrested and a dusk-to-dawn curfew imposed. Simultaneously, bands of tribesmen appeared in the Punjab and attacked Murree, Taxila, and Rawalpindi.

Muslim League head Muhammad Ali Jinnah, always quick to oppose communal violence, sent an urgent request to the Frontier League to refrain from provocative action. The local League leader who had organized the demonstrations, a remarkable young man known as the Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif, ordered his followers to limit themselves to peaceful resistance. The Pir Sahib, unflatteringly referred to by harassed British officials as "the Manki Mullah", had a religious following of more than 200,000.

The communal element remained, however, despite Mr. Jinnah's intercession, and eager tribesmen from the hills continued to pour into the Punjab to sack Hindu villages and shops. Their action drew official protest from the Punjab authorities who charged the N-WFP government with failure to exercise sufficient control over the bridges at Attock and Khushalgarh. In the settled districts of the Frontier, the khans were ordered to assume responsibility for the safety of Hindus and Sikhs in their villages.

When the passive resistance campaign continued to paralyze the area, large numbers of Khudai Khitmatgars, followers of Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan, began to assemble outside Peshawar. On March 18, 4,000 of them marched into the city to "quiet" communal fears and began an unsuccessful attempt to get shopkeepers to reopen for business. As the Khudai Khitmatgars paraded the streets in their red uniforms, groups of Khaksars, a militant Muslim organization, also appeared in khaki uniforms and Arab headdress.

Troops were called out, and the Legislative Assembly met behind barbed wire and bayonets. By this time, 150 persons had already been killed in two weeks and 2,500 Muslim Leaguers arrested. With one or two exceptions, all of the seventeen Muslim League members of the Assembly were in jail. The Pir of Manki Sharif was arrested on March 28 at the Muslim League Office in Peshawar. The same day Qaiyum and twenty other League leaders were transferred from Peshawar jail to Dera Ismail Khan Central Prison in the hope of preventing a popular attack on the jail building.

The Congress ministry managed to survive the challenge, but it was apparent that the government which had won a heavy popular majority

only a year before was now a small isolated island in an intensely hostile sea.

Lord Louis Mountbatten, the new Viceroy, met with Sir Olaf Caroe, Governor of the N-WFP, Chief Minister Khan Sahib, and Jawaharlal Nehru on April 18 in New Delhi to consider the situation. No representative of the Muslim League was present, but the recently demonstrated power of the League on the Frontier must have hung heavily over the conference. While the leaders talked, new rioting broke out at Tank, key administrative post on the border of Waziristan. New tribal movements were being reported daily, and in London the staid *Times* announced that the Frontier was once again on the verge of going up in flames.²

The conference decided that as a step toward ending the disturbances all political prisoners in the N-WFP would be released. On April 24, Mr. Jinnah announced that he had been informed of this decision by Lord Mountbatten and that he was convinced that the Viceroy would play fair with the Muslim League. Accordingly, he added his voice to those calling for peace on the Frontier. On April 27, Khan Sahib, back in Peshawar, ordered that all prisoners not convicted of acts of violence be released. Some 4,000-5,000 Muslim Leaguers emerged from jail, but many of the organization's key leaders remained confined.

Meanwhile, Mountbatten had decided to come to the Frontier himself to see what was going on. He arrived in Peshawar on April 28. He went almost immediately to address a crowd of angry Muslim Leaguers gathered outside the city and threatening to enter for a clash with the Khudai Khitmatgars inside. The novelty of the viceregal presence averted violence that day, but on the next bombing and firing began within the city. At this date, the British Government was still officially denying the possibility of partition of the subcontinent, but the same day both Jawaharlal Nehru and Rajendra Prasad, in the opening of the third session of the Constituent Assembly in Delhi, admitted the likelihood of a divided India after withdrawal of the British *Raj*.

Early in May the *Times* still deemed the Frontier the "most dangerous spot in India".³ In the face of increasing violence, the Khudai Khitmat-

² *Times* (London), 19 April 1947. The chronology of events described in this chapter has been reconstructed from a number of newspapers, including *Times* (London), *New York Times*, *Statesman* (New Delhi and Calcutta), and *Dawn* (New Delhi and Karachi), and from personal interviews in Peshawar. Specific newspaper references are given only in the case of direct quotes or similar material.

³ *Times* (London), 7 May 1947.

gars, pledged to Gandhian non-violence, found themselves at a distinct disadvantage in the midst of a community of incensed Pathan warriors. Abd-ul-Ghani Khan, son of Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan, founded the Young Pathans, dedicated to violent defense and retaliation. Members of this group, armed with rifles and pistols, began to appear at public meetings in open challenge to the Muslim League.

In a final attempt to end the League agitation, the Congress Government released five key League leaders from jail for the purpose of consulting with Mr. Jinnah at Delhi and arriving at a peaceful solution. Samin Jan Khan, Abd-ul-Qaiyum Khan, the Pir of Manki Sharif, Mian Abdullah Shah, and Arbab Nur Muhammed made the journey to the capital in the first week in May. While they were talking to Mr. Jinnah, former Muslim League Chief Minister of the N-WFP Sardar Aurangzeb Khan was arrested in Peshawar.

This was too much for Jinnah, and in a statement on May 7 he announced that he could not advise the Frontier League to call off its civil disobedience campaign. He insisted that the root cause of the trouble was Congress control of the N-WFP in defiance of the wishes of a majority of the inhabitants. He condemned use of the Frontier Crimes Regulations against League workers. He admitted that the League had been attempting to force imposition of Section 92A (Governor's Rule) on the Province, but stated he now pinned his hopes on new arrangements to be announced shortly in London.

The need for some kind of a prompt decision on the part of the British Government was becoming increasingly apparent. The extent to which British administration was breaking down was illustrated on May 7 when Sir Evan Jenkins fruitlessly imposed an enormous collective fine on Muslims of the Rawalpindi District of the Punjab for communal disturbances of the preceding two months. (The mischief was done mainly by Pathans from across the Indus, and the fine was never collected.)

Prime Minister Attlee announced the plan for the independence of India in the House of Commons on June 3. Partition was implicit in it. The announcement pointed out that two of the three N-WFP representatives to the Central Constituent Assembly were currently participating in its work, but that if all or a part of the Punjab opted for representation in a new assembly (*i.e.*, for partition), the N-WFP, which would then be isolated geographically, must have an opportunity to reconsider its position.

This was to be done by means of a referendum to be administered by the Viceroy in consultation with the provincial government. All electors

to the N-WFP Legislative Assembly would be eligible to take part in the referendum. This was the "new arrangement" which Mr. Jinnah had been anticipating from London. It sounded the death knell of the Congress Party on the Frontier and made the N-WFP's becoming part of Pakistan a certainty. The League called off its 105-day-old civil disobedience campaign as soon as the referendum was announced and began a full-scale campaign for Pakistan.

Brigadier J. R. Booth, Commander of the Wana Brigade, was appointed referendum commissioner. The entire process was supervised exclusively by British Army officers without assistance from the political service or Indian officials. For some time, Sir Olaf Caroe, Governor of the N-WFP, had, for no apparent reason, been suspected by the Khudai Khitmatgars and the Congress of favoring the Muslim League. To avoid any charge of bias, Sir Olaf went on leave at his own request on June 18. He was replaced by Sir Rob Lockhart, until then chief of the Southern Command of the Indian Army.

The Congress leaders soon realized that they had been outmaneuvered by Mr. Jinnah. The choice to be offered the overwhelmingly Muslim inhabitants of the N-WFP was participation in the existing Congress-dominated Assembly in Delhi (*i.e.*, of becoming part of Hindu-dominated India) or sending representatives to a new assembly to be made up of members from other provinces who had chosen to stay outside the Delhi Assembly (*i.e.*, opting to join Muslim Pakistan). Pakistan, it had been apparent for some time, was to be the creation of Mr. Jinnah and his Muslim League, and there would be little room in it for Muslim splinters such as the Khudai Khitmatgars.

Faced with this dilemma, there was only one course open to the Khudai Khitmatgars; and as the last chance of maintaining some political power, they took it. Although never communal, the Khudai Khitmatgars had always been almost exclusively a provincial organization. It was a Pathan party first, a Congress faction second. If, then, the Frontier was to be separated from India and the rule of the Congress Party, the Khudai Khitmatgars could survive only if some kind of a "Pathanistan", within or without Pakistan, could be established with which they could be primarily identified. This idea of Pathan autonomy was not entirely new. It had been given a certain amount of discussion in previous months. It had an inherent attraction for the tribesmen, who were little interested in either Congress or League politics. It could expect support from Afghanistan. The terms of the referendum, of course, ignored it.

The Khudai Khitmatgars fought the referendum from the day of its

announcement. At a meeting in the Viceroy's house in Delhi on June 18, at which both Gandhi and Jinnah were present, Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan formally put forward his "Pathanistan" alternative. The Congress, however, was already worrying about the problem concerning the Indian princely states it would soon have to face. Gandhi, Nehru, and Patel feared further balkanization of the subcontinent more than they feared Pakistan. Gandhi, therefore joined Jinnah in approving the terms of the June 3rd plan as offered by the British.

Nonetheless, on June 22 a Congress Party meeting in Bannu agreed on a demand for a separate Pathan state "which will have a Pathan constitution and be framed on the basis of Islamic conceptions of democracy, equality, and social justice".⁴ The same day Jawaharlal Nehru, addressing Pushtu-speaking Sikh and Hindu refugees from the Punjab and the N-WFP at Hardwar in the United Provinces, gave public support to the idea.

On June 23, in an atmosphere of high tension, the Punjab Legislative Assembly voted to send representation to a new assembly — in effect a vote for the partition of India and of the province between the two new dominions. The Viceroy immediately announced procedures for holding the promised referendum in the N-WFP. Simultaneously, Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan committed himself in Delhi to the support of an independent Pathan state. He denounced the British Government for refusing to include such a choice in the referendum, charging: "They are bent upon thrusting Pakistan upon the N-WFP against the will of the Pathans, so as to establish military bases and landing grounds for themselves against Russia".⁵ On June 23, Ghaffar Khan formally announced that the Khudai Khitmatgars would boycott the Frontier referendum.

Mr. Jinnah then charged that Congress support for "Pathanistan" was "a direct breach of the acceptance by the Congress Party of His Majesty's Government's Plan of June 3rd".⁶ He attacked Gandhi, as well as Ghaffar Khan, for continuing to promote the idea, and promised that the Frontier would be, in an unspecified way, an autonomous unit of Pakistan.

The Frontier referendum began on July 6, simultaneously with a similar voting in the Sylhet District of Assam on the far side of the great subcontinent. It proceeded peacefully, although the Khudai Khitmatgars' boycott apparently kept a considerable number from the

⁴ *New York Times*, June 23, 1947.

⁵ *New York Times*, June 24, 1947.

⁶ *New York Times*, June 29, 1947.

polls. On July 18, in London, the King's assent was given to the Indian Independence Act, formalizing the legal instrument for the transfer of power, and on July 19 the Frontier referendum was completed. The results were made public the next day. They clearly committed the N-WFP to Pakistan but lent themselves to conflicting claims by both sides.

Only 50.99 percent of the eligible electorate of the N-WFP expressed a choice; of these the count was 289,244 for Pakistan, and 2,874 for India. This meant that only 50.49 percent of the total electorate of the Province had expressed a desire for Pakistan. It also meant, of course, that the Muslim League, which stood for Pakistan, had won a better than 99 percent majority of the votes cast. It is difficult to say how many of the 49.01 percent who refrained from expressing a choice did so on the basis of allegiance to the Khudai Khitmatgars. Some certainly did so. The gesture, however futile, was the last powerful expression of the Khudai Khitmatgars.

Tension remained high in the Province, and the Khudai Khitmatgars continued to hint darkly of violence to come, but the express train of independence was rocketing along, and Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan and his Congress associates had missed it as far as most of the population of the Frontier was concerned. On August 3, Sir George Cunningham, who had served previously as Governor of the N-WFP from 1937 to 1946, returned to the Province to supervise the final days.

INDEPENDENCE AND PARTITION

August 15 came to the Frontier in an atmosphere of quiet jubilation. On August 22, Governor General Jinnah of Pakistan dismissed the Khan Sahib ministry after a year and a half in office, and Abd-ul-Qaiyum Khan, the Muslim League assembly leader, became chief minister. For the next six months he ruled almost single-handedly, and managed to keep the Frontier free of the communal horror that swept the Punjab. The administrative system inherited from the British remained essentially unchanged, but Qaiyum infused a new and dynamic element into the N-WFP, which in succeeding years was to turn "the problem province" of British India into the "model province" of Pakistan.

In January of 1948, Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan visited the Frontier and gave the new government his blessing. Sir George Cunningham fell ill, and early in April he was replaced as governor by

Sir Ambrose Dundas, previously Agent to the Governor General for Baluchistan. In the same month, Mr. Jinnah made a tour of the Frontier. During his visit, the waning power of the Khudai Khitmatgars received a final blow when Mian Jafar Shah, formerly a chief lieutenant of Ghaffar Khan, was added to the two-man Muslim League cabinet at the Governor General's suggestion. (The other minister was Muhammad Abbas Khan.) A new budget aimed at making the Province self-sufficient was prepared and approved.

At this point an issue which has bedeviled Pakistan ever since was raised by the aggressive young Pir of Manki Sharif, who had played a major role in winning the province for Pakistan. The Pir Sahib had refused a ministry in the Qaiyum Government after the dismissal of Khan Sahib. Subsequently, he failed in an effort to win election to the central Constituent Assembly. He now demanded that Governor General Jinnah and Chief Minister Qaiyum immediately establish *shariat* rule in the Province in order to achieve the goal of making Pakistan an Islamic state. The demand was rejected, and Manki passed into active opposition, a role he maintained as long as the Qaiyum Government remained in control.

Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan also began to press for an "Islamic government". He continued in bitter opposition to the Muslim League government and began an extensive speaking tour in May of 1948. He hinted that "Pathanistan" was still a possibility. Early in June he was elected president of a new Pakistan People's Party, which was intended to replace the old Khudai Khitmatgars, tainted indelibly by its Congress connection.

Reports that Ghaffar Khan was about to depart on a trip to Europe were ended on June 15 by his arrest at Bahadur Khel, a small village in Kohat District. The next day he was given a summary trial under Section 40 of the Frontier Crimes Regulations by the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat in a mudfloored rest house at Banda Daud Shah on the Kohat-Bannu road. He was sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment. The charge was "sedition against the state".

The N-WFP Government, sensitive about its use of the hated Frontier Crimes Regulations, issued a long communiqué charging that Ghaffar Khan was on his way to Bannu where, "according to reliable information, he was going for collaboration with agents of the Fakir of Ipi, with a view to stirring up trouble on the border".⁷ An international note entered in

⁷ *Statesman*, 16 June 1948.

when Ghaffar Khan was accused of participating in “a definite and clearly laid out plot to create disturbances in the N-WFP to synchronize with the expected and much advertised advance of the Indian Army through Kashmir to the Frontier Province”.⁸ Qazi Ataullah Khan, former revenue minister in the Congress Government, and Amir Mohammad Khan, president of the N-WFP Congress Committee, were also arrested on June 19 in Peshawar in connection with the plot.

Whether or not Ghaffar Khan was guilty of the charges against him remains uncertain. Ipi had already identified himself actively with the Afghan-sponsored “Pukhtunistan” movement, and the Pakistan government appears to have had some reason to believe that coordinated Indian and Afghan attacks were planned on the respective borders in the spring of 1948. Ghaffar Khan remained in jail until the end of 1953. He has since steadfastly denied any connection with Ipi or any desire for the kind of a “Pukhtunistan” hostile to Pakistan toward which Ipi had been directing his efforts. Probably the most significant point about Ghaffar Khan’s arrest, however, was the slight public reaction to it. Scarcely more than a year before, the “Badshah Khan” had been the most powerful and popular man on the Frontier. The ability of the six-month-old government to effect his arrest in June without any significant public outcry was a measure of his great loss of prestige.

On July 8, 1948, the N-WFP Government assumed extra-ordinary powers to outlaw by ordinance all organizations objectionable to peace and security. It was stated expressly that the action was directed not so much against the Khudai Khitmatgars as a group as against the “foreign intrigue” which had been exploiting them. Nonetheless, the Khudai Khitmatgars, after less than twenty years of violent and sometimes spectacularly successful political activity, ceased to exist, and with this, the crisis of Partition on the Frontier ended.

THE TRIBAL AREA

The Indian Independence Act, Clause 7, Paragraph c, provides:

There lapse also any treaties or agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and any powers having authority in the tribal areas, and obligations of His Majesty existing at that date to any such persons or with respect to the tribal areas, and all powers, rights, authority,

⁸ *Times* (London) 17 June 1948. The full text of the communiqué is in *Dawn*, June 16, 1948.

or jurisdiction exercisable at that date by His Majesty in or in relation to the tribal areas by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance, or otherwise.

With this, Dir, Swat, Chitral, and Amb were faced, as were their more important counterparts further east, with the problem of accession. So also were the individual clans and tribes, many of which had no recognized sovereign individual or body to act for them. In Baluchistan, the states of Kalat, Mekran, Las Bela, and Kharan, which connected the Pathan Frontier with the Arabian Sea, also had to decide their future roles.

Though these areas and their peoples were in a very real sense "the farthest parts of India", they were inevitably deeply affected by the events which were taking place all over the subcontinent. While the Muslim League was vying with the Congress for power in Peshawar, the tribes expressed themselves in their traditional way. In the first three months of 1947, the Afridis cut the Khyber Pass three times. A party of Afridi *maliks* did little to lighten the burdens of a harassed Sir Olaf Caroe when they called on him at Government House in Peshawar to announce: "We won't deal with a Congress Party. We won't deal with the Muslim League. We may deal with a government representing both sides. We own the Khyber Pass and will bargain on that basis".⁹

A month later a similar declaration was made to Lord Mountbatten during his visit to the Frontier by Malik Abd-ul-Latif Khan, a Malikdin Khel Afridi. Abd-ul-Latif went a step farther and threatened to negotiate with Afghanistan unless future relations were adjusted to his satisfaction.

Independence Day confirmed legally the freedom which the tribes had always enjoyed in practice. Departure of the British made little difference to the way of life in the border hills. The chaos which developed in the plains, however, had its historic appeal. By the beginning of September, sporadic tribal movements were underway. In Baluchistan, the Legharis began to erupt into the lower Punjab, spreading terror and destruction in their path. A mixed band of Pathans attacked a troop train near Kohat, killed twenty-two and wounded ninety-four of the Bombay Grenadiers who were being evacuated from the Kohat Cantonment. These incidents were isolated, however, and on September 6, a *Times* correspondent on the spot was able to report: "Nor have the Pathan tribesmen as yet given much trouble, mainly because it is the time of year when they descend into the valleys with their herds. The Pathan shooting season does not open until later in the year".¹⁰

⁹ *New York Times*, March 20, 1947.

¹⁰ *Times* (London), September 6, 1947.

When the shooting season did get underway, all Pathan energies were concentrated on the Kashmir *jihad*, and the tribal area quietly and almost imperceptibly became a part of Pakistan. The Karachi Government, sorely pressed from all sides, decided almost at once to abandon all army installations in the tribal belt. Busy in Kashmir, the tribesmen hardly noticed this gesture of confidence in their loyalty. On December 25, 1947, Governor General Jinnah's birthday, it was announced that withdrawal of regular military units had been completed.

Jirgas of all of the most important tribes had already made agreements with Sir George Cunningham to accept Pakistan as their new suzerain on the same terms as had existed with the British. In mid-January, 1948, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan paid a hurried visit to the tribal area to add his prestige to the process of accession. He was present on January 15 at a *jirga* at Landikotal, headquarters of the Khyber Rifles, and made a formal plea to the tribesmen to withdraw from Kashmir. The Afridis greeted him warmly but flatly turned down his request. Abd-ul-Latif Khan and Sherwani Murad Khan declared that Kashmir belonged to the Pathans and that the 60,000 tribesmen who were there would never return until they had won it in battle. Both *maliks* took advantage of the occasion to ask for increased allowances to compensate for crop failures and the costs of their new responsibilities. Liaquat in turn politely rejected these requests. Similar scenes were enacted the next day at Miranshah and Tank where the Prime Minister addressed Wazir and Mahsud *jirgas*.

On April 14, 1948, tired and ill but triumphant, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah arrived to climax the process of accession. He rode through the Khyber and at its end reached across the border to shake the hand of the Afghan sentry on the other side of the Durand Line. Afridis and Shinwaris expended their powder recklessly in greeting and honor. Young Malik Wali Khan, leader of the Kuki Khel Afridis, as a token of friendship and loyalty presented the Quaid-i-Azam with a .303 rifle made in his own factory at Jamrud. (Four years later the same Wali Khan, having deserted to Kabul, was to lead more than a thousand hostile tribesmen in an attack on Pakistan.) The jubilant tribesmen did not allow themselves to be carried away completely, however. As usual, they pointed out that, if they were to be able to serve the new nation properly, they must have larger allowances for food and clothing.

An all-tribal *jirga* was held at Government House in Peshawar on April 17. In the presence of Mr. Jinnah, 200 *maliks* pledged their allegiance to Pakistan, restated their determination to win Kashmir for their new country, and requested that they be placed under the direct admin-

istration of the Central government. The request was met on July 6 when Governor General Jinnah created the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions and personally took over responsibility for the tribal area.

As this was happening in Karachi, a detachment of Tochi Scouts was attacking the Fakir of Ipi in Waziristan in an operation during which Ipi's lieutenant, Said Emir, was killed and thirty-one prisoners taken. Except for this and one other incident in which P.T. Duncan, a British political officer who stayed on to serve Pakistan as Political Agent for South Waziristan, was killed about sixty miles from Tank by a disgruntled Mahsud, the wild Tribal Territory settled down peacefully to the new era.

Subsidies were continued, but by the end of the year it was apparent that abandonment of the military cantonments in the tribal area had not been an unmixed blessing. With the departed troops went the contracts for supplies and roadmaking which had been economically important to the impecunious tribes. The Mahsuds and Wazirs suffered the most, and within a year were requesting that the garrisons be returned. All in all, however, the tribal area was quieter than it had been in many years.

THE STATES

The Frontier states presented little problem to the new dominion of Pakistan. All quickly acceded, Chitral ignoring a vague suzerainty claimed by Kashmir since 1854. In Baluchistan, Kalat, which dominated the southern frontier and had a strong Pathan element, presented a more difficult problem.

On August 12, 1947, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, the ruler of Kalat, reluctantly accepted an agreement with Pakistan, guaranteeing a free flow of communications and commerce to and through the state, providing for subsequent negotiations on defense, foreign affairs, and communications, but recognizing Kalat as a sovereign state with a status different from that of the other states of Pakistan and India. This unsettled situation was allowed to remain for six months while Pakistan tackled more pressing problems.

Meanwhile the Khan of Kalat made it clear that he had ambitions of his own. He began to insist on the return of the strategic Quetta and Bolan areas leased by Kalat State to the British three-quarters of a century earlier. On February 12, 1948, Governor General Jinnah met Mir Ahmed at Sibi for a talk which failed to relieve the growing tension

between Karachi and Kalat. The Quaid-i-Azam did succeed, however, in winning the allegiance of powerful Baluch and Brahui tribal chiefs, who had long been at odds with the Khan.

Information began to circulate that Mir Ahmed was in touch both with India and Afghanistan in an attempt to obtain support for a completely independent Kalat. Karachi was especially worried by a reported offer to Afghanistan of the use of the ports of Gwadar (then under Omani sovereignty) and Pasni. The Khan was reported also to have offered India use of the airfield at Mekran as an intermediate stop on flights to the Persian Gulf.

To counter these developments, Pakistan began to increase its pressure for full and unqualified accession. On March 21, 1948, Kharan, Mekran, and Las Bela, subsidiary states of the Kalat Confederacy, acceded to Pakistan in defiance of Mir Ahmad's orders. Pakistani troops were reinforced in Quetta, and naval units were set to patrolling the Mekran coast. Toward the end of March, Col. A.S.B. Shah, Joint Secretary of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, began in Quetta new negotiations with the foreign minister of Kalat.

In the midst of these discussions, Kalat's prime minister, Muhammad Aslam Khan, was arrested by the Khan on charges of plotting with Pakistan. On March 27, the All India Radio broadcast a story that the Khan had tried to accede to India two months before but had been refused. The report was subsequently declared to be incorrect by Prime Minister Nehru in the Indian Parliament, but it served to resolve the crisis, for on March 28, Mir Ahmed acceded unconditionally to Pakistan.

THE KASHMIR JIHAD

The Pathan invasion of Kashmir in 1947-48 is significant in two respects. One is international and legal. It involves the status of the princely state at the time of independence and partition and its relations with both India and Pakistan since that time. This question has been fought out frequently before the United Nations and picked over in dozens of bilateral conferences between India and Pakistan. It has been reported in detail in several books.

The other facet of the invasion lies in the tribesmen's performance in Kashmir. Little attention has been paid to this, and in it lies a key to the character of the tribes and a demonstration of the limitations and potentialities of their power. Many of the things the tribesmen did in Kash-

mir were less than creditable. There is little doubt, however, that their movement into the state was inspired primarily by the stories which reached them of atrocities committed against the Muslim inhabitants of Kashmir by the Dogras (Kashmir's traditional warriors) of the state army and by the Hindu extremist organization, the Jan Sang. This made their invasion of Kashmir a very real *jihad* in their eyes.

On the night of October 22, 1947, just as the blood bath in the Punjab had begun to abate, a force of about 2,000 Pathans, mostly Afridis, descended on the town of Muzaffarabad, just across the Kashmir border from the Hazara District of the N-WFP. Most of them came in approximately 100 trucks across the Krishen Ganga Bridge, west of Domel. A few, more romantically, floated down the river on logs and rafts. They sacked Muzaffarabad with speed and efficiency and sped on up the main road toward Uri and Srinagar.

Another group moved on Uri by way of Poonch. The disorganized and panic-stricken state troops crumpled before them. The raiders met and scattered a battalion of Dogras on the road between Muzaffarabad and Domel. They seized the power station which supplied electricity to Srinagar, fifty miles further east.

News of the incursion was published in Delhi on October 26, and by a hastily contrived agreement with Lord Mountbatten, the Maharajah of Kashmir, who had hitherto refused to accede to either India or Pakistan, declared his state for India. An interim government under Sheikh Abdullah (who had been released from the Maharajah's jail for the purpose) was formed in Srinagar, and 2,000 Indian Sikh troops were flown into the state immediately.

By October 30, the Pathan *lashkar* was at Pattan, eighteen miles from Srinagar, with advance parties already prowling in the outskirts of the capital. The Kashmir State Army of 15,000 men had almost ceased to exist as a result of desertions and casualties, and the problem of the defense of Srinagar devolved on the Indians. The Sikh battalion reached the Srinagar airstrip barely in time to deny it to the tribesmen. As it turned out, Indian capture of the airstrip was also to deny the invaders victory. For a time, however, the outcome remained in doubt. The raiders had a tight grip on the entrance to the Vale of Kashmir at Baramula. On October 31, they threw a column across the mountains to Gulmarg. The same day they broke up the reorganized remnants of the Dogras near Uri.

The Sikhs kept a firm hold on the airstrip, however, and reinforcements continued to pour in from India. Spitfires belonging to the month-old Royal Indian Air Force began to harass the raiders' lines of com-

munication and support up the valley. On November 4 the tribesmen were driven out of Pattan, as they tried a gallant but belated pincers movement on the airstrip. Some of them got to within five miles of Srinagar before being repulsed. This marked the high point of the advance into Kashmir.

The superior discipline of the Indian regulars and the advantages of air support began to tell more heavily as the fighting went into its third week, and the raiders were gradually pushed back up the valley. By November 8, the threat to Srinagar had ended, and the raiders were driven out of their informal command post at Baramula, where a retired English colonel, his wife, and a nun at the local convent had been killed in the first tribal onslaught.

Even as the first-comers were being driven back, more tribesmen flowed into the state. By the first week of November, more than 10,000 of them were scattered about the valley. They were joined by officers on leave from the Pakistani Army, and, incidentally, by an American army sergeant who rose to the rank of "brigadier" before being ejected from the area a few weeks after his arrival. The raiders captured and made use of mortars and light artillery. Additional heavy weapons reportedly reached them from army supply dumps in Pakistan.

In India all available aircraft had been diverted to flying troops into Kashmir since no practical surface approach existed in the winter. By mid-November more than a brigade had been air-lifted. As fighting slowed in mid-winter, the valley had been pretty well cleared of tribesmen, though in the Jammu area a fierce battle flared up when 5,000-6,000 tribesmen drove Indian troops out of Jhangar. They moved on to attack Nowshera on January 6, 1948 but were beaten back with the aid of heavy air support. Throughout January and February, the city of Jammu, which stood astride the only land route between India and Kashmir, was in imminent danger of capture. On February 21 a group of raiders from Chitral, who had stormed into Gilgit the previous November, crossed the 12,000 foot Burzil Pass in the heart of the Karakorams, and began a series of attacks on Skardu, capital of Baltistan, which stood at the head of the northern access route to the Vale.

With the coming of spring, the Indian Army under Major General Thimayya (later of Korea fame) began a fullscale offensive. Its purpose was to open the roads and clear the areas outside the Vale which had not been reached the previous year. In response to this, regular troops of the Pakistan Army entered the state, and most of the tribesmen went home. By mid-April, only a few thousand remained, although some

continued to participate in the fighting until a cease-fire was reached under UN auspices on January 1, 1949.

It is impossible to estimate with any accuracy the total number of tribesmen who participated in the Kashmir *jihād*. Many thousands of them were probably in the state at one time or another during the year of conflict. The initial drive into the Vale was almost exclusively Pathan. In the Jammu fighting, the tribesmen were probably more than matched in number, if not in ferocity, by the native Kashmiris (especially the Poonchis) to whose revolt they had come in aid. All the major tribes in Pakistan and most of those in Afghanistan had parties in Kashmir.

Although the main battle for Kashmir was fought in the Vale, the raiders erupted into all parts of the state. Srinagar is 290 miles from Fort Jamrud at the entrance to the Khyber. It is almost twice that distance from Razmak in the heart of Waziristan. Skardu and Ladakh are another 150 miles beyond Srinagar over some of the highest mountains on earth. Pathan war cries were heard in all of these places. The raiders brought a reign of terror to the remote valley of Ladakh, killing the head lama of one of the main Buddhist monasteries there, and cutting off the caravan trade with China.

Not all of the tribesmen, it must be confessed, waited until they had crossed the borders of Kashmir to begin their activities. The northern districts of the Punjab suffered considerably from their passage to and fro. One group of raiders returning from Kashmir through Gujrat District attacked a non-Muslim refugee train on January 13, 1948, and were driven off only after a six-hour pitched battle with Pakistani Army units.

Indian charges that the Pakistani Government inspired and connived at the tribal invasion have never been proven or disproven. Muslim officers of the late British Indian Army certainly led parties of the raiders. Members of the Muslim League National Guards such as Major Khurshid Anwar, who was present during the initial attack on Muzzafarabad, led raids also. Most of these officers, however, appear to have taken command of — or more accurately, attached themselves to — tribal *lashkars* after the latter were en route to or already in Kashmir.

Long before the Pakistani Army entered the battle in the spring of 1948, heavy weapons of a kind not ordinarily included in the tribesmen's arsenal were in use. Vehicles "commandeered" by the raiders were found to have ready supplies of gasoline from N-WFP Government stores. N-WFP Chief Minister Qaiyum admitted encouraging the raiders in January, 1948, although Prime Minister Liaquat, according to all

indications, had tried sincerely to prevent the invasion under stern orders from Governor General Jinnah, the staunch legalist.

There can be little doubt, however, that the inspiration for the movement came from the tribesmen themselves. Although given over at times to senseless destruction and looting, the tribesmen were influenced strongly by the spirit of *jihad* under which they claimed to march. Blood feuds and ancient intertribal enmities were temporarily laid aside. Many observers commented that, insofar as any control was exercised over the raiders, the *pirs* and *mullahs* appeared to have more influence than the *maliks*. All of the tribesmen who took part in the fighting remember their experiences today with relish. One young *malik* described it in 1954: "It was the best time of my life. We went along singing and holding our rifles. Nothing was able to stand before us".

Since 1948 the tribes have regularly demanded that they be allowed to return to Kashmir. Some of these demands, presented inevitably to foreign visitors, have undoubtedly been inspired by Pakistani officials, but there is no doubt that most of them are sincere. The most compelling reason for the demand to return is classic in its simplicity: *badal*, revenge. Many of the tribes left clansmen on the Kashmiri battlefield. They know that they did not win the war, and the desire to return and wipe out the blot on their honor is strong. Thus, one of the most explosive international incidents of our time, born out of the narrow concept of Islamic *jihad*, could still be renewed by the even narrower compulsion of Pathan honor.

PAKISTAN: PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS

INTRODUCTION

The North-West Frontier Province became part of Pakistan on August 14, 1947. On October 14, 1955 it was amalgamated, together with the Punjab, Sind, and Baluchistan, into the "one-unit" province of West Pakistan. Thus it existed as an independent political unit of Pakistan for about eight years. It is with this period that this chapter is mainly concerned. For the first five of these eight years, the affairs of the Frontier Province were directed almost exclusively by Khan Abd-ul-Qaiyum Khan, the Muslim League leader who took over as Chief Minister on August 22, 1947. Qaiyum brought to the Province a period of stability and development unique in its history.

Until 1945, Qaiyum was a member of the Congress Party. He served as deputy leader of the Congress in the Central Assembly in Delhi at the same time that Liaquat Ali Khan, later to become Pakistan's first Prime Minister, served as deputy leader of the Muslim League. In August, 1945, shortly after publishing a book which extolled the objectives of the Congress and which, ironically, was dedicated to Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan,¹ Qaiyum left the Congress and gave his support to the idea of Pakistan which was being promoted by the Muslim League. He then joined the small and uninfluential League organization on the Frontier. The role he played in expanding the Frontier League and in the agitation to bring down the Khan Sahib government has been mentioned in the previous chapter.

For the first half-year after independence, Qaiyum ruled the Province virtually single-handed. He included in his cabinet only one other member of the Legislative Assembly, the membership of which had fallen

¹ Abdul Qaiyum, *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier* (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1945).

from fifty to thirty-nine as a result of the withdrawal of non-Muslim members consequent upon partition. The allegiance of the Assembly members was by no means certain, and it appeared for a while that a resolution approving Ghaffar Khan's "Pukhtunistan" might actually be passed. By the time the Assembly took the oath of allegiance to Pakistan on March 15, 1948, however, Qaiyum had established his power in the Province through effective use of the civil and police services and exceptionally competent political maneuvering among the Assembly members. His victory was assured when Mian Jafar Shah, one of Ghaffar Khan's former lieutenants, joined the Muslim League in April.

The banning of the Khudai Khitmatgars in July of 1948 removed the only remaining potentially serious challenge to Qaiyum's authority, and almost all elements of the expanded League organization accepted Qaiyum's leadership. The most important exception was the former chief of the League, the Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif. The Pir Sahib, having failed in his efforts to force through a program for an Islamic state, returned to the opposition, and eventually became head of the Frontier Branch of H.S. Suhrawardy's Jinnah Awami League, at that time the national opposition party.

Qaiyum's aggressive and sometimes arbitrary methods brought him into occasional collision both with the central government and with local League leaders. He encouraged and even supported the tribal *lashkar* into Kashmir in the winter of 1947 in defiance of Governor General Jinnah's wishes. He began almost at once to bring pressure on the better-developed portions of Tribal Territory for integration into the Province. He undertook development projects prior to approval from the central government. He ruthlessly weeded out unfriendly politicians in the League organization regardless of their previous service. He employed all the latitude given him by the Frontier Crimes Regulations and other special legal devices inherited from the British to suppress opposition parties.

THE 1951 ELECTIONS

Nonetheless, Qaiyum was sufficiently confident of his own popularity and authority to push ahead as rapidly as possible toward elections. These were held between November 26 and December 12, 1951 and were among the first to take place in Pakistan. The Assembly was enlarged to eighty-five seats to which representatives were elected on the

basis of universal adult franchise. Eighty-two of the seats were for territorial constituencies for Muslims; two were for special seats for Muslim women; one was for non-Muslim representation.

A determined although not altogether successful effort was made to delimit the new constituencies on a strictly geographic basis in order to reduce the traditional influence of local "notables" based on economic or kinship ties. The electoral rolls for the contest listed 1,516,347 voters out of the Province's estimated total population of 3,252,747.²

Nine candidates, all Muslim League, were returned unopposed. In the remaining seventy-six constituencies, about 660,000 voters — forty-nine percent of those eligible — exercised their franchise. Qaiyum was an overwhelming victor in the elections. His candidates won in most constituencies, and opposing League factions led by Yusuf Khattak, General Secretary of the national Muslim League, and Ibrahim Khan of Jaghra, were submerged. When the Assembly met, Qaiyum proved to be in control of sixty-seven of the eighty-five seats, including the two reserved for women.³ Independents held thirteen seats, and the opposition Jinnah Awami League had four.

With a large majority in the Assembly and an exceptionally competent corps of secretaries and department heads, Qaiyum in the next year and a half pushed through a comprehensive legislative and development program. In April, 1953, he reluctantly resigned the Chief Ministership of the N-WFP to enter the central cabinet of Muhammad Ali, who had replaced Khwaja Nazimuddin who had succeeded Liaquat Ali Khan, as Prime Minister of Pakistan. Qaiyum's position in the N-WFP was taken by Sardar Abd-ur-Rashid Khan, until then the provincial inspector general of police. Rashid maintained the steady pace of development set by Qaiyum until the N-WFP was amalgated into "one-unit" West Pakistan on October 14, 1955.

² N-WFP (Pakistan), Information Department, *The North-West Frontier Province Yearbook, 1953* (Peshawar: Government Press, 1953), p. 27.

³ The backgrounds of the two ladies elected to the Assembly provided an interesting sidelight on the peculiar role of Pathan women. Both ladies were in their late twenties. Both observed strict *purdah* and took little part in the activities of the Assembly. Yet both had for several years been active in Muslim League affairs, including the civil disobedience movement. Both were fluent in Pushtu, Persian, and Urdu. One had participated with her husband in the Kashmir *jihad*. See N-WFP (Pakistan), Information Department, *Guide to the N-WFP Assembly* (Lahore: Pakistan Printing Works, 1952), pp. 72 and 100.

QAIYUM AND THE MODEL PROVINCE

The N-WFP, despite its lack of resources, progressed more rapidly than any of other provinces of Pakistan in the years after independence. Much of the credit for this belongs to Qaiyum who, despite his disregard for democratic methods in the political field, showed every sign of being deeply imbued with a sense of responsibility for the welfare of the people of the area.

A "poor boy" without tribal connections⁴ in an area where most important matters were decided by a small oligarchy of hereditary landowners or established "official" families. Qaiyum was apparently originally attracted to the Khudai Khitmatgars and the Congress largely by the social and economic reforms preached by the Khan brothers. The exact motivation for his spectacular break with the Congress has never been clear. His critics allege personal aggrandizement. It is true that the Khan brothers were not ones to share leadership, but the potential for personal success in the Muslim League could not have seemed very great at the time either. He may have been disturbed at the increasing note of communalism which was appearing in Congress' activity, but he showed no signs of religious fanaticism and continued highly critical of the negative role played by the *mullahs* in social and political life. The most likely explanation seems to be that he was affected by the same mysterious embryonic patriotism for Pakistan and the creating of a separate country that struck so many other Muslim leaders of India at the time.

At any rate when he joined the League, he did not embrace the conservative economic philosophy which dominated it. Having consolidated his power in the Province, he depended less and less on the conservative forces and broke with them completely when he surmounted the Yusuf Khattak-Ibrahim Jaghra challenge in the 1951 election. Ironically, at the very time that Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan, his bitterest political enemy, was in jail at his hands, Qaiyum was busily implementing a reform program containing many of the very same projects embodied in the old Khudai Khitmatgar platform.

⁴ Qaiyum was born in Chitral in 1901, the son of a government official. Although raised in Peshawar, he was commonly referred to as a "Kashmiri" by political enemies because of family origins.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The N-WFP budget remained under Pakistani rule, as it had been under British, a deficit one. However, it expanded rapidly as the provincial government increased its activities. Expenditures rose from Rs. 34,093,000 in 1946-47 to Rs. 74,482,000 in 1955-56.⁵

In addition to regular expenditures from revenue, a capital expenditures budget supported by public and central government loans was put into effect. This is equivalent to the development budget of the province. By 1955-56, capital expenditures were estimated at Rs. 35,585,000. The development priorities of the province were reflected in this sum, which included:

Irrigation	Rs. 15,964,000
“Grow More Food”	Rs. 5,137,000
Electricity	Rs. 10,055,000
Industrial development	Rs. 700,000
Roads and Transport	Rs. 500,000 ⁶

AGRICULTURE

About seventy-five percent of the inhabitants of the N-WFP depend directly or indirectly on agriculture for their living. Despite this, the province has an annual food deficit of about 50,000 tons of food grains — chiefly as a result of the extremely low production in the tribal area. Intensive efforts have been made to reduce this deficit by bringing into production marginal land and by increasing yields on existing lands through improved seeds, implements, fertilizers, and antirust devices, but the steady increase in population and in *per capita* food consumption, as well as periodic droughts and floods, have kept the annual deficit about

⁵ *N-WFP Budgets: 1951-52 through 1955-56*

Year	Revenue	Expenditure	Balance
1951-52	Rs. 47,700,000	Rs. 49,360,000	Rs. — 1,660,000
1952-53	57,307,000	57,105,000	202,000
1953-54	57,708,000	62,186,000	— 4,478,000
1954-55	63,587,000	66,052,000	— 2,465,000
1955-56	71,998,000	74,482,000	— 2,484,000

⁶ *N-WFP Yearbook, 1955, p. 58.*

the same. Particularly noteworthy advances have been made in fruit production, the orchard area having been expanded from about 18,000 acres in 1948 to 36,000 acres in 1955.⁷

An extensive village development program known as Village AID (Agricultural and Industrial Development), financed by the United States Foreign Operations Administration, the Ford Foundation, and the Pakistani Government, is active in the province, and a large training center, which combines the traditional lines of Frontier architecture with the utilitarian design of a Western public building, has been completed in Peshawar. The Village AID program, using committees formed in the participating villages, has had considerable success in attacking a combination of economic and social problems. These include the settlement of petty disputes without recourse to litigation, the encouraging of reduced expenditures on weddings, the use of fertilizers and improved seeds, line-sowing methods for wheat and maize, the digging of compost pits, reconstruction of drains, vaccination and anti-malarial campaigns, improvement of intervillage communications, and reclamation of waste land.

Behind all of this was a comprehensive, though moderate, program of land reform fathered by Qaiyum. In 1949, many *jagirs*, land revenue rights (in some cases exemptions from tax liability) acquired for ancient political or religious services, were abolished. The N-WFP Tenancy Act of 1950, in addition to abolishing long-standing customary distinctions between agriculturist and non-agriculturist classes, authorized occupancy tenants to acquire ownership of all or a portion of the land they cultivated upon payment of reasonable compensation to their landlords. The Act also abolished the services and special duties, including forced labor, which tradition permitted landlords to extract from tenants-at-will in addition to the usual share of the produce. Another act put through the legislature at the same time invalidated mortgages issued prior to 1920. The following year a supplementary act was passed to restore possession to tenants ejected by their landlords before provisions of the Tenancy Act of 1951 were put into effect.

By 1955, title to a total of 57,121 acres formerly held in the names of large landowners had been handed over to 26,864 small holders formerly listed only as occupancy tenants. This transfer was without compensation, since the tenants' traditional rent to the landowners had been limited to the amount of land revenue and other taxes due to the government.

⁷ *N-WFP Yearbook, 1955*, p. 85.

Another 181,184 acres were deeded to more than 200,000 separate occupancy tenants in return for compensation. Finally, an additional 342,961 acres were partitioned between landlords and about 120,000 occupancy tenants, with the tenants receiving title to about seventy-five percent of the total partitioned land.

The distinction between occupancy tenants (a) who received land without the obligation to pay compensation, (b) who received land in return for compensation, and (c) who partitioned the land with their landlords (in some cases with and in some without compensation) is exceedingly complex, because of the many differing kinds of titles and tenants' rights recognized in traditional law. In no case, however, was the land reform program confiscatory. In those cases where no compensation was paid, the landlord either never had or had long since relinquished any right to profit from the land. In many cases, the landlord merely paid the taxes on the land after collecting them from the occupancy tenants, who because of some tribal or social disability had at some time been held ineligible to formal ownership of the land.

By early 1958, the land reform program had slowed to a virtual halt as the big land owners reasserted their power through the short-lived Republican Party which controlled the West Pakistan Assembly. However, the political pendulum swung again, and the Ayub regime which took power in October 1958, quickly and efficiently finished the land reform program which Qaiyum had begun.

IRRIGATION

Expansion of irrigation facilities has had a high priority in the effort to grow more food. A large number of small lift and tube well projects have been constructed by the Public Works Department, which also is responsible for maintaining the extensive existing system of canals. Most important of the projects now under construction are the Warsak and Kurram Garhi schemes.

Warsak, at the point where the Kabul River debouches onto the Peshawar Plain, is being built under the supervision of Canadian engineers under Colombo Plan auspices. In addition to an enormous power production, it is expected to bring under cultivation more than 100,000 acres of new agricultural land when the dam and the main canal system are completed. The Kurram Garhi project, near Bannu, involves the creation of a huge reservoir to store summer flood waters behind an

earthfill dam. This project, which is nearing completion, is expected to provide water for almost 200,000 acres of agricultural land, as well as to produce substantial amounts of power.

INDUSTRY

The basis for development of a diversified light industry in what before 1947 was an almost exclusively agricultural area has been laid by steady expansion of the power supply. The total installed capacity in 1955 was still well under 50,000 kw. Nonetheless, this represented a substantial increase over 1947 when it was scarcely 19,000 kw. More important, the availability of power has been extended into almost all parts of the province.⁸ Power supply will be vastly increased, of course, when the Warsak project, which is expected to have a capacity of almost 200,000 kw., is completed.

In 1947 there were only two significant industrial plants in the N-WFP. By 1955 this number had risen to thirty-two, including sugar mills, cotton and woolen textile mills, fruit-canning factories, a chemical works, steel re-rolling mills, a pharmaceutical factory, and tobacco processing plants. Cottage industry, a favorite development target all over Asia, has not progressed as rapidly, although there are now more than 10,000 hand looms at work in the province — including a small but high-quality woolen industry in the Kaghan Valley.

EDUCATION

Education received the single largest share of most annual budgets since 1947. Interestingly, it managed to top police and security expenditures each year by a few hundred thousand rupees. In the 1955-56 budget, education came in for about twenty percent of the total allocation.⁹

As a result, more than 200 new schools have been opened and the in-school population doubled between 1947 and 1955. Education has been made free through the sixth grade. New government colleges for men have been set up in each of the districts, and three women's colleges

⁸ *N-WFP Yearbook, 1955*, p. 139.

⁹ Included in this calculation are figures for construction of school, college, and university buildings, which in the budgetary breakdown are carried under Civil Works. See *N-WFP Yearbook, 1955*, p. 59.

at Peshawar, Abbottabad, and Dera Ismail Khan have been expanded. Total college enrollment rose from 1,210 in 1947 to 2,839 in 1955.¹⁰

Probably the greatest achievement has been the University of Peshawar, the sprawling campus of which sits astride the road from Peshawar to the Khyber Pass. Ground was broken for the University, a pet project of Chief Minister Qaiyum's, in 1951. By October of 1952, a hostel for 200 students, probably the best equipped in Asia, an impressive administration building, and an engineering college were functioning. Since then, law, science, medicine, agriculture, forestry, teacher training, and arts faculties have been added.

MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH

Several excellent hospitals exist in the Frontier area, but most of them are military, and the main medical problems of the rural population are taken care of through an extensive program involving small permanent and mobile dispensaries, visiting nurses and mid-wives, and touring X-ray, tuberculosis, and vaccination units. In 1955, the ratio of dispensaries to population was estimated to be about 1 to 31,000. While inadequate by Western standards, this represented a considerable achievement in a remote and economically depressed area.

Apart from the ever-present problem of infant illness and mortality, the main threat to health in the area is malaria. This disease flourishes in the irrigated areas, despite efforts to stamp it out through mosquito control.¹¹ Malaria is endemic in every one of the districts and agencies, although a test area in the Kohat-Hangu Valley, where the problem has been under concentrated annual attack since 1949, has been almost entirely rid of new cases.

Typhus is also a major problem, especially in those areas through which the nomad — and frequently lice-ridden — *powindahs* and their animals regularly pass. Pneumonia and tuberculosis, frequently the result of lowered resistance caused by malaria, account for about twenty-five percent of the annual deaths in the Province.

¹⁰ *N-WFP Yearbook 1955*, p. 64.

¹¹ These efforts are still woefully inadequate. In 1955-1956, the anti-malaria program received an appropriation of only Rs. 91,586. See *N-WFP Yearbook, 1955*, p. 76.

THE TRIBAL AREA UNDER PAKISTAN

The tribal area retained in Pakistan the special status accorded it in British India. However, the departure of the British made possible the development of a new relationship between the government and the people of the hills. If Pakistan was more kindly disposed toward the tribes, so too they were more willing to cooperate with Pakistan. The tribal area remained directly under the central government, but the N-WFP government, now in the hands of Pathans, became a more important instrument for influencing the tribes.

The national law of Pakistan does not apply in the tribal area. The inhabitants do not pay normal taxes, although they are subject at least indirectly to revenue charges on such consumer items as salt. Nonetheless, government expenditures for the tribal area have risen constantly. In 1952, for example, total expenditure for civil administration for all of Pakistan was Rs. 195,365,000. Of this sum, Rs. 58,265,000, or almost a third, was devoted to the tribal area.¹² Much of the money went for the maintenance of the administrative and welfare services with which Pakistan is trying to replace the traditional British subsidies to the tribes.

In 1947 the educational budget for the tribal area was Rs. 17,000. About 1,500 children were in school. In 1955, the budget figure was Rs. 1,400,000, and more than 25,000 children were in school. In addition during 1954 alone, thirty-nine new schools were constructed at a total cost of Rs. 4,500,000. (School construction costs are carried under the civil works rather than the education budget.)¹³

In the medical field, each agency has its own surgeon and several assistant surgeons, a Scout hospital, and a mobile dispensary. Corps of "vaccinators" are constantly on the move through the tribal belt, sometimes penetrating into areas where the Political Agent himself hesitates to go for fear of stirring up disorder.

Beginning in 1952, the central government has made a limited attempt to develop cottage industries. Silk-production and basket-weaving centers have been established in Kurram; a rug-making school in Malakand; and a metal-working shop at Wana in South Waziristan. While these experiments have as yet had little economic effect on the area as a whole,

¹² *Budget of the Central Government of Pakistan for the Year 1951-52* (Karachi: Central Government Press, 1952).

¹³ *N-WFP Yearbook, 1955*, pp. 235-37.

several hundred tribesmen have obtained training in trades which provide an opportunity for them to add to their meager incomes.

LAW AND ORDER

At the same time it must be admitted that expenditures for law and order have continued high. In the 1952 central budget, only Rs. 207,000 was listed for subsidies to the tribes, although a far greater amount was almost certainly spent. (The subsidies category was dropped from subsequent budgets entirely.) Even today allocations to the Scouts, Frontier Constabulary, and *khassadars* probably account for more than half of the central government's spending in the tribal belt.

In one sense, government control of portions of the tribal area has declined rather than increased under Pakistan. Razmak, the great cantonment in central Waziristan, provides an example. The cantonment itself has been abandoned. It is visited by officials rarely — and then only at the invitation of the local *maliks*. The excellent roads connecting Razmak with Miranshah in the north and Jandola (on the Tank-Wana road) in the south are no longer open. As a result, the traveler from Miranshah (headquarters of the North Waziristan Agency) to Wana (headquarters of the South Waziristan Agency) must go three-quarters of the way around a circle through Bannu and Tank. The Fakir of Ipi remained until his death as inaccessible and intractable as ever at Gorwekht.

At the same time Peshawar and the other towns of the plains enjoy a security unknown in British times. Some of them continue to close their gates at dusk and open them again only at dawn, but this is clearly a formality, and the single policeman who guards the gate can usually be prevailed upon to allow through any reasonably respectable-appearing passerby. Statistics on Frontier "incidents" are still difficult to obtain, but raids on the settled districts from the tribal area appear to have ceased completely. Despite the "Pukhtunistan" agitation, trans-border incursions also went way down — only thirty-one being reported between January 1, 1952 and October 1, 1953.¹⁴ This is far below the most peaceful year in British times.

¹⁴ *Pakistan News Digest*, Karachi, 15 October, 1953.

TERRITORIAL MERGERS

Under a policy of merger vigorously pursued by Chief Minister Qaiyum, some small sections of the tribal area joined the N-WFP before the latter was merged into West Pakistan. The lower Black Mountain tribes, numbering about 43,000, merged with Hazara District in 1952. Most of Amb state (about 48,000 out of approximately 53,000 population) was incorporated about the same time. The Gadun tribes (totaling about 35,000), who live between the Swat and the Indus Rivers, joined Mardan in 1953. A part of Indus Kohistan, with a mixed population of about 150,000, was added to Hazara in July, 1954. The government has assumed responsibility for law and order and certain welfare programs in the merged area but in order to make the transition as easy as possible has not yet introduced taxation.

No mergers have taken place since establishment of the "one-unit" province of West Pakistan. It is significant that those which took place earlier were all on the eastern fringes of the Pathan area where the tribal structure is weaker than in the area along the Durand Line, and that none of them abutted on the international boundary itself. The latter fact is probably the reason why such relatively well developed areas as Kurram and Swat State retain their special status. They are simply too strategically located for the central government to be willing to relinquish entirely its direct control over them.

Nevertheless, at least insofar as the tribal problem is economic, merger with the settled districts has considerable appeal for the inhabitants of the hills. Poor as they are, all of the settled districts enjoy a higher standard of living and provide more opportunities for advancement than do the hills.

Regardless of the method by which integration is attempted, the nature and outlook of the tribesmen require that the process be a gradual one. In the course of half-a-dozen trips through the tribal area in 1951-54, the author found no reason to believe that the majority of the tribesmen are yet willing to forsake their independence for a very limited economic advantage.

In one case, a Wazir *jirga* asked the Political Agent to send a mobile dispensary to their village and to supply a teacher for a village school. The official promised to do so when his budget permitted. When one of the *maliks* was asked why his tribe did not join the settled districts where it would be automatically entitled to schools and hospitals, the chieftain replied with formidable logic: "Then we would be forced to have hospi-

tals and schools and to go to them. Now it is we who decide whether or not they are good for us”.

SWAT, A UNIQUE STATE

Before we leave the tribal area, it is desirable to look briefly at its most unusual phenomenon, Swat State. Swat is not of foremost importance in either the political or the economic scheme of things on the Frontier. However, it is interesting for two reasons. First, it presents an almost unique example in Pakistan or India of a princely state — and a small one at that — which has not only survived but flourished in the years since Partition. Second, it suggests what a Pathan state might develop into under exceptional leadership.

Swat has a population of about 500,000. The lower Swat Valley is inhabited by Yusufzai Pathans, most of them of the Akazai section of the tribe. The upper valley and the highlands are inhabited by non-Pathan tribes, notably the Torwas and Gohrwas. The state was organized in this century chiefly through the efforts of a remarkable man, Abd-ul-Wadood. Abd-ul-Wadood abdicated in 1949 in favor of his son Jehanzeb, the present ruler.

The *Wali*, as Jehanzeb is called, rules his state carefully and thoroughly. He personally supervises the repair of bridges and maintenance of roads, as well as the conduct of the more than 125 schools (including a four-year college) which the state possesses. While the reins of government remain almost entirely in the *Wali's* hands, there has been since 1954 a Council of Advisers, ten of whom are appointed by the *Wali* and fifteen of whom are elected. The administration of the state is conducted through an excellent system of communications and transportation facilities, which includes 1,500 miles of telephone line, and 375 miles of all-weather road.

THE FRONTIER AS A PART OF PAKISTAN

The Pathans' consciousness of their racial identity has not waned with the coming into being of Pakistan. They have provided many of the most vigorous opponents of the “one-unit” province of West Pakistan, being prepared to make political alliances with Bengalis, Sindhis, and Baluchis against what they fear is “Punjabi domination”. A few Pathan political

leaders and rather more civil servants have accepted the "one-unit" idea as an administrative improvement and as conducive to a more stable political balance between East and West Pakistan, but many remain suspicious of it.

The skirmishing over "one-unit", however, is merely the most obvious manifestation of the Pathans' deep affection for their own area as it has traditionally been — "Yaghistan", the land of the unruly, or alternatively, of the "unruly". If Pathan nationalism has never developed in the modern mode, Pathan tribalism and provincialism still bitterly resent assimilation with any other group, let alone domination by it.

In a series of conversations with tribal *maliks* in 1951-53, the author asked each, "Who are you? Who is your leader? What is your country?" Almost without exception, the pattern of the replies was the same. The man gave his name, his tribe or *khel*, and the name of the leading *malik* of his *khel* (if he recognized one). In a few cases, political consciousness — or perhaps expediency — had developed sufficiently for the name of the local Political Agent to be included. All concluded "I am Pathan!"

Attempts to rephrase the question were of little avail. Not until they had been asked specifically what they thought of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and "Pukhtunistan", did the men reply in nationalist terms. All affirmed their preference for Pakistan, but even then, it was clear that Pakistan was looked upon as something separate and distinct from themselves.

On the other hand, a number of Pathan political leaders have succeeded in integrating themselves thoroughly into the national scene. Khan Abd-ul-Qaiyum Khan, after his departure from the N-WFP in 1953, spent a year and a half in the central cabinet. While there, he not only performed efficiently in the fields of agriculture and economic affairs, but played a leading role in the parliamentary revolt of September, 1954, which succeeded temporarily in curtailing the powers of the Governor General.

Having been dismissed from the cabinet when the Governor General struck back at the dissident ministers a month later, Qaiyum passed for a while into the political wilderness. He reappeared in 1958 as President of the Muslim League. In this capacity, his vigorous activities appeared to be directed almost exclusively at national and international questions without any manifestation of Pathan provincialism.

Abd-ur-Rashid Khan, Qaiyum's successor as Chief Minister, was deprived of his post by the merger of the N-WFP into the new West Pakistan province. Rashid did not return to police work, however, and served in the West Pakistan cabinet before becoming Chief Minister of

that province. Rashid remained concerned with the problem of the relationship of the Frontier to the rest of Pakistan. At first in favor of "one-unit", he subsequently veered away from it, and in July, 1955, vigorously defended the right of Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan to return to the Frontier area to work against the plan. During his career in West Pakistani politics, he abandoned the Muslim League and joined the newly-founded Republican Party.

Mian Jafar Shah, possibly the most astute and durable of all the Frontier politicians, served in the pre-Partition Congress Government, under Qaiyum and under Rashid. He then passed over to the central cabinet where he successfully subordinated his deep personal roots in the Frontier to the demands of the Ministry of Communication.

None of these men have appeared on the national scene as champions of Pathan provincialism. The same may be said to an even greater degree of the Pathan generals who comprise the bulk of the general staff of the Pakistan army. Likewise, the relatively few Pathan senior civil servants have served effectively and objectively in all parts of both East and West Pakistan.

The Khan brothers, Dr. Khan Sahib (who was assassinated by a disgruntled job-seeker in May, 1958) and the "Badshah Khan", Abd-ul-Ghaffar, represent a somewhat different outlook. Khan Sahib came back from retirement and obscurity during the first half-dozen years after partition to become the first Chief Minister of the new West Pakistan province. Why he was called to the job is clear enough. He was, first of all, a well-known Pathan, whose presence at the head of the new government would serve to counter the charges of "Punjabi domination". Second, he was honest and a widely-known and respected reformer.

Just why he accepted a post which, however honorable, put him in a position completely contrary to the Pathan-centered ideals and goals of his old Khudai Khitmatgars is less clear. It may have been a case of the old warhorse rising to political battle and welcoming the chance to prove his worth after a period of obscurity and distrust. Perhaps also, since he was always by far the more sophisticated of the brothers, he hoped to bring to the larger stage some of the ideas on political and economic reform of the Khudai Khitmatgars.

Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan was released from imprisonment early in 1954 after almost six years in jail. He returned at once to the political lists from which he had been forcibly removed. He resumed his seat in the central Assembly and became one of the government's most vigorous critics. He was rearrested briefly for agitation in the Frontier and Ba-

luchistan. He was adamantly opposed to the "one-unit" plan and attempted in every possible way to prevent the merger of his beloved Frontier with the rest of West Pakistan. While denying that he had ever supported an independent "Pukhtunistan", he continued to insist that the Frontier must have some special autonomous status.

The Khudai Khitmatgars remained under ban, but elements formerly important in the organization continued loyal to Ghaffar Khan, and he drew large crowds in speaking tours of the settled districts. Finally, in 1957, Ghaffar Khan joined with disgruntled leaders from other parts of Pakistan to found the National Awami Party, whose leftist, provincially-oriented platform was in many ways reminiscent of the Khudai Khitmatgars. He made no secret of the fact that not only was he not concerned about foreign policy questions but that he cared little about what went on in Pakistan outside the Frontier. He has refused to define the kind of special status that he wants for the Frontier, but insists with Gandhian persistence that the present "wrong" situation must end. After the establishment of a new regime in Pakistan by General Ayub Khan in October, 1958, Ghaffar Khan was again arrested.

In general the Ayub regime has pushed more rapidly toward integration of the Pathans than any of its predecessors. Considerable of the authority once held by the N-WFP government and by the center has been put into the hands of the West Pakistan provincial government at Lahore. Even the administrative organization of the six settled districts once again looks to Lahore for much of its guidance.

More importantly, governmental pressure on the Tribal Territory has increased as President Ayub has reacted vigorously to Afghan efforts to stir tribal unrest. Hostile *lashkars* inspired by Kabul were forcibly dispersed in the fall of 1960 by loyal tribes supported by Pakistani troops. Subsequent to the agitation, the Nawab of Dir was deposed and regular Pakistani troops and administrators stationed in the state for the first time. Additional engagements, including bombing raids by the Pakistan Air Force on the houses of the leaders of the agitation in Bajaur, took place in 1961.

THE FUTURE

It is difficult to extract from the present confused political situation a clear picture of what the future relationship of the Frontier to the rest of Pakistan is likely to be. One thing is reasonably clear, however.

“Pukhtunistan” notwithstanding, there appears to be little chance that the Frontier will become an independent political unit. Its more sophisticated leadership has accepted Pakistan as the stage on which its destiny is to be determined, and the hill tribes simply do not care about nationalism in any modern sense.

It is also unlikely that, barring a major upheaval in adjacent areas, the hill tribes will again become involved with the government of the settled districts in the large-scale warfare which took place in 1937-38. At the same time, the Frontier will almost certainly not completely submerge its identity in Pakistan. The farthest it is likely to go in this direction is to become a kind of Pakistani Texas.

The problem of the hill tribes is complicated by the fact that they are not merely Pathans in a nation of Punjabis, Sindhis, and Bengalis, but they are also tribesmen in a twentieth-century republic. They have to date shown little inclination to abandon this role, and Pakistan has been reluctant to force them to do so.

The economic development projects now underway will attract some of the tribesmen down from the hills. However, Pakistan is beset by serious basic economic problems, and it appears unlikely that in the near future, at least, the settled areas will be able to develop sufficiently to lure all of the hill men down or to maintain them if they come.

Meanwhile, they remain in their hills with no assets other than their own splendid human resources. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan have competed for this human resource in pursuing their national interests in the past and are still doing so. As will be seen in the next chapter, this competition has done more than anything else to hinder the pacification and assimilation of the Pathans of the hills.

XII

AFGHAN INTEREST IN THE FRONTIER

Afghan interest in the Frontier area flows from two sources. From the standpoint of the men who rule in Kabul, both are pertinent and legitimate. First, the Frontier is in a sense Afghanistan Irredenta. Second, the Pathan tribes constitute a source of power which can and has made and unmade Afghan governments. The two elements are closely inter-related in the minds of many Afghans and have in recent years been combined and elaborated in the "Pukhtunistan" movement. Before examining "Pukhtunistan" itself, it is necessary to review the complexes which created it.

AFGHANISTAN IRREDENTA

Historical developments in the Frontier area have already been summarized. A recapitulation with emphasis on Afghan claims to the Frontier may be useful here, however.

De facto political sovereignty over the Frontier area in the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries was erratic in the extreme. From the Afghan point of view, however, a fairly consistent pattern can be drawn. In 1739, Nadir Shah, the Afshar-Turkic king of Persia, forced the Mogul emperor, Muhammad Shah, to cede to him the trans-Indus tracts of the Delhi empire. When Nadir's short-lived empire broke up, the eastern portions of his conquest came under the rule of Ahmad Shah Abdali, a native Afghan. Ahmad Shah established his capital at Kandahar, gave the ruling tribe of the Pathans its name, Durrani, and founded a political entity which has persisted to the present through no more metamorphoses than many another state.

Ahmad Shah's son and successor, Timur Shah, moved the capital to Kabul, the better to control a far-flung empire, which at his death in

1773 included almost all of what is now Afghanistan, as well as Peshawar, Lahore, Multan, Sind, Kalat, Baluchistan, Kashmir, and Khorrasan. During the next fifty years the Durrani empire melted away, but the trans-Indus tracts remained under its control well into the nineteenth century. Sikh raids on Peshawar began about 1818. However, the Pathan capital remained under Durrani control until 1834, when Ranjit Singh annexed it outright.

The Amir Dost Muhammad never ceased his attempts to recover the area during the less than twenty years of Sikh rule. While the British always refused to support the Amir's claims against their Sikh ally, many individual British officials, including Alexander Burnes, McNaughton, John Lawrence, and Lumsden, admitted the validity of Afghan interest in the trans-Indus tracts.

In actual fact, British-Sikh cooperation in the First Afghan War (1838-1840) clearly established the military supremacy of these allies (chiefly, of course, the British) in this part of Central Asia, and demolished Dost Muhammad's hopes of winning back his lost province by force of arms. Afghan demands for justice continued, however, after the British take-over from the Sikhs in 1849, even during and after the Second Afghan War (1878-80).

Not until the Durand Agreement of 1893 did Afghanistan formally give up its claims to large areas of the Frontier. Amir Abd-ur-Rahman's claim that he then yielded only under duress is true enough. However, it is equally true that the trans-Indus tracts had been ceded to Nadir Shah and appropriated by Ahmad Shah only by virtue of force. In 1901, the political shape of the trans-Indus area was formalized with Lord Curzon's creation of the N-WFP and the tribal marchland beyond.

In the Durand Agreement, Amir Abd-ur-Rahman and the British promised not to "exercise interference" in each other's territory as divided by the Durand Line. They both professed to regard the agreement as "a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the Frontier". The Amir Habibullah, Abd-ur-Rahman's son and successor, signed another treaty in 1905 undertaking to fulfill the commitments made by his father in 1893.

Although they had signed away the trans-Indus tracts and pledged themselves to non-interference in them, the Afghans continued their efforts to extend their influence among the border tribes on the British side and, through secret diplomatic communications, to press the British for the return of at least part of the area.

No documentary evidence exists to support it, but a belief still persists in Afghanistan and on the Frontier that the British promised Habibullah that the tribal territory would be returned to him in exchange for a benign neutrality during World War I. It is also said that he was murdered in 1919 to prevent his making this arrangement public and demanding his reward.

However unlikely such an arrangement (especially the latter part of it) may seem to the Western world, it is not considered at all unusual or impossible to Pathans steeped in the intrigues of Central Asian politics. Whether or not there is any basis in fact for it, this explanation of Habibullah's behavior and demise is no more improbable than that advanced by the British at the time: *i.e.*, that Habibullah had inherited from his father an awareness of the wisdom and value of friendly cooperation with the British and developed a sincere admiration for them, and his murder was arranged by his son, Amanullah, to secure the throne for himself.

The purpose of the Third Afghan War launched by Amanullah in 1919 was simply to recover the trans-Indus tracts or make them untenable for the British. He was at the same time, no doubt, aware of internal opposition to his rule and hoped to divert it by a *jihad* which would also attract the border tribes. At any rate, he achieved little success in his main objective, although the Treaty of Rawalpindi ending the war and signed on August 8, 1919, recognized Afghanistan's independence in foreign affairs. At the same time, it included Amanullah's acceptance of the Indo-Afghan frontier established by the Durand Line.

The Treaty of Kabul of November 22, 1922, which superseded the temporary Treaty of Rawalpindi, confirmed the provisions of the earlier document. However, Amanullah did manage to get included a provision which recognized implicitly that both powers had an interest in the tribal area astride the border. Article 2 provided that the two parties "having mutually satisfied themselves each regarding their benevolent intention toward the tribes residing close to their respective boundaries, hereby undertake each to inform the other in future of any military operations of major importance which may appear necessary for the maintenance of order among the frontier tribes residing within their respective sphere, before the commencement of such operations".¹

Amanullah also managed to extract one other thing. It was included in a note from the British Minister in Kabul in connection with the con-

¹ Texts of both documents are in Aitcheson, *op. cit.*, XIII, 23-24.

clusion of the Treaty of 1921. The note said in part: "As the condition of the frontier tribes of the two Governments are of interest to the Government of Afghanistan, I inform you that the British Government entertains feelings of good will towards all the frontier tribes and has every intention of treating them generously, provided they abstain from outrages against the inhabitants of India".²

In passing, it is well to note that Afghan sovereignty in one form or another continued to be recognized in the border area until a surprisingly late date. The Baluch districts of Pishin and Sibi, the Kurram Valley between Parachinar and Thal, and the Khyber itself were "assigned" to the British only in 1879 under the Treaty of Gandamak. Pishin and Sibi were not actually declared British territory until 1887. The Kurram was not formally taken over until 1892, preliminary to the general cleaning up of the border by the Durand Agreement. While all of the present tribal agencies were separated from Afghanistan by the Durand Agreement, none of them except Kurram was ever formally proclaimed British territory.

As far as the personal activities of the hill tribes were concerned, the Durand Line exercised less of a limiting influence than did the administrative boundary between Tribal Territory and the N-WFP. Afghan currency was more in use in the Tribal Territory than was the British variety. (It is still used in many parts of the agencies today.) There is also no doubt that in the social and cultural spheres, the tribes remained closer to Kabul than to Delhi right up to 1947, although in the broader economic, and after 1930 in the political field, their orientation was more toward British India.

Afghan interest in and contact with the supposedly British-controlled tribes continued to 1947. While the hope of recapturing the area from the British by force did not reappear after the Third Afghan War, the idea of reoccupying it in the event of British departure lurked in Afghan minds whenever the possibility of freedom for India was discussed. During the Round Table Conferences of 1931 and 1932, Afghanistan apparently intimated to London that it must have a hand in determining the future of the trans-Indus territories. There are some indications that the idea was broached again during the Cripps Mission to India in 1942 and at the end of the war.³

Nonetheless, Kabul appears to have been taken unawares by the speed

² Aitcheson, *op. cit.*, XIII, 23-24.

³ B. Shiva Rao, "Conflict Beyond the Indus", *The Nation*, July 16, 1949.

and decision with which British plans for the freedom and partition of India developed. On May 30, 1947, King Zahir Shah told the National Assembly in Kabul that Afghanistan expected to maintain friendly relations with the United Kingdom and with its successors in India, adding that "political changes in India will hardly affect relations". Though mentioning recent boundary revisions with the Soviet Union, he said nothing about the Durand Line.⁴

A month later, however, Afghan Prime Minister Hashim Khan, while visiting Bombay, announced that the British had been informed that Afghanistan wanted an outlet to the sea. He added that Afghanistan disapproved of the referendum to be held in the N-WFP to allow the inhabitants to choose between India and Pakistan, but felt that Kabul was entitled to have a representative at the referendum. At the same time, a group of Afghan emigrés at Poona declared themselves in favor of an independent "Pukhtunistan".⁵

Almost simultaneously, Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai Khitmatgars, fighting for their political lives, raised a similar cry within the N-WFP itself. (See Chapter X.) There is no evidence that the two demands were the result of a prearrangement between Kabul and Ghaffar Khan, but as the plan for freedom and partition of India proceeded according to schedule, it was inevitable that the two movements should come into a certain degree of cooperation, however different their motives. When Kabul, in the years after partition, gave more and more official support to an independent "Pukhtunistan", it of course at the same time subordinated its own irredentist claims.

The intensity of Afghan feeling was manifested in September, 1947, when Kabul cast the sole vote opposing Pakistan's admission to the United Nations. This was done on the grounds that Afghanistan could not recognize the North-West Frontier as part of Pakistan so long as the people of the area had not been given the opportunity to opt for independence. By this action, Kabul made it abundantly clear that it was not going to seek solution of the Frontier problem through cooperation with its new neighbor.

Thus "Pukhtunistan" was born. Behind Kabul's adamant attitude was a line of reasoning which, while not generally given credence outside South Asia, was accepted as not altogether unfounded in India and Afghanistan. This reasoning centered on doubts as to Pakistan's viability.

⁴ *Times* (London), 31 May 1947.

⁵ *Statesman*, 22 June 1947.

In the event of a breakup of the new nation, the chances of emergence of some kind of a "Pukhtunistan" were good. Such an entity, it could be assumed, would speedily merge into Afghanistan — especially with the support of India, which would pick up the territory east of the Indus.

Although the breakup has not occurred, Afghan enthusiasm for "Pukhtunistan" has to a considerable degree waxed and waned as Pakistan's stability has deteriorated or improved. Even now, "Pukhtunistan" remains as the most useful and practical repository for Afghan irredentist feelings. In addition, of course, it serves as an effective instrument for countering Pakistani pressure on Kabul over the whole gamut of mutual relations. Above all, it has to some degree diverted the attention of the border tribes from objectives within Afghanistan.

THE SEATS OF POWER

The border tribes have always played an important role in determining who was to hold power in Afghanistan. In the fratricidal struggle for the throne which took place in the early years of the nineteenth century, the tribes made and unmade amir after amir. Their refusal to accept Shah Shuja made it impossible for the British to keep him on the throne after the First Afghan War. Sher Ali (1870-74) and Yakub Khan (1879-80) both depended on the support of the tribes to maintain their rule. Only the great Abd-ur-Rahman (1880-1901) was able to put down tribal rebellions without losing his throne.

THE OVERTHROW OF AMANULLAH

The lesson of tribal power was brought home most forcefully in the overthrow of Amanullah. The seeds of the rebellion against Amanullah lay in tribal opposition to his drastic reform program through which he aimed at modernizing Afghanistan as Atatürk had modernized Turkey.

Amanullah, son of Habibullah, came to the throne in 1919. Almost immediately, he led his country into a third war with the British. The expected rising of the northern tribes on the British border, which would have enabled Amanullah's general, Nadir Khan, to sustain his bold thrust into the Kurram Valley, never came off. The tribes remained a powerful but uncertain factor throughout the early years of Amanullah's reign. In 1924, he weathered a revolt which at one time included almost all of the Ghilzais only by making major concessions in his reform program.

The memory of this display of weakness lingered and played an important role in his subsequent downfall. In November, 1928, the northern tribes broke out. The Shinwaris rose and seized Jelalabad. The Mohmands rushed eagerly to share the spoils. The Jajis and Zadrans raised the standard of rebellion around Khost. To add to Amanullah's troubles, a Tajik freebooter, Habibullah, called Bacha-i-Saqao, appeared in the north with an insurgent band.

Amanullah was driven from the throne in short order. Bacha-i-Saqao occupied it briefly until, nine months later, he relinquished it and his life to Nadir Khan, supported by the southern Pathan tribes, mainly Wazirs and Mahsuds from the Indian side of the border. In payment Nadir Khan was forced to allow the wild tribesmen to loot his own capital. Within a few years, these same Wazirs and Mahsuds were denouncing Nadir Shah and insisting that they had supported him only for the purpose of restoring Amanullah who had fled before Bacha-i-Saqao.

In 1933, defying orders from the Government of India, the Wazirs and Mahsuds crossed the Durand Line again and laid siege to Matun, capital of the Khost province. They were driven off only after a battle with all the forces the Afghan Government could muster under the command of Hashim Khan, brother of King Nadir.

There was no lack of other tribal challenges to the newly-established dynasty of Nadir Shah. The "Lame Mullah" and the youthful "Mad Fakir of Lannennai" defied the control of Kabul in the south. Ibrahim Beg, a Basmachi opponent of the Soviet state in Farghana, crossed the Oxus and provoked a Soviet pursuit deep into Afghanistan. An insurrection almost in the suburbs of Kabul among the followers of the dead Bacha-i-Saqao forced Nadir Shah once again to call the Pathan tribes to his support. This time he was able to get them home again without having to let them loot Kabul in recompense.

No sooner had these threats been met than another appeared. One Ghulam Nabi, a favorite of Amanullah's and head of the powerful Charkhi family, long-time enemies of the ruling family, signified his desire to return from exile, repent of old sins, and serve Nadir Shah. After laying careful plans for a tribal revolt in the south, he appeared in Kabul, hoping at the appropriate time to unseat Nadir Shah. His plans were discovered, and on November 8, 1932, he departed from life at the mouth of a cannon in the traditional Afghan way. His execution, however justified in fact, served to increase the hatred of the tribes which supported him for the dynasty.

Kabul was able to put down a Ghilzai revolt in 1937 without very

great difficulty, but in the spring of 1938 a new challenge developed. A Syrian adventurer, Said al-Kalani, known as the Shami Pir, appeared in Waziristan. He was reported to be a relative of the Tarzi family, leaders of Amanullah's reform program and from which he had taken his queen, Suraya. The Shami Pir issued a call to war to restore Amanullah from Kaniguram in the heart of the Mahsud country. The Wazirs and Mahsuds obligingly rose, and a large *lashkar* started for the border, notwithstanding the plenitude of local amusement centering on the Fakir of Ipi and a British campaign.

The escapade of 1929 was not to be repeated, however. After frantic and vehement Afghan protests, the Indian Political Department, with an eye on the war clouds gathering in Europe, managed to get hold of the Shami Pir. He was put in an airplane with £ 20,000 in gold sovereigns to distract his attention and deposited back in Damascus.

These lessons were not lost on the Kabul Government. What £ 20,000 could stop, a similar or smaller sum could start. Afghan subsidies to the Pathan tribes, especially those on the British side of the Durand Line, were stepped up. *Khilats* (robes of honor) were liberally distributed to visiting *maliks* in royal audiences in Kabul.

Large-scale participation in the Kashmir *jihad* (see Chapter X) by Afghan tribesmen also reminded the Kabul regime of its lack of control over the tribes. Indian support for "Pukhtunistan" required some *quid pro quo* from Afghanistan, and Kabul tried to provide it by opposing the Kashmir *jihad* in every way possible. Under orders from the government, the Jamaat-ul-Ulami, the official religious council of the nation, denounced the tribal movement and denied it the status of *jihad*.

The Jamaat, however, was composed almost entirely of young, government-trained divines, and the real religious influence was elsewhere. The grand old man of religio-political intrigue in Afghanistan, the late Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar, made it clear he did not share the government's viewpoint. Nur-i-Masheikh, a revered and respected *mullah* of the old school, publicly condemned the Jamaat's *fatwah* against the *jihad* and urged the Muslims of Afghanistan to participate.

The Afghan tribesmen knew their own minds well enough without either political or religious guidance. They went to Kashmir in large numbers. Whether or not the Pakistan government could have prevented the tribal invasion is debatable. It is clear, however, that the Afghan government, despite invocation of the highest religious authority and maximum official pressure, was unable to do so and even failed in its attempts to prevent its own nationals from participating.

“PUKHTUNISTAN”

The Afghan concept of an independent Pathan state is much more elaborate than that concocted by Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan. While at times the “Pukhtunistan” advocates in Kabul have indicated that they would be willing to settle for an area roughly encompassing the old N-WFP and Tribal Territory, the new state as more frequently defined would also include Baluchistan, Kalat, and the southern Baluch states of Las Bela, Mekran, and Kharan. Together, these areas constitute only slightly less than one half of the total territory of West Pakistan.

The “Pukhtunishness” of such a state is questionable. There are few Pushtu speakers in the Hazara District east of the Indus or in Chitral State. Baluchistan, the Baluch States, and the lower part of Dera Ismail Khan District include only minorities of Pathans. The Afghan proposal also included the minute enclave of Gwadur on the Mekran coast which until 1958 was under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. No attention was paid to the international problem involved.

Most interestingly of all for a state basing its claims to existence on racial, linguistic, and cultural identity, Kabul’s “Pukhtunistan” does not include any of the five million or more Pathans dwelling west of the Durand Line (*i.e.*, in Afghanistan).

From 1948 onward a careful and intensive propaganda campaign on behalf of the proposed state has been carried on in the outside world, the main instruments being Afghan diplomatic personnel and establishments. Books have been produced; maps printed; and “citizens” of “Pukhtunistan” have appeared at private international gatherings. Radio Kabul has devoted much air time to news of events in “Pukhtunistan” and to anti-Pakistan material in Pushtu designed to inflame the tribes. This barrage tapered off considerably in 1956-59, as Kabul and Karachi gradually moved toward a rapprochement, but rose again in 1960-61 as relations once again deteriorated.

In the beginning, Pakistani officials took pains to deny the existence of “Pukhtunistan” and to denounce the motives behind it. In January, 1950, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan called the demand for “a so-called free Pukhtunistan entirely a figment of the imagination of certain individuals in Afghanistan”.⁶ Later, Pakistan adopted a policy of pretending to ignore the whole agitation as an idle Afghan fancy inspired by jealousy, hatred, and Indian and perhaps Soviet support. Karachi’s

⁶ *Debates of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Karachi, 9 January 1950.*

suggestions for solution were usually couched in terms of bland appeals to "Islamic brotherhood" and "Muslim solidarity". Generally, Karachi has refused to discuss "Pukhtunistan" with Afghan officials, although an indirect acknowledgement of the existence of the problem was included in a communiqué issued after the visit of Prime Minister Daud to Karachi in 1957. In 1960-61, President Ayub embarked on a "hard" policy, aimed at proving to the Afghans that their demands for "Pukhtunistan" would cost them heavily if persisted in. To date, the result has been merely an intensification of "propaganda" and tribal agitation.

A meaningful description of "Pukhtunistan" is not easy. Much is form without substance, and even the form has changed from time to time. The amount of cohesion within the whole can only be guessed at. Yet there are certain important factors associated with it.

According to Kabul, the governing body of "Pukhtunistan" consists of a president, under whom there are several department heads, and a national assembly. The assembly is divided into southern, central, and northern sections. For years, the president was the Fakir of Ipi. His department heads lived with him in cliffside caves at Gorwekht, which also housed stores of food and arms and a small Pushtu printing press on which a monthly newspaper was produced. Ipi claimed control of an area of 5,000 square miles centering on Gorwekht, but actually managed to assert his authority in considerably less than 500 square miles.

Most notable among the department heads in 1954 were Muhammad Zahir Shah, who held the thankless position of chief of internal affairs, and Ramazani, chief of publicity and sometimes president of the central section of the national assembly.

The national assembly, sometimes referred to by the tribesmen as the *loe jirga*, includes a member or two from practically each of the major hill tribes and a few individuals from the settled districts of Pakistan. The southern section is located at Gorwekht; the central section in the Tirah; and the northern section in the Mohmand country above the Kabul River. Meetings are rare and little, if any, business appears to have been conducted. Indeed, the whole "governmental organization" of "Pukhtunistan" appears to exist in theory rather than in fact, and even the theory is often elusive.

The "Pukhtunistan" leaders are all outlawed in Pakistan. Most of them spend a major portion of their time in Kabul where they are the responsibility of the *Kabaile*, the Afghan Ministry of Tribal Affairs. When in their own areas, they receive support from local Afghan officials. Most "Pukhtunistan" leaders are men of substantial reputation in their own

tribes, although it is difficult to assess the amount of influence they retain on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line.

Notable among the "Pukhtunistan" *maliks* in 1954 were Wali Khan,⁷ formerly leading *malik* of the Kuki Khel Afridis; Said Ahmad of the Zakka Khel Afridis; Mira Jan (Sial), a Mohmand poet and warrior; Amin Jan, another Mohmand; Aurangzeb Khan, a Mahsud; Ayub Khan, an Achakzai chief from Baluchistan; Mullah Jangri Sher Ali, a Mahsud lieutenant of the Fakir of Ipi from the early days; Muhammad Arbab Khan, an exile from Swabi *tahsil* of Mardan District; and Shahzada Khan, brother of the Adam Khel Afridi, Ajab Khan, who made history thirty years ago with the kidnaping of Mollie Ellis from Kohat. (See Chapter VII.)

Individually, these men are impressive personalities, and in company they present an impressive assembly. The power of each, however, is based on traditional tribal ties and obligations and not on their followers' allegiance to the idea of "Pukhtunistan". To date, there has been no indication that any large number of tribesmen are eager to rally to the standard that has brought together some of their *maliks*. Nevertheless, in the Tirah, sections of the Mohmand country, and around Gorwekht, the rebel *maliks* have been able to exert a certain amount of influence.

In these small portions of its national territory, Pakistan has been unwilling and perhaps unable to exert its authority directly. However unimportant, the continued existence of these enclaves represents a thorn in the side of Rawalpindi and gives a semblance of reality to "Pukhtunistan". No such situation exists in any of the rest of the areas claimed for "Pukhtunistan", for in these the Pakistani administration is in complete and apparently unchallenged control.

The feelings of the mass of the tribesmen toward "Pukhtunistan" are not easy to determine, but from 1948 to the present, there has been no evidence of any mass support for the movement. Clandestine agitation directed from across the border has been continual, but the author in the course of prolonged visits to the area in 1951-54 was unable to discover any significant indigenous support for the new state, even in situations where there could be no suspicion of Pakistani intimidation.

The "Pukhtunistan" movement has been presented to the outside world almost exclusively through Afghan channels. Approach to it by a foreigner is likewise through Afghan officialdom. A leading Afghan ex-

⁷ Wali Khan returned in 1959 and made his peace with the Government of Pakistan.

ponent of the movement in recent years was Sardar Najibullah Khan, successively Afghan ambassador to New Delhi, London, and Washington (now retired). Najibullah had also conducted the first negotiations with Pakistan at the end of 1947 and in the early months of 1948 when he headed a mission to Karachi. Another Afghan official who has played a prominent role in the "Pukhtunistan" question is Abdur-Rahman Pazhwak, most recently chief of the Afghan delegation to the United Nations. Pazhwak devoted his considerable talents as a writer to the cause in a number of booklets produced while he was press attaché in London.⁸

Within Afghanistan, contact with "Pukhtunistan" is arranged through the *Kabaile* whose able director, Mir Shamsuddin Majruh, is in close touch with tribal affairs on both sides of the border. Most of the *maliks* mentioned above are generally available in Kabul for interviews with outsiders. In 1954, for the first time in almost twenty years, a foreign correspondent was able to interview the Fakir of Ipi at Gorwekht and took the "Pukhtunistan President" very seriously indeed.⁹ Shortly afterward two Russian officials, Messrs. Alexovitch and Demrovitch, members of a Soviet technical mission to Kabul, called upon the Fakir at his headquarters.¹⁰

The main source of funds for "Pukhtunistan" is the Afghan government. There is reason to suspect that for a time some financial support was received from Indian sources. Indeed at one time it was reported that New Delhi was attempting to arrange direct payment to Ipi rather than supplying funds through Kabul. In 1952-53, the flow of money to Ipi was greatly reduced, and rumors of a rupture between Ipi and the "Pukhtunistan" leaders in Kabul were common. However, in 1954 the subsidies were apparently resumed through Faiz Muhammad, the Afghan governor of the Southern Province. To date there has been no reason to believe that financial support has been given to the "Pukhtunistan" movement by any other outside source. The total sum, whatever it may be, can fairly safely be assumed to be less than the amount spent by Pakistan on subsidies for loyal tribes.

⁸ E.g., Pazhwak, Abdur Rahman, *Afghanistan* (London: Afghanistan Information Bureau, 1952); *The Pakhtun Question* (Sussex: The Key Press, n.d.); *Pukhtunistan* (London: Afghanistan Information Bureau, n.d.).

⁹ Christopher Rand, "Our Far-Flung Correspondents: From the Sweet to the Bitter", *The New Yorker*, February 19, 1955, pp. 100-115.

¹⁰ A somewhat garbled account of the visit appeared in the *New York Times*, February 9, 1955.

Support for "Pukhtunistan" reaches to the very top of the Afghan official hierarchy. The tribesmen are welcomed in Kabul and on holidays given public honor by King Zahir Shah. Prime Minister Daud Muhammad Khan has allowed his own position and personal prestige to become closely associated with the movement, and his freedom of action in regard to it has been somewhat limited.

In practical terms, "Pukhtunistani" pressure against the Frontier area has been confined almost exclusively to Tribal Territory. It has at various times apparently included the offering of rewards for the killing of designated Pakistani officials in the agencies. *Lashkars* invaded Pakistani territory occasionally during 1950-54 in order to attempt to arouse support by planting the "Pukhtun flag". Probably the most noted of these was a gathering of 5,000 tribesmen, mainly Afridis and Shinwaris, near Fort Jamrud early in 1952, and a *lashkar* of about the same size which tried to cut the Peshawar-Kohat road in December of the same year. The announced purpose of the latter was to plant the flag on the banks of the Indus. Both were under the leadership of Malik Wali Khan. Mohmand *lashkars* organized by Hassan Khan, an Afghan Mohmand leader, crossed the border in 1954 and held *jirgas* on Pakistani territory north of the Kabul River.

In the popular tradition of the Frontier, reprisals for activities against "Pukhtunistan" are also resorted to occasionally. In the fall of 1954 a driver-training convoy of Pakistan Air Force trucks was ambushed between Kohat and Bannu. Three airmen were killed and one carried off to Gardez. The action was subsequently announced as revenge for the air-force bombing of Wali Khan's *lashkar* two years earlier and the destruction from the air of his home in the Tirah.

Special attention has been devoted to undermining the loyalty of Scout and *khassadar* members. About a dozen members of the Khyber Rifles went over to "Pukhtunistan" in 1953 and were subsequently maintained in Kabul and Jelalabad at official expense. Promises of generous allowances and high positions in the "Pukhtunistan" government were made to prominent leaders of the Pakistani tribes. Two princes of Chitral, Aziz-ur-Rahman and Muhammad Usman Khan, adhered to the cause in 1950 but returned and declared their allegiance to Pakistan in 1953. The Khan of Nawagai, a leading Mohmand *malik*, accepted an invitation to be honored in Jelalabad in the spring of 1953, but publicly declared himself in favor of Pakistan during a visit to Peshawar in 1954. Another notable penitent was Khalifa Mehr Dil, at one time designated by the Fakir of Ipi as his successor. Mehr Dil surrendered to Pakistani officials

in Bannu in November, 1954, bringing seventy followers with him. He had been one of Ipi's principal lieutenants since joining him after deserting from the Tochi Scouts in 1936. (Mehr Dil's surrender and declaration of allegiance may not have been altogether spontaneous as when he decided to make his peace he had been trapped and surrounded by Pakitani forces.)

The scheming and counter-scheming that has gone on between tribal leaders and officials on both sides is not without its amusing aspects. For instance, in 1948 Kabul sent the Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar to the tribal area to give the "Pukhtunistan" cause a blessing with his venerable presence. The Hazrat Sahib distributed money as freely as blessings but met with a cool response. Secret emissaries from Pakistan who were present in the *jirgas* addressed by the Hazrat Sahib gave him a message from al-Haj Muhammad Amin Husseini, the ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. The Grand Mufti ordered the Hazrat Sahib to cease stirring up trouble between Islamic nations. The Hazrat Sahib yielded to the undoubted master of the craft and returned to Kabul. Here rumors were spread that he had pocketed the subsidies intended for the tribes.

This kind of intrigue and sporadic border skirmishing is as old as the Frontier itself. It has waxed and waned since Partition, reaching one high point in the period of 1950-54, tapering off for the next five years or so, and rising again in 1960-61 when pitched battles took place in Bajaur and Pakistan deposed the Nawab of Dir. To a large extent, the amount of pressure generated at any given time is determined in Karachi and Kabul rather than on the Frontier itself. Not only does this make pacification virtually impossible, but turmoil continued over a prolonged period tends to become self-perpetuating and can easily get out of control.

In this regard, one of "Pukhtunistan's" most dangerous instruments is the Khushal Khan School in Kabul. The school is located near the tomb of the Mogul emperor, Babur, on a hillside in the outskirts of the city. It had in 1954 about 500 students from age six to age eighteen. Another hundred older boys lived at the Khushal Khan hostel but attended the various Afghan colleges in Kabul.

Almost all of these boys receive their education, food, and lodging through scholarships provided by the Afghan government. Most of them are from Tribal Territory in Pakistan. The Khushal Khan School, unlike other Afghan educational institutions, which are under the control of the Ministry of Education, is directly under the *Kabaile*. The facilities and the standard of teaching are probably the best in Afghanistan. The language of instruction is Pushtu and emphasis is on Pathan history,

literature, and tradition. The ordinary secondary subjects, as well as English and *Islamiyat*, are also given.

All the students live together in an atmosphere steeped in Pathan culture. Boys from all the important tribes sit down together on a basis of friendly equality unknown and unthinkable to their fathers. Traditional concepts of *Pukhtunwali*, which at home are used and understood primarily in terms of intertribal feuds, are here taught in terms of a Pathan nation.

In the Khushal Khan School, at least, a real Pathan nationalism has been developed. It is being carefully nurtured, and a sense of an important and demanding mission is instilled in the boys at their most impressionable age. Some Pakistani *maliks* opposed to "Pukhtunistan" admit to sending their sons to the school for a free education in their heritage better than anything they could receive on the Pakistani side of the line. These men discredit the idea that their sons can acquire any political ideas opposed to their own.

This belief is of doubtful validity. The boys will necessarily emerge as leaders in their home communities. As group after group leaves the school, they will constitute a force of continuing importance in their own right — far more so than the *maliks* who now head the "Pukhtunistan" movement and whose keenly developed sense of political expediency makes it possible for them at any time to accept a solution of the border problem satisfactory to either Rawalpindi or Kabul. However artificial may have been the beginnings of the Khushal Khan School, the results may well be beyond the control of anyone outside the tribes themselves.

There have been occasional defections from the Khushal Khan School. Now and again boys have run back to their homes as do school boys the world over. One group defection in 1954 was considered important enough for the Afghan prime minister himself to come to the school and lecture the students on their ingratitude. The majority of the group, however, appears to be sincerely and fanatically devoted to "Pukhtunistan". Most do not realize its lack of reality in a wider context.

The wider implications of the "Pukhtunistan" movement were clearly demonstrated in 1955. Early in that year Pakistan began to move toward a merger of all the political sub-units of West Pakistan into a "one-unit" province. Some of these were sub-units included in the Afghan claim for "Pukhtunistan", and reaction in Kabul was violent. The reaction culminated in an incendiary speech by Afghan Prime Minister Daud Khan on March 28. The next day Afghan mobs, unmolested by the police, sacked Pakistani diplomatic establishments in Jelalabad and Kandahar, and the embassy in Kabul.

Pakistan reacted with equal vehemence. The Afghan consulate in Peshawar was attacked. A Mahsud *jirga* in South Waziristan and a meeting of *maliks* claiming to represent 10,000 North Waziristan tribesmen ostentatiously asked permission to march on Kabul to avenge the national honor. The Pakistani press openly raised the question of the right of the present dynasty to the Afghan throne. Early in May, the Afghan army was mobilized to "resist outside aggression". An unofficial embargo on Afghan imports through Pakistan was enforced. Afghan diplomats were called home. When for the first time in several years a major border incident took place between Pakistani and Indian troops on the Kashmir border, the old fear of an Afghan-Indian pincers was revived in Karachi. After several months of mediation, principally by Saudi Arabia, a settlement was patched up, but the ability of "Pukhtunistan" to touch off a major international crisis had been amply demonstrated.

A second demonstration took place in the fall of 1961 when Afghan-supported tribal agitation in Bajaur and Pakistani countermeasures led to a deterioration in relations between the two countries which finally resulted in a break in diplomatic relations and the closing of the international border to trade and transit. The result was Afghanistan's virtually complete dependence on the Soviet Union for transportation and communication facilities and a necessary cutting back of US assistance programs, supplies and equipment which normally flowed through Pakistan. However reluctant the Afghans might have been to see the consequent increase in already substantial Soviet influence, they clearly were willing to accept it rather than compromise on "Pukhtunistan".

To sum up, "Pukhtunistan" as a national entity has little basis in reality. It is impractical economically, politically, and geographically. Insofar as it is a nationalist movement at all, it is before its time as far as the vast bulk of the tribesmen is concerned. However, it is of real significance as a continuing source of irritation on a sensitive border and as a dangerous weapon in broader conflicts. "Pukhtunistan" is an expression of Kabul's attempt to cope with two vital and lasting concerns of Afghanistan: historical irredentist urgings and the need to control a powerful and irresponsible threat to national security. The movement is a focus and magnifier of Pakistani-Afghan tensions as much as a cause of them. The solution of the underlying problems, if there is to be one, is yet in the future. The Frontier has demonstrated the ability to remain for prolonged periods in a nerve-wracking state of suspended eruption. Indeed, such a situation is frequently to the taste and profit of its inhabitants.

XIII

“THE GREAT GAME” GOES ON

INTRODUCTION

As has already been indicated, time was called in “The Great Game” between Russia and England with the signing of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. There was a brief resurgence of competition in Persia in 1911, but the Frontier and the areas directly connected with it continued undisturbed through the remaining few years of Tsarist rule.

The traditional struggle for control of Central Asia began again, however, almost immediately after establishment of the Bolshevik state. Unfortunately many documents which might shed new light on this twentieth-century version of “The Great Game” remain unavailable in both Soviet and British archives. The outline of events given below, therefore, is somewhat fragmentary. Insofar as it concentrates almost entirely on matters affecting the Frontier, it covers only one part — and that not necessarily the most important — of the conflict between Imperial Britain and Soviet Russia in the decade after World War I.

INTERVENTION IN THE TRANS-CAUCASUS

The British played a leading role in all of the Allied interventions in Russia after the Bolshevik revolution. However, the only one which concerns us directly here is the intervention in the Trans-Caucasus area in the summer of 1918.

The immediate cause of British concern over Central Asia at this time was twofold. Thousands of German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Rumanian prisoners of war, who had been imprisoned by the Tsarist regime in Turkestan, had been released by the Bolsheviks when they took Russia out of the war. These men were roaming about Turkestan, and attempts

were being made to organize them into new fighting units. At the same time the Turks, who were still in the war despite their defeats in the Middle East, were preparing a drive into the Caspian area. These developments, in addition to the statements calling for liberation of the colonial areas which were already beginning to emanate from the Bolsheviks, were judged in London to be a significant potential threat to the Indian Empire.

The danger was intensified by German activity in Afghanistan, where the remarkably capable Wassmuss, von Niedermeyer, and von Hertig were attempting to stir up the tribes for an attack on the Frontier. Such an attack, they promised, would be supported by the prisoners of war in Turkestan.

The British decided to meet the threat, as Sir Olaf Caroe puts it, "by the use of the smallest possible force at the farthest accessible point on the glacis of the Indian fort".¹ The fact that the particular point on the glacis which was chosen belonged to someone else was not allowed to deter the operation.

Two small British forces moved from Iraq and Iran into the chaotic situation in Central Asia where Red, White, and Turkic forces were struggling for supremacy. Both British forces were Anglo-Indian in make-up, drawing on such famous Indian army units as the Guides. One, known as the "North Persian Cordon", set out under General Malleon from Meshed, took Merv, but failed in an attempt to occupy Tashkent. It did, however, in collaboration with a group of Mensheviks, manage to obtain for some time control of the Trans-Caspian Railway, thus cutting off communication between the Bolshevik regime in Tashkent and its parent group in European Russia. The other, known as "Dunsterforce", under Major General Dunsterville, moved from Baghdad to Enzeli (Pahlavi) on the Caspian shore, and on August 16, 1918, went on to Baku, where a shaky Soviet government had been set up. Within a month, both British and Soviets were driven out by an unexpected Turkish advance led by Nuri Pasha, a brother of Enver Pasha, who was subsequently to play an important role in the struggle for Central Asia.

In the withdrawal from Baku a number of Soviet commissars were arrested by the White General Deniken with whom the British were collaborating. Twenty-six of the commissars were "sentenced" to exile in India. Put on a train in Krasnovodsk to begin their journey, they were

¹ Sir Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism* (London: Macmillan, 1953), p. 115.

almost immediately taken off again outside the town and shot on the spot. Meanwhile, the British force which had fallen back on Enzeli helped General Deniken to secure control of the Russian Caspian fleet which was tied up there and to refit it for use against the Bolsheviks. Before the fleet could get into action, it was taken for the Soviets through a daring maneuver by F. F. Rashkolnikov, a Red naval officer, whom we shall meet again later.²

The British role in these two events was remembered and bitterly resented by the Bolsheviks long after the interventions were ended. Some Soviet leaders subsequently insisted that the British had been responsible for the execution of the commissars. The Soviet Government itself brought the matter up in a note of May 11, 1923, rebutting British charges of Bolshevik anti-British activity.³

BRITISH ACTIVITY IN KASHGAR

Meanwhile, the British were also actively opposing the Bolsheviks in another key area of Central Asia. In the spring of 1918 a British mission consisting of three officers experienced in Central Asian affairs was sent to the British consulate general in Kashgar in Chinese Turkestan. Two of the officers, Lt. Col. F. M. Bailey and Major L. V. S. Blackner, went on to Tashkent in August to establish contact with the Bolshevik regime there and to assess its strength and intentions.⁴ The third officer, Lt. Col. Percy Etherton, replaced Sir George Macartney as consul general in Kashgar.

In Tashkent, Bailey received a far from friendly reception from the Soviet regime, which feared an attack from the British forces in the Caspian area, and had to go underground almost immediately. After several months of fantastic experiences, Bailey managed to escape to Persia via Bokhara by enrolling himself in the Bolshevik secret service for the task of catching himself. While in the Tashkent area, he set up

² Xenia J. Eudin and Harold H. Fisher, *Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-27; A Documentary Survey* (Stanford: University Press, 1957), p. 226; W. P. Coates and Z. K. Coates, *Armed Intervention in Russia, 1918-22* (London: V. Gallancz, 1935), pp. 61-64.

³ Eudin and Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 226; *Parliamentary Papers, 1923*, Cmd. 1874 (Russia No. 3), "Reply of the Soviet Government to His Majesty's Government respecting the Relations between the Two Governments", p. 7.

⁴ See Bailey's own account of his adventures in Frederick M. Bailey, *Mission in Tashkent* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1946).

a fairly elaborate intelligence apparatus and was in touch both with the White General Kornilov and with the first stages of the Basmachi movement under Irgash in Kokand.

Meanwhile, in Kashgar, Etherton persuaded the Chinese authorities to join him in opposing the Bolsheviks. He rapidly set up an intelligence apparatus which was in contact with anti-Soviet forces in Bokhara and Ferghana and which also searched out and turned over to the Chinese for imprisonment suspected Bolshevik agents and sympathizers in Chinese Turkestan. Etherton himself led raids on suspected Bolshevik hide-outs in Kashgar and in general appears to have assumed many of the responsibilities of government in the city.⁵

In addition to running an anti-Soviet newspaper and propaganda service, the doughty colonel succeeded in getting a prohibition on the export of Chinese textiles to the Bolsheviks and in turning back several Soviet missions which attempted to establish contact with the Chinese authorities in Kashgar. On the assumption that it was supported or at least approved by the Bolsheviks, he also harassed the lucrative gun-running trade operated by Afghans and Pathans between Yarkand and the Frontier.⁶

Etherton remained in Kashgar throughout 1919 and 1920. In the latter year, he was in correspondence with the terrified Amir of Bokhara, who offered to cede Bokhara to the British Empire in return for British assumption of responsibility for protecting from the Bolsheviks the Amir's personal assets of £ 35 million. In September, 1920, Etherton reluctantly rejected the offer on the grounds that "it had some time since been decided to discontinue assistance hitherto granted to various anti-Bolshevik organizations".⁷

Despite his rejection of the Amir's offer, Etherton apparently did not entirely discontinue his operations at that time. Some months later, after the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of March 16, 1921, he commented that he was "placed in an invidious position" because he had not known that the agreement (which called for an end to hostile activities against each other by both parties) was pending, and "therefore had no opportunity of preparing the way for a cessation of the counter-propaganda which I had been directed to carry out".⁸

⁵ Percy Thomas Etherton, *In the Heart of Asia* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1926), p. 62.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 123, 229-30, 268-71.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 169-71.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 216-17.

SOVIET ACTIVITY

The Bolsheviks had little need — even if they had been able — to fight back directly against the interventions, which soon collapsed more or less of their own weight. Nonetheless, they lost little time in coming to grips with the British in Asia. The weapons they used were somewhat different from those of Tsarist days and in the new climate of world opinion even more dangerous.

While still fighting to establish their position within the former Tsarist domains, Soviet theoreticians made no bones about the importance of the rest of Asia, especially India, to the worldwide Communist revolution. World War I had been over for less than three weeks and British forces were still in the Caspian area when Stalin called into session in Moscow a Congress of Muslim Communists. He told them:

No one can erect a bridge between the West and the East as easily and quickly as you can. This is because a door is open for you in Persia, India, Afghanistan, and China. The liberation of the people of these countries from the yoke of the imperialists . . . would undermine imperialism at its very foundations.⁹

In May, 1919, an article in *Zhizn Natsionalnostei*, the official organ of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, proposed to implement Stalin's challenge by the establishment in Turkestan of special battalions of Soviet Muslims for an attack on British imperialism in the East and for the creation of a propaganda apparatus there to utilize "specially-trained emissaries" for the same purpose. The article concluded with the statement: "Cossack spears appearing on the Himalayan summits were Britain's nightmare in the past. Now there will be the spears of Russian proletarian Muslims who will be coming to the rescue of their brothers in Persia, India and Afghanistan".¹⁰

A few months later Lenin himself, in a letter to the Communists of Turkestan published in *Pravda*, called for the strengthening of the Communist Party in Central Asia "in order that we may struggle in all honesty with the world imperialism headed by the British".¹¹

⁹ *Zhizn Natsionalnostei*, No. 3, November 24, 1918, p. 2, quoted in Xenia J. Eudin and Robert C. North, *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-27: A Documentary Survey* (Stanford: University Press, 1957), pp. 77-78. *Zhizn Natsionalnostei* was the official organ of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, which Stalin then headed.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 19, May 26, 1919, p. 2; reproduced in Eudin and North, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

¹¹ *Petrogradskaia Pravda*, No. 259, November 13, 1919; quoted in Eudin and North, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

A second Congress of Muslim Communists was convened in Moscow in November, 1919. At this meeting, a resolution was passed announcing that the Third International would henceforth regard “India, Egypt, Turkey, and other states which are under the yoke of imperialism . . . as sovereign and independent”. The declaration ended with the hope that this would rouse “the revolutionary spirit” in the countries concerned.¹²

In September, 1920, the Bolsheviks’ preparation for a revolutionary campaign in Asia culminated in the famous Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East. Here the Bolshevik leaders, Zinoviev, Radek, and Pavovich, vied with one another in preaching revolution to the almost 2,000 Asians who attended — among them Enver Pasha. Zinoviev hailed the creation of a Red Army in the East which was to “start a revolt in the rear of the British . . . and cut down every impudent British officer who has been accustomed to being master in Turkey, Persia, India and China”.¹³

The next step was the setting up of a permanent Council for Propaganda and Action of the Peoples of the East. This soon became three councils, one with headquarters in Baku to direct work in the Near East, one in Irkutsk for the Far East, and one in Tashkent for “Middle Asia”, including Afghanistan and India.¹⁴ We are not concerned here with the activities of the Baku and Irkutsk centers (the former never really got organized), but the Tashkent center was to become an object of loathing and fear in India for the next few years.

THE TASHKENT SCHOOL

From the beginning of the Bolshevik regime, Tashkent had been the center of activity directed against India. Early in 1919, while Colonel Bailey was still underground in the city, Professor Barkatullah, one of a group of Indian revolutionaries which had founded a “Provisional Government of India” in Berlin during World War I, appeared in Tash-

¹² *Zhizn Natsionalnostei*, No. 47, December 14, 1919, p. 2; reproduced in Eudin and North, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-65.

¹³ *Pervyi sezd narodov Vostoka, Baku, 1-8 sentiabria 1920 g. Stenograficheskie otchety* (The First Congress of the Peoples of the East, Baku, September 1-8, 1920, Stenographic Report) (Moscow: n.p., 1920), extracted in Eudin and North, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

¹⁴ *Zhizn Natsionalnostei*, No. 46, December 15, 1920, pp. 1-2; quoted in Eudin and North, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

kent. Barkatullah was in close touch with leading figures in Kabul and apparently served as a kind of intermediary between them and the Bolsheviks for the coordination of agitation against India.¹⁵ With Barkatullah in Central Asia was one Mahendra Pratap, who had been President of the "Provisional Government" in Berlin, and who was also active in seeking both Soviet and Afghan help against the British.¹⁶

Early in 1920, a special training school for Indian revolutionaries was set up in Tashkent by the Tashkent branch of the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The school was soon taken over by the Tashkent Bureau of the Communist International, headed by M. N. Roy, a devoted Communist and professional agitator far more capable than either Barkatullah or Pratap.

In October, 1920, thirty-six Indians, most of them members of the *Hijrat* movement (composed of Muslims who were abandoning life in India in protest against British treatment of Turkey after World War I), reached Tashkent, where they were welcomed by Roy and enrolled in the school. Having completed a nine-month course in Tashkent, three of the thirty-six, Shaukat Osmani, Abd-ul-Majid and Abd-ul-Qadir Sehrai were sent on to Moscow for further training. The three were subsequently joined in Moscow at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East by a number of others when the Tashkent school was closed in March, 1921, as a result of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of March 16, 1921.¹⁷ According to the British, the Tashkent school had at its disposal during its brief existence two million gold rubles.¹⁸

In June, 1921, fifteen of the Tashkent alumni were arrested in Peshawar while returning to India and sentenced to imprisonment in what was known as the Tashkent Conspiracy Case. In November, 1922, seven more were apprehended out of some sixty-two the British claimed were sent into India. Shortly afterwards, a number of £ 100 banknotes issued by Lloyd's of London to a Soviet trade official there were discovered to

¹⁵ Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 144. Barkatullah gave a succinct statement of his political philosophy to *Izvestia* in 1919: "I am not a communist or a socialist, but my political program has been so far that of driving the Britons from Asia" (*Izvestia*, No. 95, May 4, 1919, p. 1; quoted in Eudin and North, *op. cit.*, p. 181).

¹⁶ Bailey, in his disguise as a Soviet Cheka officer, treated himself to a long conversation with Pratap in a hotel in Kazan outside Bokhara. See Bailey, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-30.

¹⁷ Saumyendranath Tagore, *Historical Development of the Communist Movement in India* (Calcutta: Communist Party of India, 1944), p. 3.

¹⁸ *Parliamentary Papers, 1927*, Cmd. 2895, (Russia No. 3), "A Selection of Papers dealing with the Relations between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government, 1921-27", p. 8.

have been cashed in India by a revolutionary known to be in touch with the Tashkent alumni and with the Soviet mission in Kabul. The British claimed that the Fourth Congress of the Third International meeting in November, 1922, had allotted £ 120,000 for subversive activity in India.¹⁹ M. N. Roy himself was caught returning to India in 1931 and arrested on earlier charges.

SOVIET-AFGHAN COLLABORATION

The Bolsheviks found willing allies in Kabul for their anti-British activities.

The Afghan Amir Habibullah was assassinated in February, 1919. Within three months, Habibullah's third son, Amanullah, had won the succession for himself over an uncle and two elder brothers and had launched a war against British India. In April, 1919, Amanullah sent General Muhammad Wali Khan to Moscow with a letter addressed to Lenin. Included in the letter were recognition of the Soviet state and a request for arms to aid in the war against the British. An Afghan consul general was stationed at Tashkent; his principal task seems to have been support of Professor Barkatullah's anti-British activities.

Lenin replied to Amanullah's letter, recognizing Afghanistan as an independent state and proposing “mutual assistance against any attempt of the foreign vultures” to deprive either Afghanistan or the Soviet Union of their newly-established independence.²⁰ This exchange took place several months before the British, in the Treaty of Rawalpindi of August 8, 1919, officially acknowledged the right of the Afghans to handle their own foreign affairs.

A revolt planned to take place in Peshawar at the same time as the advance of the Afghan army into Kurram, was engineered by the Afghan postmaster in Peshawar, possibly with some assistance from Pratap and Barkatullah. The uprising was nipped in the bud by the Chief Commissioner, Sir George Roos-Keppel, who blockaded the old city of Peshawar and turned off the water supply.

While Delhi and Whitehall debated the peace terms to be imposed on Afghanistan, word came down of a Soviet offer to Amanullah to return

¹⁹ *Parliamentary Papers, 1923*, Cmd. 1869, (Russia No. 2), “Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government respecting the Relations between the Governments”, pp. 8-9.

²⁰ Eudin and North, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

to Afghanistan the Penjdeh district, the seizure of which forty years earlier had brought Britain and Tsarist Russia to the brink of war.

At the end of 1919, a Soviet mission under Brovini came to Kabul, and a permanent representative, IA. Z. Suritz, was assigned to the Afghan capital. Nothing came of the proposals for the return of Penjdeh, but the Afghan Soviet rapprochement continued apace. On September 13, 1920, a draft of an Afghan-Soviet agreement was initialed in Kabul, and on February 28, 1921, a treaty was signed in Moscow. This 1921 treaty provided for the establishment of consulates by the respective parties (five Soviet consulates in Afghanistan and seven Afghan consulates in the Soviet Union), for free transit of Afghan goods through the Soviet Union, and for mutual recognition of the independence of the khanates of Bokhara and Khiva. Article X provided that the Soviet Union would "give material and financial assistance to the Government of Afghanistan". The British subsequently charged that this assistance consisted of a subsidy of Rs. 1 million gold or silver annually.²¹

To add insult to injury, immediately upon completion of the Afghan-Soviet Treaty of February, 1921, Moscow replaced Suritz with F. F. Rashkolnikov, the Red Navy officer who had recaptured the Caspian fleet from the British three years earlier at Enzeli. The Soviet Union also announced its intention of opening consulates at Kandahar and Ghazni on the edge of the Indian Frontier.

In June of 1921, Stalin described Afghanistan as the country "through which the Communist International maintains direct communications further south with British India, propaganda in which is the primary objective of the Eastern Secretariat".²²

Rashkolnikov set out at once to expand and strengthen these communications. Professor Barkatullah and several other Indian revolutionaries who had been in contact with the Bolsheviks after the end of World War I were brought to Kabul. One Dr. Hafiz, "a well-known Indian anarchist who had been studying the manufacture of bombs in Vienna", was brought to the Afghan capital to set up a bomb factory.²³

²¹ Texts in Leonard Shapiro, *Soviet Treaty Series*, Vol. I (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1950), pp. 61, 96-97; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1427, Cmd. 2895, p. 9.

²² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1927, Cmd. 2895, (Russia, No. 3), p. 5.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

CEMAL AND ENVER

Accompanying Barkatullah to Kabul was Cemal Pasha, comrade of Enver Pasha and Nuri Pasha. A word about the Turkish pashas is necessary before discussing Cemal's role in the struggle between Soviet Russia and Imperial Britain for the Central Asian borderland.

Cemal, Enver, and Talat comprised the triumvirate that had been largely responsible for bringing Turkey into the war on the side of Germany in 1914. With Turkey's defeat and the rise of Kemal Atatürk, Cemal and Enver drifted to Bolshevik Russia. Both had vague dreams of a Pan-Islamic state centered on Turkestan, a state which would eventually include Afghanistan and Muslim India. Their ambitions fitted in with Soviet plans directed against India at the time, and both men received support and encouragement from the Bolsheviks.

Enver was one of the principal speakers at the Baku Conference of the Peoples of the East. Shortly afterwards, however, after a stay in Bokhara, he became disillusioned with the Bolsheviks and joined the Basmachis, Central Asian tribesmen who were conducting a guerrilla war against the Soviet regime. Enver sought support for his dreams of a Pan-Islamic state in Afghanistan and was at one time reported to have 1,000 Afghans in his force.²⁴ The revolt was unsuccessful, however, and Enver died fighting a gallant last-ditch stand on August 8, 1922.²⁵

After Enver joined with the Basmachis, Cemal went on to Kabul, his hatred of the British taking priority over his dreams of an Islamic renaissance. There is ample evidence that his activities in Afghanistan were financed by the Bolsheviks and probably to a large extent directed by them also. Cemal set up an "Islamic Revolutionary League", the professed objective of which was to free India from British rule. At the same time, he undertook to train an élite corps of the Afghan army for King Amanullah. He also established contact with the Frontier tribes, still smouldering after the Third British-Afghan War, and met a group of Wazir *maliks* in Kabul in January, 1921. He subsequently visited the tribal area secretly and may have supplied a limited number of arms used in the fighting in Waziristan in 1921-22. According to the British, he had been given Rs. 1 million by the Bolsheviks for this purpose.²⁶

Cemal returned to the Soviet Union for a visit, however, and before his plans for Islamic revolution could get very far, he was murdered at

²⁴ W. P. and Z. K. Coates, *The Soviets in Central Asia*, p. 80.

²⁵ For an account of Enver and the Basmachis, see Caroe, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-130.

²⁶ *Parliamentary Papers, 1927*, Cmd. 2895 (Russia, No. 3), pp. 10-11.

Tiflis on July 21, 1922, probably by the Bolsheviks, who no longer trusted him and in any event felt that he had outlived his usefulness.²⁷

Meanwhile, Rashkolnikov continued busy. Some of his activities are apparent from a series of cables between Kabul and Moscow and Tashkent which came into the hands of the British and were subsequently published by them. On November 8, 1922, Rashkolnikov wired Moscow: "Special attention is now being given to the region north of Peshawar, among the Mohmands, but in this respect we cannot do much owing to the insufficiency of funds".²⁸

On February 17, 1923, Rashkolnikov added in a cable to the Tashkent branch of the Soviet Foreign Office that "the immediate delivery of arms and money would have an immense significance" in instigating and supporting a new Afghan move against British India. Four days later he told Moscow, "I am making arrangements for giving help to Waziristan, probably to the extent of the outlay of 3,000 rubles and 10 boxes of cartridges".²⁹ In addition to subsidizing the tribes, Rashkolnikov also was in contact with revolutionary groups inside India, many of them alumni of the Tashkent school, for whom he requested 25,000 gold rubles from Moscow.³⁰

On March 16, 1923, just before Rashkolnikov was due to return to Moscow for consultation, the Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs instructed him: "Bring with you a concrete proposal in regard to the form and cooperation in assisting the tribes should [sic] . . . Please inform us as to the form of cooperation necessary to ensure local supervision in the distribution of arms".³¹

Rashkolnikov's activities ended a few months later when he was withdrawn as a result of Lord Curzon's "ultimatum" of May 8, 1923, and his intrigues with the tribes resulted in little actual accomplishment. According to British estimates, he spent 800,000 Kabuli rupees between October, 1922, and October, 1923, in his attempts to stir up an attack on British India.³² His main achievement seems to have been to make the tribes that much richer.

²⁷ Caroe, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

²⁸ *Parliamentary Papers, 1923*, Cmd. 1869 (Russia, No. 2), p. 8.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³² *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*

REACTION IN INDIA

The reaction in India to Soviet activity in Central Asia and in Afghanistan was little short of panic. Senior officials in the Government of India, many of whom in their younger days had played a role in "The Great Game" with Tsarist Russia, saw the Bolsheviks as a greater and more immediate threat than the Tsarists had ever been. In the annual *Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Conditions of India* for 1920, the very first words were:

Rarely of recent years has it been so borne upon the students of politics that India is an integral part of Asia as in the case of the period under review. It is impossible on the one hand to understand the relations between India and Afghanistan, and on the other hand, the relations between India and the Frontier Tribes, without some knowledge of the stormy background of Bolshevik activity upon which both in greater or lesser degree depended.³³

Particularly disturbing to the men who ruled India were the Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism of Enver and Cemal. These had direct repercussions in India. Maulana Muhammad Ali led the Muslims of the sub-continent into unprecedented cooperation with the Congress Party in support of the *Khilafat* movement. The *Hijrat* brought thousands of Indian Muslims flocking into Afghanistan in renunciation of British India, not a few of whom subsequently ended up in Tashkent. "From the middle of 1920, the alliance of Bolshevism and Islam was openly proclaimed", concludes the Government of India's official report for that year.³⁴

Our old friends, the followers of Sayyid Ahmad, were credited with a leading role in carrying the alliance inside the borders of India. The Sayyid's colony at Chamarkand was described as "an *entrepot* for the dissemination of Communist propaganda among the tribes of Dir and the Hazara border". One Muhammad Ayub Khan, a former *jagirdar* of Battal in the Hazara District, who had taken refuge in Afghanistan some years earlier, was proscribed for spreading "Bolshevik doctrines under a Pan-Islamic cloak".³⁵

At the same time, the British professed to see a conflict of interest between the Bolshevik and Pan-Islamic aspects of the alliance. The annual *Moral and Material Progress* report for 1922 speculated that King Amanullah was aiming at creation of a great Central Asian feder-

³³ *Moral and Material Progress of India, 1920*, p. 1.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

³⁵ *N-WFP Border Administration Report, 1922-23*, p. 3.

ation under his own direction. "This scheme", the report explained, "naturally does not suit the Bolsheviks who dislike the idea of a strong Islamic *staatsbund* blocking their path to India".³⁶

Amanullah's *staatsbund* failed to appear. The Waziristan revolt of 1921-22 was suppressed. The Bolsheviks consolidated Tsarist acquisitions in Central Asia but, geographically at least, advanced not an inch further along the path to India. The reason they did not do so, however, lay in a diplomatic struggle played out in Europe rather than in any new moves in "The Great Game" in Central Asia.

THE DIPLOMATIC BATTLE

A detailed account of the diplomatic struggle between wily old Britain and the brash new Soviet state would take up more space than can be given here. In brief outline, however, the Soviet Union, despite its expansionist and revolutionary ambitions, was in dire need of a period of peace and renewed contact with the outside world in the early 1920's. The Soviet economy, ravaged by half-a-dozen years of war and revolution, desperately needed imports, both raw materials and capital goods. Britain needed markets for its exports. India, it appeared, was not quite as ready for revolution as Communist theoreticians had at first believed. The Communist International shifted its emphasis eastward where China promised to provide even more fertile ground for activity.

The result of these factors, after a year of negotiation, was the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of March 16, 1921.³⁷ This document accorded the Soviet Union *de facto* recognition, and brought to an end the undeclared war of the Allies against the Bolshevik state. The agreement was concerned primarily with trade, but one of the most sensitive points at issue between the two states was covered in the preamble.

Herein the Soviet Government undertook to refrain from "any attempt by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire, especially in India and in the Independent State of Afghanistan", Britain, in turn, gave "a similar particular undertaking" to the Soviet Government in respect to "those countries which formed part of the former Russian Empire and which have now become independent".³⁸

³⁶ *Moral and Material Progress of India, 1922*, p. 8.

³⁷ Text in Shapiro, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-104.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

This wording represented a considerable concession by Britain, since Foreign Minister Lord Curzon had originally insisted that the ban on anti-British activity by the Soviets also include the Caucasus, Persia, and Asia Minor. In addition, the Soviet Government's pledge was not made binding upon the Comintern which, as both parties well knew, was the source of most of the activities to which the British objected.

Rashkolnikov's activities in Afghanistan, as well as a host of other Communist activities in 1921, 1922, and 1923, soon provided ample evidence to the not altogether surprised British Foreign Office that the Soviet undertaking in the Trade Agreement was of little value. Accordingly, Whitehall took such independent measures as it could to deal with the problem. In the exchange of notes which accompanied the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of November 22, 1921, for example, the Afghan foreign minister was prevailed upon to assure the British that in exchange for the customs exemption provided in Article VII of the Treaty, Afghanistan would “not give the opportunity of establishing a Consul-General or Consul or representatives of the Russian Government at the positions and territories of Jelalabad, Ghazni, and Kandahar, which are contiguous to the Frontiers of India”. This was in clear violation of Article V of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty signed nine months earlier which specifically provided for the establishment of Soviet consulates at Kandahar and Ghazni.³⁹

The British also protested directly to the Soviet Union. On September 7, 1921, Lord Curzon directed a strong note to Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin. The note referred to Soviet support of Indian revolutionaries, including Barkatullah and Dr. Hafiz, the bomb manufacturer, and complained of the Tashkent school. It also protested Soviet activities in Afghanistan, including the support of Cemal, and objected to the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of February 28, 1921.⁴⁰ In a reply of September 27, 1921, Litvinov repudiated the charges as based on false information and forgeries, denied all knowledge of Dr. Hafiz and the Tashkent school, and disassociated the Soviet government from the activities of Cemal in Afghanistan and those of the Third International everywhere.⁴¹

Whitehall sent an acid rebuttal to the Soviet denial but took no further

³⁹ *Parliamentary Papers, 1922*, Cmd. 1786: “Treaty between the British and Afghan Governments, 22 November 1921” (Treaty Series 1922, No. 19); Shapiro, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

⁴⁰ Text of Curzon's note is in *Parliamentary Papers, 1927*, Cmd. 2895 (Russia, No. 3), pp. 4-12.

⁴¹ Text in *ibid.*, pp. 12-16.

action for a year and a half, during which Rashkolnikov pursued his activities vigorously in Kabul, and the alumni of the Tashkent school began to reappear in India in increasing numbers. Then without prior diplomatic warning, Lord Curzon let fly his famous "ultimatum" in a note of May 2, 1923. Curzon's new note recounted numerous violations of the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement and concluded that the agreement would be terminated unless the Soviet officials (including Rashkolnikov) who were guilty of the most flagrant violations were "dismissed and recalled from the scenes of their maleficent labours".⁴²

The Curzon ultimatum stirred up a great outcry both in England and in the Soviet Union. Trotsky, Bukharin, and Radek saw the note as designed to lay the groundwork for another intervention or to provoke the Soviet Union into war. Many English liberals viewed it in much the same light. Even many of the normally anti-Bolshevik conservatives were reluctant to upset the trade arrangements under which they had begun to profit.⁴³

The formal Soviet reply, however, was mild. In a note of June 4, 1923, the Soviet Foreign Office repudiated the charges, specifically denying that Rashkolnikov was guilty of the activities ascribed to him. These activities, the note said, were not those of the Soviet Minister but of "some other person having no connection with the Russian Government, whose name generally accepted rules of international courtesy do not permit the Soviet Government to disclose".⁴⁴ This intriguing reference was most likely meant to apply to Cemal, although why Moscow felt compelled to be so circumspect is not clear.

Moscow's desperate need to maintain its economic link with the West was made abundantly clear a few months later when Rashkolnikov and his fellow offenders were recalled. With what was probably deliberate malice, King Amanullah presented the hard-working Rashkolnikov with the title "Sardar" and an appropriate decoration before the old Bolshevik departed from Kabul.

Soviet activity against India tapered off after this, and Curzon's ultimatum was never enforced, although recriminations continued to be exchanged between London and Moscow even after *de jure* recognition

⁴² *Parliamentary Papers, 1923*, Cmd. 1869 (Russia, No. 2), p. 9.

⁴³ See Eudin and Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-89; and W. P. and Z. K. Coates, *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1943), pp. 102-129.

⁴⁴ Text of the Soviet note is in *Parliamentary Papers, 1923*, Cmd. 1874: "Reply of the Soviet Government to His Majesty's Government respecting Relations between the Two Governments" (Russia No. 3, 1923), p. 4.

was extended to the Soviet Union in February, 1924, by a new British Labour Party government.

The 1921 Trade Agreement was abrogated and diplomatic relations between the two countries suspended in May, 1927, as a result of the notorious Arcos case in which a Soviet espionage ring was discovered in London.⁴⁵ The breach was not as complete as might have been expected, however, as both parties now had substantial economic ties with each other, and trade was kept going under informal arrangements. Relations were formally restored in October, 1929, and the final phase of “The Great Game” between Britain and Russia ended. As far as the Frontier and Central Asia were concerned, “The Game” had really been over in 1923 when Rashkolnikov left Kabul and international Communism had shifted its priority target from India to China.

There were, of course, a few subsequent maneuvers, such as the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression signed at Paghman near Kabul on August 31, 1926. In this document each party agreed to prevent outsiders from acting against the other within their respective territories and promised to refrain from joining any political or military alliance or boycott or blockade directed against the other.⁴⁶ A certain amount of sparring also continued in Kurdistan where both Britain and the Soviet Union strove to establish dominant influence. This, however, was checked to a considerable degree by the Turco-Persian Pact of April 26, 1926, in which Western Asia’s two new strongmen, Atatürk and Reza Shah, agreed to joint measures to secure their Kurdish territories.

In the 1930’s, the growing strength of the Congress Party of India and the great tribal risings of 1930 and 1936-37 distracted attention from the “Red Menace”, and indeed little, if any, Soviet activity (except, of course, for a certain amount of support for the relatively unimportant Communist Party of India) appears to have taken place in South Asia.

WORLD WAR II AND AFTER

With the approach of World War II, wider interests began to appear again. Under both Amanullah and the succeeding dynasty founded by Nadir Shah, Kabul had come to have close personal and economic ties

⁴⁵ The text of Chamberlain’s note on the Arcos case is in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1927, Cmd. 2895, pp. 69-70.

⁴⁶ Text in Shapiro, *op. cit.*, pp. 322-23.

with Berlin, and German and Italian diplomats in Kabul began again to try to stir up the Frontier tribes against British India. These activities became intensely disturbing to the British as Iran became more and more sympathetic to the Axis powers. With Japan's entry into the war and the commencement of direct pressure on India's eastern borders, the situation became critical. King Zahir Shah, however, chose to follow the same policy Habibullah had in World War I, and the Afghan Government refrained from hostile acts or the encouragement of them against India. With occupation of Iran by the Allies and the checking of the Japanese advance in Burma, the situation relaxed, and the Frontier in the last years of the War was more peaceful than at any time since the previous war.

The events which led up to the British decision in the first half of 1947 to withdraw from India have already been touched upon. When the withdrawal came, massive changes occurred, both in South Asia itself and in the setting of "The Great Game".

CHANGES IN PAKISTAN

Much was made by commentators of the "power vacuum" left in Asia by the British departure from India. Nowhere was this more apparent than on the Frontier. The normal garrison strength of troops on the Frontier in the years before Partition (with the exception of World War II when it was reduced) was in the neighborhood of thirty battalions. This was supported by the whole complex of military power of undivided India, including naval and air elements. The Indian forces in turn were backed up by the global strength of Britain and its allies.

With the British withdrawal, all this disappeared, except that minority portion of the British Indian military establishment which fell to Pakistan. This totaled something less than 200,000 men in all. Within a month, all of this was focused on the Kashmir border, where it was being used to cancel out the residue of the subcontinent's military power. By the spring of 1948, the best units of both the Pakistani and the Indian armies were committed in the disputed state. All regular army units were withdrawn from Tribal Territory. The security of the Frontier was left to half a dozen Scout units, the Frontier Constabulary, and a few thousand untrained *khassadars*, many of whom had taken themselves off to Kashmir. In addition, Afghan pressure for "Pukhtunistan" had already begun.

In the pride of its new national and religious independence, Pakistan limited its attempts to secure external alliances to the other Muslim states of the Middle East, from which little real support was possible and none forthcoming. The exercise of military domination of the Central Asian highlands below the Hindu Kush and of naval control of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean from a South Asian base, long an accepted fact, was no longer even a possibility. Simultaneously, the ancient Central Asian trade routes, for centuries no longer important to the world's economy but still an integral part of the Frontier's way of life, were cut off by the "Iron Curtain". In 1950 China slipped behind the barrier, and the diplomatic listening posts inherited from the British in Kashgar and Tibet were soon closed to the new dominions.

Even apart from the complication caused by "Pukhtunistan", Pakistan's relations with the Frontier tribes were not going quite as smoothly as envisaged in the first flush of triumphant Islamic independence. Pakistan took over the British system of tribal administration relatively intact, but had to staff it for the most part with young, relatively inexperienced political officers, whose religious affinity to the tribesmen did not entirely compensate for their relatively limited experience in handling them. Several *maliks* defected to the "Pukhtunistan" cause because of real or fancied injuries to their prestige and honor at the hands of political officers. The religious fervor generated by the Pakistani government's emphasis on an Islamic state made the tribesmen restless and eager to find a *jihad* to release their pent-up energies.

Pakistan's economic difficulties, which intensified after the ending of the Korean War, forced a reduction in spending in Tribal Territory; subsidies and development projects were cut back periodically; some *khassadar* units were disbanded. Evacuation of the large army cantonments, such as Razmak, resulted in economic hardship for the neighboring tribesmen who, between forays against the cantonments, augmented their meager incomes by supplying goods and services to them.

The struggle for political dominance within Pakistan, a struggle that developed between Bengali East Pakistan and Punjabi-dominated West Pakistan, left the Pathan North-West Frontier Province in a position to upset a precarious balance by allying itself with East Pakistan. Merger of all the provinces and sub-divisions of West Pakistan into a single unit was designed to settle this problem. It did not do so, and Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan and indeed most of the Pathans remained the spearhead of anti-"one-unit" activities which did little to improve the stability of the state.

Pakistan's initial foreign policy was aimed at steering clear of the "cold war". In February, 1951, however, an allegedly Communist-connected plot to overthrow the Muslim League government was discovered. It included officers of the armed services, all of whom were imprisoned. Subsequently, a definite anti-Communist policy, both at home and abroad, began to develop. Continuing fear of neutralist India, coupled with interference in East Pakistan by the Communist Party of India and increasing Communist influence in the National Conference Government of Indian-held Kashmir, helped produce a definite pro-Western orientation.

Afghan pressure on the Frontier, with the support and approval of the USSR, and Soviet support for India on the Kashmir issue, added to the desire to obtain support from the West. In the spring of 1953 Secretary of State Dulles put forth his "northern tier" concept in which he proposed American support for the "interrelated" defense of those countries of the Middle East bordering on the USSR. In the fall Pakistan responded with a request for military assistance. The next year it joined SEATO, and in 1955 entered the Baghdad Pact (now CENTO) with the United Kingdom, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. A large-scale program of American technical, economic, and military assistance followed, and Pakistan took a position as one of most pro-Western nations of Asia, with especially close ties with the United States.

CHANGES IN AFGHANISTAN

In the five years which followed the withdrawal of the British from India, Afghanistan continued to pursue its traditional policy of isolation and neutrality. Its main interest was "Pukhtunistan", and it confined its efforts on behalf of this objective to stirring up trouble against Pakistan among the border tribes, publicizing its case where possible in the UN, and accepting such limited support as India was prepared to offer.

The internal situation also remained relatively unchanged. Mindful of the results of Amanullah's efforts to enact rapid and drastic reforms, the government took few and cautious steps toward modernization. A brief liberalization in 1951, which permitted a free press and the formation of political parties, was quickly reversed when the signs of an increased political consciousness and discontent began to appear. Power remained a monopoly of the royal family, with King Zahir Shah playing a passive role, while his uncles, Hashim Khan and Shah Mahmud, held the

reins of government in the prime minister's office. In 1953, Shah Mahmud was succeeded as prime minister by Daud Muhammad Khan, his nephew and King Zahir's cousin. The only immediately noticeable consequence of Daud's coming to power was an intensification of the "Pukhtunistan" agitation.

As was the case with Pakistan, 1953 appears to have been a year of decision for Afghanistan. Prime Minister Daud soon displayed signs of being interested in a more rapid modernization of his country and in a large-scale economic development program. He also indicated a desire to strengthen Afghanistan's power position generally and to bring it into a more active international role. As talk of a "Middle East Defense Organization" or a "Northern Tier Alliance" began to increase in late 1953, Afghanistan made discreet gestures of interest. At the same time, hints of a possible settlement of the "Pukhtunistan" dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan began to be heard in both Kabul and Karachi. Despite this, however, Afghan pressure on the border increased rather than decreased.

At this point, the Soviet Union began to move toward center stage in the Afghan drama, perhaps inspired by growing Western influence in Pakistan and the hustle and bustle of preparations for the new "Northern Tier Alliance".

Soviet relations with Afghanistan had been minimal for several years after the end of World War II. The Afghan-Soviet Treaties of 1921 and 1926 remained in force, and in July, 1950, were supplemented by a four-year commercial agreement, consequent to which the Soviet Trade Agency in Kabul was reactivated. The Soviet airline, Aeroflot, provided the only air service into or within the country, a once or twice weekly flight from Tashkent to Kabul and return. In 1952, Afghan plans for oil exploration by French personnel in the Mazar-i-Sharif area were dropped as a result of Soviet objections to Westerners operating so close to the border of the USSR.

In mid-1953, the USSR offered several small credits to Afghanistan for building of grain storage facilities, a bakery, oil storage tanks, and street paving in Kabul. After some delay, these were accepted, and in 1954 evidence of Soviet interest increased. Czechoslovakia offered help in construction of a textile mill and a cement plant. A Soviet cultural mission visited Afghanistan; the 1950 commercial agreement was renewed and its provisions expanded; the USSR offered to build a petroleum pipeline from the Soviet side of the Oxus to Mazar-i-sharif. (The pipeline has never been built.) In passing, it is interesting to note that the

Communist economic offensive which has since had such great impact on the Middle East and the world generally, began with these modest efforts in Afghanistan.

Several of the Soviet-sponsored projects were under way by early 1955, and isolationist Afghanistan had let down its barriers for a couple of hundred Russian and satellite technicians. However, their numbers were still more than matched by the large work force of Americans employed by the construction company which was engaged in developing the Helmand River Valley for the Afghan Government and by the expanding personnel of the US technical assistance mission in Kabul.

Just as Afghanistan appeared to be enjoying the best of both worlds, an abrupt local crisis forced Kabul to a major decision in its foreign policy. On March 27, 1955, the Pakistani Government promulgated the ordinance creating "one-unit" in West Pakistan. The Afghans saw this as a blow directed primarily against their aspirations for some form of autonomy for the Pathans of Pakistan. On March 28 Prime Minister Daud made an inflammatory speech on the Kabul radio denouncing the action, and the next day the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was sacked and the flag desecrated by mobs apparently operating with the Afghan government's approval.

A retaliatory attack was made a few days later on the Afghan consulate in Peshawar, and Pakistan clamped a blockade on Afghan imports and exports. In early May, Afghan Prime Minister Daud ordered full mobilization of the Afghan army. The quarrel was eventually patched up, the blockade lifted, and the Afghan army demobilized. The impact of this sequence of events on the "Pukhtunistan" question and on Pakistani-Afghan relations has been discussed in the previous chapter.

However, by far the most important consequence of "the flag incident", as it was called, was in Afghan-Soviet relations.

Cut off by Pakistan's severance of the transit route by which it traditionally communicated with the rest of the world, Afghanistan quickly made arrangements with the USSR for its imports and exports to be supplied from Soviet sources or to transit the Soviet Union. The change-over caused considerable hardship at first, but the USSR cooperated to the fullest extent possible, and by the time the blockade was lifted, a large proportion of Afghan trade was going to or through the Soviet Union. Some of this returned to the Pakistani route in subsequent years, but a higher proportion than before the blockade continued to use the Soviet route.

Frightened by the poor showing made by his untrained army and its

archaic equipment during mobilization, and more conscious than ever of its inability to cope with Pakistan's military establishment which was being rapidly improved with American help, Prime Minister Daud, in a rare *Loe Jirga* or Grand Assembly of the Tribes which he called in November, 1955, announced his intention to continue to support the cause of “Pukhtunistan” and to obtain arms wherever he could to strengthen his country for this purpose. He also took the occasion to make clear that efforts to obtain sympathy and support from the West toward this end had been rebuffed.

A few weeks later Bulganin and Khrushchev arrived in Kabul on their grand Asian tour which included India and Burma also. They offered a long-term, low-interest credit of \$ 100 million for economic development which was promptly accepted by the Daud government. Project agreements for hydro-electric plants, irrigation dams, motor repair shops, a road across the Hindu Kush through the Salang Pass, and for one military and several civil airfields were signed in 1956, and by the middle of the year an estimated 400 Soviet technicians were at work in the country.⁴⁷ In April, 1956, an Afghan military mission went to Prague to purchase arms, and in August an expanded mission was in Moscow for the same purpose. The first shipment of arms, part of a deal estimated at \$ 25 million, arrived in Afghanistan in September.⁴⁸ The next month, a shipment of jet military aircraft was delivered. Subsequently, heavy weapons, including tanks and artillery, were delivered and Afghans trained in their use.

Soviet ties have also grown closer in the cultural and political fields. The Communist Bloc countries were lavishly represented at the annual *Jashn* fairs in Kabul in 1956 and 1957. In January, 1957, Radio Moscow instituted Pushtu broadcasts, employing Afghans supplied by the Kabul government. Daud visited the USSR and Communist China in 1956 and 1957, and Chou en-Lai journeyed to Kabul in January of 1957. King Zahir made a state visit to the USSR in July, 1957.

At the same time, there are clear indications that the Afghans have not abandoned their traditional suspicion of the USSR. For one thing, the government has carefully excluded Soviet aid in the field of education while continuing to permit and even encourage Western aid in this key area. In general, the Daud government appears prepared to take all it can use in the way of economic, military, and technical support from

⁴⁷ “Soviet Activities in Afghanistan”, *Central Asian Review*, Vol. VI, No. 1 (London, 1958).

⁴⁸ *Times*, (London), 28 September, 1956.

the Communist Bloc while simultaneously making every effort to maintain and even expand existing ties with the West. Thus, the Helmand Valley project remains an exclusive American operation; the Afghan airline, founded in 1955, is managed and its equipment and training supplied by an American company; and in the spring of 1958, the usually dour and taciturn Prince Daud displayed remarkable charm and friendliness on a visit to the United States. American cooperation in the improvement of relations with Pakistan has been welcomed, and "Pukhtunistan" agitation diminished in 1957 and 1958, only to flare up again in 1960 and 1961. In the latter year, the bitterness reached a point where Kabul and Rawalpindi actually broke off diplomatic relations. Whether or not these attempts to balance off the great powers, together with Afghanistan's traditional ability to walk a tight rope in its relations with its neighbors, will be enough to prevent eventual Soviet domination remains to be seen.

THE ROLE OF INDIA

The "Pukhtunistan" movement, as we have seen, received support from Indian Congress Party leaders even before Partition. This support continued after Pakistan and India gained their independence and the Pathan autonomy movement had passed almost completely into Afghan hands. In the early years, when both Pakistan and India were preoccupied almost exclusively with fear and hatred of each other, the Indian motive was relatively simple: "The enemy of my enemy is my friend". At the same time, of course, sharing Kabul's doubts about Pakistan's viability, India was probably not unconcerned with the possibility that it might one day share with Afghanistan the territories of West Pakistan. In addition, Afghanistan provided a valuable outlet for India's few manufactured exports, chiefly low-quality textiles.

As neutralist India's aspirations toward leadership of Asia began to grow, traditionally neutral Afghanistan appeared to be a natural recruit, and Indian diplomatic activity in Kabul was unusually intense in the period 1949-54. From 1954 onward, heavy American economic and military support for Pakistan brought to this picture a change which was distasteful in the extreme to New Delhi. Pakistan's alliance with the United States resulted in an inevitable increase in its strength *vis-a-vis* India and not unnaturally caused India to devote a greater proportion of its resources to defense at the expense of planned economic develop-

ment. The chances of Pakistan's remaining viable appeared to be greatly increased. American efforts seemed to be improving the prospects for an eventual settlement of the "Pukhtunistan" problem. Most dangerous of all, in Indian eyes, Pakistan's membership in SEATO and the Baghdad (CENTO) Pact brought the "cold war" to its doorstep and violated the neutralism of South Asia.

Indian propaganda stressed this theme, and as Afghanistan began to rely more heavily on the USSR for support, New Delhi described the process as the inevitable result of the United States' misguided arming of Pakistan. Although itself suspicious of Soviet motives in Asia and under increasing pressure from the Chinese Communists on its north-eastern border, New Delhi found itself in the position of relying on Soviet support in the UN Security Council to protect its position on Kashmir. At the same time, the bulk of the massive economic aid necessary to keep India's development program going and to give it a chance of resisting Chinese pressure over the longer run had to come from the West. As a result, India's policy was forced at times to follow lines which were more schizophrenic than neutralist. The net effect of all this was to demonstrate fairly clearly that independent India, short of turning Communist itself, could do relatively little to affect the latest phase of "The Great Game" between the great powers.

THE ROLE OF THE USSR

The ultimate objective of the USSR for South Asia, one can reasonably assume, is communization of the area. Of secondary but more immediate importance is destruction or neutralization of Western military alliances such as SEATO and the Baghdad or CENTO Pact and Western-supported local military establishments, which Moscow insists on seeing as a threat to its southern borders. The first of these objectives is clearly a long-term one, and outside of a major war, it appears unlikely in the present climate of world opinion that an effort will be made to achieve it through military occupation. The urgency of the second objective will almost certainly decrease in the near future as intercontinental ballistic missiles and other advanced weapons reduce the value of anti-Communist military establishments on the Asian mainland.

The USSR has several assets in the latest phase of "The Great Game", assets which it did not enjoy in the past. These include the high degree of Afghan dependence on Soviet military and economic assistance, the

pronounced neutralist policy of India, the political instability which Pakistan has at least in the past demonstrated to an alarming degree and the latent anti-Western sentiments of much of Pakistan's population, and the cooperation of a powerful and dynamic Communist China. Throughout the area, widespread aspirations for economic betterment exist, and the USSR has shrewdly catered to these. Finally, in the "Pukhtunistan" and Kashmir disputes the Soviet Union has chronic sore spots, similar to that of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which can, if the occasion arises, be fanned into armed conflict.

At the same time there are formidable obstacles to Soviet objectives. Pakistan is closely associated with the West. Afghanistan remains suspicious of Soviet intentions and continues acutely jealous of its independence. In addition, the widespread appeal of communism as an economic and political system to the masses of Asia is at a minimum among the rough and individualistic Afghans. To apply too much pressure to Afghanistan would ruin Moscow's posture of disinterested friendliness in more important parts of Asia. Even economic support for India contributes to the progress of a democratic political and social system which is consciously competing with Communist China. To digress for a moment, one cannot help wondering if South Asia might not provide that field of competition and conflict between the USSR and Communist China which could split the monolithic Communist Bloc.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

The United States entered "The Great Game" as a substitute for Britain under distinct disadvantages. In the first place, it had no foothold of its own on the continent of Asia, and could at best only influence, never dictate, the policy of its only strong ally, Pakistan. In general, US efforts to mobilize Asian resources to resist the USSR were opposed by India. American attention was frequently diverted from the area — first by European recovery, then by the Korean War and subsequent tensions in the Far East, by turmoil in the Arab Near East, and most recently by the Berlin crisis. The US was understandably unwilling (and, of course, unable) to give Afghanistan the guarantee of its sovereignty against the USSR which it wanted. In attempting to promote stability through South Asia, the US was also necessarily reluctant to take strong stands in the "Pukhtunistan" and Kashmir disputes or to support Pakistan against India.

As a result, the battle lines of “The Great Game” were pushed back and to some degree obscured in the years after World War II. Afghanistan is no longer recognized by anyone as a sphere of exclusive British influence as had been the case before 1919. Indeed, as the USSR has become the single most important foreign influence in it, Afghanistan has become less of a No-Man’s land than it was between the two world wars.

The Pakistan military establishment has been strengthened considerably by American military assistance, but its relative capabilities, both from the standpoint of its own objectives and those of the US, have changed little if at all. Thus, as demonstrated in October, 1958, when Commander-in-Chief General Ayub assumed control of the government, the Pakistani army can still maintain internal security. (No one doubted its ability to do so at any time since Partition.) It can still handle the Afghan army, although as a result of Soviet military aid to Kabul, the relative capabilities of the two armies are still — or soon will be — roughly the same as they have always been. It cannot defeat the Indian army, although it can still — as always — fight an effective defensive action against an Indian invasion. Even together with the Iranian army, also a recipient of US military support, it can still do almost nothing to challenge a Soviet advance southward.

In this situation it appears increasingly likely that the ultimate decision in the latest phase of “The Great Game” will depend primarily on the desire and the ability of the new nations concerned to retain their own independence. That all of them have desire is beyond doubt. Their ability should not be dismissed lightly either. The population of Afghanistan, and indeed its leaders, are no more pro-Soviet than their counterparts in Pakistan are pro-American. The hold of the present government of Pakistan on the country is no more precarious than that of the Daud government on Afghanistan.

Both parties have shown a remarkable ability to sustain themselves — the Afghans through a century and a half of British-Russian competition, the Pakistanis in the very achievement of their independence and their maintenance of it. In periods when international pressures were at a minimum, both have shown a tendency to get together on the basis of religious and racial unity.

The rules of “The Great Game” are changing as the peoples and areas which were formerly mere pieces on the chessboard to be moved about by the great powers are taking on independent power and objectives of their own. Herein, we may hope, lies the ultimate advantage of the West,

since the US and, since 1947 the United Kingdom, are prepared to have them do so, while the USSR still presumably seeks control over them as a final end.

IMPACT ON THE FRONTIER

These international trends and developments have, of course, had an impact on the Frontier. The tribesmen can see new American-made jet fighters flying from the American-improved airfield at Peshawar. By strolling a few miles westward along the slopes of their hills, they can look down on the beginning of the Jelalabad Plain where Soviet technicians are working on irrigation developments. They are aware that Abdul-Ghaffar Khan, who was an honored guest in Kabul with the approval of the Pakistani government in the spring of 1958, was subsequently again jailed in Pakistan for continuing his anti-"one unit" agitation. They have talked to their cousins returning from service in the Afghan army who have handled the new Soviet weapons.

At the same time, the traditional way of life on the Frontier has remained remarkably unchanged. The main currents of the new Asian nationalism which have been felt in Kabul, Karachi, and Rawalpindi have bypassed the border hills. No great Pathan leader of the stature of Khushal Khan Khattak has arisen. The tribesmen on both sides of the Durand Line are still in their own eyes Afridis, Wazirs, and Mohmands rather than Afghans or Pakistanis. "Government" is still the Pakistani — or Afghan — political officer who passes over the subsidies which the tribe has earned by merely being what it is. The Soviet visitor on the Afghan side of the border — and the American on the Pakistani side — is still an object of detached curiosity and interest who is to be treated according to the dictates of *Pukhtunwali* — the only law that matters.

"The Great Game" is not over yet as far as the Pathans are concerned. The development of a Soviet-trained and equipped Afghan army has reduced the centuries-old threat the tribes have posed to the government in Kabul. It has not yet ended it, however. In early 1960 the Pathans proved that they could still be a source of serious embarrassment to Kabul when there was violent reaction throughout eastern Afghanistan to the government's efforts to encourage the abandonment of the veil by Afghan women.

More importantly, the tribes, and indeed to some degree the whole Pathan community, still holds a kind of balance of power between Pak-

istan and Afghanistan. The settled districts of the Frontier are thoroughly integrated into Pakistan. The tribal agencies are not, but their allegiance has for many years been toward the east rather than the west. Despite Soviet-supported development programs in Afghanistan, both agencies and districts know that their economic well-being lies with Pakistan.

Yet it is not a simple matter of economics. For a number of years, the Afghan government has been glorifying the Pathan way of life and enforcing it more and more within its own borders at the expense of the Persian culture which was previously dominant in Kabul. However unjust this has been to Afghanistan's non-Pathan majority, it has been gratifying to the Pathans in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan.

In Pakistan, the trend has been in the opposite direction. Since 1955, there has been a steady drive to integrate the Pathans into the national life which has its roots in Muslim Indian traditions. The abolition of the N-WFP, the establishment of “one-unit”, the advent of the strongly centralistic Ayub regime, and the very movement of the capital from Karachi to Rawalpindi have all contributed to this. There is little doubt that such things are necessary and commendable in a modern nation-state, but many Pathans do not see it this way. Resentment against “one-unit” appeared to be as strong, if not stronger, in 1959 than it had been in 1955.

Pathans are being constantly reminded by Kabul that they are separate from and superior to the peoples of the rest of India and Pakistan. They are told that the true Pathan home is being rebuilt in Afghanistan on the basis of *Pukhtunwali*. In Afghanistan, non-Pathans are inferior rather than superior to Pathans. At the same time, Pakistan is calling upon the Pathans to subordinate their “Pathanishness” and to think as Muslims and as Pakistanis. As always, there are ironic twists to the competition. In the 1960 disturbances mentioned above, Afghanistan, the advocate of Pathan traditionalism, found itself opposing the venerable institution of the veil, while modernist Pakistan defended it.

Although changes in the political outlines of the Frontier area appear unlikely, the outcome of the struggle for the allegiance of the Pathans is not yet certain. Looking at the problem of the Frontier from afar, however, one cannot but believe that change, faster and wider than any which has yet taken place, is coming to the Pathan borderland. Conscious of its long and romantic history, one cannot help also being a little sad at such a prospect. The inevitable melancholy will be moderated, however, if the new order develops, as ultimately seems most likely, in the context of Pakistani-Afghan cooperation. Thus, the remarkable energies and abil-

ities of the Pathans, refined and broadened by education and economic progress but still free and distinct, could contribute devotion and leadership to both countries and perhaps eventually be a permanent bond between them.

In any event, in closing a history of the Pathans, it is well to recall the words of Lord Curzon, spoken on July 20, 1904, as he neared the end of his vice-regal stewardship: "No man who has ever read a page of Indian history will prophesy about the Frontier".⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Lord Curzon of Kedleston, "Freedom of the City of London Speech", *Speeches as Viceroy and Governor General of India* (London: J. Murray, 1906), p. 43.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Much has been written of the Pathans, frequently by distinguished authors (ranging all the way from the Mogul Emperor Babur to Eleanor Roosevelt). However, almost all of these works are limited in scope, in time, or by the personal viewpoint of their authors. As far as the present writer has been able to determine, there exists no single, comprehensive, up-to-date book on the Frontier which can serve as a general reference for the student of the area.

Ironically, the closest thing to such a work that does exist is probably the first book on the subject ever published in the West. This is the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone's monumental *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, published in London in 1815. Most of Elphinstone's material was collected during his journey to Kabul as the first British envoy in 1809. As might be expected of an educated man of his time, Elphinstone writes freely and accurately of Pathan customs, laws, geography, history, and political and social organization. Having come as explorer rather than conqueror or administrator, he gave an account which is sympathetic but objective and is totally free of the patronizing tone frequently present in the works of later British writers.

Similar in approach to Elphinstone's work is Charles Masson's four-volume *Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, and the Punjab*, published in 1844. Masson's material was collected during prolonged wanderings about the area in the 1820's and 1830's. The works of Masson, a self-educated deserter from the ranks of the East India Company's army who lived and traveled as a native, complement those of Elphinstone, a highly cultured member of the nobility who moved about with the dignity and pomp of an eighteenth-century ambassador, and constitute an invaluable picture of practically all phases of life on the Frontier in the first quarter of the nineteenth century when the area was almost completely untouched by the West.

Both works are more than a hundred years old, however, and things

have changed even on the Frontier. While most of the information contained in Elphinstone's and Masson's work is still useful (and in some cases unique), they can hardly be relied upon as reference works today.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth, a host of books dealing with various aspects of the Frontier was produced by English authors. These include memoirs, biographies, tracts on the writers' pet subjects, indictments or defenses of one policy or official or another, sporting volumes, and a dozen other specialized subjects. The best among these works, such as Lady Betty Balfour's *The History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration* (London, 1899), Sir Robert Warburton's *Eighteen Years in the Khyber* (London, 1900), and Sir Thomas Holdich's *The Indian Borderland* and *The Gates of India* (London, 1901, 1910), provide not only valuable data but useful insight into the problems of the time. Taken together with the vast number of official reports produced during the period, they make possible a pretty thorough reconstruction of the events of their time.

Almost all of them, however, are highly personalized and in their treatment of the Pathans necessarily have a "them" and "us" outlook which obscures an integrated picture of the area and leaves the modern reader with more knowledge of how the British lived in and looked upon the Frontier than of the Frontier as it was.

The same disabilities are present, though to a considerably lesser degree, in the works of later British writers. The best of these are Collin Davies' *The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908* (Cambridge, 1932), Sir William Barton's *India's North-West Frontier* (London, 1939), and W. K. Fraser-Tytler's *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central Asia* (Oxford, 1953).

Davies' work, originally a doctoral dissertation at Cambridge University, covers only a limited period, but includes much excellent data on the tribes which is still valuable. Barton's book rambles over the author's personal experiences but provides much useful data and comment on the later days of British rule. Fraser-Tytler is concerned primarily with the development of Afghanistan as a state but brings his unique personal experience to bear in a most useful way on the problems of the tribes as seen from the standpoint of Kabul.

A book by Sir Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans, 550 B.C.-A.D. 1957* (London, 1958), became available just as the present work was completed. Sir Olaf's volume is by far the best yet. Based on twenty years' experience on the Frontier and extensive research, it goes far toward remedy-

ing the lack of modern reference works referred to above. It too has its limitations, however. It is almost entirely historical in nature, and only the last 100 pages or so deal with the British period. Developments under Pakistan are virtually ignored. In addition, relatively little use appears to have been made of the voluminous British official documents of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, documents which are available in the India Office Library and the Public Record Office in London. Finally, although Sir Olaf, like Sir William Barton, is to an extra-ordinary degree sympathetic to Pathan character and aspirations, he is an Englishman and an old Frontier administrator. As such, his approach is necessarily tinged with the "us" and "them" attitude common to most of the earlier works.

In the field of lighter literature, there are two good travelogues of fairly recent date; Ian Stephens' *Horned Moon* (London, 1953) and Peter Mayne's *The Narrow Smile* (London, 1955), the latter published in the United States as *Journey to the Pathans* (Garden City, N.Y., 1955). Both Stephens and Mayne are Englishmen who knew and admired the Pathans in British India and made sentimental journeys back to the area after Partition. While their works present the color of the Frontier today in graphic terms, they provide little background or interpretation.

The one element common to all the writers hitherto mentioned is that they were Englishmen. As such, they had a particular interest in the Frontier, and their approach to it, however scholarly or sympathetic, was conditioned by more than a century of history and circumstance. Works by non-Englishmen have been rare and, except in a few specialized cases, insignificant. The Scandinavian Frederick Barth and the American Herbert Vreeland have done excellent anthropological studies, the complete results of which have not yet been published. Justice William O. Douglas in his *Beyond the High Himalayas* (Garden City, N.Y., 1952) devotes considerable space to an account of his trip through the Frontier. There is also my own little travelogue *The Way of the Pathans* (London: Robert Hale, 1962). To judge by the catalogue entries in the major libraries in England and the United States, an increasing amount of work on Afghanistan is being done by Soviet writers. Unfortunately, the author, lacking a knowledge of Russian, has been unable to investigate this.

The bibliography which follows is highly selective. It does not assay to cover the entire field of literature on the Frontier but merely to list the works which the writer has found most useful in gathering information on different facets of the subject.

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